wills
In United States, can guardianship be meaningfully contested by other grandparents?
<p>In case both parents die before the child reaches the age of majority, and BOTH of them leave the wills with identical wording about guardianship wishes; that explicitly name <em>the same</em> set of grandparents as guardians, and the designated guardians are clearly fit for guardianship (e.g. medically and mentally healthy, own their own house and have comfortable financial situation, have good relationship with the kids and the kids themselves would want to remain with them, and no other obvious signs of un-fitness); <strong>can the other set of grandparents meaningfully contest the guardianship merely "because we are also grandparents"</strong>? </p>

<p>(I understand that in US, anyone can always contest anything if they feel like it, so "meaningfully" in this case means that the challenge to the will has any chance  of being successful).</p>

<p>Furthermore, in case it matters, the will clearly names the second set of grandparents as backup guardians, and explains why the first set was chosen (geographic proximity to where the kids grew up, as opposed to second set living far away); and clearly spells a request for the second set of grandparents to have reasonable visitation rights.</p>

<p>Short answer, no. <a href="http://family.findlaw.com/child-custody/summaries-of-state-law-grandparent-visitation-and-custody.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This</a> gives a summary of custody and visitation law by state (a bit skimpy on the guardianship after death question). The parents have clearly stated their wishes, have even explained the basis, so given your representation of the situation, there would be no reason to overturn that decision. "We're grandparents too" cuts both ways, and doesn't give one set superior rights.</p>

<p>Slightly longer version: the disposition of minor children is based on the interests of the child. The defeasible presumption is that the parents can best judge the interests of the child, and considerable deference is given to that judgment. Including a rationale in the will supports the conclusion that the parents are indeed acting reasonably. The child would have an interest in remaining connected to both grandparents, and faced with the necessity of making a choice, the "A first, then B" indicators in the will clearly show that the parents understand those interests. OTOH if the will said "But absolutely never let B have the child", and failed to say why, then a court could reasonably wonder about the parents' judgment.</p>

<p><strong>Caveat: State Law Governs</strong></p>

<p>Guardianship of minors is a matter of state law and varies somewhat from state to state although there aren't huge interstate differences on most issue in the formal statutes other than fairly subtle issues of burden of proof. Case law and local sensibilities can greatly influence how the overarching best interests of the child standard is applied.</p>

<p><strong>Overview and Analysis</strong></p>

<p>It would be an uphill battle for a contesting set of grandparents to overcome a set of grandparents nominated by the parents, but a meaningful contest could be brought by contesting grandparents. </p>

<p>While a guardianship appointment made by both parents is presumptively valid and usually has the first priority, no decision made by a parent with respect to a child is ever binding on a court resolving custody and guardianship issues related to children.</p>

<p>The court would consider arguments about who would be the better parent on the merits and would not have to find that the grandparents nominated by the parents were actually "unfit" under most state's laws. </p>

<p>Instead, usually the bottom line decision would be the "<strong>best interests of the child</strong>" but the parents' wishes would be given great weight which would be hard to overcome in making that determination. </p>

<p>Under one of the leading case in Colorado on the relevant standard, the best interest of the child standard applies when a court must appoint a guardian for a minor when a person with the care or custody of the child objects to a testamentary appointment. The testamentary nomination, while one of many factors to consider, shall not be considered binding where the trial court determines that a party with the care or custody of the minor is better suited to act as permanent guardian. <em>In re R.M.S.</em>, 128 P.3d 783 (Colo. 2006). In that case, which I quote at length because it is directly on point on the relevant legal issue the Colorado Supreme Court said:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Petitioners, Ginny Villers and William Brian Villers (collectively,
  "the Villers"), . . . seek[] to vacate the trial court's order
  awarding guardianship of R.M.S., a minor, to Respondent, Kathleen
  Nace, after the deaths of R.M.S.'s parents, Sara Sherwood and Stephen
  Sherwood. The trial court enforced the terms of Stephen Sherwood's
  will, which appointed Nace guardian for R.M.S., based on its legal
  conclusion that a court can set aside a valid testamentary appointment
  only to avoid potential harm or injury to the minor. The Villers, as
  persons with the care and custody of R.M.S., objected to the
  testamentary appointment and seek a new order appointing a guardian
  for R.M.S. pursuant to the best interest of the child standard.</p>
  
