california consumer-protection motor-vehicle case-law lemon-law
What effect does this ruling have on the burden of proof, if any?
<p>“[T]he Act does not require consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or repair a vehicle to conform to applicable warranties—other than, of course, permitting the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle . . . . <strong>In reality, . . . , the manufacturer seldom on its own initiative offers the consumer the options available under the Act: a replacement vehicle or restitution.</strong>  Therefore, as a practical matter, the consumer will likely request replacement or restitution. But the consumer’s request is not mandated by any provision in the Act. Rather, the consumer’s request for replacement or restitution is often prompted by the manufacturer’s unforthright approach and stonewalling of fundamental warranty problems.” (<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1506706.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Lukather v. General Motors, LLC</em> (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1050</a> [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 853], original italics.)(California Jury Instruction CACI 3201)</p>
<p>This effectively means that most often manufacturers evade lemon branding provisions for the purposes of California's jurisdictions.</p>
<p>But does the text in bold (in its context) create any sort of presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, of the same fact that is that manufacturers are presumed to do this when the lemon buyback facts are actually present? Can you use this as a presumption at court?</p>

<h2>No, there is no Presumption Created</h2>
<p>The bolded statement is an expression by the Judge of the CA Court of Appeal who wrote the opinion of his or her experience in such matters, based on other such cases that have come up. It might incline a future court, particularly a trial court, not to stretch its discretion in favor of the auto manufacturer. But it forms no part of the binding holding, it is <em>obiter dictum</em>. The actual binding holdings are:</p>
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<li>[T]he evidence supports the implied finding that GM had ample time in the period between March 8 and April 12, 2007, in order to comply with the Act. No evidence supports GM's assertion that in this case the matter of restitution was a labor intensive process that required months to accomplish.</li>
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<li>[T]he Act does not require consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or repair a vehicle to conform to applicable warranties-other than, of course, permitting the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle․</li>
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<li>the manufacturer has an affirmative duty to replace a vehicle or make restitution to the buyer if the manufacturer is unable to repair the new vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts, and the buyer need not reject or revoke acceptance of the vehicle at any time.   The buyer need only provide the manufacturer with a reasonable opportunity to fix the vehicle.  </li>
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<li>[A] violation [of the Act] is not willful if the defendant's failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present.  </li>
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<li>Lukather's testimony and GM's telephone logs permitted the trial court to make the following reasonable inferences:  GM knew or reasonably should have known from information available from the dealer on March 8, 2007, that the Cadillac was a “lemon” and Lukather had selected the restitution option.   Nevertheless, for the next two months GM did not act in good faith to provide Lukather with the restitution remedy;  rather, GM actively discouraged Lukather from pursuing this remedy by telling him that the Cadillac was repaired and he should pick it up, that he should select another car at the dealer, that he would not get all of his money back, and that it would take several months for GM to act on his request for restitution. [This constitutes willful violation of the act.]</li>
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<li>As in Jiagbogu, the imposition of a requirement that Lukather mitigate his damages so as to avoid rental car expenses - after GM had a duty to respond promptly to Lukather's demand for restitution - would reward GM for its delay in refunding Lukather's money.</li>
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<p>None of these holdings alter the burner of proof, and all of them appear to be in accordance with previous decisions, cited in the opinion. In short, this decision affirms and restates the existing rules under the California Lemon Law, and do not change the law in any significant way. Future similar cases ought to be decided in much the same way, absent a change in the law.</p>
