Ian Haney López, the John H. Boalt Professor of Law at the  University of California, Berkeley [ 29 ]  explains ways race is a social construct. He uses examples from history of how race was socially constructed and interpreted. One such example was of the  Hudgins v. Wright  case. A slave woman sued for her freedom and the freedom of her two children on the basis that her grandmother was Native American. The race of the Wright had to be socially proven, and neither side could present enough evidence. Since the slave owner Hudgins bore the burden of proof, Wright and her children gained their freedom. López uses this example to show the power of race in society. Human fate, he argues, still depends upon ancestry and appearance. Race is a powerful force in everyday life. These races are not determined by biology though, they are created by society to keep power with the majority. He describes that there are not any genetic characteristics that all blacks have that non-whites do not possess and vice versa. He uses the example of Mexican. It truly is a nationality, yet it has become a catch-all for all Hispanic nationalities. This simplification is wrong, López argues, for it is not only inaccurate but it tends to treat all "Mexicans" as below fervent Americans. He describes that "More recently, genetic testing has made it clear the close connections all humans share, as well as the futility of explaining those differences that do exist in terms of racially relevant gene codes" (Lopez 199–200). Those differences clearly have no basis in ethnicity, so race is completely socially constructed.


Some [ who? ]  argue it is preferable when considering biological relations to think in terms of populations, and when considering cultural relations to think in terms of  ethnicity , rather than of race.


These developments had important consequences. For example, some scientists [ who? ]  developed the notion of "population" to take the place of race. It is argued that this substitution is not simply a matter of exchanging one word for another.


This view does not deny that there are physical differences among peoples; it simply claims that the historical conceptions of "race" are not particularly useful in accounting for these differences scientifically. In particular, it is claimed [ by whom? ]  that:


Neven Sesardic  has argued that such arguments are unsupported by empirical evidence and politically motivated. Arguing that races are not completely discrete biologically is a  straw man  argument. He argues "racial recognition is not actually based on a single trait (like skin color) but rather on a number of characteristics that are to a certain extent concordant and that jointly make the classification not only possible but fairly reliable as well". Forensic anthropologists can classify a person's race with an accuracy close to 100% using only skeletal remains if they take into consideration several characteristics at the same time. [ 30 ]   A.W.F. Edwards  has argued similarly regarding genetic differences in " Human genetic diversity: Lewontin's fallacy ".


There is an active debate among biomedical researchers about the meaning and importance of race in their research. The primary impetus for considering race in biomedical research is the possibility of improving the prevention and treatment of  diseases  by predicting hard-to-ascertain factors on the basis of more easily ascertained characteristics. The most well-known examples of genetically determined disorders that vary in incidence between ethnic groups would be  sickle cell disease  and  thalassemia  among black and  Mediterranean  populations respectively and  Tay–Sachs disease  among people of  Ashkenazi Jewish  descent. Some fear that the use of racial labels in biomedical research runs the risk of unintentionally exacerbating health disparities, so they suggest alternatives to the use of racial taxonomies.


In the United States since its early history, Native Americans, African-Americans and European-Americans were classified as belonging to different races. For nearly three centuries, the criteria for membership in these groups were similar, comprising a person's appearance, his fraction of known non-White ancestry, and his social circle. [ 31 ] [ unreliable source ]  But the criteria for membership in these races diverged in the late 19th century. During Reconstruction, increasing numbers of Americans began to consider anyone with " one drop " of "Black blood" to be Black. [ 32 ] [ unreliable source ]  By the early 20th century, this notion of invisible blackness was made statutory in many states and widely adopted nationwide. [ 33 ] [ unreliable source ]  In contrast,  Amerindians  continue to be defined by a certain percentage of "Indian blood" (called  blood quantum ) due in large part to  American slavery ethics . [ citation needed ]


The concept of race as used by the Census Bureau reflects self-identification by people according to the race or races with which they most closely identify. These categories are sociopolitical constructs and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature. They change from one census to another, and the racial categories include both racial and national-origin groups. [ 34 ]


Compared to 19th-century United States, 20th-century  Brazil  was characterized by a relative absence of sharply defined racial groups. This pattern reflects a different history and different  social relations . Basically,  race in Brazil  was recognized as the difference between ancestry (which determines genotype) and phenotypic differences. Racial identity was not governed by a rigid descent rule. A Brazilian child was never automatically identified with the racial type of one or both parents, nor were there only two categories to choose from. Over a dozen racial categories are recognized in conformity with the combinations of hair color, hair texture, eye color, and skin color. These types grade into each other like the colors of the spectrum, and no one category stands significantly isolated from the rest. That is, race referred to appearance, not heredity.


Through this system of racial identification, parents and children and even brothers and sisters were frequently accepted as representatives of opposite racial types. In a fishing village in the state of  Bahia , an investigator showed 100 people pictures of three sisters and they were asked to identify the races of each. In only six responses were the sisters identified by the same racial term. Fourteen responses used a different term for each sister. In another experiment nine portraits were shown to a hundred people. Forty different racial types were elicited. It was found, in addition, that a given Brazilian might be called by as many as thirteen different terms by other members of the community. These terms are spread out across practically the entire spectrum of theoretical racial types. A further consequence of the absence of a descent rule was that Brazilians apparently not only disagreed about the racial identity of specific individuals, but they also seemed to be in disagreement about the abstract meaning of the racial terms as defined by words and phrases. For example, 40% of a sample ranked moreno claro as a lighter type than mulato claro, while 60% reversed this order. A further note of confusion is that one person might employ different racial terms to describe the same person over a short time span. The choice of which racial description to use may vary according to both the personal relationships and moods of the individuals involved. The  Brazilian census  lists one's race according to the preference of the person being interviewed. As a consequence, hundreds of races appeared in the census results, ranging from blue (which is blacker than the usual black) to pink (which is whiter than the usual white). [ citation needed ]


