At the time of its founding, the organization was called the Society of Conscious Motherhood. In 1959 it was admitted to the  International Planned Parenthood Federation  (IPPF). In 1960 the first national congress of the Society, members were organized. The name of the organization was changed again in 1970, to the Society for Family Planning. Since 1979 the present name – Society for Family Development - is still in use. At the moment of its widest coverage (1988) The company had 8 clinics, 23 premarital clinics and family counseling, 3 youth clinics, 4 antenatal and 40 branches in different provinces. People connected with the Society:  sexologists  prof.  Mikołaj Kozakiewicz  – longtime chairman of the TRR,  Kazimierz Imieliński ,  Michalina Wisłocka  and  Zbigniew Lew-Starowicz .


The Society is currently a member of the  International Planned Parenthood Federation  and the Federation for Women and Family Planning.


The main tasks of the Society include: support for women and men in their right to decide the number and spacing of their children's birthdays, promotion of family planning movement through: information, counseling and advocacy, and collaboration with all stakeholders. Society for their actions emphasizes the importance of prevention care for the health of women of reproductive age and the health of mother and child, by disseminating information and specific services. An important task is to fight for equal rights for men and women and help women in a bid to fully participate in public, political and economic life.


The objectives of the Society are:


The  Society of Family Planning  ( SFP ) is an international non-profit [ 1 ]  professional organization established in 2005 specializing in " abortion  and  contraception  science" [ 2 ] [ 3 ]  composed of  physicians ,  nurses ,  sociologists ,  public health  practitioners and trainees in these fields. [ 4 ]  The majority of member physicians include specialists of  obstetrics and gynecology ,  family medicine , and  adolescent medicine . [ 4 ]


The organization sponsors the Society of Family Planning Research Fund that provides grants for research in abortion and contraception. [ 4 ]  This funding source was established in 2011. The Society of Family Planning supports the  Fellowship in Complex Family Planning , previously known as the Fellowship in Family Planning. The  fellowship  is certified by the  American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology  (ABOG), member of the  American Board of Medical Specialties , as a  subspecialty  of  Obstetrics and Gynecology . [ 5 ]


The Society of Family Planning was created in 2005 by 18 founding members and 33 charter members, initially focusing on grant support for rigorous family planning research. [ 4 ] [ 6 ]  Membership has expanded to almost 800 members as of 2017. [ 4 ]  As of 2020, the scope of the organization includes education based on clinical guidelines, research and grants, and advocacy through clinical guidelines and research. [ 4 ] [ 7 ] [ 8 ]  The organization holds an annual meeting called the North American Forum on Family Planning (the Forum). [ 9 ]


There are three categories of membership: Fellow, Junior Fellow, and Affiliate Fellow. [ 10 ]  In order to apply for membership, a potential applicant must be referred by a current member. [ 11 ]  Members connect to the Society and collaborate with each other through  Society of Family Planning Connect . [ 12 ]


Contraception  published by  Elsevier  is the official SFP  medical journal . [ 13 ]  As of 2019, the journal has an  Impact Factor  of 2.819.


The Society of Family Planning is managed by staff members including an Executive Director and an elected Board of Directors. [ 2 ]  The organization is also made up of Committees, Subcommittees and Working Groups including the Executive, Governance, and Finance Committees; Complex Family Planning Council; Annual Meeting, Clinical Affairs and Research Affairs Subcommittees; Abortion Clinical Research Network Working Group; and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Working Group. [ 2 ]


The Society of Family Planning was originally created to provide grant support for family planning research. While the Society's scope has expanded, it has continued to provide significant research support, funding over $2.6 million dollars in grants in 2019. [ 14 ]  After an analysis of the impact of a decade of grantmaking, [ 15 ] [ 8 ]  the Society of Family Planning Research Fund transitioned to funding targeted grant opportunities, published in the spring and awarded in the fall. SFP also supports the Abortion Clinical Research Network, a multi-site research network including independent clinics,  Planned Parenthood  affiliates, academic practices, patients, and researchers. [ 16 ] [ 8 ]


The  Fellowship in Complex Family Planning (CFP)  is accredited by the  Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education  as a two-year  fellowship  after completing specialty training in  obstetrics and gynecology . [ 17 ] [ 5 ] [ 18 ]  The fellowship focuses on further clinical training and research on complex  abortion  and  contraception.  SFP's Complex Family Planning Council partners with  ABOG  to provide programmatic oversight of the  fellowship . [ 19 ]  Many academic institutions offer this fellowship training including  Columbia University ; [ 20 ]   Johns Hopkins University ; [ 21 ]   University of California, Davis ; [ 22 ]   University of Michigan ; [ 23 ]   University of Southern California ; [ 24 ]  and  Yale University . [ 25 ] [ 18 ]


Together with other medical and reproductive health organizations, the Society of Family Planning filed  amicus briefs  in  Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, [ 26 ] [ 27 ]  later  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby , [ 28 ]  to support increased access to the full range of contraceptive methods approved by the  US Food and Drug Administration . In her  dissenting opinion ,  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg  highlighted the importance of contraception to women in whom pregnancy may pose life-threatening risk and non-contraceptive benefits including cancer prevention and treatment of menstrual disorders and pelvic pain. [ 28 ]


The  American Civil Liberties Union  filed  Chelius v. Wright  on behalf of Dr. Graham Chelius, the Society of Family Planning, and other organizations against the restricted access to  medical abortion . [ 29 ] [ 30 ]


The Society of Family Planning joined other medical organizations in the amicus brief  ACOG v. US Food and Drug Administration  against the in-person dispensing requirement of  mifepristone  in medical abortion. [ 31 ] [ 32 ] [ 33 ]


The  American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists  (ACOG) and Society of Family Planning jointly developed clinical guidance on medical abortion up to 70 days' gestation. [ 34 ]  SFP endorsed ACOG's Practice Guideline on second-trimester abortion. [ 35 ]


After a workshop entitled "Reproductive Services for Women at High Risk for Maternal Mortality", ACOG, SFP,  Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine  (SMFM), and the Fellowship in Family Planning, now known as the  Fellowship in Complex Family Planning , [ 17 ]  issued an  executive summary [ 36 ]  and  consensus statement [ 37 ]  regarding assessment, counseling, and training on reproductive health services for women at high risk for maternal morbidity and mortality. [ 38 ] [ 39 ]  To promote development of evidence-based guidelines for reproductive health services associated with high-risk pregnancies, SFP and SMFM are partnering to offer the  SMFM and SFP Bridge Builder Award  for research funding. [ 40 ]  SMFM refers to  SFP guidance on contraceptive provision  when there is restricted healthcare access during the  COVID-19 pandemic . [ 41 ] [ 42 ]


The Society of Family Planning released a  statement  to preserve timely access to abortion services during the COVID-19 pandemic, in collaboration with ACOG,  ABOG ,  American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists , American Gynecological and Obstetrical Society,  American Society for Reproductive Medicine , the Society for Academic Specialists in General Obstetrics and Gynecology, and SMFM. [ 43 ]


Yayasan Cipta Cara Padu (YCCP) [ 1 ]  was established in 2008 to sustain donor assisted programs implemented by  Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Center  for Communication Programs in  Indonesia  in the past 15 years.


YCCP has expertise and hands-on experience in a wide spectrum of health and environmental issues including water, sanitation and hygiene,  HIV/AIDS , safe motherhood, child survival,  family planning  (FP), [ 2 ]  reproductive health (RH), infectious disease, and environmental conservation.


Activities


Currently, the YCCP team is managing:  The Advance Family Planning (AFP)  initiative, funded by the Gates Institute;  the Improving Contraceptive Method Mix (ICMM) , funded by  USAID  and AUSAID; and the High Five program, funded by USAID.


Natalism  (also called  pronatalism  or the  pro-birth  position) is a policy paradigm or personal value that promotes the  reproduction  of  human  life as an important objective of humanity and therefore advocates high  birthrate . [ 1 ]


According to the  Merriam-Webster dictionary , the term, as it relates to the belief itself, dates from 1971 and comes from  French :  nataliste , formed from  French :  natalité , birthrate. [ 2 ]


Just like a  population decline  is observed in many countries associated with  ageing  and  cultural modernization , attempts at a political response are also growing. According to the  UN , the share of countries with pronatalist policies had grown from 20% in 2005 to 28% in 2019. [ 3 ]


Generally, natalism promotes  child-bearing  and  parenthood  as desirable for social reasons and to ensure the continuance of humanity. Some philosophers have noted that if humans fail to have children, humans would become extinct. [ 4 ] [ 5 ]


Many religions encourage procreation, and religiousness in members can sometimes correlate to higher rates of fertility. [ 6 ]   Judaism , [ 7 ]   Islam , and major branches of  Christianity , including  the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints [ 8 ]  and the  Catholic Church , [ 9 ] [ 10 ] [ 11 ]  encourage procreation. In 1979 one research paper indicated that  Amish  people had an average of 6.8 children per family. [ 12 ]  Among some conservative Protestants, the  Quiverfull  movement advocates for large families and views children as blessings from God. [ 13 ] [ 14 ] [ 15 ]


Those who adhere to a more traditionalist framing may therefore seek to limit access to  abortion  and  contraception , as well. [ 16 ]  The 1968  encyclical   Humanae Vitae  e.g. criticized artificial contraception and advocated for a natalist position. [ 17 ]


Beginning around the early 2020s, the threat of "global demographic collapse" began to become a cause célèbre among wealthy tech and venture-capitalist circles [ 18 ] [ 19 ]  as well as the  political right . [ 19 ] [ 20 ]  In Europe, Hungarian prime minister  Viktor Orbán  has made natalism a key plank of his political platform. [ 19 ]  In the United States, key figures include Kevin Dolan, organizer of the  Natal Conference , [ 21 ] [ 20 ] [ 22 ]   Simone and Malcolm Collins , founders of Pronatalist.org, [ 18 ] [ 23 ] [ 21 ]  and  Elon Musk , who has repeatedly used his public platform to discuss global birth rates. [ 18 ] [ 19 ]


The right-wing proponents of pronatalism argue that falling birthrates could lead to economic stagnation, diminished innovation, and an unsustainable burden on social systems due to an aging population. [ 23 ]  The movement suggests that without a significant increase in birth rates, the sustainability of civilizations could be in danger; Elon Musk has called it a "much bigger risk" than global warming. [ 24 ] [ 18 ]


An intention to have children is a substantial  fertility factor  in actually ending up doing so, but childless individuals who intend to have children immediately or within two or three years are generally more likely to succeed than those who intend to have children in the long term. [ 25 ]
There are many determinants of the intention to have children, including:


Natalism in  public policy  typically seeks to create financial and social incentives for populations to reproduce, such as providing tax incentives that reward having and supporting children. [ 28 ]


Some countries with  population decline  offer incentives to the people to have large families as a means of  national efforts to reverse declining populations . Incentives may include a one-time  baby bonus , or ongoing  child benefit  payments or tax reductions. Some impose penalties or  taxes  on those with fewer children. [ 36 ] [ 27 ]  Some nations, such as  Japan , [ 37 ]   Singapore , [ 38 ]  and  South Korea , [ 39 ]  have implemented, or tried to implement, interventionist natalist policies, creating incentives for larger families among native stock.


