What was the significance of Texas v. White (1868)?
355739
"The Republic of Texas is no more," proclaimed Anson Jones, the last president of the republic, as he stood on the steps of the old wooden Capitol building in Austin and hauled down the Lone Star flag. The date was Feb. 19, 1846, and the ceremony was the culmination of years of effort on the part of Jones, Sam Houston and other Texas leaders who orchestrated Texas' annexation into the union. \n\nBy all historical accounts, Texas officially joined the Union on Dec. 29, 1845. It has been a state for more than 150 years. But now, a beleaguered group calling itself the Republic of Texas is capturing headlines with its claim that Texas annexation violated the United States Constitution. Despite more than 150 years of calling itself a state, the group argues, Texas remains a sovereign, independent nation. \n\nThe self-styled Republic of Texas has taken its argument to the Supreme Court of Texas, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The group also has petitioned the International Court of Justice at The Hague; the court refused to hear its application. Nor would the U.S. State Department listen to its contention. Since then, the group has begun filing phony property liens, including a $93 trillion lien against the assets of the state of Texas, and last weekend it took two people hostage. So the time has come to take a serious look at the group's claim that Texas' annexation was illegal. \n\nThe group argues that since Texas was an independent nation in 1845, and nations make agreements by treaty, the United States could annex Texas only by treaty. Only Congress has the power to admit new states, so a treaty would have relegated Texas to territorial status. Moreover, the U.S. Senate was in no mood to ratify an annexation treaty in 1845. It had rejected just such a treaty in 1844. Thus was born the idea of annexing Texas -- as a state -- by joint resolution of Congress. A joint resolution required only a majority vote in each house, and Congress could admit new states. \n\nThe group's claim that the joint resolution was unconstitutional is not original. It was raised in both houses of Congress during the debates, and a majority of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported against the resolution on that ground. \n\nNevertheless, Congress passed the joint resolution consenting to Texas' annexation, and President John Tyler signed it on March 1, 1845. The Congress of Texas unanimously accepted the resolution on June 18, and a constitutional convention, convened on July 4, drafted a new state constitution. \n\nThe annexation proposal was submitted to the people of Texas and ratified by an overwhelming majority on Oct. 13, 1845. The U.S. Congress quickly adopted a Texas statehood resolution, and President James K. Polk (who had taken office in the interim) signed it on Dec. 29, 1845. \n\nTexas' annexation marked the first time in history that a sovereign nation voluntarily relinquished its sovereignty and became a part of another nation. Was it constitutional? Under international law -- and the group claims its status is governed by the law of nations -- no nation has the right to question its agreement with another nation by claiming that the other nation violated its own law. \n\nIn any event, in an 1868 case called Texas vs. White, the Supreme Court held that once Texas became a state in 1845, its union with the other states was complete, perpetual and indissoluble. In a 1901 case, the Supreme Court said that territory acquired by conquest or treaty is acquired "as absolutely as if the annexation were made, as in the case of Texas ... , by an act of Congress." \n\nNor did the state of Texas reassert its independence in 1861, as the group argues, by seceding from the Union. As Texas vs. White makes clear, Texas' attempt at secession was void from the beginning. \n\nThe Republic of Texas insists that since Texas is an independent nation, its status is governed by intern
758827
Most criminal and civil matters are tried at the state court level in Texas and all other states. The only cases that rise to the federal level are those involving:\na. criminal violations of federal law\nb. civil cases where:\n    1. there is jurisdiction in federal court because of diversity of citizenship among the parties, and\n    2. the primary cause of action involves interpretation of or rights under a federal statute.
107478
The text of this important and historic amendment to the U.S. Constitution has already been identified in previous posts, however the reasoning and legislative history has not.\n\nIt was ratified on February 3, 1870.\n\nThis amendment prohibits the states or the federal government from using a citizen's race, color, or previous status as a slave as a voting qualification. Its basic purpose was to enfranchise former slaves. But it was not really until the Voting Rights Act in 1965, almost a century later, that this purpose was actually achieved in all states.\n\nAfter the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, southern blacks voted in numbers that on a per capita basis would probably exceed black political participation today. On both a per capita and absolute basis, more blacks were elected to political office during the period from 1865 to 1880 than at any other time in American history. Although no state elected a black governor during Reconstruction, a number of state legislatures were effectively under the control of a substantial African American caucus. These legislatures brought in programs that are considered part of government's duty now, but at the time were radical, such as universal public education. They also set aside all racially biased laws, even those prohibiting interracial marriage.