However, Brazilians are not so naïve to ignore one's racial origins just because of his (or her) better social status. An interesting example of this phenomenon has occurred recently, when the famous  football (soccer)  player  Ronaldo  declared publicly that he considered himself as  White , thus linking racism to a form or another of  class conflict . This caused a series of ironic notes on newspapers, which pointed out that he should have been proud of his African origin (which is obviously noticeable), a fact that must have made life for him (and for his ancestors) more difficult, so, being a successful personality was, in spite of that, a victory for him. What occurs in Brazil that differentiates it largely from the US or South Africa, for example, is that black or mixed-race people are, in fact, more accepted in social circles if they have more education, or have a successful life (a euphemism for "having a better salary"). As a consequence, inter-racial marriages are more common, and more accepted, among highly educated  Afro-Brazilians  than lower-educated ones.


So, although the identification of a person by race is far more fluid and flexible in Brazil than in the U.S., there still are racial stereotypes and prejudices. African features have been considered less desirable; Blacks have been considered socially inferior, and Whites superior. These white  supremacist  values were a legacy of European colonization and the slave-based  plantation system . The complexity of racial classifications in Brazil is reflective of the extent of  miscegenation  in  Brazilian society , which remains highly, but not strictly,  stratified  along color lines. Henceforth, Brazil's desired image as a perfect "post-racist" country, composed of the "cosmic race" celebrated in 1925 by  José Vasconcelos , must be met with caution, as sociologist  Gilberto Freyre  demonstrated in 1933 in  Casa Grande e Senzala .


Michel Foucault  argued the popular historical and political use of a non- essentialist  notion of "race" used in the " race struggle" discourse  during the 1688  Glorious Revolution  and under  Louis XIV 's end of reign. In Foucault's view, this discourse developed in two different directions:  Marxism , which seized the notion and transformed it into " class struggle " discourse, and  racists , biologists and  eugenicists , who paved the way for 20th century " state racism ".


During  the Enlightenment , racial classifications were used to justify  enslavement  of those deemed to be of "inferior", non-White races, and thus supposedly best fitted for lives of toil under White supervision. These classifications made the distance between races seem nearly as broad as that between species, easing unsettling questions about the appropriateness of such treatment of humans. The practice was at the time generally accepted by both scientific and lay communities.


Arthur Gobineau 's  An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races  (1853–1855) was one of the milestones in the new  racist   discourse , along with  Vacher de Lapouge 's "anthroposociology" and  Johann Gottfried Herder  (1744–1803), who applied race to  nationalist  theory to develop militant  ethnic nationalism . They posited the historical existence of national races such as German and French, branching from basal races supposed to have existed for millennia, such as the  Aryan race , and believed political boundaries should mirror these supposed racial ones.


Later, one of  Hitler 's favorite sayings was, "Politics is applied biology". Hitler's ideas of racial purity led to unprecedented atrocities in Europe. Since then,  ethnic cleansing  has occurred in  Cambodia , the  Balkans ,  Sudan , and  Rwanda . In one sense,  ethnic cleansing  is another name for the tribal warfare and mass murder that has afflicted human society for ages.


Racial inequality has been a concern of United States politicians and legislators since the country's founding. In the 19th century most White Americans (including  abolitionists ) explained racial inequality as an inevitable consequence of biological differences. Since the mid-20th century, political and civic leaders as well as scientists have debated to what extent racial inequality is cultural in origin. Some argue that current inequalities between Blacks and Whites are primarily cultural and historical, the result of past and present racism,  slavery  and  segregation , and could be redressed through such programs as  affirmative action  and  Head Start . Others work to reduce tax funding of remedial programs for minorities. They have based their advocacy on aptitude test data that, according to them, shows that racial ability differences are biological in origin and cannot be leveled even by intensive educational efforts. In  electoral politics , many more ethnic minorities have won important offices in Western nations than in earlier times, although the highest offices tend to remain in the hands of Whites.


In his famous  Letter from Birmingham Jail ,  Martin Luther King Jr.  observed:


King's hope, expressed in his  I Have a Dream  speech, was that the  civil rights  struggle would one day produce a society where people were not "judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character".


Because of the identification of the concept of race with political oppression, many natural and social scientists today are wary of using the word "race" to refer to human variation, but instead use less emotive words such as "population" and "ethnicity". Some, however, argue that the concept of race, whatever the term used, is nevertheless of continuing utility and validity in scientific research. [ 36 ]


In an attempt to provide general descriptions that may facilitate the job of  law enforcement officers  seeking to apprehend suspects, the United States  FBI  employs the term "race" to summarize the general appearance (skin color, hair texture, eye shape, and other such easily noticed characteristics) of individuals whom they are attempting to apprehend. From the perspective of law enforcement officers, a description needs to capture the features that stand out most clearly in the perception within the given society.


Thus, in the UK,  Scotland Yard  use a classification based on the  ethnic composition  of  British society : W1 ( White British ), W2 ( White Irish ), W9 ( Other White ); M1 (White and black Caribbean), M2 (White and black African), M3 (White and Asian), M9 (Any other mixed background); A1 (Asian-Indian), A2 (Asian-Pakistani), A3 (Asian-Bangladeshi), A9 (Any other Asian background); B1 (Black Caribbean), B2 (Black African), B3 (Any other black background); O1 (Chinese), O9 (Any other).