Paid  maternity and paternity leave policies  can also be used as an incentive. For example,  Sweden  has generous parental leave wherein parents are entitled to share 16 months' paid leave per child, the cost divided between both employer and  state . However, it appears not to work as desired. [ 40 ]   [ 41 ]


Natalist thinking was common during Soviet times. After a brief adherence to the strict Communist doctrine in 1920s and attempts to raise children communally, coupled with the government-provided healthcare, the Soviet government switched to  neo-traditionalism , promoting  family values  and sobriety, banning abortions and making divorces harder to obtain, advancing natalist ideals that made mockery of irresponsible parents. The expanded opportunities for female employment caused a population crisis in the 1930s, government had expanded access to child care starting at the age of two. [ 42 ]   After the  Great Patriotic war  the skewed ratio of men to women prompted additional financial assistance to women that had children or were pregnant. Despite the promotion  and long maternity leave with maintenance of employment and salary, modernization still caused birthrates to continue to slide into the 1970s. [ 43 ]


The end of the  USSR  in 1991 was accompanied by a large drop in fertility. [ 43 ]  In 2006,  Vladimir Putin  made demographics an important issue, [ 44 ]   instituting a two-pronged approach of direct financial rewards and socio-cultural policies. The notable example of the former is the maternal-capital program where the woman is provided with subsidies that can be spent only on improved housing or the education of a child (and can also be saved for the retirement).  [ 45 ]


The Hungarian government of  Viktor Orbán  in 2019 announced pecuniary incentives (including eliminating taxes for mothers with more than three children, and reducing credit payments and easier access to loans), and expanding day care and kindergarten access. [ 46 ]


Natalism has been criticized on human-rights and environmental grounds. Most  antinatalists ,  malthusians ,  reproductive rights  advocates and environmentalists see natalism as a driver of reproductive injustice, population growth, and  ecological overshoot . [ 33 ] [ 28 ] [ 36 ] [ 27 ] [ 47 ] [ 30 ]  In politics, journalists have linked the pronatalist movement with  far-right   eugenics . [ 48 ] [ 20 ]


The  Alliance for the Union of Romanians  ( Romanian :  Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor ,  AUR , meaning "gold" in  Romanian ) [ 28 ]  is a  right-wing populist [ 11 ] [ 12 ]  and  nationalist [ 29 ] [ 5 ] [ 30 ]  political party active in  Romania  and  Moldova . It was founded on 19 September 2019 ahead of the  2020 Romanian local  and  legislative  elections. The party president is  George Simion . The party ran in the local elections, not obtaining many votes and only winning in three towns. However, in the legislative elections, the AUR won 9% of the votes in all of Romania and its  diaspora , thus becoming the fourth-largest party in the country at the central level, which surprised observers. As of 2025, the party is the second largest party in the  Romanian Parliament .


AUR aims for the unification of all  Romanians  from Romania and Romanian-populated neighbouring zones, and for the support of the Romanian diaspora in other countries. The party seeks the  unification of Moldova and Romania , supports  NATO  membership and aims for  energy independence  for Romania. It claims it is a  centre-right , [ 31 ]   patriotic , [ 32 ]  and  Christian democratic  party. [ 33 ]  It has been described as supporting anti-vaccination ideas and being  Magyarophobic , [ 34 ] [ 35 ] [ 12 ]   neo-fascist , [ 36 ] [ 37 ]   pro-Russian , [ 38 ] [ 39 ] [ 40 ] [ 41 ]  and  antisemitic ; [ 24 ] [ 26 ] [ 42 ] [ 43 ]  relevant figures of the party have rejected all these characterizations. [ 44 ] [ 45 ] [ 46 ]  The party states that its four main pillars are " family ,  nation ,  Christian faith , and  liberty ". The party has been described as being  right-wing , [ 47 ] [ 48 ] [ 49 ]  as well as  far-right . [ 28 ] [ 50 ] [ 51 ]


The Alliance for the Union of Romanians was formally established on 19 September 2019. [ 52 ]  Later, during the  Great Union Day  of  Romania  on 1 December 2019, its leader,  George Simion , said the party's aims were to participate in the  2020 Romanian local  and  legislative  elections of the country. [ 53 ]  Simion had up to this point been a campaigner for the  unification of Romania and the Republic of Moldova . [ 12 ]   Claudiu Târziu , who was co-president of the party along Simion until 27 March 2022, [ 54 ]  was a member of  Coalition for the Family  which unsuccessfully campaigned to ban gay marriage through constitutional change in a  2018 referendum . [ 55 ] [ 56 ]


On 26 June 2020, AUR condemned the disinterest of the Romanian authorities regarding the  minority rights  of the  Romanians  in  Serbia  and Ukraine and declared that it would fully support them once it entered the  Romanian Parliament . [ 57 ]  Two days later, AUR also condemned the 80th anniversary of the  annexation  of  Bessarabia ,  Northern Bukovina , and the  Hertsa region  by the  Soviet Union , declaring that "it is our obligation to regain our state". [ 58 ]  By July 2020, AUR counted 22 branches in Europe and North America for the  Romanian diaspora . [ 59 ]  The first of these was established in  Wolverhampton , in the United Kingdom. [ 60 ]  AUR was the only party in Romania that expressed support for  Donald Trump  in the  2020 United States presidential election . [ 61 ]


During the 2020 Romanian local elections, AUR won the  mayoralty  in three towns:  Amara ,  Pufești , and  Valea Lungă . [ 62 ]


In the 2020 Romanian legislative election, AUR obtained a high percentage of the votes, being called as the "surprise" of Romania. The results also increased the popularity of the party on the  Internet . [ 12 ] [ 63 ] [ 64 ]  The party came first among  Romanians in Italy , the largest group of the Romanian diaspora, and ran a close second among  Romanians in France  and  Romanians in Spain . It also scored first in  Cyprus . [ 65 ]  AUR's candidate for prime minister was  Călin Georgescu , who worked for the  United Nations  for 17 years. [ 66 ]  According to a statement released by AUR, between 7 and 8 December 2020, 15,000 Romanians joined the party in just 24 hours. The party is supposedly to have 46 members of parliament in the 2020–2024 Romanian legislature, according to the same statement. [ 67 ]


The party achieved good results in rural areas of  Moldavia  and  Dobruja , areas traditionally dominated by the other big parties. Its most significant percentages were in the counties where the  Romanian Orthodox Church  has a strong influence and a large number of practicing believers. These are  Suceava  (14.72%),  Botoșani  (14.62%),  Neamț  (14.4%),  Constanța  (14.2%), and  Vrancea  (13.43%). [ 68 ]  The party speculated the new communication channels (social networks) in a similar way to the  Greater Romania Party  (PRM) of the late 1990s - early 2000s, which used the newspaper "România Mare" ( Greater Romania ) as a communication channel, reaching high electoral scores. Another example is the  People's Party – Dan Diaconescu  (PP-DD), which was propelled with the help of the  OTV  television channel. [ 68 ]


Recorder, a Romanian online publisher, argues that the election campaign of AUR has adapted to the rural environment, which lacks modern technology, relying more on messages desired by the masses than on a coherent ideology. In this way, they argue, in addition to a core of supporters who voted for radical messages, there is also the wider category of electorate strictly attracted by populist messages. [ 68 ]


On 22 January 2021, Simion announced that the party would officially adhere at European level to the " European Conservatives and Reformists Party " after going on visits in Poland and  Brussels , Belgium. [ 69 ]  Simion announced on 15 March 2021 that the AUR had intentions to start operating in the  Republic of Moldova  on the occasion of the  Day of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania  celebrated every 27 March. [ 70 ]  The party was officially launched, as previously stated, on 27 March 2021, and the elected president of the party was Vlad Bilețchi, a renowned Moldovan unionist. [ 71 ]  This new section of the AUR in Moldova later participated in the  Moldovan snap parliamentary elections  of 11 July 2021. [ 72 ]


On 2 October 2021, AUR organised a 15,000–20,000 people-strong protest against  COVID-19  restrictions at the  Victory Square  in Bucharest, drawing both national and international attention and being the most attended protest in Romania since the start of the pandemic. [ 73 ] [ 74 ]  On 5 October 2021, a  motion of no confidence  initiated by AUR, but legally proposed by PSD, was passed with 281 votes, thus dismissing the  Cîțu Cabinet . [ 75 ]


On 27 March 2022, AUR held its first party congress at the  Palace of the Parliament . On it, it was intended to elect the party's president. There were two candidates, Simion and Dănuț Aelenei, AUR deputy in the Constanța County. Aelenei claimed to have nominated himself with the simple intention of showing that AUR was a democratic party and that he did not intend to "expel" Simion from the party, admitting that he was less well-known compared to him. 784 voted for Simion and 38 for Aelenei, making Simion the party's sole president after having previously shared leadership with Târziu, who became president of the party's CNC. [ 54 ]  In November 2022, Simion met with Israel's ambassador to Romania, Reuven Azar. The encounter drew  outrage from some Israelis and diaspora Jews, as AUR is officially boycotted by Israel due to its history of antisemitism. [ 76 ] [ 77 ]


On 14 November 2023, at an AUR press conference,  Lidia Vadim Tudor  (the daughter of the late  Corneliu Vadim Tudor ), former Minister for Business Environment  Ilan Laufer  (who is also the president of the  National Identity Force ), businessman  Muhammad Murad , entrepreneur  Sorin Constantinescu  and  Sorin Ilieșiu , as well as deputies  Florică Calotă  (who was elected on PNL list),  Daniel Forea  (elected on PSD list),  Dumitru Viorel Focșa  (elected on AUR, but later left) and senators  Ovidiu Iosif Florean  (elected on PNL list),  Călin Gheorghe Matieș  (elected on PSD list) and  Vasilică Potecă  (elected on PNL list) announced that they are joining AUR for the next election. [ 78 ]  Later, on 21 November, AUR announced, together with the  Romanian Village Party ,  National Rebirth Alliance ,  Romanian Republican Party  and  National Peasants' Alliance  the creation of a Sovereigntist Alliance to contest the  2024 Romanian parliamentary election . [ 79 ] [ 80 ]


After the  2024 European Parliament Election , AUR gained 5 seats in the EU Parliament, with a total of 6 seats, receiving 14.9% of the total votes, ranking 2nd behind the  CNR . [ 81 ]  AUR previously held only 1 seat in the European Parliament. [ 82 ]  After the  2024 Romanian Local Elections , they are also expected to win some seats in county and local councils; however, not all votes have been counted nationally as of June 12, 2024, with results only available in some counties.


