united-states licensing constitutional-law traffic frivolous-arguments
Legal to &quot;drive&quot; without a license
<p>Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be protected by the courts.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667 (1971):</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>No where does it specify you can only travel as a passenger, where is the confusion coming from that you can ONLY travel freely by public conveyance or as a passenger?</p>

<p>Apparently, people are citing these cases for the proposition that there is a right to drive a car without a license (several facebook accounts making this claim have been shut down and a <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/185596996/Right-to-Drive-No-License" rel="noreferrer">document making this argument</a> is signed with the Biblical name of God). This is frivolous poppycock reserved for conspiracy theory crackpots that also never works. </p>

<p>A lawyer who tried to make an argument like this in court would probably be sanctioned by the trial court judge for making a frivolous argument, and might even risk suspension of his license to practice law, unless he made clear that he was arguing for a change in the law that is not supported by any current law.</p>

<p>Like all rights, the right to travel, including the right to travel by motor vehicle, is subject to reasonable restrictions which include the requirement that one have a driver's license that is currently valid.</p>

<p>No court has ever held that having a traffic code regulating the use of motor vehicles on public roads is unconstitutional, nor has any court every held that the government may not obstruct public roads in a reasonable manner for purposes such as maintenance, parades, and the like.</p>

<p>The question in <em><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/14/930.html" rel="noreferrer">People v. Horton</a></em> (the correct citation to which is 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666 and not the one cited that conflates two separate citations in different reporters to the same case), entered by an intermediate appellate court in California on January 29, 1971, is whether a search of an occupant of a motor vehicle requires probable cause under the 4th Amendment as incorporated by the 14th Amendment to apply to the states, and under parallel California constitutional provisions, and it hold that even occupants of motor vehicles have a 4th Amendment expectation of privacy despite the exigent circumstances associated with a motor vehicle. A more complete quotation from the case states:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Applying these principles to the instant case, we are impelled to
  conclude that Officer Winfrey did not have legal cause to stop
  appellant's automobile. Appellant was driving within the legal speed
  limits, not erratically, and there were no visible operational defects
  on the vehicle. Furthermore, although the officer observed two young
  passengers in the vehicle, he saw no furtive or suspicious movements
  and he had no information that the youths were being kidnaped,
  detained or molested in any manner. In fact, the only reason given by
  Winfrey for stopping appellant was that appellant was driving a
  vehicle along the streets of Modesto at 1:15 in the morning with two
  young passengers and that he did not look old enough to be their
  parent or guardian. Clearly, even if we should assume that what the
  officer observed constituted unusual activity, and it is difficult to
  make such an assumption in this modern age, the activity alone did not
  suggest that it was related to criminality. </p>
  
  <p>The Attorney General
  argues that Officer Winfrey had reasonable cause to stop appellant's
  vehicle on suspicion that appellant was aiding and abetting his two
  young passengers to loiter in violation of the municipal ordinance of
  the City of Modesto. However, driving along city streets, even at
  1:15 in the morning, is not “loitering.” (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d
  308, 312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d
  845, 853 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353].) For all that Officer
  Winfrey knew, appellant could have been driving his two young
  passengers home from a theater or other authorized place of amusement.</p>
  
  <p>We are not insensitive to the numerous problems which face police
  officers on patrol in a mechanized nation. As we stated in Bramlette
  v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.App.2d 799, 804 [78 Cal.Rptr. 532], “[t]he
  use *934 of the automobile in criminal activity has vastly increased
  the possibility of unlawful conduct, and the likelihood of escape by
  criminals from the scene of their crimes.” Moreover, we are cognizant
  of the fact that the great majority of police officers assume the
  grave responsibility which our society has foisted upon them in a
  courageous and conscientious manner. Nonetheless, the right of the
  citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police
  interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in
  some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right
  which must be protected by the courts. Consequently, while we do not
  censure Officer Winfrey or question his motives, the fact remains that
  he stopped appellant's vehicle solely because it was occupied by young
  people. Were we to condone the stopping of vehicles for this reason
  alone, no matter how altruistic the officer's motive might be, we
  would lend our approval to the creation of a second class citizenry;
  we would also contribute to an already deteriorating relationship
  between the youth of America and law enforcement officials; in a free
  nation this relationship must be based on mutual confidence and
  respect. </p>
  