In the United States, the practice of  racial profiling  has been ruled to be both  unconstitutional  and also to constitute a violation of  civil rights . There also an ongoing debate on the relationship between  race and crime  regarding the disproportional representation of certain minorities in all stages of the criminal justice system.


There are many studies that have proved the reality of racial profiling.  A huge study  published in May 2020 of 95 million traffic stops between 2011 and 2018 shows that it was more common for black people to be pulled over and searched after a stop than whites even though white people were more likely to be found with illicit drugs.  Another study  found that in Travis County, Texas, despite black people comprising only around 9 percent of the population, they made up about 30 percent of police arrests for possessing less than a gram of illicit drugs, even though surveys consistently show that black and white people use illicit drugs at the same rate. Despite statistics and data that show that black people do not actually possess drugs more than white people, they are still targeted more by the police than white people which is largely due to the social construction of race.


Studies in racial taxonomy based on DNA cluster analysis has led law enforcement to pursue suspects based on their racial classification as derived from their DNA evidence left at the crime scene. [ 37 ]  DNA analysis has been successful in helping police determine the race of both victims and perpetrators. [ 38 ]
This classification is called "biogeographical ancestry". [ 39 ]


Rakut Sitelu  is a kinship system of the  Karo  people of  Indonesia . [ 1 ]  There are three titles in the rakut sitelu, namely  kalimbubu  (bride´s family),  sembuyak  or  senina  (parents), and  anak beru  (groom´s family) . [ 2 ]


This  Indonesia -related article is a  stub . You can help Wikipedia by  expanding it .


Recognition  is the process in some jurisdictions whereby a man is recognised as the father of a child in situations of no  presumption of paternity , generally because the mother is unwed. Historically, the  Roman law  principle of  mater semper certa est  (the mother is always certain) causes the action was not available to mothers, but the introduction of  in-vitro fertilisation  has changed that to change. Recognition is an act that confers  legitimacy  on the child.


When a child is born the mother is known, but the father is not certain. When the mother is married, the husband is presumed to be the father (see  presumption of legitimacy ). When the mother is unmarried, some jurisdictions require the father to take extra steps to be recognised as the father, the  presumption of paternity  does not apply. The laws vary between jurisdictions but common themes are:


There is no requirement that the recogniser actually be the biological father. In fact, if the child already has a legal father (by the presumption of paternity or by prior recognition) the biological father may not be allowed to recognise their own biological child unless the legal father voluntarily denies fatherhood; a child may only have one legal father. This can happen in cases where the presumed father discovers a child is not their biological child (see  paternity fraud ). In this case the law holds the rights of the "social father" above those of the "biological father".


In all cases it is a voluntary act by the father to recognise a child.


Recognition is not generally possible in the case of mothers under the principle of  Mater semper certa est  (The mother is always certain). However, it may be possible in the case of  anonymous birth .


The  Napoleonic Code  in 1804 had the concept of recognition (Book 1, Title VII [ 1 ] ) and was a major influence on the civil codes of much of continental Europe due to the Napoleonic Wars, and throughout the world due to European colonies. It prohibited paternity suits [ 2 ]  and claims for child support in the case where both the mother and father were unwed. The purpose was to protect the legally married heterosexual reproductive family, there was no room in this system for natural children, mothers outside of marriage, and involuntary paternity. [ 3 ]  In an era without DNA testing, the discussions often revolved around evidence.


In the modern era DNA testing has made definitive proof of paternity possible but also the concept of parenthood has expanded (e.g.  same sex parenting ). Intersection with the rights of children, state support of children and gender equality means this is a rapidly evolving area of law.


Similar concepts exist in Asian countries for the same reason: the protection of married heterosexual men from paternity suits from unmarried women. However, even there is introduction of DNA testing has changed the situation in recent years. [ 4 ]


Article 199 of Book 1 of the  Burgerlijk Wetboek [ 5 ]  determines that the man who recognises a child becomes the child's legal father. This can be done by a  public instrument , or by an  act of recognition , completed by an officer of the register office. It also the lists situations on which recognition may be considered invalid.


The requirement for the mother to consent can be overridden by a court only if the recogniser is the biological father, or the lifelong partner of the mother consented to an act that could have led to the birth of the child unless it would disrupt the relationship between the mother and the child, or it would not be in the best interests of the child.


The act of recognising a child does not automatically grant  legal guardianship , which must be applied for separately via  court order .


Since 2014, the act of recognition is also available to women who wish to be recognised as the mother of a child born to another women, such as if they are in a lesbian relationship.


In 2012, over 90% of all children of unwed mothers were recognised before the first year of age. Of the children born in 2000, only 9% remained unrecognised in 2012. [ 6 ]


Denial of fatherhood is possible only if the presumed father is not the biological father. [ 7 ]  The procedure can be initiated by the father, the mother or the child.


Recognition in Belgium is set out in Article 315 and subsequent articles of the Belgian Burgerlijk Wetboek. [ 8 ]


If the man/woman recognising a child is married to someone other than the legal mother of the child, then the act of recognition cannot be enforced until the spouse has been notified.


A challenge to the presumed legal fatherhood can be started:


A challenge cannot succeed if the legal father is the social father; that is, they act as a father toward the child, and they are considered the father by others (in  possession of status  –  bezit van staat  [ nl ] ).


