united-states discrimination employment
Is employment discrimination crime, or tort, or what?
<p>I just learned that, in the US, literally <em>asking</em> certain questions on a job interview (as opposed to making discriminatory decisions based on the answers to those questions) is illegal (as found <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/51493/job-interview-according-to-the-laws-of-washington-state-usa">here</a> and <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/3554/are-all-interview-questions-that-dont-apply-to-essential-functions-illegal">here</a>).</p>

<p>It turns out, however, that asking <em>itself</em> is not a punishable offense. Employer can get away with asking those questions until someone uses them as evidence of discrimination in a court case.</p>

<p>Such evidence, by its nature, is only circumstantial. That is, it does not directly show discrimination (after all, the interviewer could be simply doing small talk / assessing soft skills when asking "<em>what is your gender identity?</em>" — rather than having discriminatory intent in mind). But, in conjunction with other corroborating evidence (e.g. rejection despite apparent fitness to work, and acceptance of a less fit applicant who is of a different answer to those question) these questions could indeed prove discrimination.</p>

<p>Now, what standard of proof? "Balance of probabilities" (as for a tort), or "beyond reasonable doubt" (as for a crime)? Is such discrimination a crime in the US, or tort, or what?</p>

<p>Is it the case that those questions prove discrimination just because the statute says they do, despite that otherwise they would not (especially given that state of mind of the employer is not determinable)?</p>

<p>At the federal level, employment discrimination <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=3a3c0be5e65f577366f7fd2581a784a7&amp;mc=true&amp;tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title29/29chapterXIV.tpl" rel="noreferrer">as prohibited here</a> is at its core a tort rather than a crime. Probably the most pertinent first part of the law is <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=3a3c0be5e65f577366f7fd2581a784a7&amp;mc=true&amp;node=pt29.4.1601&amp;rgn=div5#sp29.4.1601.b" rel="noreferrer">Subpart B</a>, which encompasses procedures. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may receive allegations of a violation, and there is a procedure for deciding on the merits of the case. After charges are filed, there is an investigation by the EEOC, which may include a public hearing. Based on the investigation, the commission may dismiss the charge (technical flaws in the complaint); they may issue a letter of determination to that effect if they find that there was no reasonable cause for the complaint. They can also encourage a negotiated settlement. In making this determination, the commission follows its own guidelines, as encoded in the regulations. So if the commission determines by its rules that there was a violation, the courts will generally <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference" rel="noreferrer">defer to that finding</a> unless the finding is contrary to what Congress said. If there is no dismissal or settlement, then they issue a determination that there is reasonable cause (§1601.21). Then there is a procedure to rectify unlawful practices, which includes the possibility of a conciliation agreement.</p>

<p><em>Finally</em>, starting at §1601.27, we get to the point that somebody might get their day in court. If the accused still refuses to relent on whatever point was at stake, the matter can go to trial:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent named
  in a charge not a government, governmental agency or political
  subdivision, after thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of a
  charge with the Commission unless a conciliation agreement acceptable
  to the Commission has been secured</p>
</blockquote>

<p>But also, the aggrieved can take the accused to court at any time. The allegation then must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.</p>

<h2>Neither a tort nor a crime</h2>

<p>Torts are civil wrongs. Crimes are offences against the state which are deemed criminal. Both have roots in common law although in many jurisdictions they have been codified.</p>

<p>The cause of action for unlawful discrimination is statute law. That is, it is what it is because the statute says it is. The offence against the state is a civil offence - not a criminal one. The cause of action between private parties is unlawful discrimination. In both the standard of proof is civil “balance of probabilities” or “preponderance of evidence”.</p>

<p>Tort law is invoked in discrimination cases in:  <em>Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.</em>, <em>Staub v. Proctor Hosp.</em>, and <em>University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar</em>. &quot;In these three cases, the use of tort law commands a majority of the Court.  The use of tort law is also tied to textual claims, where certain words or concepts in discrimination law are directly interpreted through the lens of tort law.&quot; Sandra Sperino, &quot;<em>Let’s Pretend Discrimination is a Tort</em>,” 75 Ohio St. L.J. 1107 (2014).</p>
<p>I agree that discussion of one's gender identity, sexuality, or other personal information does not constitute small talk.  &quot;So, hey, how old are you today?  Nice personal pronouns we're having aren't they?&quot;  Yeah, No.</p>

<p>Employment discrimination is not generally a criminal matter without a further showing that it constitutes a criminal act to deprive someone of their civil rights under color of state law, something that a private employer lacks the capacity to do.</p>
<p>One could imagine a criminal case if, for example, a state's authorized militia refused to accept black residents as employees solely on the basis of race, under a policy, statute, or regulation of the state. But that is a pretty far fetched possibility.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court of Colorado recently concluded, for purposes of its governmental immunity act which bars claims against state and local governments and their employees for intentional torts, except in cases not applicable to an employment discrimination claim, that an employment discrimination claim against a governmental employee was a claim for equitable relief, rather than a tort claim, and hence was outside the scope of the state's governmental immunity act.</p>
<p>Arguably, this is an outcome driven result, and there are many cases that consider employment discrimination claims to be torts in other contexts. But it is a case clearly address the somewhat formalistic issue raised in the question.</p>
<p>The Colorado Supreme Court announced its opinion on December 21, 2020, in a long-anticipated case involving the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), section 24-34-405, C.R.S. (2020) and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), section 24-10-106, C.R.S. (2020) in <em>Elder v. Williams</em>, <a href="https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2019/19SC1009.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2020 CO 88</a>. The syllabus to the court’s 4-3 opinion states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This case principally requires the supreme court to decide whether
claims against a governmental entity for compensatory relief under the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”), section 24-34-405, C.R.S.
(2020), are barred by operation of the Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act (“CGIA”), section 24-10-106, C.R.S. (2020). The court is also
asked to decide whether subsection 24-34-405(8)(g) of CADA, which
allows for compensatory damages against “the state,” should be read to
include political subdivisions of the state of Colorado and whether
front pay is compensatory in nature, lies in tort, and is therefore
barred by the CGIA. The court now concludes that (1) claims for
compensatory relief under CADA are not claims for “injuries which lie
in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore
public entities are not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2)
“the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), includes political
subdivisions of the state and thus political subdivisions are not
immune from claims for compensatory damages based on intentional
unfair or discriminatory employment practices; and (3) front pay is
equitable and not compensatory in nature under CADA, and age
discrimination and retaliation claims seeking front pay do not lie and
could not lie in tort for CGIA purposes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The dissent argued that the damages remedies afforded by CADA are remedies that “lie in tort or could lie in tort,” bringing CADA claims within the protective orbit of the CGIA. The General Assembly could, of course, have foreseen this potential issue when it enacted CADA, but remained silent about whether CGIA would apply to CADA claims.</p>
<p>The fact that a different ruling would have rendered a state statute barring employment discrimination by governmental agencies enacted after the governmental immunity act, no doubt influenced the court to reach this somewhat strained interpretation.</p>
<p>This doesn't necessarily imply that a different classification might not be applied for a different purpose, e.g. the application of the pre-judgment interest statute, or statute of limitations classification. American courts frequently employ the same legal term in an inconsistent manner in different contexts. Legal terms in U.S. law do not mean the same thing in all circumstances.</p>