63978
Check this website.  It has a copy of it and tells how it was bascially written over night and in a hurry.  This website tells you all about Texas.\nwww.lsjunction.com/docs/tdoi.htm
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Yes. District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals\n\nWEEKS v. U S , 245 U.S. 618 (1918)\n\nThis was a prosecution under the Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, upon a charge of shipping an article of food in interstate commerce in circumstances making the shipment a violation of the act. The information contained two counts, both charging that the article was misbranded-one because it bore a false and misleading label, and the other because it was offered for sale as lemon oil when in truth it was an imitation thereof containing alcohol and citral derived from lemon grass. In the District Court there was a conviction upon both counts, and the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction as [245 U.S. 618, 620] to the first count and affirmed it as to the second. 224 Fed. 64, 139 C. C. A. 626. The judgment upon the latter is all that is brought here for review.\n\nIn the Circuit Court of Appeals the view was expressed [245 U.S. 618, 623] that intent was not an element of the offense charged in the second count and therefore that it was immaterial whether the representations of the salesman had the sanction of the defendant. Complaint is now made of this. But the question is not in the case, the view expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals not being essential to an affirmance of the judgment. The District Court had expressly instructed the jury that to hold the defendant responsible criminally by reason of such representations it must appear, and appear beyond a reasonable doubt, that they were made by his authority. The record before us does not show that the defendant objected to the submission of this question to the jury in this way; neither does it purport to contain all the evidence. The verdict therefore must be taken as conclusively determining that the representations were made with the defendant's sanction.\n\nJudgment affirmed
339775
This is a listing of briefs for cases currently on the Docket.  The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe RR case is an employment discrimination case.  I've also posted a link to the latest slip opinions.\n\nhttp://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.html\nhttp://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05slipopinion.html
107068
If it was it was stolen by Texans.  Texas won it's independence in 1836 and was the Texas Republic until 1845 when it joined the Union.  The Mexican-American War was not until after that.  Lincoln's single term in the U.S. Congress was from 1847-1849.  If it can be said that we stole any lands from Mexico as a result of the settlement of a war, could it not be said that Mexico had itself stolen these lands from Spain?  Then of course we all know who had them before that and had it stole from them as well.  Are we now trying to rewrite history books to make them politically correct without stepping on anyone's toes?
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U.S. Supreme Court\nSAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)\n411 U.S. 1\n\nSAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL. v. RODRIGUEZ ET AL.\nAPPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT\nOF TEXAS\nNo. 71-1332.\n\nArgued October 12, 1972\nDecided March 21, 1973\n\nThe financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program designed to provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each district supplements state aid through an ad valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class action on behalf of schoolchildren said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The District Court, finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that education is a "fundamental" right, concluded that the system could be upheld only upon a showing, which appellants failed to make, that there was a compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded that appellants failed even to\n\nPage 411 U.S. 1, 2\n\ndemonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's system. Held:\n\n      1. This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. Pp. 18-44.\n\n      (a) The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. It has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class of "poor" people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. Pp. 18-28.\n\n      (b) Nor does the Texas school-financing system impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right or liberty. Though education is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited category of rights recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if some identifiable quantum of education is arguably entitled to constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise of other constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that purpose. Pp. 29-39.\n\n      (c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke strict scrutiny since it involves the most delicate and difficult questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of review. Pp. 40-44.\n\n      2. The Texas system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly imperfect, the system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages participation in and significant control of each district's schools at the local level. Pp. 44-53.\n\n337 F. Supp. 280, reversed.\n\nPOWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. [411 U.S. 1, 3]
133719
Yes, it has been held as a protected form of speech in two separate cases, Texas v. Johnson (1989) and US v. Eichman (1990). Information about the two cases is below.