Whether the parents are married or not, maternal affiliation is automatically established once the name of the woman is on the birth certificate. By contrast, if the parents are not married to each other, the  presumption of paternity  does not apply. By article 312 and the following articles of the Civil Code, paternity may be assumed in this case by a  man wishing to recognise the child, by a declaration made in a  public instrument  before: [ 9 ]


Recognition can be done before birth ("déclaration sur le ventre"), during the declaration of birth or afterwards.


France recognises the possibility of  anonymous birth  for unwed women, in which case the mother's name does not appear on the birth certificate. In this case recognition by the mother after the fact is also possible.


The legal framework for the recognition of paternity is defined in section 1594 of the  German Civil Code . [ 10 ]


A child has in certain circumstances (initially) no legal father. This is always the case where no legal presumption of paternity exists, for example if at the time of birth the mother is unmarried  or  divorced  or the marriage is legally annulled, or if the husband is deceased more than 300 days before the child's birth. The same applies to a child whose origin is unclear (a foundling) or if the previous paternity in the context of  paternity fraud  was excluded.


In these cases, an recognition of paternity by a man together with the consent of the child's mother results in the legal paternity of the child. Whether the recogniser is also the biological father of the child is irrelevant; the legislature intended to create with the process of the recognition of paternity the possibility for legal paternity for men that fill an actual father role ("social father"), in the absence of a biological father (for example in blended families). The act of recognition is not an assertion by a man that he is in fact the biological father of the child.


Family and Guardianship Code in art. 72 [ 11 ]  indicates that the recognition of paternity can occur if


In the case of any of the above two situations, paternity can occur by the acknowledgement of paternity by the father or by judgement of a court.


The statement necessary to establish paternity may be submitted by a person if they are at least 16 years of age and there are no grounds for  legal incapacitation .


If a man having recognised paternity does not have full legal capacity, he may make a statement necessary for the recognition of paternity only before a court guardianship.


The recognition is unallowed if a child is major.


Religious response to assisted reproductive technology  deals with the new challenges for traditional social and religious communities raised by modern  assisted reproductive technology . Because many religious communities have strong opinions and religious legislation regarding marriage, sex and reproduction, modern fertility technology has forced religions to respond.


Both for male factor testing and in order to use  sperm  for  intrauterine insemination  or  in vitro fertilization  the couple must first collect a sperm sample. For many religious groups this creates a challenge due to a prohibition on  masturbation .


Chemical


Neurological


Christian Churches  have different views on the use of assisted reproductive technology. [ 1 ]


The  Catholic Church  opposes certain types of assisted reproductive technology and artificial  birth control  since they separate the procreative goal of  marital  sex from the goal of uniting married couples. The Catholic Church permits the use of a small number of reproductive technologies and pregnancy postponement methods like  natural family planning , which involves charting  ovulation  times.


The church allows other forms of reproductive technologies that allow conception to take place from normative  sexual intercourse , such as a fertility lubricant, the use of hormonal injections to grow follicles and assist in ovulation, and intrauterine insemination with sperm collected using the approved method of collection during intercourse.


More recently, some Catholic authors have seen the  Creighton Model FertilityCare System , a technique based on the search for the restoration of fertility as a way to obtain a natural conception, as a morally licit alternative to other assisted reproduction techniques such as IVF. [ 2 ]


Pope Benedict XVI  publicly reemphasized the Catholic Church's opposition to in vitro fertilization, claiming it separates the unitive procreative actions that characterize the sexual embrace. [ 3 ]  In addition, the church opposes in vitro fertilization because it might cause disposal of embryos; Catholics believe an embryo is an individual with a  soul  who must be treated as a such. [ 4 ]  In addition, when it comes to the embryos, cryofreezing them for later use is frowned upon by the Catholic Church because it is considered immoral.


This  particular doctrine , often expounded by the  magisterium of the Church , is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act.
The reason is that the fundamental nature of the marriage act, while uniting husband and wife in the closest intimacy, also renders them capable of generating new life—and this as a result of laws written into the actual nature of man and of woman. And if each of these essential qualities, the unitive and the procreative, is preserved, the use of marriage fully retains its sense of true mutual love and its ordination to the supreme responsibility of parenthood to which man is called. We believe that our contemporaries are particularly capable of seeing that this teaching is in harmony with human reason. [ 5 ]


According to the  Catechism of the Catholic Church ,


Techniques involving only the married couple (homologous artificial insemination and fertilization) are perhaps less reprehensible, yet remain morally unacceptable. They dissociate the sexual act from the procreative act.  The act which brings the child into existence is no longer an act by which two persons give themselves to one another, but one that "entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents and children." [ 6 ]


The Catholic Church maintains that it is not objectively evil to be infertile, and advocates adoption as an option for such couples who still wish to have children:


The  Gospel  shows that physical sterility is not an absolute evil. Spouses who still suffer from infertility after exhausting legitimate medical procedures should unite themselves with the  Lord's Cross , the source of all spiritual  fecundity . They can give expression to their generosity by adopting abandoned children or performing demanding services for others. [ 6 ]


Gamete intrafallopian transfer  (GIFT) is not technically  in vitro  fertilisation because with GIFT, fertilisation takes place inside the body, not on a Petri dish. [ 7 ]  The Catholic Church nevertheless is concerned with it because "Some theologians consider this to be a replacement of the marital act, and therefore immoral." [ 8 ]