AUR is young as a party, but it didn't come out of nowhere. It brings together some people whose history is linked to the  late period of communism . Its candidates are experts in  propaganda , intellectuals with more or less open sympathy for  legionnaires  and legionary or pro-legionary intellectuals, businessmen and itinerant politicians who wander from one radical party to another.


According to the party's website, AUR's ultimate goal is to achieve the unification of all Romanians "wherever they are located, in  Bucharest ,  Iași ,  Timișoara ,  Cernăuți ,  Timoc ,  Voivodina , Italy, or Spain", while wanting to unite Romania and  Moldova  together, as well as land with Romanian speakers in neighboring countries. [ 84 ]  The website names four pillars for the party:  family ,  nation ,  Christian faith , and  liberty . [ 48 ] [ 56 ]  The party characterizes its members as "the defenders of the Church". [ 61 ]  It is opposed to " gender ideology " and believes that a nation has no chance of surviving "unless it cultivates the original pattern of the classic family". [ 49 ]


The party's representatives became popular on  social media  as a result of their positioning against measures taken by the government during the  COVID-19 pandemic . Leading members, such as Șoșoacă (later expelled), gained thousands of followers. AUR has been described as supporting "anti-medicine, anti-vaccination" rhetoric. [ 56 ]  This accusation was rejected by George Simion, president of AUR, claiming that the party supports the "freedom of choice". [ 85 ]  The party's manifesto opposes  secularism  and condemns  atheism , and claims that  Christians  are persecuted in Romania. [ 50 ]  The party has been critical of the impact of the  local autonomy of Hungarians in Romania  on the rights of ethnic Romanians in the centre of the country (where the  Hungarians  are the majority), [ 49 ]  leading to accusations of being  Magyarophobic . [ 12 ]  The latter accusation was rejected by the president of AUR, [ 86 ]  and the party denounced the media, accusing media outlets of spreading false information about its campaign. [ citation needed ]  Simion has cited  Law and Justice  and  Fidesz , the ruling parties in Poland and Hungary respectively, as some of his models. [ 87 ] [ 88 ]  Despite this, AUR has also expressed deep criticism of Fidesz, stating that it would not join the same group in the  European Parliament  as Fidesz, due to its claims on Romanian  territory . [ 89 ]  However, AUR later reversed its stance, expressing openness to Fidesz joining the  European Conservatives and Reformists . [ 90 ]


AUR wishes to position Romania as a leader in central and eastern Europe within the  European Union  and to integrate the Republic of Moldova into Romania, [ 5 ] [ 6 ] [ 91 ]  whilst also being  Eurosceptic . [ 6 ] [ 92 ]  The party is pro- NATO  and views the integration of Moldova into Romania as strengthening NATO's eastern flank. [ 49 ]  The party also takes a strongly pro- Israel  stance, supporting  Israeli settlements  in the  West Bank . [ 93 ]  It supports the  Serbian  stance on the  political status of Kosovo , considering Kosovo to be part of Serbia. [ 94 ]  By 2023, the party had become critical of Romanian military support for Ukraine in the  Russo-Ukrainian War , suggesting that the war is "not ours". AUR also criticised the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products through Romania, and Simion has been banned from entering Ukraine. [ 95 ]  Nevertheless, the party leadership is critical of relations with Russia, with Simion calling for the expulsion of the Russian Ambassador and closing Russian consulates in Romania following Russian threats against Romania in December 2023. [ 96 ]  Simion has called for Western nations to "stop exporting wars", suggesting that the downfall of the "strong Syrian state" during the  Syrian Civil War  had increased illegal immigration. [ 97 ]


AUR wishes to ensure Romania's self-sufficiency in energy, the prosecution of those deemed responsible for mismanaged post-Communist  privatisation  projects, and a fight against  illegal logging  by banning the export of non-processed wood. [ 87 ]  Additionally, AUR wishes to reform and modernize the education system, with a focus on reducing the overhead of political administration in order to improve the quality and the availability of education in Romania. [ citation needed ]  The party has a senate, which is equivalent to the National Executive Committee of other Romanian parties such as the PSD, the  National Liberal Party  (PNL), and the  Save Romania Union  (USR). [ 98 ]


Notes :


1   1 senator and 4 deputies from  NR  were elected on AUR's list [ 99 ]


Note :
 1   AUR Alliance  members: AUR (5 MEPs),  PNRC  (1 MEP) and the other party members did not achieved any mandates ( ARN , PRR and BUN).


The  Alternative Mitte   ( German  for "Alternative Midpoint" or "Alternative Centre"), sometimes referred to as  Alternative Mitte Deutschland , was a faction and  political association  within the  Alternative for Germany  party which was formed in 2017 and presented itself as "liberal patriotic" and "conservative". It has been described by commentators as being founded as a counterweight and a response to the more hardline  Der Flügel  wing of the AfD. [ 1 ]  The faction ended its activities in November 2019 without dissolving officially;  Der Flügel  ended its activities officially in April 2020.


In July 2017, a coalition formed within the AfD who took a critical view of rising voices within the party such as that of the Thuringian state spokesman and parliamentary group leader  Björn Höcke , who in a speech described the Berlin  Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe  as a "monument of shame."  Berengar Elsner von Gronow  first founded the  Alternative Mitte NRW  (AM) in  North Rhine-Westphalia  with like-minded people in order to "finally give the moderate, the bourgeois, a perceptible and concerted voice." Gronow argued the party had to work harder to counter media accusations that the AfD was a  far-right extremist movement  and that a vocal minority should not be allowed to dominate the party's external perception. [ 2 ]


The formation of the group was welcomed by former AfD chairwoman  Frauke Petry  and AfD national board member Dirk Driesang, who argued the party would not find peace unless there was an answer to the  Der Flügel  faction and networking was done to attract intellectual and middle class conservatives back to the AfD in order to strengthen Germany as a whole. [ 3 ] [ 4 ]  In September 2017, the association branched out into  Saxony-Anhalt ,  Hesse ,  Lower Saxony  and  Thuringia . The founder of Thuringia wing Helmut Witter argued that the party needed to focus on issues such as freedom of speech, law & order and the European Union while distancing itself from the  Identitarian movement . [ 5 ] [ 6 ] [ 7 ]


The AM was officiated nationwide in October 2017 in a meeting of around 200 AfD members in  Tettau  and was endorsed by AfD spokespeople Konrad Adam,  Beatrix von Storch  and  Alice Weidel . In a speech addressing the group, Von Storch stated its objectives of advocating a balance between the  national-conservative  and the  liberal-conservative  parts of the party, for talks between the camps, remembering the "historical responsibility from the Nazi era," support for Israel and observing red lines on extremism. [ 8 ] [ 9 ] [ 10 ]


The AM published an open letter to members and federal delegates of the AfD in which they warned against electing people to the federal executive board who do not respect  liberal democratic basic order  in Germany. [ 11 ]


In February 2018, the AM planned a rally in  Paderborn  but was forced to cancel the event after the owner of the venue received death threats and threats of protests by  left-wing  activists. [ 12 ] [ 13 ]


In March 2018, the group called on AfD to formally reject any collaboration between the party and  PEGIDA  founder  Lutz Bachmann . [ 14 ]


Journalist and author Matthias Kamann saw AM as an attempt to give those in the AfD a platform "who want it to be hard conservative, but factual - not ethnic or insulting. The fact that this voice has been missing so far is one of the many weaknesses of the party." [ 3 ]  On the other hand, commentator  Alan Posener  argued the AM was more about getting rid of the "yuck factor" rather than changing the ideological core of the party. [ 9 ]  Konrad Litschko of  Die Tageszeitung  described AM as a "current of moderate forces in the AfD." [ 15 ]  Tilman Steffen wrote in  Die Zeit  that he considers the AM group to be  socio-economically   right-wing populist  but does not espouse  Volkish  ethnic nationalism and presents itself as a moderate alternative to Björn Höcke and  Goetz Kubitschek  and rejects the integration of PEGIDA and the  Identitarian Movement into the AfD. [ 8 ] [ 16 ]


Writing in  Frankfurter Rundschau  political analyst and journalist Pitt von Bebenburg described the AM's objective as "preserving the nation state within secure borders and thus the local homeland," but rejecting "nationalism,  revisionism , totalitarianism or a  cult of personality  that rises above others." [ 17 ]


The  AUR Alliance  ( Romanian :  Alianța AUR ) is a Romanian  right-wing nationalist  political alliance, consisting of the  Alliance for the Union of Romanians  (AUR) and other smaller parties. The alliance was founded in January 2023, and aims to participate in the 2024 Romanian elections.


The AUR Alliance was officially founded on 24 January 2023, the  Day of the Unification of the Romanian Principalities . Initially, the alliance consisted of the  Alliance for the Union of Romanians  (AUR)  George Simion , the  Republican Party of Romania  (PRR) led by  Marian Cucșa , and the  National Peasant Alliance  (ANȚ) led by  Radu Ghidău . Party leaders said their common goal was to "return Romania to where it deserves to be" and win the 2024 elections. [ 1 ] [ 2 ]


On 14 November 2023, at an AUR press conference,  Lidia Vadim Tudor  (the daughter of the  Corneliu Vadim Tudor ), former Minister  Ilan Laufer  ( FIN  party leader), businessman  Muhammad Murad , entrepreneurs  Sorin Constantinescu  and  Sorin Ilieșiu , as well as deputies  Florică Calotă ,  Daniel Forea ,  Dumitru Viorel Focșa  and senators  Ovidiu Iosif Florean ,  Călin Gheorghe Matieș  and  Vasilică Potecă  announced that they are joining AUR Alliance for the 2024 elections. [ 3 ]


On 21 November 2023, George Simion announced that the  Romanian Village Party  and the  National Rebirth Alliance  would join the AUR Alliance. [ 4 ] [ 5 ]  On 14 December 2023,  Romanian National Conservative Party  (PNCR), led by  MEP   Cristian Terheș  since 12 December 2023, and the  National Unity Bloc  (BUN) party led by  Dorel Vulpoiu , joined the AUR Alliance. [ 6 ]


On 1 March 2024,  Ilan Laufer  announced that his FIN party was leaving the AUR Alliance. Laufer claimed that the  George Simion 's AUR Alliance and was created "to illegally transfer members of its member parties to the  AUR  Party, which is an attempt to eliminate sovereigntist parties from the Alliance with the clear aim of confiscating and destroying the nationalist and sovereigntist movement in Romania". [ 7 ]  On 2 March 2024, the National Peasant Alliance also announced its withdrawal from the AUR Alliance. The ANȚ leader explained the reason for leaving the alliance as "totalitarian tendencies and dictatorial leadership style" of George Simion. [ 8 ] [ 9 ]  The  Romanian Village Party  also left the AUR alliance before the 2024  local  and  European  elections. [ 10 ] [ 11 ]


In April 2024, PNCR leader  MEP   Cristian Terheș  became the leader of the AUR Alliance list for the  2024 European Parliament election in Romania . [ 12 ]


Note :
 1   AUR Alliance members:  AUR  (5 MEPs),  PNCR  (1 MEP) and the other party members did not achieved any mandates ( ARN , PRR and BUN).