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"The case of Fare v. Michael C. the U.S. Supreme Court held that whether a juvenile's waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing depends on the totality of circumstances"\n\nYou can find information about FARE V. MICHAEL C. in the links below.
291597
Not so brief, but it sums it up I think. =-)\n\nEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that determined that it is unconstitutional for state officials to compose an official school prayer and require its recitation in public schools, even when it is relatively non-denominational and students may excuse themselves from participation. This was decided in a vote of 6-1, with Justices Frankfurter and White unable to vote.\n\nThe case was brought by the parents of students who complained the prayer to "Almighty God" contradicted their religious beliefs and was supported by groups opposed to the school prayer including Madalyn Murray O'Hair's American Atheists . The prayer in question was:\n\n    Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country. Amen.\n\nThe plaintiffs argued that opening the school day with such a prayer (even if students are not required to recite it) violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth), which says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The governments of twenty-two states1 signed on to an amicus curiae brief urging affirmance of the New York Court of Appeals decision that upheld the constitutionality of the prayer. The American Ethical Union, the American Jewish Committee, and the Synagogue Council of America each submitted briefs urging the Court to instead reverse and rule that the prayer was unconstitutional.\n\nJustice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, pointed out that the prayer is a religious activity by the very nature of its being a prayer. The majority further ruled that prescribing such a religious activity for school children is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. That is, the program was created by government officials to promote a religious belief and therefore not permissible.\n\nIn response to the defendant's claims that: (a) the prayer does not respect any specific established religion; and (b) the prayer is voluntary, Black's opinion held that neither of these claims frees it from contradicting the Establishment Clause. The opinion held that the fact that it promotes a religion is sufficient to conclude it is in violation, even if that promotion is not coercive. Furthermore, the opinion held that the fact that the prayer is vaguely worded enough to not promote any particular religion is not a sufficient defense, as it does still promote a family of religions (those that recognize "Almighty God"), which is also a violation of the Establishment Clause.
118646
I'm not sure what the question is but this is a case in which the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana. The Criminal District Court No. 2, Tarrant County, David McGee, J., rendered judgment, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, 380 U.S. 253, 85 S.Ct. 942, 13 L.Ed.2d 818, reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The Court of Criminal Appeals, Morrison, J., held that police officer's affidavit alleging that on or about named date two named men, in named county, unlawfully and fraudulently took $50 from named company without company's consent was insufficient for issuance of arrest warrant, in view of United States Supreme Court's opinion.\nReversed and remanded.
140022
You can go to free site, FindLaw, or just try to Google "United States v. Rosado-Fernandez" and see what you get. If you have Westlaw or Lexis you can use those
328532
I think you are referring to the Ayers Desegregation case.  It was a very lengthy case (at least twenty years).  Check the archives of Jackson, Miss. newspaper www.clarionledger.com
181146
The decision was based on the 14th amendment.  The case was Afroyim vs. Rusk and details can be found at:\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afroyim_v._Rusk
18315
First, stop the CAPSLOCK.  Second, as usual with legal-related questions on Yahoo! Answers, far too little information exists to answer the question adequately. Vernon's Annotated MISSOURI Statutes?  Vernon's TEXAS Civil Statutes?  Let's assume it's Texas.  Article 1A is an invalid reference; articles usually refer to portions of constitutions or to legislative documents, nto statutes.  Come back with a question that's more detailed, more specific, and with careful grammar so that I can answer it adequately.
181787
I think it is possible to say without hesitation, equivocation, or fear of contradiction that the most important and far-reaching  event of Ike's admin was the ruling in the  Supreme Ct. decision in Brown vs. Board of  Education of Topeka, Kansas.  This set aside the doctrine of "separate but equal" vis-a-vis the seregation of  schools question and laid the groundwork for the many other  civil rights breakthroughs which would soon follow.  BROWN was truly a watershed case!!!  Look it up.