  <p><strong>Facts and Proceedings</strong></p>
  
  <p>On the afternoon of August 3, 2005, Larimer County law enforcement
  officials responded to a 911 call reporting sounds of
  gunfire in the home of Sara and Stephen Sherwood. Upon entry,
  officials discovered the Sherwoods' bodies. Nine days after returning
  from active combat duty in Iraq, Stephen Sherwood shot and killed his
  wife, Sara Sherwood, and then killed himself.</p>
  
  <p>The Sherwoods' daughter, R.M.S., was at a neighbor's home during > the shootings. Authorities subsequently placed R.M.S. in the
  care of Ginny Villers, Sara Sherwood's sister, and Ginny Villers'
  husband, William Brian Villers. R.M.S. has remained in the Villers'
  care and custody since the deaths of her parents.</p>
  
  <p>On August 8, 2005, the Villers filed an emergency petition for 
  the appointment of a guardian for R.M.S. The petition asserted
  that all parental rights had been terminated by death and the Villers
  were interested persons with the current care of R.M.S. The petition
  further asserted it was necessary to appoint a temporary and emergency
  guardian for R.M.S. until a hearing could be held on the petition
  because an immediate need existed and the appointment of a temporary
  guardian was in the best interest of R.M.S.</p>
  
  <p>Seven days later, Kathleen Taylor Nace, Stephen Sherwood's 
  mother, petitioned for appointment of guardianship on the basis that
  she was appointed by the will of the last parent to die, Stephen
  Sherwood, and the appointment had not been prevented or terminated . . .</p>
  
  <p>The Villers objected to Nace's petition for the appointment of
  guardian and advanced a best interest of the child standard to the
  guardianship determination. Under this standard, the Villers argued it
  would be in R.M.S.'s best interest to remain in their care and
  custody.</p>
  
  <p>After a hearing on both guardianship petitions, the trial court 
  entered an oral ruling appointing Nace guardian of R.M.S. <strong>The
  trial court concluded the relevant statute, while providing a court
  some degree of discretion in determining the appointment of a
  guardian, did not provide it with the discretion to employ a "best
  interests of the child standard." The court instead applied a harm
  standard: it concluded Stephen Sherwood's will controlled the
  guardianship appointment unless "the appointment causes harm or injury
  " to R.M.S.</strong> Because Nace was willing to accept the appointment and
  the court could not find any indication that such an appointment would
  cause harm or injury to R.M.S., the court granted Nace's petition and
  denied the Villers' emergency petition. <strong>The trial court noted,
  however, that if it had applied a best interest standard, it might
  have appointed the Villers as R.M.S.'s guardian. The trial court
  stayed removal of R.M.S.</strong> . . . </p>
  
  <p>II. Analysis</p>
  
  <p>Sections 15-14-201 to -210, C.R.S. (2005), of the Colorado 
  Probate Code govern the appointment of guardians. . . . </p>
  
  <p>To determine the issue Before us--whether an objection under 
  section 15-14-203(1) to a parental appointment requires judicial
  appointment of a guardian determined on the best interest of the child
  standard. . . . We first discuss uncontested testamentary appointments
  made under section 15-14-202 and note that a court's role is limited
  to confirming the appointment. Next, we consider objections to
  parental appointments under section 15-14-203(1) and conclude an
  objection triggers the judicial appointment statute. We then discuss
  judicial appointments made under section 15-14-204, C.R.S. (2005), and
  observe that <strong>the legislature has clearly conditioned all judicial
  appointments on the minor's best interests.</strong> Finally, <strong>we conclude
  that a judicial appointment, made subsequent to an objection to a
  testamentary appointment, is to be made pursuant to the best interest
  of the child standard.</strong></p>
  
  <p>A. Testamentary Appointment of a Guardian</p>
  
  <p>Section 15-14-202 confers authority on a parent to appoint a 
  guardian by will or other signed writing: "a guardian may be appointed
  by will or other signed writing by a parent for any minor child the
  parent has or may have in the future." § 15-14-202(1), C.R.S. (2005);
  see also § 15-14-201. . . . </p>
  
  <p>A testamentary appointment is generally effective upon the death 
  of the appointing parent: . . . </p>
  