  <p>Having decided that Officer Winfrey did not have probable
  cause to stop appellant's vehicle in the first instance, it follows
  that the subsequent search was unlawful, even though consented to by
  appellant, and that all evidence adduced therefrom was the product of
  an unlawful search. As our Supreme Court said in People v. Haven, 59
  Cal.2d 713, 718, 719 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381, P.2d 927]: “A search or
  seizure made pursuant to a valid consent before any illegal police
  conduct occurs is obviously not a product of illegal conduct. A search
  and seizure made pursuant to consent secured immediately following an
  illegal entry or arrest, however, is inextricably bound up with the
  illegal conduct and cannot be segregated therefrom.” The case of
  People v. Franklin, 261 Cal.App.2d 703 [68 Cal.Rptr. 231], is squarely
  in point. There, as here, the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle
  without probable cause, and afterward defendant consented to the
  search which ultimately uncovered marijuana. The court in reversing
  the conviction, at page 707 of the opinion, had this to say: “The stop
  having been illegal, the search, though by consent of the vehicle
  owner, does not breathe legality into the resultant find by the
  officers.”</p>
</blockquote>

<p>A later California case before the same intermediate appellate court a few years later, also distinguished <em>People v. Horton</em>, holding that while driving in a car as a juvenile as 1:15 a.m. was not "loitering" that similar conduct did violate a municipal curfew ordinance for minors which was validly enacted and not unconstitutional. <em>In re Francis W.</em>, 117 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1974).</p>

<p>The claim that <em>People v. Horton</em> recognizes a constitutional right to drive without a license was analyzed and rejected in the case of <em>Newman v. Garcia</em>, 2016 WL 8939133, Case No. 3:16-cv-137-J-PDB (M.D. Fl. September 26, 2016) in which a federal trial court ruled on a motion to dismiss a civil rights claim brought by a man alleging that his constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license in which he sought $28 million of damages. The judge in that case held in pages 3-5 of the Slip Opinion that dismissed this claim that:</p>

<blockquote>
  <ol>
  <li>Right to Travel</li>
  </ol>
  
  <p>Newman primarily argues Officer Garcia violated his constitutional
  right to travel by issuing him a citation for driving with a suspended
  license and stopping him from driving his car. See generally Doc. 2,
  Doc. 12. He contends he has a protected liberty interest in driving on
  public highways, he does not need a license to drive, and a driver's
  license is a contract between the state and a person that is cancelled
  when the state suspends a license. Doc. 12 at 3–4, 7. In Kent v.
  Dulles, the United States Supreme Court explained the right to
  travel—the freedom to move “across frontiers in either direction, and
  inside frontiers as well”—is “part of the ‘liberty’ of which the
  citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law.” Kent v.
  Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). It has long been recognized as a
  basic constitutional right. Att'y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476
  U.S. 898, 901 (1986). “A state law implicates the right to travel when
  it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary
  objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize
  the exercise of that right.” Id. at 903 (internal citations and
  quotation marks omitted). A restriction on one method of travel does
  not violate a person's constitutional rights. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d
  1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no constitutional right to the
  “most convenient form of travel.” City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d
  1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).</p>
  
  <p>*4 <strong>The constitutional right to travel does not include a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle. Duncan v. Cone, 2000 WL 1828089, at *2
  (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206 (9th Cir.
  1999).</strong> <strong>The Supreme Court has recognized a state's power to “prescribe
  uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect
  to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v.
  Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). That includes passing legislation
  requiring drivers to have licenses. Id.</strong> Such a regulation is “but an
  exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the
  states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and
  comfort of their citizens.” Id.</p>
  
  <p>Newman cites many state-court cases he contends support his argument
  he has a right to drive without a license. See Doc. 12 at 3–4. They do
  not. See People v. Horton, 92 Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)
  (addressing legality of traffic stop and search; observing, “The right
  of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police
  interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in
  some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right
  which must be protected by the courts” (emphasis added)); Schecter v.
  Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 137–38 (Ariz. 1963) (addressing state law
  suspending license of uninsured motorist involved in an accident who
  does not post sufficient security); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d
  869, 871, 872 (R.I. 1958) (addressing state law suspending license for
  failure to deposit security with the registrar; observing, “[T]he
  right to use the public highways for travel by motor vehicles is one
  which properly can be regulated by the legislature in the valid
  exercise of the police power of the state”); Payne v. Massey, 196
  S.W.2d 493, 495–96 (Tex. 1946) (addressing ordinance regulating
  operation of taxicabs); Teche Lines, Inc., v. Danforth, 12 So. 2d 784,
  785, 787 (Miss. 1943) (addressing state law regulating stopping on
  certain portion of highway; observing right to travel “may be
  reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuance of the police
  power of the State”); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930)
  (addressing contention city could not change ordinance to permit
  revocation of license; observing, “regulation of the exercise of the
  right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be
  accomplished in part ... by granting, refusing, and revoking ...
  permits to drive an automobile on its streets”); Swift v. City of
  Topeka, 23 P. 1075 (Kan. 1890) (addressing ordinance restricting use
  of bicycles on sidewalks and a bridge).4</p>
  
