england-and-wales discrimination equality-act-2010
Is it indirect discrimination or otherwise unlawful to maintain a menu that does not include vegan options?
<p>A restaurant R has a menu of various things but does not include vegan options. As veganism is a protected philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010 and the Grainger test, this omission affects vegans disproportionately.</p>
<p>If the restaurant was a steakhouse intended to cater specifically to meat enthusiasts or ideological carnivores, then I could imagine the non-accommodation as being a legitimate end to a proportionate aim, but otherwise, has a restaurant not committed unlawful discrimination against vegans?</p>

<h2>Caveat about the &quot;Grainger test&quot; as applied to veganism</h2>
<p><em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grainger_plc_v_Nicholson" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Grainger plc v Nicholson</a></em> is a 2010 employment discrimination case. It established a five-point test for whether a philosophical belief triggers the protection of the Equality Act 2010. <a href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2009/0219_09_0311.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">See the judgment here, §24.</a></p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKET/2020/3331129_2018.html&amp;query=(Casamitjana)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2020 preliminary hearing in <em>Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports</em></a> found that the claimant (= plaintiff, for US readers) held a belief in ethical veganism that did meet the five-point test.</p>
<p>I would note that Casamitjana’s beliefs are much stronger than &quot;simple&quot; veganism. The judgment at §17-§22 enumerates a list of Casamitjana’s behaviour, much of which goes well beyond what the average vegan undertakes, such as avoiding the use of bank notes (manufactured from animal products) or public transportation (buses kill insects).</p>
<p>I would assume that &quot;simple&quot; vegan beliefs could still meet the &quot;philosophical belief&quot; test, but I can see obvious differences with the Casamitjana case and would not advise anyone to rely solely on it.</p>
<h2>The restaurant case</h2>
<p>I refer to <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/87429/47680">this excellent answer regarding a different hypothetical</a>. The key question is whether the restaurant’s choice of menu is <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/19" rel="nofollow noreferrer">&quot;a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim&quot;</a>.</p>
<p>In that case, the restaurant might argue that they chose what dishes to offer based on the cook’s ability, on a commercial strategy of selling only high-end dishes, or other similar considerations. (Note that I have not practiced law in E&amp;W, and any real-world respondent would do well to consult a qualified sollicitor before relying on that argument.)</p>
<p><em>As a non-legal answer, I would also argue that such an application of the Equality Act 2010 would be extremely burdening. For instance, ethical vegans could sue any restaurant offering any non-vegan options at all (regardless of whether there are vegan options on the menu, they would not want to patronize such a restaurant), or transportation company using leather seats in their vehicles; Orthodox Jews might sue any business open on Saturdays; and so on. However, I do not know how that objection could be worked into a legal argument.</em></p>

<p>Under the Equality Act 2010 in the UK, it is illegal to discriminate against someone because of their philosophical belief, including veganism, if that belief is considered a &quot;protected characteristic.&quot; However, simply not offering vegan options on a menu would not necessarily be considered direct discrimination on the basis of philosophical belief.</p>
<p>Indirect discrimination occurs when a provision, criterion, or practice (PCP) is applied equally to everyone but disproportionately affects a particular group of people. For example, if a restaurant only offered a limited selection of dishes, none of which were suitable for vegans, that could be considered indirect discrimination because it would disproportionately affect vegans.</p>
<p>It would be important to prove that the restaurant does not cater for vegans on the menu, and that it put them at a substantial disadvantage, and that there are no legitimate reasons for the restaurant to not offering vegan options.</p>
<p>It would be up to the courts to decide whether a lack of vegan options on a menu constitutes indirect discrimination on the basis of philosophical belief, but it's possible that this could be the case, especially if the restaurant could reasonably accommodate vegans by offering a sufficient selection of vegan options.</p>
<p>However, If a restaurant, on the other hand, was catering for a diverse group and it is not commercially viable for them to cater for every dietary requirement, it would not be considered as indirect discrimination.</p>
<p>It is worth noting that, Many independent and chain restaurants now offer vegan options to cater for a diverse group of customers and to address ethical concerns around animal welfare.</p>