A  baby boom  is a period marked by a significant increase of  births . This  demographic  phenomenon is usually  ascribed  within certain  geographical  bounds of defined  national  and  cultural  populations. The cause of baby booms involves various  fertility factors . The  best-known baby boom  occurred in the mid-twentieth century, sometimes considered to have started in the  Aftermath of World War II , sometimes from the late 1940s, and ending in the 1960s. [ 1 ]  People born during this period are often called  baby boomers .


"According to the new UNICEF report, almost 2 billion babies will be born in Africa between 2015 and 2050 and the 2 main driving forces behind this surge in births and children are continued high fertility rates and rising numbers of women able to have children of their own." [ 2 ]


By 2050, Africa is predicted to account for about 55% of all births in the world, 40% of all children under the age of five, and 37% of all children worldwide (under 18). Africa will become more crowded as its population continues to grow, considering the continent is predicted to grow from 8 people per square kilometer in 1950 to 39 in 2015, and to around 80 by the middle of the century. [ 3 ]


The  HIV/AIDS  crisis in Africa has contributed to a population boom. Aid money used for  contraception  has been diverted since the start of the AIDS crisis in Africa into fighting HIV, which has led to far more births than AIDS has killed. [ 4 ]


Africa accounted for one out of every nine births in the world in 1950. It is predicted that they will account for approximately one in every three global births by the year 2030. Africa would account for almost half of all births by the end of the century. [ 3 ]


Until the 1960s, the Aboriginal population rose steadily. The child mortality rate started to decline steadily in the 1960s, due to the increased access to health care. Throughout the 1960s, the fertility rate remained high, resulting in the Aboriginal baby boom peaking in 1967 – about ten years after the postwar baby boom in Canada. [ 5 ]


While Aboriginal fertility has remained higher than the overall Canadian birth rate, it has decreased from four times in the 1960s to one-and-a-half times today. According to Statistics Canada, demographic change was just a part of the reason for the increase in Aboriginal population in the last half of the century, with more complete census taking and increased numbers of people identifying as Aboriginal also playing a role. [ 5 ]


Generation X refers to the birth rate decline after the mid-20th century baby boom. Author Douglas Coupland, who coined the term Generation X, defined it as children born 1960 and after. High unemployment and uneven income distribution welcomed Generation X, giving them little opportunity to produce the next baby boom. [ 6 ]


In 2011, the children of baby boomers made up 27% of the total population; this category was called Generation Y, or the "baby boom echo". The fertility rate of the generations after the baby boomers dropped as a result of demographic changes such as increasing divorce and separation rates, female labour force participation, and rapid technological change. [ 6 ]


The echo generation's children, known as Generation Z, are people born after 1994, or after the invention of the Internet, making up over 7.3 million people in Canada born between 1993 and 2011. [ 6 ]


Israel has been in a constant baby boom since independence, with the highest fertility rate in the  OECD  at 3.1 children per woman. [ 7 ] [ 8 ]  In addition to having the highest fertility rate among developed nations, it is the only developed country to have never had a sub-replacement fertility rate. Israel's baby boom began in 1947, a year before independence, when the fertility rate among the  Yishuv , or Jewish population of what was then  Mandatory Palestine , began to rise dramatically as a result of the aftereffects of the  Holocaust  and expectations of Jewish independence. [ 9 ]


Ireland has a much younger population compared to Europe overall, with one in four people under age 15. [ 10 ]  This is likely due to the baby boom experienced in the late 2000s and early 2010s, after the Great Recession. The number of births in Ireland reached a 118-year high in 2009 when the economy experienced its worst year on record. The number of births had remained stable with 74,650 babies born in 2012, higher than the 65,600 average during the  Celtic Tiger  (1995–2007), despite the struggle to emerge from financial crisis. [ 11 ]


The number of births in Ireland rose by more than 3,000 in 2021 after being in decline for more than a decade, implying the  COVID-19 pandemic  triggered a baby boom in Ireland.  Health Service Executive  figures show 59,874 babies were born in maternity hospitals and units in 2021, up from 56,858 the previous year, which could continue into the early 2020s. It is the first time that there has been an annual increase since 2009, when there were 75,554 births registered. [ 12 ]


In Japan, the first baby boom occurred between 1947 and 1949. [ 13 ] [ note 1 ] [ note 2 ]  The number of births in this period exceeded 2.5 million every year, bringing the total number of births to about 8 million. The 2.69 million births in 1949 are the most ever in postwar statistics. [ note 3 ]  The cohort born in this period is called the "baby boom generation" (団塊の世代, dankai no sedai, means "the generation of  nodule ").


A period of more than two million annual births from 1971 to 1974, with the number of births in 1973 peaking at 2.09 million, [ 14 ]  is referred to as the second baby boom. However, unlike the first boom, this increase in the number of births is an increase in the number of births not accompanied by an increase in the total fertility rate. The people born during this period are often called "baby boom juniors" (団塊ジュニア, dankai junia, means "the juniors of the generation of  nodule ").


The number of annual Russian births hit a  low in the 1990s and early 2000s , following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the  1998 financial crisis . However, the following years saw the birth rate rise rapidly. By 2012, the number of births outnumbered deaths for the first time since the Soviet Union. [ 16 ]  To many Russians, this was not only a sign of  economic prosperity , but also a recovery from the poverty and social decline following the downfall of the Soviet Union. [ 17 ]


After the  fall of the Soviet Union  in 1991, the Ukrainian birth rate reached a low of 1.14 births per women in 2003. Following the  Orange Revolution , the  total fertility rate  gradually elevated, eventually to a peak of 1.49 births per women in 2014. However, this did not last, as the birth rate rapidly diminished following the  Invasion of Crimea  in 2014. [ 18 ]


Probably due to the ongoing  Russian Invasion of Ukraine , the birth rate in Ukraine has declined significantly in 2022, down to 1.2-1.3 per woman. Despite this, there could very well be a baby boom after the war ends, with the fertility rate projecting to reach 1.60 births per women by 2030. However, the millions of refugees and emigrants fleeing since the Russian Invasion will keep the overall population falling short of what it was before  the war  for at least a few decades, despite the baby boom. [ 19 ]


The term "baby boom" is often used to refer specifically to the post–World War II (1946–1964) baby boom in the United States and Europe. In the US the number of annual births exceeded 2 per 100 women (or approximately 1% of the total population size). [ 22 ]  An estimated 78.3 million Americans were born during this period. [ 23 ]


Since the beginning of the 20th century there were several baby booms:


The baby boomers are commonly defined as the generation born after the Second World War, generally from 1946 to 1964. However, this definition of baby boomers is based on American demographic trends which saw a surge in births post Second World War that was sustained into the 1960s. In the UK, the post Second World War surge in births was confined to a sharp spike in 1946, after which the number of births dropped again. Then the post-World War babies started having their babies, giving rise to the births that can be seen across the 1960s. Due to the different demographic profile seen in the UK compared to America, British people usually define as those born between 1960 and 1969 (inclusive) as baby boomers. [ 29 ]


As of 2021, baby boomers make up about 20% of the British population, which is about 14 million people. Baby boomers today are certainly one of the most powerful and wealthy generations in the United Kingdom. For example, in 2020, growth in online shopping was led by baby boomers. [ 30 ]


The  Battle for Births  was one of four  economic battles  that took place in  Fascist Italy  (1922–1943), the others being the  Battle for Grain  (to make the country more  self-sufficient ), the  Battle for the Lira  (an increase in the value of the currency), and the  Battle for Land  (which involved policies of  land reclamation ). Prime Minister  Benito Mussolini , often known as  Il Duce , envisioned an  Italian Empire  to rival  that of the Romans , and in order to carry out this objective, foresaw the need to increase the population. Mussolini pursued an often aggressive foreign policy to achieve his colonial aims: the  Italian army   invaded Abyssinia  (now  Ethiopia ) in October 1935. The phrase "Battle for Births" was also used, in contemporary sources, to describe policies developed in  Nazi Germany . [ 1 ]


Mussolini feuded with the  Catholic Church  over a number of issues in his time in office, but their views, at that time, coincided on the issue of  gender roles  and  contraception : both felt that women should assume a role as wife and mother, and both disagreed with  contraception  and  abortion , with Mussolini banning the former. The Battle for Births began in 1927: Mussolini introduced a number of measures to encourage reproduction, with an objective of increasing the population from 40 million to 60 million by 1950. Loans were offered to married couples, with part of the loan cancelled for each new child, and any married man who had more than six children was made exempt from taxation. Mussolini, who had developed a  cult of personality , argued that the Italian people had a duty to himself to produce as many children as possible according to Lisa (2009) and Talent et Al.


In correspondence with these incentives, laws were brought in to penalize any citizens who proved to be less productive.  Bachelors were taxed increasingly , and by the late 1930s, the  civil service  began recruiting and promoting only those who were fertile and married. The state exercised some control over the number of women in employment through nationalized businesses, and the state-owned railway company sacked all women employed since 1915, with the exception of war widows. These policies extended to private industry as well, with the majority of companies reserving promotions for married men.


Unlike the Battle for Grain and Battle for Land, which were considered to be moderately successful, the Battle for Births is seen as a failure. By 1950—seven years after Mussolini had been ousted by  King Victor Emmanuel III , and five years since his execution—Italy's population stood at 47.5 million. Marriage rates stayed virtually the same during Mussolini's reign, and birth rates decreased until 1936, after which there was a modest increase. The birth rate of 112 per 1000 in 1936 was below that of pre- World War I  levels (1911: 147 per 1000). Mussolini felt that the lack of enthusiasm shown by the Italian nation had cost him 15  army divisions  in  World War II  (in which Italy had fought alongside the Axis Powers).


