defamation
Can a part time lecturer in a public university be still a public figure?
<p>Is a part-time lecturer of a public university (without quarterly renewed and without any benefits) still a "limited public figure"?</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Is a part-time lecturer of a public university (without quarterly
  renewed and without any benefits) still a "limited public figure"?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Employment at a public university does not automatically attach the status of public figure, since not all positions there implicate the acquisition of "<em>roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society</em>". As the U.S. Supreme Court explains at <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/1974741418us3231732" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</em>, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)</a>,</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the
  forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
  resolution of the issues involved.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Thus, if the part-time lecturer was defamed about matters in which he or she has prominence, the issue of defamation would be adjudged under a status of public figure.</p>

<p>The opinion <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/200753164calrptr3d4671491" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>McGarry v. University of San Diego</em>, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 481 (2007)</a> cites various authorities for the proposition that</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>[n]umerous courts [...] have concluded professional and collegiate
  athletes and coaches are at least limited purpose public figures [...]
  [because] one's voluntary decision to pursue a career in sports,
  whether as an athlete or a coach, `invites attention and comment'
  regarding his job performance and thus constitutes an assumption of
  the risk of negative publicity</p>
</blockquote>

<p>As you will notice from the <em>McGary</em> opinion, mere employment at a public university is not what determines the status of <em>limited [purpose] public figure</em>, but the plaintiff's aforementioned role (if any) of prominence in the matter at issue.</p>

<p>You might already know that the relevance of being considered a <em>public figure</em> in a defamation lawsuit lies in whether the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant made the defamatory falsehood(s) with a mental state known in defamation law as <em>actual malice</em> (that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not; see Gertz at 328).</p>

<p>Depending on <em>who</em> defamed the lecturer, he [the lecturer] might have to prove <em>actual malice</em> anyway because --under some circumstances-- the defendant's falsehoods could be within the scope of <em>qualified privilege</em>. In such instances, the status of public figure only heightens (to the plaintiff's detriment) the applicable standard of proof of <em>actual malice</em>.</p>

<p><strong>8/20/2018 Edited to add:</strong> Reference to defamation case involving a <em>public</em> university (see comment by Nate Eldredge)</p>

<p>The decision of <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/inohco20160805454" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Waters v. Ohio State University</em></a> (a public university) does not strictly constitute legal precedent, although it is consistent with <em>McGarry</em> in that  </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>the touchstone of the limited-purpose public figure analysis remains
  determining whether an individual has assumed [a] <strong>role</strong>[] <strong>of especial
  prominence</strong> in the affairs of society</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)</p>

<p>It is noteworthy that the OSU's argument is not that Waters was a public figure insofar as employee of the University, but that he "<em>should be considered a public person because, as director of the OSU marching band, he enjoyed national — and even international acclaim.</em>" (internal quotation marks omitted).</p>