  <p>In addition to petitioning the court for confirmation of a 
  testamentary appointment, the appointee must file an acceptance of the
  appointment and "[g]ive written notice of the acceptance to ... a
  person other than the parent or guardian having care and custody of
  the minor." § 15-14-202(4)(b), C.R.S. (2005). In this regard, the
  notice provisions contained in section 15-14-202 make clear that the
  legislature considered the person with the care or custody of the
  minor significant to the guardianship confirmation and appointment
  process. For example, whether a court confirms a testamentary
  appointment Before or after the appointment is effective, a petitioner
  must give notice of a guardianship hearing to "[a]ny person alleged to
  have had the primary care and custody of the minor during the sixty
  days Before the filing of the petition." § 15-14-205(1)(b), C.R.S.
  (2005) . . . .</p>
  
  <p>B. Objection to a Testamentary Appointment</p>
  
  <p>Section 15-14-203(1) addresses objections by others to a 
  parental appointment. By statute, an objection may be filed only by
  the other parent or, as relevant here, "a person other than a parent
  or guardian having care or custody of the minor," § 15-14-203(1)
  (emphasis added). Significantly, an objection under section
  15-14-203(1) to a testamentary appointee terminates, and may prevent,
  the appointment: . . . . Once a
  person with the care or custody of the minor terminates the
  testamentary appointment by objection, the parental appointment is
  ineffective and the appointee has no authority. See § 15-14-202(9); §
  15-14-203(1). Since the testamentary appointee has no authority, no
  guardian exists for the minor and a guardian must be appointed by a
  mechanism other than the testamentary appointment. See id.</p>
  
  <p>We conclude it is plain in subsection 15-14-203(1) that an 
  objection triggers a judicial appointment under section 15-14-204.
  Section 15-14-203(1) specifies a trial court's involvement in the
  appointment process upon objection by providing that an objection does
  not prevent a court from appointing the testamentary appointee: . . .
  .Likewise, section 15-14-203(1) also anticipates court involvement in
  the
  appointment process subsequent to objection by permitting the court to
  treat an objection as a petition for a temporary guardian under the
  judicial appointment statute: . . . . In
  noting that a court may still appoint the testamentary guardian or
  treat an objection as a petition for the appointment of a temporary
  guardian, the legislature plainly identified the judicial appointment
  procedures under section 15-14-204 as the mechanism to resolve a
  guardianship dispute between a testamentary appointee and a person
  with the care or custody of the minor involved.</p>
  
  <p>Thus, an objection under section 15-14-203(1) has two 
  interrelated effects on a parental appointment: (1) it terminates and
  may prevent the appointment; and (2) requires judicial appointment of
  a guardian. The parties agree that an objection to a parental
  appointment triggers a court's involvement in the guardianship process
  beyond confirmation, but disagree as to the scope of the involvement.
  The Villers argue a guardian must be judicially appointed pursuant to
  a best interest of the child standard. Nace asserts a valid
  testamentary nomination pursuant to section 15-14-202 removes all
  discretion from the trial court and requires the trial court to
  enforce the terms of the will unless such an appointment would cause
  harm or injury to the child. We agree with the Villers and conclude
  that an objection triggers the judicial appointment statute's best
  interest standard, to which we now turn.</p>
  
  <p>C. Conditions for the Judicial Appointment of a Guardian</p>
  
  <p>Section 15-14-204 conditions the judicial appointment of a 
  guardian on a finding that the appointment will be in the minor's best
  interest. Under section 15-14-204(2), the best interest of the child
  is the overriding requirement governing judicial appointments: . . .</p>
  
  <p>Consistent with the conditions for appointment set forth in 
  section 15-14-204, the procedures for the judicial appointment of a
  guardian also impose a best interest of the child standard. Section
  15-14-205(2) provides: "The court, upon hearing, shall make the
  appointment if it finds that ... the best interest of the minor will
  be served by the appointment" . . . </p>
  
  <p>The legislature thus made clear that the paramount consideration > in appointing a guardian is the best interest of the
  minor. In fact, no mention of a standard other than the best interest
  of the child is made in section 15-14-204. We see no reason to deviate
  from the best interest standard when the judicial appointment is made
  subsequent to an objection to a testamentary appointment.</p>
  