In  Judaism ,  Christianity , and some other  Abrahamic religions , the commandment to " be fruitful and multiply " (referred to as the " creation mandate " in some denominations of Christianity) is the divine injunction which forms part of  Genesis   1:28 , in which   God , after having created the world and all in it, ascribes to humankind the tasks of filling, subduing, and ruling over the earth. [ 1 ] [ 2 ]  The cultural mandate includes the sentence "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Earth."


The text finds an immediate interpretation in the opening chapter of the book of  Exodus  as the description of the Israelites in Egypt are alluded to as, "fruitful, increased greatly, multiplied, and extremely strong, so that the land was filled with them." [ 3 ]


In  Orthodox Judaism , the mandate to "be fruitful and multiply" is interpreted as requiring every couple to have at least a son and a daughter. [ 4 ]  Other Jewish groups (such as  Reform Judaism ) and individual Jews have interpreted this mandate differently. For example, Richard Friedman in his  Commentary on the Torah  (2001) claims that the mandate "be fruitful and multiply and fill the Earth" has "been fulfilled." [ 5 ]  The mandate is elaborated upon in numerous parts of the  Talmud , for example in  Kidushin .


In the interpretation of some denominations of  Christianity , adherents should actively work to fulfill the mandate. [ 2 ]


Despite "be fruitful and multiply" being the most important mitzvah,  contraception is permitted in some sects of Judaism  in appropriate circumstances such as difficult family situations. In instances like these, rabbis may allow women to start contraceptive methods. [ 6 ]


The text of Genesis 1:28 states:


וַיְבָרֶךְ אֹתָם אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם אֱלֹהִים פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ וּמִלְאוּ אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְכִבְשֻׁהָ וּרְדוּ בִּדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבְכָל חַיָּה הָרֹמֶשֶׂת עַל הָאָרֶץ    Wayəḇāreḵ ’ōṯām  ’ĕlōhîm , wayyō’mer lāhem ’ĕlōhîm, "Pərû, ûrəḇû, ûmilə’û ’eṯ-hā’āreṣ, wəḵiḇəšuhā; ûrəḏû biḏəg̱aṯ hayyām, ûḇə‘ôp̱ haššāmayim, ûḇəḵāl-ḥayyāh hārōmeśeṯ ‘al-hā’āreṣ."


The text of surat al-Baqarah 2:187, [ 8 ]  in the Qur'an, enjoins the listeners (presumably male) to be intimate with their wives and do "that which God has decreed for them", a statement defined by  commentators  to refer to having children:


Ohilla lakum laylata assiyamiarrafathu ila nisa-ikum hunna libasunlakum waantum libasun lahunna AAalima Allahuannakum kuntum takhtanoona anfusakum fatabaAAalaykum waAAafa AAankum fal-ana bashiroohunnawabtaghoo ma kataba Allahu lakum wakuloo washraboohatta yatabayyana lakumu alkhaytu al-abyadumina alkhayti al-aswadi mina alfajri thumma atimmoo assiyamaila allayli wala tubashiroohunna waantum AAakifoonafee almasajidi tilka hudoodu Allahi falataqrabooha kathalika yubayyinu Allahu ayatihilinnasi laAAallahum yattaqoon


Below is a list of some instances where the injunction has been used in modern media, music, and literature.


Breeder  is a  pejorative  term coined by  gay  people particularly for parents who purportedly over-focus on their children and allegedly abandon their previous friends and lifestyle; or to women who give birth to many children, often with the derisive implication that they have too many offspring. The term is also used by  antinatalists  to pejoratively refer to anyone who has procreated, an act which they consider immoral.


The use of "breeder" in this way is not new. It appears, for example, in  Jonathan Swift 's  A Modest Proposal , widely acknowledged as the preeminent English  satirical essay , in which Swift repeatedly uses the term.


The number of souls in this kingdom being usually reckoned one million and a half, of these I calculate there may be about two hundred thousand couple whose wives are breeders; from which number I subtract thirty thousand couples who are able to maintain their own children, although I apprehend there cannot be so many, under the present distresses of the kingdom; but this being granted, there will remain an hundred and seventy thousand breeders. [ 1 ]


Some parents resent being referred to as "breeders", and feel that the word  unduly reduces  the process of child-raising to  animal husbandry . [ 2 ]


The term was part of a 2006 controversy in the heavily  gay  resort town of  Provincetown, Massachusetts , when petitioners against  same-sex marriage  whose identity was published complained of having been called "breeders". The  San Francisco Chronicle  described the term as "a joking or derogatory slur used by gays to describe heterosexuals". [ 3 ]


While using the term "breeder" as a descriptive term is not new, the term has increased in use within the last decade [ when? ]  mainly due its acceptance by pop culture and specifically youth pop culture. Some  heterosexuals  have said that the term "breeder" is offensive to straight people and associated it with " heterophobia " or degrading heterosexual lifestyles. [ 4 ]


The term "breeder" has also been used to describe lesbian parents that partake in reproduction. [ 5 ]  The idea of gay parenting has led some to say that the line between "breeders" and otherwise is less clear, with the idea of  LGBT  families beginning to "breed". [ 6 ]  The term's connotation is a point of contention within the  LGBT community . The expansion of the term to include parents within the community has created a divide on its meaning. There has been debate over its acceptability, inside and outside of LGBT circles, and whether it is a  slur .


The  Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party  ( Romanian :  Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat ,  PNȚCD ) is a  agrarian [ 1 ]  and  Christian democratic [ 2 ]   political party  in  Romania . It claims to be the rightful successor of the  interwar   National Peasants' Party  (PNȚ), created from the merger of the  Romanian National Party  (PNR) from the then  Austro-Hungarian-ruled   Transylvania  and the  Peasants' Party  (PȚ) from the  Romanian Old Kingdom .


PNȚCD was the largest and most important political party of the  Romanian Democratic Convention  ( Romanian :  Convenția Democrată Română , CDR) during the 1990s and was led by  Corneliu Coposu  and  Ion Diaconescu , two former political prisoners during  communism , but as the 2000s began it gradually feel out of grace amongst  centre-right  Romanian voters and slowly became an inactive  microparty . The party was subsequently excluded from the  European People's Party  (EPP) in June 2017. [ 15 ]  Eventually, it joined the  European Christian Political Movement  (ECPM) in February 2020. [ 16 ]


Given a tremendous disdain and resentment towards Pavelescu's leadership (the incumbent party president since 2011 onwards), another Christian peasant group known as the  National Peasant Alliance  ( Romanian :  Alianța Național Țărăniștă – Țărăniștii , ANȚ) seceded from the main PNȚCD in 2019 (which, according to them and their electoral basin, greatly drifted from its original ideology) and centered around leader  Radu Ghidău  (one of the youngest PNȚCD MPs during the legislature of the late 1990s, more specifically the one spanning over 1996–2000) for the  2020 Romanian local elections . [ 17 ] [ 18 ] [ 19 ]


The Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party was (re)-founded by  Corneliu Coposu ,  Ioan Alexandru , and  Ion Rațiu  in December 1989, being thus the first officially registered political party after the  fall of communism . The party competed in the  1990 elections , where it ranked 4th with 2.5% (or 348,637 votes) and endorsed Ion Rațiu for president. The PNȚCD presidential candidate ranked 3rd, with 4.3% (or 617,007 votes).


Given the political dominance of the  National Salvation Front  (FSN) that was exerted prior and after the first free elections in post-1989 Romania, the PNȚCD decided to form a consistent alliance of centre-right parties aiming mainly to oppose it.


As a result, in 1991, most notably alongside the  National Liberal Party  (PNL; but also with other noteworthy civic organisations, foundations, and minor additional right-leaning political parties), the PNȚCD formed the  Romanian Democratic Convention  (CDR).


Eventually, the PNȚCD would affirm itself as the most dominant internal political force for much of the convention's existence. For the period 1990–1992, PNȚCD was one of the main opposition parties.


At the  1992 elections , the party ran on a common CDR list (along with other allied parties within the convention) and endorsed the candidacy of  Emil Constantinescu  as  President of Romania . Consequently, the CDR ranked 2nd, having scored 20.16% (or 2,210,722 votes), while Emil Constantinescu managed to qualify in the second round of the presidential election where he finished second with 38.57% (or 4,641,207 votes). For the period 1992–1996, the party was the main opposition force in the  Parliament of Romania .


At the  1996 elections , CDR managed to rank 1st, with 30.70% (or 3,772,084 votes), and once again endorsed Emil Constantinescu, who also managed to win the presidency with 54.41% (or 7,057,906 votes). For the period 1996–2000, PNȚCD was the most important governing party within the CDR, being also part of a grand coalition which included the  Democratic Party  (PD) and the  Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania  (UDMR/RMDSZ).


At the  2000 elections , PNȚCD ran on a common CDR 2000 list and scored 5.30% (or 575,706 votes), being unable to pass the electoral threshold required for an alliance. This weak electoral result was primarily owed to the fragmentation of the alliance and the scission of the Romanian right into several other parties as well as to the tumultuous previous governing term. For the period 2000–2004, PNȚCD was in extra-parliamentary opposition.


At the  2004 elections , PNȚCD ran independently, having obtained 1.9% (or 196,027 votes), failing this time as well to surpass the needed electoral threshold. The party endorsed the presidential candidacy of  Gheorghe Ciuhandu , former mayor of  Timișoara . Ciuhandu eventually ranked 5th in the first round, with 1.9% (or 198,394 votes).


In March 2005, PNȚCD voted to change its name to the Christian Democratic People's Party ( Romanian :  Partidul Popular Creștin-Democrat ,  PPCD ) after the unification with the Union for Romanian Reconstruction. Eventually, it returned to its original name (PNȚCD). The party did not compete in the  2008 legislative elections .


Afterwards, the party was split between a wing sustained by  Marian Petre Miluț  endorsing  Aurelian Pavelescu  as president (who decided on an alliance with the then governing  Democratic Liberal Party , PDL) and one endorsing former  Prime Minister  and  Bucharest mayor   Victor Ciorbea  as president (who, at that time, favoured an alliance with the National Liberal Party). [ 20 ]


Victor Ciorbea was elected on 18 June 2011 president of the party. In September 2011, the Bucharest Courthouse (responsible for the parties registry) recognised  Victor Ciorbea  as party president. [ 21 ]  Nonetheless, the split continued until Ciorbea left the party (until October 2012 namely) in order to become a senator on PNL's lists. Pavelescu was subsequently recognised as president and the fractions were dissolved.