The  Lutheran Council in the United States of America , organized by the  Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod  and parent bodies of the  Evangelical Lutheran Church in America , produced an authoritative document on the issue of in-vitro fertilisation, which "unanimously concluded that in vitro fertilization does not  in and of itself  violate the will of God as reflected in the Bible, when the wife's egg and husband's sperm are used" (LCUSA n.d.:31). [ 9 ]


The Lutheran Churches approve of artificial insemination by a husband (AIH), though representatives from the  Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod  hold that such IVF is only unobjectionable if the sperm and egg come from husband and wife and all of the fertilized eggs are implanted in the womb of the wife. [ 9 ]  With regard to artificial insemination by a donor (AID), the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America teaches that it is a "cause for moral concern", while the  Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod  rejects it. [ 9 ]


The  Episcopal Church  approved the use of in vitro fertilisation in its General Convention in 1982; though it approved artificial insemination by a husband (AIH), in the General Convention of 1988 it declared "artificial insemination by donor problematic". [ 10 ]


For couples considering in-vitro fertilisation, the  United Methodist Church  in its  Book of Resolutions  states: [ 11 ]


With regard to the remaining embryos after in vitro fertilization procedures, the United Methodist Church teaches: [ 11 ]


The United Methodist Church supports persons who wish to enhance medical research by donating their early embryos remaining after in vitro fertilization procedures have ended, and urges national governments to pass legislation that would authorize funding for derivation of and medical research on human embryonic stem cells that were generated from in vitro fertilization embryos and remain after fertilization procedures have been concluded, provided that:


National health agencies are urged to establish an interdisciplinary oversight body for all research in both the public and private sectors that involves stem cells from human embryos, adult stem cells that have been made pluripotent, parthenotes, sperm cells, or egg cells, and cells that produce sperm or eggs. [ 11 ]


The  Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints  policy states:


Hinduism is generally tolerant of assisted reproductive technology with several people in  Hindu  mythology who have been born without intercourse including  Karna  and Five  Pandavas . [ 13 ]  Additionally, infertility is often associated with  karma  in the Hindu tradition and consequently treated as a pathology to be treated. [ 14 ]  This has led to general acceptance of medical intervention for addressing infertility amongst Hindus. [ 14 ]  As such, surrogacy and other scientific methods of  assisted reproduction  are generally supported within the Hindu community. [ 14 ]  Nonetheless, Hindu women do not commonly use surrogacy as an option to treat  infertility , despite often serving as surrogates for Western commissioning couples. [ 15 ] [ 14 ]  When surrogacy is practiced by Hindus, it is more likely to be used within the family circle as opposed to involving anonymous donors. [ 14 ]


The Islamic community, after the  fatwa  on  assisted reproductive technology  by  Gad al-Haq  of Egypt's  Al-Azhar University , largely accepted assisted reproductive technology. [ 16 ]


In vitro fertilization and similar technologies are permissible as long as they do not involve any form of third-party donation (of sperm, eggs, embryos, or uteruses). Regarding third-party donation there is a debate between  Sunni Islam  and  Shi'a  Islam. Sunnis, following the al-Azhar fatwa, do not allow third-party donations. In 1999,  Ali Khamenei , the authority for his followers, issued a fatwa stating that it was permitted to use third-party donors. [ 17 ]


The conclusions of Gad al-Haq's assisted reproductive technology fatwa are as follows: [ 16 ]


Defining Jewish views on assisted reproductive technology based solely on branches of  Judaism  is problematic since there is substantial overlap in opinions and  moral authority . [ 4 ]


Within the  Orthodox Jewish  community the concept is debated as there is little precedent in traditional Jewish legal textual sources. Non-legal sources such as  medrash  and  aggadah  provide stories that have been used to draw conclusions regarding assisted reproductive technology by modern Jewish  legal decisors . In general, traditional Judaism views medical intervention positively. [ 18 ]  Regarding assisted reproductive technology, the positive view of medicine is challenged by the Jewish religious legal system which has numerous laws regarding modesty and sexuality and a strong emphasis on verifiable lineage.


In Orthodox Judaism, insemination with the husband's sperm is permissible if the wife cannot become pregnant in any other way. [ 4 ]


Regarding  laws of sexuality , religious challenges include  masturbation  (which may be regarded as "seed wasting" [ 4 ] ), laws related to sexual activity and menstruation ( niddah ) and the specific laws regarding intercourse. Additional issues arise regarding the restrictions of the Sabbath ( Shabbat ) and  Jewish holidays .


An additional major issue is that of establishing paternity and lineage. For a baby conceived naturally, the father's identity is determined by a legal presumption ( chazakah ) of legitimacy:  rov bi'ot achar ha'baal  - a woman's  sexual relations  are assumed to be with her husband. Regarding an in vitro fertilization child, this assumption does not exist and as such Rabbi  Eliezer Waldenberg  (among others) requires an outside supervisor to positively identify the father. [ 19 ]  Doctors or laboratory workers present at the time of the fertility treatment are not considered supervisors due to a  conflict of interest  and their pre-occupation with their work. [ 20 ]


As such, supervisory services are required for all treatments involving lab manipulation or  cryopreservation  of sperm, ovum or embryos.


While a range of views exist, both  egg donation  and  surrogacy  are permitted according to many Orthodox decisors, pending  religious fertility supervision . [ 4 ] [ 21 ]  (In Israel, the " Embryo Carrying Agreements Law " was formulated to ensure that surrogacy agreements between Jewish Israelis do not conflict with  Jewish laws  concerning incest and adultery and that the child born of the arrangement will be recognized as a Jew.) [ 22 ]


Those interested are recommended to contact their local Orthodox or Hasidic Rabbi, as these laws are obviously complicated, and as is customary.