  <p>We therefore decline to employ the harm standard advanced by 
  Nace and adopted by the trial court. Indeed, applying a harm standard
  would require us to read language into the statute. The judicial
  appointment statute makes no mention of a harm standard and does not
  direct that a trial court, in making its appointment, should apply any
  standard other than the best interests of the child, the standard that
  applies to all judicial appointments. Nor does the judicial
  appointment statute identify any exceptions for a judicial appointment
  made subsequent to an objection by a person with the care or custody
  of the minor. Had the legislature intended a court to appoint a
  guardian pursuant to a harm standard, it could have so stated. See In
  re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 555 (Colo.App.2004). Instead, the statute
  repeatedly provides a consistent standard by which to make a judicial
  appointment: the best interest of the child. Hence, when the trial
  court has jurisdiction over appointment of a guardian, its
  responsibility is to provide for the best interest and welfare of the
  minor.</p>
  
  <p>Although we recognize the strong public policy in favor of 
  encouraging parents to make testamentary selections in the first
  instance, we conclude the legislature did not intend to preclude the
  court from considering the best interests of the child who has been in
  the care or custody of persons other than the testamentary guardian.
  Hence, the testamentary nomination is not binding where the trial
  court determines in its sound discretion that a party with the care or
  custody of the minor is better suited to act as guardian.</p>
  
  <p>Parental intent as to who should care for their minor children 
  may nonetheless be a relevant factor to be considered in
  appointing a guardian under the best interest standard. A court may
  consider all relevant facts and circumstances to determine the best
  interest of the child. See Rayer v. Rayer, 32 Colo.App. 400, 403, 512
  P.2d 637, 639 (1973); Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Booth, 984
  P.2d 639, 651 (Colo.1999) (citing § 14-10-124, 5 C.R.S. (1998)).
  Hence, the best interest of the child standard does not preclude a
  court from considering the desires of the pertinent parties, including
  the wishes of the minor's parent as expressed through a testamentary
  appointment. Thus, a court may weigh such wishes, keeping in mind the
  fluid and changing nature of interpersonal relationships and the
  frequency with which the will was reviewed after its election.</p>
  
  <p>However, the paramount consideration is the best interest of the 
  child and a testamentary appointment must yield to this overriding
  concern when the court resolves a guardianship dispute subsequent to
  an objection by a person with the care or custody of the minor under
  section 15-14-203(1). Accordingly, to appoint a guardian for a minor
  when a person with the care or custody of the child objects to the
  testamentary appointment, the court shall appoint a guardian under
  section 15-14-204 pursuant to the best interest of the child standard.</p>
  
  <p>III. Application</p>
  
  <p>Here, Stephen Sherwood effected a valid will appointing Nace as 
  R.M.S.'s testamentary guardian. Although Nace accepted the
  testamentary appointment, the timely objection of the Villers, as
  persons with the care and custody of R.M.S. terminated Nace's
  appointment. Consequently, the court must make a judicial appointment
  of a guardian for R.M.S. pursuant to the best interest of the child
  standard.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>In Colorado, only a guardian approved by a minor over the age of twelve faces has the benefit of the higher standard of proof of requiring contestants to show that another appointment would be "<strong>contrary to the best interests of the minor</strong>." In all other cases, every would be guardian has an almost equal duty to show "best interests of the child" with the nomination serving merely as one piece of evidence demonstrating that this is the case.</p>

<p>Note also that grandparent status or even blood relation status is basically irrelevant to guardianship determinations. Any "person interested in the welfare of a minor" is on basically an equal footing (they must be 21 year old as well), with the exception of a parent whose parental rights have been previously terminated for neglect or abuse (who is strongly disfavored).</p>

<p><strong>Many states, including Colorado, do have custody law provisions that  allow grandparents to seek visitation of a child because they are grandparents, but that would be a limited visitation right and not a full or even limited guardianship right. The guardian would stand in a similar position vis-a-vis a grandparental visitation request as a parent would while a parent was living.</strong></p>

<p><strong>The Statutory Provisions In Uniform Probate Code States</strong></p>

<p>The relevant provisions of Colorado law from the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016) (which are based upon the Uniform Probate Code and are typical of the more modern rules) on this subject read as follows (with the key provisions highlighted).</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>§ 15-14-202. Testamentary appointment of guardian - appointment by
  written instrument</p>
  