For the  2012 legislative elections , PNȚCD ran on a common  Right Romania Alliance  (ARD), along with the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), and the  Civic Force  (FC). The party won one senator seat and one deputy seat. On 23 April 2013, Pavelescu was elected president of the party.


At the  2014 European Parliament election , the party gained only 0.89% of the cast votes, [ 22 ]  with candidates like former EP member  Sebastian Bodu  and the current party president, Aurelian Pavelescu, opening the list.


Following the  2019 European Parliament election  and thanks to an agreement between the party and the  Social Democratic Party  (PSD), the party has 1  MEP , more specifically  Cristian Terheș . [ 23 ]


For the  2019 Romanian presidential election , the party did not compete but endorsed PSD candidate Viorica Dăncilă. Furthermore, the party did not compete for the  2020 Romanian legislative election  but it did compete for the  2020 Romanian local elections , where it won 1 mayor and 42 local councillors.


Its motto as of 2006 was  Fiecare contează  ( Each one counts ). At the  2014 EU elections ,  PNȚCD's  motto was  Renaștem pentru România ta!  ( Reborn for your Romania! ).


The PNȚCD is an  agrarian ,  Christian democratic , and  Christian humanist  political party that stands for "social justice, Christian morality and enlightened patriotism." The party is  anti-communist  and advocates for de-Sovietization within Romania. It endorses the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights  in conjunction with the  Romanian constitution  and seeks to protect the cultural and traditional rights of all Romanian people. It also advocates for equal opportunities for all Romanians, uphold rule of law, defends the right to private property ownership, and calls for economic reform to stimulate the  Romanian economy . [ 24 ]


Internationally, the party is a member of  Centrist Democrat International  (CDI) along with other Christian democratic and  conservative  movements and was affiliated with the  European People's Party  (EPP) in the  European Parliament  before joining the  European Conservatives and Reformists  (ECR) group.


1   CDR  members in 1992: PNȚCD,  PAC  (7 senators and 13 deputies),  PNL-AT  (1 senator and 11 deputies),  PSDR  (1 senator and 10 deputies),  PNL-CD  (4 senators and 3 deputies), and  PER  (no senators and 4 deputies).

 2   CDR  members in 1996: PNȚCD,  PNL  (22 senators and 28 deputies),  PNL-CD  (1 senator and 4 deputies),  PAR  (3 senators and 3 deputies),  PER  (1 senator and 5 deputies), and Ecologist Federation of Romania (FER – 1 senator and 1 deputy).

 3   CDR 2000  members: PNȚCD,  UFD , Ecologist Federation of Romania (FER), National Christian Democratic Alliance (ANCD), and The Moldavians' Party (PM).

 4   PNȚCD competed on PNL lists.

 5   Right Romania Alliance  (ARD) members:  PDL  (22 senators and 52 deputies),  FC  (1 senators and 3 deputies), and PNȚCD.


1   Emil Constantinescu was the common centre-right candidate who was endorsed by the PNȚCD in both 1992 and 1996 as part of the larger  Romanian Democratic Convention  (CDR).

 2   Mugur Isărescu was endorsed by the PNȚCD at the 2000 elections as part of the  Romanian Democratic Convention 2000  (CDR 2000) alliance.

 3   Electoral protocol endorsing  Traian Băsescu , the candidate of the  Democratic Liberal Party  (PDL), due to a decision enforced by the then official fraction of the PNȚCD led by  Marian Petre Miluț .

 4   Elena Udrea was endorsed by the  People's Movement Party  (PMP)-PNȚCD alliance at the  2014 Romanian presidential election .

 5   Electoral protocol endorsing  Viorica Dăncilă , the candidate of the  Social Democratic Party  (PSD).


1   Electoral protocol endorsing the  Social Democratic Party  (PSD).


In  Reformed   Christian ethics , the  creation mandates  or  creation ordinances  are the commandments given to  Adam and Eve  in  Genesis 1 and 2 . These predate the  Mosaic Law  and are often thought to apply to all people rather than just Christians. They include the  cultural mandate  ("Be fruitful and multiply!"), including both  marriage  and procreation (Gen 1:28), the  labour mandate  (Gen 2:15), and complying with  Sabbath  (Gen 2:3). [ 1 ]


These mandates are considered by many to be superseded by the Noahic Mandates in Genesis 9. Of note is that Adam was told to "subdue" the Earth, but Noah was not. This suggests that Fallen Man is incapable of subduing Earth without exploiting it contrary to God's Plan.


This  Christianity -related article is a  stub . You can help Wikipedia by  expanding it .


Decree 770  was a decree of the  communist government  of Romanian dictator  Nicolae Ceaușescu , signed in 1967. It restricted  abortion  and  contraception , and was intended to create a new and large Romanian population. The term  decreței  (from the  Romanian language  word  decret , meaning " decree "; diminutive  decrețel ) is used to refer to those  Romanians  born during the time period immediately following the decree.


Before 1968, the Romanian  abortion  policy was one of the most liberal in Europe. Because the availability of  contraceptive  methods was poor, abortion became the foremost method of Romanian family planning.  [ citation needed ]


Through a combination of Romania's  postwar modernization , high participation of women in the workforce, and a low standard of living, the number of births significantly decreased after the 1950s, reaching its lowest recorded level in 1966. Romanian leaders interpreted the decreasing number of births to be a result of the 1957 decree that  legalized abortion . [ citation needed ]


To counter this sharp decline in the birth rate, the  Communist Party  decided that the country's population should be increased from 20 million to 30 million inhabitants. In October 1966, [ 1 ] [ 2 ]  Decree 770 was personally sanctioned by Ceaușescu. Abortion and contraception [ citation needed ]  were declared illegal, except for:


To enforce the decree, society was strictly controlled.  Contraceptives were removed from sale and all women were required to be monitored monthly by a  gynecologist . [ 3 ] : 6  [ better source needed ]  Any detected pregnancies were followed until birth. The  secret police  kept a close eye on hospital procedures.


Sex education  was refocused primarily on the benefits of motherhood, including the ostensible satisfaction of being a heroic mother who gives her homeland many children.


The direct consequence of the decree was a huge  baby boom . Between 1966 and 1967 the number of births almost doubled, and the estimated  total fertility rate  (TFR) increased from 1.9 to 3.7. The generation born in 1967 and 1968 was the largest in Romanian history. Thousands of nursery schools were built. As the children got older, their needs were not properly met. There were cases where lectures were shortened to enable three school shifts. In schools, a  student–teacher ratio  of over 40 children per class became frequent. [ 3 ] : 9   When, after the revolution, lots of businesses closed or shrank their workforce,  the latest hires were fired preferentially . [ 3 ] : 10


The decree was abolished on 26 December 1989, [ 4 ]  days after the  Romanian Revolution .


In the 1970s, birth rates declined again. Economic pressure on families remained, and people began to seek ways to circumvent the decree. Wealthier women were able to obtain contraceptives illegally or to bribe doctors to give diagnoses which made abortion possible. Especially among the less educated and poorer women there were many unwanted pregnancies. These women could only use primitive methods of abortion, which led to infection, sterility or even their own death. The  mortality  among pregnant women became the highest in Europe during the reign of Ceaușescu. While the childbed mortality rate kept declining over the years in neighboring countries, in Romania it increased to more than ten times that of its neighbors. [ 3 ] : 8


Many children born in this period became malnourished, were severely physically disabled, or ended up in  care under grievous conditions , which led to a rise in  child mortality .


A consequence of Ceaușescu's  natalist  policy is that large numbers of children ended up living in  orphanages , because their parents could not cope with looking after them. The vast majority of children who lived in the state-run orphanages were not actually orphans, like the name implies, but simply children whose parents could not afford or did not want to look after them. [ 5 ]


In their book  Freakonomics , authors  Steven Levitt  and  Stephen J. Dubner  discuss the  legalised abortion and crime effect : the argument that children who are born after their mothers are refused an abortion are much more likely to commit crimes or refuse to recognize authority when they reach adulthood. They further argue that the Decreței are exactly the same people who spearheaded the  Romanian revolution  where Ceaușescu's regime was violently overthrown in 1989.


In 1989, the oldest  decreței  would have been 22 years old, in the general age range of most revolutionaries. Levitt and Dubner note that Romania was the only east-European communist country with strict anti-abortion and anti-contraception laws at the time, and the only country whose ruler was violently overthrown and killed at the  end  of the  Cold War . Most other such countries experienced a tumultuous, but peaceful, transition. There were however [ original research? ]  other aspects of  totalitarian  rule that would promote violent reaction instead of peaceful transition, including a lack of associational life and legal gatherings, a more extensive system of informants and special police than any state other than  East Germany , and a  cult of personality [ 6 ]  built up around the leader.


The actual violence of the revolution can be attributed to divisions among the ruling and military/secret police and the vacuum of power that resulted. Revolutions are often observed to come in waves, and it is believed by some authors that Romania would have experienced violent revolution no matter its demographic situation. [ 7 ]


Although in the early 1990s, shortly after abortion was legalized, the abortion rate was very high, it decreased strongly as more couples started using contraception, and the economy also started to improve after the instability of the transition. The chart presented shows data from the  National Institute of Statistics  for years between 1990 and 2010 [ 8 ]  and from  Eurostat  for data between 2011 and 2018. [ 9 ] [ 10 ]


This article, or a previous version, was translated from  the article "Decreet 770" on the Dutch Wikipedia . This Dutch article used the following sources:


Do it for Denmark  is a  Danish  media and advertising campaign designed to increase the  birth rate  of the nation. The campaign, launched by the Danish travel agency  Spies Rejser  [ da ] , is a tongue-in-cheek attempt to lure Danes to book holidays as a way to stop a purported  population decline  in Denmark. It also attracted wide attention in English-speaking countries as well. Despite the advertisements' obvious irony, it did in fact result in an increase of the Danish birth rate. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ]


A British publication, the  Policy Press , associated with the  University of Bristol , has criticized the campaign for "invoking age-related and gendered stereotypes". The "Do it for Denmark", and subsequent "Do it for Mom" ads have been accused by this publication of carrying "explicit heteronormative and ageist tones" that "reflect a pro-natal and youth-oriented culture." [ 4 ]


This  advertising -related article is a  stub . You can help Wikipedia by  expanding it .


