civil-law civil-procedure
What would happen if Protagoras v Euathlus were heard in court today?
<p>So, I was browsing Wikipedia today, and I came across <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_the_Court" rel="noreferrer">this article</a>, detailing a lawsuit in Ancient Greece. Basically, what had occurred was that a man, Protagoras, had entered into a contract with another, Euathlus, to provide him with training in oratory and law, in exchange for a sum of money that was to be paid upon Euathlus's first win in court. After this training was provided, Euathlus decided not to go into the legal profession, so eventually Protagoras elected to sue Euathlus for the sum owed to him.</p>

<p>The two men made the following arguments:</p>

<p>Protagoras stated that regardless of the court's decision, he would be paid the money he was owed, since if the court found in his favor, he was be paid the money the court awarded him, and if Euathlus won, then the terms of the contract would have been met and he would be obligated to pay the money.</p>

<p>Euathlus rebutted, however, that he would owe no money, regardless of the court's decision: if he won, then the court would have ruled in his favor and annulled the debt, and if he lost, then he wouldn't have won any cases yet, and thus wouldn't owe any money to him in accordance to the terms of the contract.</p>

<p>What I was wondering was what would have happened if this case were to be tried in a modern-day courtroom? Has thousands of years of legal development created a resolution to the paradox?</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>What would happen if Protagoras v Euathlus were heard in court today? what would have happened if this case were to be tried in a modern-day courtroom?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Generally speaking, Protagoras's position would prevail under contract law. </p>

<p>Protagoras and Euathlus entered a contract in which the <em>exchange of considerations</em> involves tutoring and compensation therefor.</p>

<p>Since the agreement nowhere portrays compensation as contingent on Euathlus <em>not declining</em> to exercise as lawyer, the most reasonable inference is that the parties' understanding <em>at the time of the formation of their contract</em> implicitly ruled out that scenario.</p>

<p>Or at least that risk, which is under Euathlus's control, was not disclosed to Protagoras. Thus, the contingency cannot be said to be <em>knowingly</em> entered by Protagoras (contract law is premised, <em>inter alia</em>, on all the conditions being entered <em>knowingly and willfully</em> by the parties).</p>

<p>The paradox conveys that Euathlus changed his mind "<em>after been trained</em>". Even if ruling out Euahtlus's change of mind is viewed as a mistake of both parties which could make their contract voidable, Protagoras would entitled to restitution for the performance of his duties. See <a href="https://www.nylitigationfirm.com/files/restat.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Restatement (Second) of Contracts</em> at § 152(2)</a>.</p>

<p>The condition that compensation be made after Euathlus's first win in court can be interpreted twofold; namely, as:</p>

<ol>
<li><p>Protagoras's acting as creditor towards Euathlus while the latter obtains funds with which to pay the tutoring; or</p></li>
<li><p>Protagoras's form of guarantee that the tutoring he provides to Euathlus is effective, since winning a case in court may be taken as evidence (again, if we assume that nowadays courts are "all integrity and honesty") of having received competent training.</p></li>
</ol>

<p>Both interpretations strengthen Protagoras's legal position, as these evidence his commitment to the covenant of <em>good faith and fair dealing</em>, respectively. By contrast, Euathlus only benefited from both standpoints without giving anything in return to Protagoras.</p>

<p>Furthermore, Euathlus's eventual decision not to work as lawyer amounts to forfeiting the aforementioned guarantee, since his unilateral decision precludes testing the effectiveness of the tutoring he received.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Has thousands of years of legal development created a resolution to the paradox?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The Paradox of the Court is more of a <em>philosophical challenge for beginners</em> that stays there and leaves out many (im-)practicalities and legal issues. But an assumption that the Ancient Greeks would not have considered these aspects in a real-life controversy would be naive and oversimplistic, especially if we bear in mind the great intellectual development they achieved.</p>

<p>Here I only cited the <em>Restatement (Second) of Contracts</em>, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts deciding contract disputes. But I can assure you that many of these principles as well as issues of impracticalities were essentially (and perhaps similarly) addressed by Aristotle.</p>

<h2>Euathlus would win</h2>

<p>At the time of the case, Euathlus has not won a case so he has no obligation to pay Protagoras. Under contract law, the court would find there is no obligation to pay. </p>

<p>But now that Euathlus won a case Protagoras can just bring the suit again, right? Sadly, no. Protagoras cannot bring suit again under the doctrine of <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Res_judicata" rel="nofollow noreferrer">res judicata</a>.</p>

<p>Now Protagoras can win but not in the way he's trying to do - he can bring a different suit (for anything) that Euathlus is bound to win. Euathlus wins that and Protagoras can then claim his payment.</p>

<p>This is on the facts as stated.</p>

<p>However, if Euathlus had represented to Protagoras an intention to enter the law (rather than Protagoras just assuming this because Euathlus wanted to learn law) then the contract could be declared void for misrepresentation. Protagoras could then seek compensation through an equitable remedy such as promissory estoppel or quantum meruit. Of course, he would need to run this argument at the same time as the contract law one as red judicata would prevent him running it later.</p>
