immigration freedom-of-speech social-media
Judges barring defendants from using social media
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/style/anna-delvey-sorokin-released.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">A New York Times article</a> recently mentioned that a US immigration judge has prohibited a non-US-citizen from speaking on social media, apparently as a condition of release from detention.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>But the federal immigration judge Charles R. Conroy ruled this week that Ms. Sorokin was no longer such a threat — provided she wears an ankle bracelet. She will also be barred from using social media, including the accounts she already has.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>How is this ability to ban people from publishing in a particular place or kind of place to be squared with free speech rights? Is it:</p>
<ol>
<li>US law does not actually recognize or protect a right to free speech by non-citizens, so while this would be illegal to do to a citizen it is not illegal here.</li>
<li>US law does not prevent the government from cutting deals with people where they &quot;voluntarily&quot; restrict their speech and it &quot;voluntarily&quot; stops locking them up when it might otherwise be allowed to. Or from then locking them up again if they go back on the deal.</li>
<li>There's something in the judge's ruling that justifies this particular restriction on free speech in this particular case, such as it being reasonably necessary to protect against the person committing a crime. (This would make a lot more sense in, say, a libel case than an immigration case.)</li>
</ol>
<p>Or is it something else?</p>

<p>The NYT article implies that she has used social media in the past to get her victims to believe her fake back story.</p>
<p>She is being released from detention, and the restriction on her using social media is not tied to her expressing a particular viewpoint.</p>
<p>Courts have repeatedly held that the Government can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms <em>if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest</em> ( U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 - Supreme Court 1968).</p>
<p>One such compelling interest is <em>the effective administration of criminal justice</em> (U.S. v. Spilotro, 786 F. 2d 808 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1986). For instance, speech restrictions can be tied to the purpose of preventing a defendant from committing further crimes while released.</p>