The official  halachic  legal authority for American  Conservative Judaism  is the  Rabbinical Assembly's [ permanent dead link  ]   Committee on Jewish Law and Standards . They vote on proposed responsa. A responsa may be approved by either a majority or a minority vote, and individual Rabbis may rely on even minority-approved responsa for their rulings.


Artificial insemination: AI is not typically allowed because it calls into question a variety of Jewish Laws regarding incest, adultery, and lineage. In fact, there are some Rabbis who work closely with fertilization clinics so that they can supervise all genetic material. The sperm donor is considered the father for purposes of determining the child's tribal status and for issues of ritual consanguinity, therefore, the use of anonymous donors is strongly discouraged. When it comes to adultery, there is the possibility that a man could have made multiple sperm donations. That leaves room for half-siblings to potentially meet and marry which would violate the Jewish incest laws. Lastly, you have the adultery claims. If a woman uses sperm from a man that is not her husband, some consider this to be adultery. Others, however, do not see this as an issue because both members of the couple consent to the use of third party sperm donation. [ 23 ]


Egg donation/Surrogacy: Surrogacy and egg donation are permissible and the birth mother, rather than the genetic mother, is considered the mother of the child, therefore conversion may be necessary if a non-Jewish woman acts as a gestational surrogate. A maximum of 3 embryos may be implanted at a time. Freezing and donation of embryos is permitted. [ 23 ] [ 24 ]


The Conservative movement's position on "family purity" practices, reducing the amount of time after a woman's period during which she is prohibited to have sex, may also work as a pro-fertility measure. As part of its treatment of  Tohorat HaMishpahah , the Conservative Assembly in 2006 accepted a position of eliminating the requirement for seven white days after the cessation of menses and establishing this as an optional custom. This is offered as a solution for women dealing with ovulation before mikvah by reducing the number of days with sexual relations being forbidden from an average of 12 to 5. [ 25 ]  Mid-cycle staining during ovulation, while ordinarily would prevent sexual relations by being considered  zavah , is to be considered a result of ancillary circumstances (diet, medical treatment, physical exertion, or illness) and as such the emission is considered permissible, and the woman would not become a zavah. [ 25 ]  Drug therapies to avoid mid-cycle staining are deemed unnecessary with the risks of the drug side-effects outweighing the prohibition of zavah due to the commandment of  hai bahem , ("[you shall] live by them"). [ 25 ]


Reform Judaism  has generally approved  artificial insemination by donor ,  in-vitro fertilization  and  surrogate  motherhood. [ 4 ]


Reproductive privilege  is a form of  social privilege  that describes people who have been able to regenerate themselves biologically and produce new generations with an unremarkable level of difficulty. People with a  reproductive disadvantage  (including those with infertility, recurrent miscarriages, involuntary childlessness, or other forms of  reproductive loss  or lack) [ 1 ]  use the term in reference to the variant levels of ease or difficulty with which people can become/stay pregnant and carry to term (if female) or father a living child (if male). [ 2 ]  The concept of  reproductive difference  is controversial and discussion of reproductive privilege is fraught with the social and sociological conflicts that are common to public discourse about children and families. [ 3 ]


The concept of reproductive privilege, like the related concept of  ableism , identifies a human capacity that many take for granted but that is not universally accessible. Reproduction is limited to people with certain bodies, at certain times of their lives, usually with certain baseline levels of physical and mental health. In addition, reproductive behaviors have traditionally occurred within a certain social and economic framework that may be inaccessible to some people for any number of reasons. A stereotypical post-menopausal 19th century spinster who still yearns for children might see a young and beautiful bride as having "reproductive privilege" in that she has an opportunity for and strong likelihood of reproduction. Heterosexual couples have a reproductive advantage over homosexual couples. An infertile couple that successfully adopted arguably has two forms of reproductive privilege, one compared to the biological parents who were not financially or emotionally equipped to raise an infant to adulthood, and two, to other adoption-seeking parents who have not been able to successfully arrange an adoption. While the most common use of  reproductive privilege  is in regards to fertility versus infertility, it can also describe the comfort of a privileged ignorance of miscarriage, stillbirth and infant death. [ 4 ]  In the words of one writer, "If people talking about their grief, their loss, their lack makes you feel uncomfortable and defensive: well, that’s privilege...You're entitled to your happiness. Just as we are entitled not to censor our sadness." [ 5 ]


Opponents of the concept argue that it commodifies children. [ 3 ]


Philosophers


Works


A  royal descent  is a  genealogical   line of descent  from a past or present  monarch .


Both  geneticists  and  genealogists  have attempted to estimate the percentage of living people with royal descent. From a genetic perspective, the number of unprovable descendants must be virtually unlimited if going back enough generations, according to  coalescent theory , as the possibility increases exponentially following every century back in time. In other words, the number of descendants from a monarch increases as a function of the length of time between the monarch's death and the birth of the particular descendant. As for descendants of genealogically documented royal descent, various estimated figures have been proposed. For instance, Mark Humphrys, a professor of  computer science  at  Dublin City University  in  Ireland , and  genealogy  enthusiast, estimated that there are millions of people of provable genealogical ancestry from medieval monarchs.