  <p>Newman does not cite authority to support his contention a driver's
  license is a contract with the state that is cancelled when the
  license is suspended, and he does not explain how the existence of a
  cancelled contract would support his argument that Officer Garcia
  violated his constitutional rights. See generally Doc. 12. <strong>Other
  courts have rejected similar arguments as meritless or frivolous.</strong> See
  Oliver v. Long, No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA, 2007 WL 1098527, at *5 (D.
  Ariz. Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished) (argument that by cancelling all
  contracts with California Department of Motor Vehicles plaintiff could
  violate traffic laws with impunity “frivolous,” “specious,” and
  “nonsensical”); North Carolina v. Ellison, 471 S.E. 2d 130, 131 (N.C.
  Ct. App. 1996) (argument that by cutting up license and returning it
  to Division of Motor Vehicles plaintiff had rescinded contract with
  state and could drive without complying with statutory requirements
  “without merit”). Absent authority to support the argument that a
  suspended driver's license is a cancelled contract with the state, and
  in light of states' authority to regulate the operation of motor
  vehicles on their roads, the argument is meritless.</p>
  
  <p>*5 Though Newman enjoys a constitutional right to travel, he has no fundamental right to drive. A state may regulate the operation of
  vehicles on its roads, including requiring a license. Officer Garcia
  informed him of the suspension and informed him of the consequences of
  driving with a suspended license but did not restrict his right to
  travel by other means of transportation. The complaint does not
  plausibly allege Officer Garcia violated Newman's right to travel</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The other two cases cited, in addition to the flaws noted below, also predate the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that a state has the power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” <em>Hendrick v. Maryland</em>, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915), including passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. <em>Id.</em> </p>

<p><em>Simeone v. Lindsay</em>, 65 Atl. 778, 779 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on February 27, 1907 (111 years ago as I write this). It held that at the time, in Delaware, on the public highway in question, both cars and pedestrians had an equal right to use the road and both had a duty of care in the contexts of a lawsuit against the car owner for causing an accident through negligence. It did not reference any fundamental or constitutional right and has no precedential value and has in any case been superseded by statute.</p>

<p><em>Hannigan v. Wright</em>, 63 Atl. 234, 236 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on December 13, 1905 also involving liability for an automobile accident. It says in the pertinent part:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public streets
  of a city as a vehicle of any kind. In using any parts of the streets
  all persons are bound to the exercise of, reasonable care to prevent
  collisions and accidents. Such care must be in proportion to the
  danger or the peculiar risks in each case. It is the duty of a person
  operating an automobile, or any other vehicle, upon the public streets
  of a city, to use ordinary care in its operation, to move it at a
  reasonable rate of speed, and cause it to slow up or stop if need be,
  where danger is imminent, and could, by the exercise of reasonable
  care, be seen or known in time to avoid accident. Greater caution is
  required at street crossings and in the more thronged streets of a
  city than in the less obstructed streets in the open or suburban
  parts.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Like <em>Simeone</em>, it predates the adoption of a statutory traffic code in the state of Delaware, has no precedential effect, is no longer good law, and does not purport to establish any fundamental or constitutional right. It merely enunciates the default rules governing the use of public highways by cars and pedestrians in the absence of other laws or regulations. </p>

<p>Rights, even fundamental rights, are never absolute.  They are always subject to appropriate regulation, restrictions, and conditions.  </p>

<p>It would be up to courts to determine when such restrictions are appropriate, and when they infringe upon the underlying right to an impermissible degree.</p>

<p>In this instance, I believe it is well established that a requirement for a driver's license is an appropriate and constitutional condition to place on the exercise of this right, and I don't see any indication that the courts you cite meant to overturn that.  I certainly don't know of any cases in which license requirements have explicitly been found to be unconstitutional.</p>