  <p>(1)   A guardian may be appointed by will or other signed writing by a
  parent for any minor child the parent has or may have in the future. A
  guardian may also be appointed by will or other signed writing by a
  guardian of a minor child. The appointment may specify the desired
  limitations on the powers to be given to the guardian. A guardian may
  not appoint a surviving parent who has no parental rights to be a
  successor guardian. The appointing parent or guardian may revoke or
  amend the appointment before confirmation by the court.</p>
  
  <p>(2)   Upon petition of an appointing parent or guardian and a finding
  that the appointing parent or guardian will likely become unable to
  care for the child within two years, and after notice as provided in
  section 15-14-205(1), the court, before the appointment becomes
  effective, may confirm the selection of a guardian by a parent or
  guardian and terminate the rights of others to object. If the minor
  has attained twelve years of age, the minor must consent to the
  appointment of a guardian pursuant to section 15-14-203(2).</p>
  
  <p>(3)   <strong>Subject to section 15-14-203, the appointment of a guardian
  becomes effective upon the death of the appointing parent or guardian</strong>,
  an adjudication that the parent or guardian is an incapacitated
  person, or a written determination by a physician who has examined the
  parent or guardian that the parent or guardian is no longer able to
  care for the child, whichever occurs first.</p>
  
  <p>(4)   <strong>The guardian becomes eligible to act upon the filing of an
  acceptance of appointment, which must be filed within thirty days
  after the guardian's appointment becomes effective. The guardian
  shall: (a)    File the acceptance of appointment and a copy of the will
  with the court of the county in which the will was or could be
  probated or, in the case of another appointing instrument, file the
  acceptance of appointment and the appointing instrument with the court
  of the county in which the minor resides or is present; and (b)   Give
  written notice of the acceptance of appointment to</strong> the appointing
  parent or guardian, if living, <strong>the minor, if the minor has attained
  twelve years of age, and a person other than the parent or guardian
  having care and custody of the minor.</strong></p>
  
  <p>(5)   <strong>Unless the appointment was previously confirmed by the court, the
  notice given under paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of this section
  must include a statement of the right of those notified to terminate
  the appointment by filing a written objection in the court as provided
  in section 15-14-203(1) and of the right of a minor who has attained
  twelve years of age to refuse to consent to the appointment of the
  guardian as provided in section 15-14-203(2).</strong></p>
  
  <p>(6)   <strong>Unless the appointment was previously confirmed by the court,
  within thirty days after filing the notice and the appointing
  instrument, a guardian shall petition the court for confirmation of
  the appointment, giving notice in the manner provided in section
  15-14-205(1).</strong></p>
  
  <p>(7)   The appointment of a guardian by a parent does not supersede the
  parental rights of either parent. <strong>If both parents are dead</strong> or have
  been adjudged incapacitated persons, a<strong>n appointment by the last parent
  who died or was adjudged incapacitated has priority. If a guardian
  survives the death</strong> or adjudication of incapacity of both parents, <strong>an
  appointment by the last parent or guardian who died</strong> or was adjudged
  incapacitated <strong>has priority. An appointment by a parent or guardian
  which is effected by filing the guardian's acceptance under a will
  probated in the state of the testator's domicile is effective in this
  state.</strong></p>
  
  <p>(8)   <strong>The powers of a guardian who complies timely with the 
  requirements of subsections (4) and (6) of this section relate back to
  give acts by the guardian which are of benefit to the minor and
  occurred on or after the date the appointment became effective the
  same effect as those that occurred after the filing of the acceptance
  of the appointment.</strong></p>
  
  <p>(9)   <strong>The authority of a guardian appointed under this section
  terminates upon the first to occur of the appointment of a guardian by
  the court or the giving of written notice to the guardian of the
  filing of an objection pursuant to section 15-14-203(1) or of the
  refusal of a minor child who has attained the age of twelve years to
  consent pursuant to section 15-14-203(2).</strong></p>
  
  <p>§ 15-14-203. Objection of others to parental appointment - consent by
  minor of twelve years of age or older to appointment of guardian</p>
  