In genealogy, royal descent is sometimes claimed as a mark of distinction and is seen as a desirable goal. However, due to the incompleteness and uncertainty of existing records, the number of people who do claim royal descent tends to be higher than the number who can actually prove it. [ 1 ]  Historically,  pretenders ,  impostors  and those hoping to improve their social status have often claimed royal descent; some have used fabricated lineages. [ 2 ]  The importance of royal descent to some genealogists has been criticized. [ 3 ]


Logically, for every royal in a person's family tree, there is bound to be a virtually unlimited number of individuals whose births, deaths and lives went completely unrecorded by history. [ 4 ]  According to authors Jiri Louda and Michael Maclagan, statistically [ 5 ]


... most of the inhabitants of  Western Europe  are probably descended from  William the Conqueror ; they are equally likely to be descended from the man who groomed his  charger .


There has been a long tradition for royalty predominantly to  intermarry  those of their own class. As a result, the ruling houses of Europe have tended to be closely related to one another, and descent from a particular monarch will be found in many  dynasties  – all present European monarchs, and a great many pretenders, are genealogical descendants of  William the Conqueror  (1028–1087), for example, [ 5 ]  and further back in time of  Charlemagne  (742/747/748–814). Through Charlemagne, some researchers have even speculated on  descent from antiquity .


The practice of restrictive marriages has been noted as increasing over the years until the 20th century: the passage of time strengthened the conviction that royalty only allied with royalty, and from the 16th century marriages between royal and commoner became rarer and rarer. This is one reason why descent from more recent monarchs is rarer amongst commoners than from monarchs further back. [ 5 ]


Members of untitled families today may be descended from  illegitimate  children of royalty. Seldom permitted to marry into other royal families, these children tended to marry into  upper-class  or  middle-class  families within their own countries. [ 6 ] [ 7 ]


At one time, publications on this matter stressed royal connections for only a few families. One example included  James Pierpont  and others. [ 8 ]  Also, there are NEHGS articles on  United States presidents  and  "tycoon" families and of royal descent that emphasize the discriminating notion, [ 9 ]  of which the " most royal candidate theory " is a notable result. That is, those of royal descent excel (to wit, Roberts' article on eminent descendants of Mrs. Alice Freeman Thompson Parke). [ 10 ]  Many, too, were at the forefront of social progress, for example  Anne Marbury Hutchinson , who was banished from the  Massachusetts Bay Colony  for her progressive beliefs.


According to American genealogist Gary Boyd Roberts, an expert on royal descent, most Americans with significant  New England   Yankee ,  Mid-Atlantic   Quaker , or  Southern   planter  ancestry are descended from medieval kings, especially those of England, Scotland, and France.  William Addams Reitwiesner  documented many U.S. descendants of  Renaissance  and modern monarchs. Some Americans may have royal descents through German immigrants who had an illegitimate descent from German royalty. [ 11 ]


Due to  primogeniture , many colonists of high social status were younger children of English  aristocratic  families who came to America looking for land because, given their birth order, they could not inherit.  Many of these immigrants initially enjoyed high standing where they settled.  They could often claim royal descent through a female line or  illegitimate descent . Some Americans descend from these 17th-century  British colonists  who had royal descent. There were at least 650 colonists with traceable royal ancestry, [ 12 ] [ 13 ]  and 387 of them left descendants in America (almost always numbering many thousands, and some as many as one million). [ 12 ]  These colonists with royal descent settled in various states, but a large majority in  Massachusetts  or  Virginia . [ 12 ]  Several families which settled in those states, over the two hundred years or more since the colonial land grants, intertwined their branches to the point that almost everyone was somehow related to everyone else. As one writer observed, "like a tangle of fish hooks". [ 14 ]


Over time, opposing factors have affected the percentage of Americans who have provable royal descent.  The passage of the generations has further intermingled the ancestry of the English colonists' descendants, thus increasing the percentage who descend from one of the immigrants with royal ancestry.  At the same time, however, waves of post-colonial immigrants from other countries decreased the percentage who have royal descent.


Royal descent plays an important role in many African societies; authority and property tend to be lineally derived. Among tribes which recognize a single ruler, the hereditary blood line of the rulers (who early European travelers described as kings, queens, princes, etc., using the terminology of European monarchy) is akin to a  dynasty . [ 15 ]   Among groups which have less centralized power structures, dominant clans are still recognized. [ 15 ]   Oral history would be the primary method of transmitting genealogies, and both nobles and commoners base their status on descent. The royal blood is among the centralized power of all blood groups.


Many Asian and Oceanic or Pacifican cultures or civilizations have a veneration for royal descents. Many Muslims revere descents from  Ali  and his father-in-law,  Muhammad . In  India ,  Pakistan ,  Bengal  ( Bangladesh ), Southeast Asia,  Japan ,  Korea  and  China , such lines are sometimes revered, even if there were no special merit attached to it. In China, a book of surnames was compiled, and updated most recently under the  Ming dynasty .


Bhutan ,  Cambodia ,  Thailand  and Japan still maintain their monarchies ruled by royal or imperial dynasties. The former maharajas (great kings) of India,  Sri Lanka , Bangladesh and Pakistan still exist, and India still recognizes them. [ citation needed ]   Tonga  has three royal families. Hawai'i has gone through three royal dynasties, the Maori of  New Zealand  had several.  Rapa Nui  recognizes the descendants of the former royal line. [ citation needed ]


Royal descent is easier to prove than descent from less historically documented ancestors, since genealogies and public records are typically fuller, better known and preserved in the case of royal descent than in the case of descent from less noted individuals. Typically, it is only since the 20th century that family history has been an interest pursued by people outside the  upper classes . Hence, the continuous lines of descent from royal ancestors are typically much better researched and established than those from other ancestors. Until the parish record system introduced in the 16th century, and  civil registration  in the 19th century, family records are fuller for  landowners  than for ordinary people.