The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity (And What To Do About It)  is a 2004 book by  Phillip Longman  of the  New America Foundation  about declining birthrates around the world, the challenges that Longman believes will accompany it, and strategies to overcome those challenges. [ 1 ]


Longman appeared in a  National Public Radio  program  Talk of the Nation  debating  Peter Kostmayer  about the thesis of his book. [ 2 ]


Richard N. Cooper  reviewed the book briefly for  Foreign Affairs , writing that Longman's concern about falling birthrates is at odds with many people's concerns about overpopulation, and also noting that Longman believed that specific government policies were responsible for the lower birthrates. [ 3 ]


Spengler reviewed the book for  Asia Times , concluding "The reader must fall back on his argument that faith, not pecuniary calculation, will motivate today's prospective parents. The reproductive power of an increasingly Christian United States will enhance the strategic position of the US over the next two generations, leaving infertile Western Europe to sink slowly into insignificance." [ 4 ]


Albert Mohler , president of the  Southern Baptist Theological Seminary , reviewed the book on his personal website. He concluded: "His research is certain to spark fierce debate and spirited discussion. In the final analysis, doesn’t it make sense that those who see children as gifts from God would have more children than those who see children as economic cost units? How could anyone be surprised?" [ 5 ]


Bill Muehlenberg reviewed the book on his own blog. [ 6 ]


The view of the  Soviet family  as the basic  social unit  in society evolved from revolutionary to conservative; the government of the  Soviet Union  first attempted to weaken the  family  and then to strengthen it from the 1930s onwards. [ 1 ]


According to the 1968 law "Principles of Legislation on Marriage and the Family of the USSR and the Union Republics", parents are "to raise their children in the spirit of the  Moral Code of the Builder of Communism , to attend to their physical development and their instruction in and preparation for socially useful activity".


Prior to the  1917 revolution , women did not have equal rights to men and, since most of the population were peasants, they lived under the patriarchal village structure; they had to take care of the home as well as playing an important role in looking after farms. Millions of peasant men did seasonal work in the cities, often leaving women without their husbands for months at a time. [ 2 ]


One of the main aims of the Lenin period was to abolish the  bourgeois  family, and free both men and women from the drudgery of housework. Communal canteens, laundry services and nurseries were set up, and women could now legally get an education and work. The Bolshevik government did not trust the  nuclear family , believing it taught individualist, bourgeois values to children; they initially believed that government institutions could raise the millions of children orphaned by the  Russian Civil War , and that these children could be inculcated with socialist values. [ 3 ]  The Civil War had left a void in the industrial sectors of the workforce, and that void was filled with hundreds of thousands of women. When Stalin came to power and instituted the  first five-year plan , women's labour became an essential economic resource that allowed a massive expansion of the workforce at a low cost, as women often were not paid as much, in part due to inexperience. [ 4 ]   They also offered opportunities for women inside of the party when the Department for Work Among Women was created in 1919.


The Bolsheviks advocated for the abolition of differentiated  gender roles . Despite this strong push for change by the  Zhenotdel , the immensely patriarchal society that had existed for hundreds of years prior, would supersede these efforts. [ 5 ]


The feminist movement was seen by the majority peasant and workforce population as bourgeois, and therefore represented something opposite of the Bolshevik idea. The emphasis on the immediate household as priority was pertinent, especially to the 1930s era of Soviet Russia. Since the Paleolithic era of Russia, there has been a fascination with the immortalization, of the mother figure. "The Motherland Calls", statute spoke up about the unrealistic expectations that the Soviet Union had on their female mothers. Motherhood, they posited, was not some divine consciousness, but instead something inherently learned as a result of being a woman. Some argued that the traditional role of the mother should be challenged, and that it was not like it had been in years past. In many instances the domestic work was piled onto the female head of the house, despite promotion of equality between genders. This left in unequal workload on the woman, who would also have a job outside of the home to help provide in a particularly difficult economy where food and adequate housing was often scarce. However, despite this argument, the role of the Bolshevik woman remained static.  Stalin  himself held both men and women to the same standard, with equal harshness doled out to both sexes. In the 1960s, it was expected of the Russian woman to fall in line with the patriarchal leadership of her husband. [ 6 ]


Another heavily relied on role that women held in the Soviet household was that of the Grandmother. In many cases, she would do all the housework and raise the children. This was because the parents were usually too busy working to do either of these. This ended up hurting the installment of Soviet values into the minds of the youth, as the Grandmother would usually teach her grandchildren more traditional values. [ 7 ]


Marxist theory on family established the revolutionary ideal for the Soviet state and influenced state policy concerning family in varying degrees throughout the history of the country. The principals are: The nuclear family unit is an economic arrangement structured to maintain the ideological functions of Capitalism. The family unit perpetuates class inequality through the transfer of private property through inheritance. Following the abolition of private property, the bourgeois family will cease to exist and the union of individuals will become a "purely private affair".
The Soviet state's first code on marriage and family was written in 1918 and enacted a series of transformative laws designed to bring the Soviet family closer in line with Marxist theory. [ 8 ] [ 5 ]


One year after the Bolsheviks took power, they ratified the 1918 Code on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship. The revolutionary jurists, led by Alexander Goikhbarg, adhered to the revolutionary principals of Marx, Engels, and Lenin when drafting the codes. Goikhbarg considered the nuclear family unit to be a necessary but transitive social arrangement that would quickly be phased out by the growing communal resources of the state and would eventually "wither away". The jurists intended for the code to provide a temporary legal framework to maintain protections for women and children until a system of total communal support could be established. [ 5 ]


The 1918 code also served to recognize the legal rights of the individual at the expense of the existing tsarist/patriarchal system of family and marriage. This was accomplished by allowing easily obtainable "no-grounds"  divorces . It abolished "illegitimacy" of birth as a legal concept and entitled all children to parental support. It abolished the adoption of orphans (orphans would be cared for by the state to avoid exploitation). A married couple could take either surname. Individual property would be retained in the event of divorce. An unlimited term of alimony could be awarded to either spouse, but upon separation each party was expected to care for themselves. Women were to be recognized as equal under the law; Prior to 1914, women were not allowed to earn a wage, seek education, or exchange property without the consent of their husband. [ 5 ] [ 9 ]


The 1918 code accomplished many of the goals that the jurists had sought to set into motion, but the social disruption left in the wake of World War I exposed the inadequacies of the code to alleviate social problems. The 1926 code would revive a more conservative definition of the family in a legal sense. "The 1918 code had been motivated by a desire to lead society forward to new social relationships in line with socialist thought on marriage and family, the 1926 code attempted to solve immediate problems, in particular to ensure the financial well-being". [ 9 ]  The hotly debated social concerns included: the unmanageable number of orphans, the unemployment of women, the lack of protection after divorce, common property and divorce, and the obligations of unmarried, cohabitating partners.


In 1921 alone, seven million orphans were displaced, roaming town and countryside. [ 10 ]  Government agencies simply did not have the resources to care for the children. An adopted child could be cared for by a family at virtually no cost to the state. The 1926 code would reinstate adoption as a solution for child homelessness.


In 1921  New Economic Policy  (NEP), brought about a limited restoration of private enterprise and free markets. It also brought an end to labor conscription. The result was a spike in female unemployment as " War Communism " came to an end and  NEP  emerged. [ 6 ]  Hundreds of thousands of unemployed women did not have registered marriages and were left with no means of support or protections following a divorce under the 1918 code. The 1926 code would make unregistered marriages legal in order to safeguard women by extending alimony to unregistered , de facto  wives, the purpose being that more women would be cared for in times of widespread unemployment.


Under the 1918 code, there was no division of property in the event of a divorce. Marriage was not to be an economic partnership and each party was entitled to individual property. This meant that women who ran the household and cared for the children would not be entitled to any material share of what the "provider" had brought to the marriage. In another conservative move, the 1926 code would require an equal division of property acquired during a marriage. All property acquired during the course of a marriage would become "common". [ 6 ]  With intentions similar to the legal recognition of  de facto  marriages, this new property law was a response to the lack of protections offered to women in the event of divorce. [ 11 ]


Additionally the code would do away with the 1918 concept of "collective paternity" where multiple men could be assigned to pay alimony if the father of a child could not be determined. According to the 1926 code, paternity could be assigned by a judge. It also enlarged family obligations by expanding alimony obligations to include children, parents, siblings and grandparents. Alimony would also have set time limits. [ 9 ]  The 1926 code would signal a retreat from many policies that served to weaken the family in 1918. The jurists were not pursuing an ideological maneuver away from socialism, rather than taking more "temporary" measures to ensure the well-being of women and children since communal care had yet to materialize. [ 9 ]


Unlike earlier codes that arranged for temporary and transitive laws as a step toward the revolutionary vision of family; the Code of 1936 marked an ideological shift away from Marxist / revolutionary visions of the nuclear family. [ 12 ]  Coinciding with the rise of Stalinism, the law demanded the stabilizing and strengthening of the family. "The "withering-away" doctrine, once central to socialist understand of the family, law, and the state, was anathematized." [ 5 ]


The 1936 code emerged along with an eruption of pro-family propaganda. [ 12 ]  For the first time, the code put restrictions on abortion and imposed fines and jail time for any that received or performed the service. The code also enacted a bevy of laws aimed to encourage pregnancy and child birth. Insurance stipends, pregnancy leave, job security, light duty, child care services and payments for large families. In another drastic move, the code made it more difficult to obtain a divorce. Under the code, both parties would need to be present for a divorce and pay a fine. There could be harsh penalties for those who failed to pay alimony and child-support payments. [ 5 ]


"Our demands grow day to day. We need fighters, they build this life. We need people." [ 5 ]  The wider campaign to encourage the family unit elevated motherhood to a form of  Stakhanovite  labor. During this time, motherhood was celebrated as patriotic and the joys of children and family were extolled by the country's leaders.


The Family Edict of 1944 would be a continuation of the conservative trending of the 1936 code. Citing the heavy manpower losses and social disruption following World War II, the  Presidium of the Supreme Soviet  enacted laws that would further encourage marriage and childbirth.


