criminal-law england-and-wales
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 — How is Section 18 , in at least one respect broader than Section 20?
<p>I don't understand the bold text in the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">OATPA 1861</a>.</p>

<ol>
<li><p>How is s. 18 "in at least one respect, broader than section 20"?</p></li>
<li><p>Are there more respects than just "one respect"? How many exactly? What are they?</p></li>
</ol>

<p>Herring, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/criminal-law-9780198811817?cc=ca&amp;lang=en&amp;" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials</em> (8 edn, 2018)</a>. p. 372.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>offence under section 47 because it may not be easy to demonstrate that there was a battery
  or an assault?251
  Although the Law Commission252 and many commentators are convinced by these
  arguments there are a few commentators who are willing to stand up for the Offences
  Against the Person Act 1861. One of the strongest defences of the Act is provided by John
  Gardner. In the following extract, he replies to some of the objections mentioned previously.
  He starts by challenging the claim that the Act is irrational:</p>
  
  <h3>J. Gardner, ‘Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences against the Person’ (1994) 53 <em>Cambridge Law Journal</em> 502 at 503–11</h3>
  
  <blockquote>
    <p>The rationality argument figures less prominently in the Law Commission’s latest report
    than it does in the consultation paper which preceded it. One can only speculate as to the
    causes of its demotion, but its spirit certainly lives on in the draft Bill. The spirit of the argument
    is captured in the Commission’s comment that ‘sections 18, 20 and 47 of the 1861
    Act . . . were not drafted with a view to setting out the various offences with which they deal
    in a logical or graded manner’. The assumption is that the three offences can, in substance,
    be graded, and that this would be the logical way to define and organise them. Between
    them they deal with matters which would most naturally be dealt with in a hierarchy of more
    and less serious offences all conforming to a standard definitional pattern. The irrationality
    of the 1861 Act lies in its failure to take this natural path, its failure to carry the underlying
    hierarchy of seriousness over into the actual definition and organisation of the offences.
    Thus, section 18 should be regarded, in substance, as an aggravated version of section 20;
    and yet there are miscellaneous differences between the two sections which do not appear
    to bear any rational relation to the aggravation. Likewise, section 20 should be regarded, in
    substance, as the more serious cousin of section 47; and yet the two offences are drafted
    in quite different terms, so that the essential difference in point of seriousness is obscured
    by a mass of other, utterly irrelevant differences. If the sections were properly graded in
    definition as they are in substance, then section 18 would surely cover a narrower class of
    cases than section 20 which would cover a narrower class of cases than section 47; and
    <strong>yet section 47 is, in at least one respect, the narrowest offence of the three, while section
    18 is, in at least one respect, broader than section 20</strong>. That is surely irrational. The law on
    such matters should be thoroughly governed, in the Law Commission’s words, ‘by clear
    distinctions . . . between serious and less serious cases’.
    That a section 18 offence should be regarded, in substance, as a more serious version of
    a section 20 offence is easy enough to understand. Section 20 covers malicious wounding
    and the malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm. Section 18 covers malicious wounding
    and maliciously causing grievous bodily harm, when these things are done with intention to
    do grievous bodily harm or to prevent or resist arrest. The extra element of intention required
    for a section 18 offence obviously accounts for the difference between the sentencing
    maxima (five years’ imprisonment under section 20 and life under section 18), and marks a
    difference in point of seriousness (or potential seriousness) which the Law Commission is
    rightly anxious to retain in its hierarchy of replacement offences. The Commission has not
    even felt the need to explain its decision, however, to eliminate the difference in the causal
    elements of sections 18 and 20. Section 20 requires that grievous bodily harm be inflicted,</p>
  </blockquote>
  
  <p>251 In fact, in the light of <em>DPP v K</em> [1990] 1 All ER 331 there is likely to be a battery.<br>
  252 Law Commission (2014).</p>
</blockquote>

<p><a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Offences Against the Person Act 1861</a> </p>

<blockquote>
  <blockquote>
    <p>yet section 47 is, in at least one respect, the narrowest offence of the three, </p>
  </blockquote>
</blockquote>

<p>Section <strong>47</strong> is a <em>general</em> clause aimed to cover all areas not covered elsewhere</p>

<ul>
<li>the punishment is less than in Section <strong>18</strong></li>
<li>Section <strong>20</strong> contains the word <strong>grievous</strong></li>
</ul>

<blockquote>
  <blockquote>
    <p>while section 18 is, in at least one respect, broader than section 20. </p>
  </blockquote>
</blockquote>

<p>Section <strong>18</strong> contains additional <strong>conditions</strong> that must be fulfilled and<br>
an <em>additional feature</em> for which it can <strong>also</strong> be used for</p>

<ul>
<li><strong>Shooting</strong>: use of firearms (as apposed to a general weapon) </li>
<li><strong>grievous bodily harm</strong>

<ul>
<li>the punishment is higher than in Section <strong>20</strong></li>
<li><strong>prevent the lawful apprehension</strong></li>
</ul></li>
</ul>

<p>Section <strong>20</strong> is a <em>general</em> clause with <strong>weapons</strong> aimed to cover all areas not covered elsewhere and must fulfill the condition of being <strong>grievous</strong>. </p>

<hr>

<blockquote>
  <p><a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/section/18" rel="nofollow noreferrer">18 <strong>Shooting or attempting to shoot, or wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm.</strong></a><br>
  Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person,<br>
   . . . F1 with intent, . . . F1 to do some . . . F1 grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable . . . F2 <strong>to be kept in penal servitude for life</strong> . . . F3</p>
</blockquote>

<hr>

<blockquote>
  <p><a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/section/20" rel="nofollow noreferrer">20 <strong>Inflicting bodily injury, with or without weapon</strong>.</a><br>
  Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any <strong>grievous</strong> bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable . . . F1 <strong>to be kept in penal servitude</strong> . . . F1</p>
</blockquote>

<hr>

<blockquote>
  <p><a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/section/47" rel="nofollow noreferrer">47 <strong>Assault occasioning bodily harm.</strong></a><br>
  Whosoever shall be convicted upon an indictment of any assault occasioning actual bodily harm shall be liable F1. . . <strong>to be kept in penal servitude</strong> F1 . . .; F2. . . F3 . . .</p>
</blockquote>
