united-states employment common-law negligence immunity
In the U.S are judges, attorneys, physicians, teachers, professors, politicians, administrative officers liable for ordinary negligence?
<p>E.g can a judge be tried for mistrial because of ordinary negligence?</p>

<p>They are not employees or workers so that they could be reasonably absolved for ordinary negligence.</p>

<p>We expect employees to be obedient so they have no moral responsibility, if we held them liable we would harm the market people would be reluctutant to enter a contract of employeement.</p>

<p>In all these of judges etc cases they receive more than enough indenization for assuming responsibility.</p>

<p>By freeing them from ordinary negligence we are making them negligent.</p>

<p>Other than political economics why would the legislator free them from such responsibility?</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In the U.S are judges, attorneys, physicians, teachers, professors,
  politicians, administrative officers liable for ordinary negligence?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>In the U.S., judges, prosecuting attorneys and legislators have absolute immunity from civil liability (but not from criminal liability) for legislative and judicial acts in their official capacity.</p>

<p>Attorneys have absolute immunity from civil liability from some claims from some people (e.g. defamation claims from non-clients for statements made in connection with representing someone) and qualified immunity from civil liability from others (e.g. most claims of non-clients) for their acts as lawyers, but are liable to their clients for ordinary negligence.</p>

<p>Physicians are liable to their patients for ordinary negligence in the nature of medical malpractice. Some acts taken by physicians that would otherwise constitute false imprisonment or assault or homicide are excluded from the definition of those crimes.</p>

<p>Elected officials in the executive branch including mayors, law enforcement officers and the attorney general have qualified immunity from civil liability for their official non-judicial acts. This means that they are only liable for intentional violations of constitutional rights that are clearly established in the law. Subject to narrow exceptions (e.g. driving or medical malpractice) they are not liable for ordinary negligence.</p>

<p>It is hard to know what kind of liability is contemplated for teachers and professors or administrative officers to answer. The answer would not be the same for all kinds of claims. Teachers of minors generally have the same immunities as a parent with respect to the use of physical force towards their students in order to maintain order in the educational process. The liability of teachers and professors also depends upon whether they are employed by public or private institutions. Those in public institutions often have more protections from liability, but also have exposure to civil rights claims that those in private institutions are not. Contractual waivers can also influence liability in these circumstances.</p>

<p>Everyone has liability for ordinary negligence in their unofficial capacity and for many acts (e.g. driving a car) while on duty but not involving activities particular to their professional responsibilities.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>They are not employees or workers so that they could be reasonably
  absolved for ordinary negligence.</p>
  
  <p>We expect employees to be obedient so they have no moral
  responsibility, if we held them liable we would harm the market people
  would be reluctutant to enter a contract of employeement.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>In the private sector, employees are usually liable for ordinary negligence that they personally commit, even though the employer is also liable. </p>

<p>Judges are employees and arguably workers as well. And, for their non-judicial acts, judges have the same liability as every other employee for their ordinary negligence. For example, if a judge gets in a car accident while driving from one courtroom to another, and harms another through negligence, the judge has personal liability for the judge's ordinary negligence and the judicial branch has vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, the judge.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In all these of judges etc cases they receive more than enough
  indenization for assuming responsibility.</p>
  
  <p>By freeing them from ordinary negligence we are making them negligent.</p>
  
  <p>Other than political economics why would the legislator free them from
  such responsibility?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Analysis of why the law is the way it is, or what it should be, are really better suited for Politics.SE than for Law.SE. I discussion of the why's of judicial immunity is appropriate for Politics.SE. A discussion of "judges etc" is probably to broad for either forum.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In all these of judges etc cases they receive more than enough
  indenization for assuming responsibility.</p>
  
  <p>By freeing them from ordinary negligence we are making them negligent.</p>
  
  <p>Other than political economics why would the legislator free them from
  such responsibility?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Judges are precisely the ones rendering this question within scope of Law SE --not Politics SE-- insofar as they repeatedly cite cases like <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/1995608337md2711593" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Parker v. State</em>, 337 Md. 271 (1995)</a> to allege that: </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>absolute immunity is needed to forestall endless collateral attacks on
  judgments through civil actions against the judges themselves.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Under that pretext, the judicial system has become quite retrograde compared to how it was 4,000 years ago. Indeed, <em>judicial immunity</em> is the opposite of how the <a href="http://www.general-intelligence.com/library/hr.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Code of Hammurabi</a> in its fifth law addressed the problem of judicial incompetence:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>If a judge atry a case, reach a decision, and present his judgment in
  writing; if later error shall appear in his decision, and it be
  through his own fault, then he <strong>shall pay twelve times the fine set by
  him</strong> in the case, and he shall <strong>be publicly removed from the judge's
  bench, and never again shall he sit there to render judgement</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(emphasis added)</p>

<p>I usually get a cascade of downvotes (and I am called "abusive", and so forth) here on Law SE for pointing to uncomfortable truths about the judiciary, but you are right in that society makes judges negligent --at best-- by allowing absolute judicial immunity to remain in our system.</p>

<p>The problem goes beyond merely ordinary negligence. Nowadays the judiciary defends that </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>absolute judicial immunity [...] applies regardless of the nature of
  the tort and even where the suit against the judge alleges that he
  acted in bad faith, maliciously or corruptly</p>
</blockquote>

<p><em>Parker</em>, <em>supra</em> at 284-285 (citations omitted), and many judges abuse that prerogative. </p>

<p>As an example of that judicial abuse, consider the matter of judge Lisa Gorcyca and her rage against the Tsimhoni siblings in year 2015. <a href="http://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/17999/lengel_shameful_supreme_court_lets_judge_gorcyca_off_with_a_mere_censure" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This</a> and <a href="http://www.oneclubofjusticides.com/2018/07/larsen-in-scotus-big-no-no.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a> are only two of many posts discussing the ultimate outcome of that aberration. Even though judge Gorcyca extorted, yelled at, and for 17 days jailed the Tsimhoni siblings, absolute judicial immunity would bar any civil action for all the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress to which these three innocent siblings were subjected by judge Gorcyca.</p>

<p>Judicial immunity supposedly encompasses judicial acts only, but the fact is that it significantly extends to non-judicial acts as well. Consider the matter of <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/inmico20170707234" rel="nofollow noreferrer">judge Gregg Iddings</a>, who sexually harassed his secretary from 2012 to 2015.</p>

<p>Pretty much anyone would lose his job for sexually harassing (even if only once) a co-worker, but the Michigan Supreme Court decided that a six-month suspension was sufficient sanction for the judge's multi-year pattern of sexual harassment (note also how outrageous it was for the <a href="https://eu.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/06/11/lenawee-county-judge/387542001/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">judge's wife</a> to allegedly make her own statement "<em>calling the suspension draconian</em>", but that goes beyond the scope of your question). Not only was judge Iddings allowed to remain in judicial office after the suspension, but he was also allowed to seek re-election and received some <a href="http://www.oneclubofjusticides.com/2018/11/judge-carol-kuhnkes-imbecile.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">disreputable endorsements</a> to that effect. He ultimately <a href="http://www.lenconnect.com/news/20181108/sala-defeats-iddings-in-probate-judge-race" rel="nofollow noreferrer">lost his bench</a>, not by judicial sense of rectitude, but thanks to the electorate.</p>