The 1944 Edict offered greater state-sponsored benefits to mothers, including: Extended maternity leave, increased family allowances even to unmarried mothers, promises of burgeoning child care services, targeted labor protections, and most notably, state recognition and the honorary title " Mother Heroine " for mothers who could produce large families. [ 13 ]


The edict also sought to preserve the family unit by making divorces even more difficult to obtain. Fines were increased and the parties were often ordered to attempt reconciliation. Divorce also became a public matter. Divorcees were required to appear in public court and their intent was published in the local newspaper. [ 14 ]


The early  Soviet state  sought to remake the family, believing that although the economic emancipation of workers would deprive families of their economic function, it would not destroy the institution but rather base family relations exclusively on mutual affection. The Bolsheviks replaced religious  marriage  with civil marriage,  divorce  became easy to obtain, and unwed mothers received special protection. All children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, had equal rights before the law, women gained sexual equality under matrimonial law, inheritance of property was abolished, and  abortion  was legalized. [ 15 ]


In the early 1920s, however, the weakening of family ties, combined with the devastation and dislocation caused by the  Russian Civil War  (1918–21), resulted in nearly 7 million homeless children. This situation prompted senior Bolshevik Party officials to conclude that the State needed a more stable family life to rebuild the country's economy and shattered social structure. By 1922 the government allowed some forms of inheritance, and after 1926 full inheritance rights were restored. By the late 1920s, adults had been made more responsible for the care of their children, and common-law marriage had been given equal legal status with civil marriage. [ 15 ]


During  Joseph Stalin 's rule (late 1920s to 1953), the trend toward strengthening the family continued. In 1936 the government began to award payments to women with large families, banned abortions, and made divorces more difficult to obtain. In 1942 it subjected single persons and childless married persons to additional taxes. In 1944 only registered marriages were recognized to be legal, and divorce became subject to court discretion. In the same year the government began to award medals to women who gave birth to five or more children and took upon itself the support of illegitimate children. [ 15 ]


After Stalin's death in 1953, the government moved in a more liberal direction and rescinded some of its  natalist  legislation. In 1955 it declared abortions for medical reasons legal, and in 1968 it declared all abortions legal, following  Western European  policy. The state also liberalized divorce procedures in the mid-1960s, but in 1968 introduced new limitations. [ 15 ]


In 1974 the government began to subsidize poorer families whose average per-capita income did not exceed 50  rubles  per month (later raised to 75 rubles per month in some northern and eastern regions). The subsidy amounted to 12 rubles per month for each child below eight years of age. It was estimated [ by whom? ]  that in 1974 about 3.5 million families (14 million people, or about 5% of the entire population) received this subsidy. With the increase in per-capita income, however, the number of children requiring such assistance decreased. In 1985 the government raised the age limit for assistance to twelve years and under. In 1981 the subsidy to an unwed mother with a child increased to 20 rubles per month; in early 1987 an estimated 1.5 million unwed mothers were receiving such assistance, or twice as many as during the late 1970s. [ 15 ]


Family size  and composition depended mainly on the place of residence—urban or rural—and ethnic group. The size and composition of such families was also influenced by housing and income limitations, pensions, and female employment outside the home. The typical urban family consisted of a married couple, two children, and, in about 20% of the cases, one of the grandmothers, whose assistance in raising the children and in housekeeping was important in the large majority of families having two wage earners. Rural families generally had more children than urban families and often supported three generations under one roof. Families in  Central Asia  and the  Caucasus  tended to have more children than families elsewhere in the Soviet Union and included grandparents in the family structure. In general, the average family size followed that of other industrialized countries, with higher income families having both fewer children and a lower rate of infant mortality. From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the number of families with more than one child decreased by about 50% and in 1988 totaled 1.9 million. About 75% of the families with more than one child lived in the southern regions of the country, half of them in Central Asia. In the  Russian ,  Ukrainian ,  Belorussian ,  Moldovian ,  Estonian ,  Latvian , and  Lithuanian  republics, families with one and two children constituted more than 90% of all families, whereas in Central Asia those with three or more children ranged from 14% in the  Kyrgyz Republic  to 31% in the  Tajik . Surveys suggested that most parents would have had more children if they had had more living space. [ 15 ]


Beginning in the mid-1980s, the government promoted  family planning  in order to slow the growth of the Central Asian indigenous populations. Local opposition to this policy surfaced especially in the  Uzbek  and  Tajik  republics. In general, however, the government continued publicly to honor mothers of large families. Women received the Motherhood Medal, Second Class, for their fifth live birth and the  Mother Heroine  medal for their tenth. Most of these awards went to women in Central Asia and the Caucasus. [ 15 ]


The primary form of contraception practiced in the early USSR was  coitus interruptus . Scarcity of rubber made condoms and diaphragms unavailable, and contraception was rarely discussed by political figures. [ 5 ]


The U.S.S.R. was the first country in the world to legalize  abortion . For many years prior to the  October Revolution , abortion was not uncommon in Russia, although it was illegal and carried a possible sentence of hard labor or exile. [ 16 ]  After the revolution, famine and poor economic conditions led to an increase in the number of "back alley" abortions, and after pressure from doctors and jurists, the Commissariats of Health and Justice legalized abortion in 1920. Abortions were free for all women, although they were seen as a necessary evil due to economic hardship rather than a woman's right to control her own reproductive system. [ 17 ]


Through the 1930s, a rising number of abortions coupled with a falling birthrate alarmed Soviet officials, with a recorded 400,000 abortions taking place in 1926 alone. [ 16 ]   In 1936 the Soviet Central Executive Committee made abortion illegal once again. This, along with stipends granted to recent mothers and bonuses given for women who bore many children, was part of an effort to combat the falling birthrate. [ 5 ]


The extended family was more prevalent in Central Asia and the Caucasus than in the other sections of the country and, generally, in rural areas more than in urban areas. Deference to parental wishes regarding marriage was particularly strong in these areas, even among the Russians residing there. [ 15 ]


Extended families helped perpetuate traditional life-styles. The patriarchal values that accompany this life-style affected such issues as contraception, the distribution of family power, and the roles of individuals in marriage and the family. For example, traditional Uzbeks placed a higher value on their responsibilities as parents than on their own happiness as spouses and individuals. The younger and better educated Uzbeks and working women, however, were more likely to behave and think like their counterparts in the European areas of the Soviet Union, who tended to emphasize individual careers. [ 15 ]


Extended families were not prevalent in the cities. Couples lived with parents during the first years of marriage only because of economics or the housing shortage. When children were born, the couple usually acquired a separate apartment. [ 15 ]


The government assumed many functions of the pre-Soviet family. Various public institutions, for example, took responsibility for supporting individuals during times of sickness, incapacity, old age, maternity, and industrial injury. State-run nurseries, preschools, schools, clubs, and youth organizations took over a great part of the family's role in socializing children. Their role in socialization was limited, however, because preschools had places for only half of all Soviet children under seven. Despite government assumption of many responsibilities, spouses were still responsible for the material support of each other, minor children, and disabled adult children. [ 15 ]


The transformation of the patriarchal, three-generation rural household to a modern, urban family of two adults and two children attests to the great changes that Soviet society had undergone since 1917. That transformation did not produce the originally envisioned egalitarianism, but it has forever changed the nature of what was once the  Russian Empire . [ 15 ]


The history of the Soviet Union diet prior to World War II encompasses different periods that have varying influences on food production and availability. Periods of low crop yields, and restrictive distribution of food in the early 1920s, and again in the early 1930s brought about great famine and suffering in the Soviet Union. [ 18 ]  Farming was one of the main efforts for food production, and was at the center of development in support of Soviet communism. When crops failed or suffered from low yields, Soviet peasants suffered greatly from malnutrition.
The traditional types of food found in the Soviet Union were made up of various grains for breads and pastries, dairy products such as cheese and yogurt, and various meats such as pork, fish, beef and chicken. [ 19 ]  By 1940, certain products, such as vegetables, meat and grains, were less abundant than other forms of food due to the strain on resources and poor crop yields. Bread and potatoes were very important staples for Soviet families, both in cities and in the countryside. [ 20 ]  Potatoes were easily grown and harvested in many different environments, and were usually reliable as a food source. Malnutrition was a prominent factor in poor health conditions and individual growth during this period in the Soviet Union. [ 21 ]
Much like the Western tradition of three main meals a day, the Soviet meals consisted of breakfast ( zavtrak ), lunch ( obed ), and dinner ( uzhin ). Soups and broths made of meats and vegetables when available, were common meals for the Soviet peasant family.


The  Free and Independent Faction  or  Free and Independent Fraction  ( Romanian :  Fracțiunea Liberă și Independentă , sometimes  Fracțiunea Liberală și Independentă , "Independent Liberal Faction", [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ]  commonly  Fracționiștii , "The F(r)actionalists") was a  nationalist  and  national liberal  party in  Romania , regionally centered on  Western Moldavia . Originally informal, and defined by its adversaries, the Faction mainly comprised pupils and followers of the philosopher  Simion Bărnuțiu . During most of its existence, it had as its recognized leader the academic and polemicist  Nicolae Ionescu .


Consolidated during the election of  Carol I  as  Domnitor , the Faction opposed his rule, favoring either an  elective monarchy  with a native prince or a republican system. Secondary Factionalist leaders included  Dimitrie Tacu ,  Alecu D. Holban  and  Nicu Ceaur-Aslan , who had varying levels of involvement with Western Moldavian separatism in 1866. The group's  nativism  bordered on violent  xenophobia , endorsing  economic antisemitism  and  anti-Germanism . The party also stood for democratization, including radical  land reform  and a reshaping of the  census suffrage , while its regional ethos resulted in support for  federalism , then  communalism .


Such stances created tension between the Factionalists and most other groups on  the left-liberal fringe , making the Faction an uneasy partner in the "Red" government alliances of the 1860s and '70s. For pragmatic reasons, Ionescu and his followers defended Carol against the conspiratorial movement known as " Republic of Ploiești ", but did not entirely reject its agenda. Soon after this incident, a conservative and monarchist movement emerged in Moldavia around  Junimea  club, with whom the Factionalists had a consuming rivalry. A Moderate Liberal Party, headed by Ionescu's rival  Mihail Kogălniceanu , also drained the Faction of its votes after 1877. Prolonged controversies surrounded Factionalist participation in the local government of  Iași  city and  Covurlui County . Within this setting, Factionalists participated in the effort to establish a  National Liberal Party  (PNL), but then withdrew from it.


Ionescu's career peaked in 1876, when he was  Minister of Foreign Affairs  in the "Red" cabinet of  Ion Brătianu , and began to separate himself from the Factionalists. He was deposed for his opposition to the  war of independence , which also brought clashes between the PNL and the Faction over the issue of  Jewish emancipation . In 1879, the Faction was narrowly prevented from forming the national government alongside conservative "Whites", after which it steadily declined in importance. In the early 1880s, after a brief alliance with the newly formed  Conservative Party , most of the Faction dissolved into the PNL, which had emerged as the dominant "Red" group in the  Kingdom of Romania . A Factionalist dissidence survived as part of the Conservative-ran Opposition Committees, but also lost members to the PNL; the last surviving Factionalist cell, formed around Holban, became a Conservative chapter in the 1890s. Some of the party tenets, in particular its antisemitism, were revived in the 1910s by  A. C. Cuza  and his  Democratic Nationalists .