  <p>(1)   Until the court has confirmed an appointee under section
  15-14-202, the other parent, or <strong>a person other than a parent or
  guardian having care or custody of the minor</strong> may prevent or terminate
  the appointment at any time by filing a written objection in the court
  in which the appointing instrument is filed and giving notice of the
  objection to the guardian and any other persons entitled to notice of
  the acceptance of the appointment. An objection may be withdrawn, and
  if withdrawn is of no effect. <strong>The objection does not preclude judicial
  appointment of the person selected by the parent or guardian. The
  court may treat the filing of an objection or the refusal of the minor
  to consent as a petition for the appointment of an emergency or a
  temporary guardian under section 15-14-204, and proceed accordingly.</strong></p>
  
  <p>(2)   Until the court has confirmed an appointee under section
  15-14-202, <strong>a minor who is the subject of an appointment by a parent or
  guardian and who has attained twelve years of age has the right to
  consent or refuse to consent to an appointment of a guardian.</strong> . . . </p>
  
  <p>§ 15-14-204. Judicial appointment of guardian - conditions for
  appointment</p>
  
  <p>(1)   A minor or <strong>a person interested in the welfare of a minor may
  petition for appointment of a guardian.</strong></p>
  
  <p>(2)   <strong>The court may appoint a guardian for a minor if the court finds
  the appointment is in the minor's best interest, and:</strong> . . . <strong>(b)   All 
  parental rights have been terminated;</strong> (c)   The parents are unwilling
  or unable to exercise their parental rights . . . ; however, the court
  shall not presume it is in the best interests of a child to be in the
  care of a parent in circumstances where a court has previously granted
  custody of a child to a third party.</p>
  
  <p>(3)   <strong>If a guardian is appointed by a parent or guardian pursuant to
  section 15-14-202 and the appointment has not been prevented or
  terminated under section 15-14-203(1) or the minor has consented to
  the appointment pursuant to section 15-14-203(2), that appointee has
  priority for appointment.</strong> However, the court may proceed with another
  appointment upon a finding that the appointee under section 15-14-202
  has failed to accept the appointment within thirty days after notice
  of the guardianship proceeding. . . .</p>
  
  <p>(5)   If the court finds that following the procedures of this part 2
  will likely result in substantial harm to a minor's health or safety
  and that no other person appears to have authority to act in the
  circumstances, the court, on appropriate petition, may appoint an
  emergency guardian for the minor. The duration of the emergency
  guardian's authority may not exceed sixty days and the emergency
  guardian may exercise only the powers specified in the order. . . .</p>
  
  <p>§ 15-14-205. Judicial appointment of guardian - procedure</p>
  
  <p>(1)   <strong>After a petition for appointment of a guardian is filed, the > 
  court shall schedule a hearing, and the petitioner shall give notice of 
  the time and place of the hearing, together with a copy of the petition,
  to: (a)   The minor, if the minor has attained twelve years of age and
  is not the petitioner; (b)    Any person alleged to have had the primary
  care and custody of the minor during the sixty days before the filing
  of the petition;</strong> (c)    Each living parent of the minor or, if there is
  none, the adult nearest in kinship that can be found; (d) Any person
  nominated as guardian by the minor if the minor has attained twelve
  years of age; <strong>(e)   Any appointee of a parent or guardian whose
  appointment has not been prevented or terminated under section
  15-14-203(1) or whose appointment was consented to under section
  15-14-203(2) ;</strong> and (f)  Any guardian or conservator currently acting
  for the minor in this state or elsewhere.</p>
  
  <p>(2)   <strong>The court, upon hearing, shall make the appointment if it finds
  that a qualified person seeks appointment,</strong> venue is proper, the
  required notices have been given, the conditions of section
  15-14-204(2) have been met, <strong>and the best interest of the minor will be
  served by the appointment.</strong> In other cases, the court may dismiss the
  proceeding or make any other disposition of the matter that will serve
  the best interest of the minor. . . .</p>
  
  <p>§ 15-14-206. Judicial appointment of guardian - priority of minor's
  nominee - limited guardianship</p>
  
  <p>(1)   <strong>The court shall appoint a guardian whose appointment will be in
  the best interest of the minor. The court shall appoint a guardian
  nominated by the minor, if the minor has attained twelve years of age,
  <em>unless the court finds the appointment will be contrary to the best
  interest of the minor.</em></strong> . . . .</p>
</blockquote>