Between 1903 and 1911, the genealogist  Melville Henry Massue  produced volumes titled  The Blood Royal of Britain  - which attempted to name all the then-living descendants of King  Edward III of England  (1312–1377) - were published. He gave up the exercise after publishing the names of about 40,000 living people, but his own estimate was that the total of those of royal descent who could be proved and named if he completed his work at that time was 100,000 people.  His work, however, was heavily dependent upon those whose names were readily ascertainable from works of genealogical reference, such as  Burke's Peerage and Landed Gentry .


Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez , 436 U.S. 49 (1978), was a landmark case in the area of  federal Indian law  involving issues of great importance to the meaning of  tribal sovereignty  in the contemporary United States. The Supreme Court sustained a law passed by the governing body of the  Santa Clara Pueblo  that explicitly discriminated on the basis of sex. [ 1 ]  In so doing, the Court advanced a theory of tribal sovereignty that weighed the interests of tribes sufficient to justify a law that, had it been passed by a state legislature or Congress, would have almost certainly been struck down as a violation of  equal protection .


Along with the watershed cases,  United States v. Wheeler  and  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe ,  Santa Clara  completed the trilogy of seminal Indian law cases to come down in the 1978 term. [ 2 ]


The Petitioners were the Santa Clara Pueblo, an  Indian tribe  that is known to have existed for more than 600 years, and its Governor, Lucario Padilla. [ 1 ]  Respondents were Julia Martinez, a full-blooded member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, and her daughter. Martinez brought suit in federal court against the tribe and Padilla, asking the court to strike down a tribal ordinance denying membership in the tribe to children of female members who marry outside the tribe, while extending membership to children of male members who marry outside the tribe.


Martinez was married to a member of the  Navajo Nation , and, according to the ordinance her children were ineligible for membership in the Santa Clara Pueblo. While her children could live with her on the reservation, they were not permitted to vote in tribal elections, hold secular office in the tribe, possess a right to remain on the reservation if their mother died, nor inherit their mother's home or her possessory interests in communally held land. [ 3 ]  The Petitioner's Brief observed that this exclusion from Pueblo membership had no bearing on whether Martinez's children (and others similarly situated) could receive federal benefits provided to Indians generally. In fact, her children were all receiving federal Indian educational and medical benefits. [ 4 ]


Martinez claimed that the tribe's membership ordinance discriminated on the basis of both sex and ancestry in violation of Title I of the  Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968  (ICRA)           ( Pub.L.  90–284, 82  Stat.  73, enacted April 11, 1968), which provides in relevant part that no "Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." [ 1 ]  The case was brought in the  United States District Court for the District of New Mexico . The District Court found for the Petitioners, because membership rules are critical to the "social . . . self-definition" of tribes and thus vital to the tribe's survival as a distinct community. To that end, it found that striking the proper balance between equal protection and tribal  self-determination  was best left to the Pueblo's judgment. [ 5 ]


The  10th Circuit Court of Appeals  reversed, holding that no "compelling tribal interest" justified the ordinance's sex-based classification. The Petitioners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ultimately reversed the 10th Circuit's holding and sustained the tribal ordinance. [ 6 ]


Justice  Thurgood Marshall  began the majority opinion by discussing general principles of tribal sovereignty relevant to the case. He noted that tribes are distinct, sovereign political communities existing within the United States, which retain powers of self-government. These include the authority to pass substantive laws governing internal matters, such as tribal membership. [ 6 ]  Furthermore, because tribes are separate sovereigns that existed prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, constitutional protections such as those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, do not constrain tribes on their own terms. [ 7 ]


Instead, Congress must exercise its  plenary power  over tribes to abridge tribal sovereignty. [ 8 ]   The substantive rights guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights act, such as the guarantee of equal protection under the law, represent such an abridgment. It is unclear, however, if Congress intended to permit federal suits against tribes, by individuals such as Martinez, to enforce those rights. [ 9 ]  Two doctrines of law,  sovereign immunity  and  implied causes-of-action , were examined to decide if Congress intended to permit such suits.


Part III of the opinion addressed why the Pueblo was immune from suit. Tribes, like states and the federal government, are generally entitled to  sovereign immunity , which means they cannot be sued in court without their consent. Congress may, however, abrogate a tribe's sovereign immunity pursuant to its plenary power. Finding that nothing in the text of ICRA appeared to waive tribal immunity, Justice Marshall held the Pueblo immune from suit in federal court. This meant the tribe could not be sued for passing the membership ordinance, which indirectly protected the law from being struck down under ICRA. [ 10 ]


Part IV analyzed whether the case may proceed against the other Petitioner, Governor Padillo. Padillo, being an officer of the tribe, does not receive the protection of tribal sovereign immunity. The obstacle for Martinez was that ICRA did not explicitly authorize suits against tribes in federal court. For her case to be lawful, the Court would need to find an  implied cause-of-action  that permitted federal suits against tribes.


To emphasize the importance of this decision, Justice Marshall observed that finding a private cause-of-action would interfere with tribal sovereignty in a way the text of the statute does not, on its own terms, allow. It would disrupt the ability of tribes to govern themselves. Out of respect for tribal sovereignty, the Court decided to "tread lightly", given the lack of express Congressional direction as to whether it has exercised its plenary power to diminish tribal sovereignty. [ 11 ]


Justice Marshall proceeded to analyze the statute's legislative history and structure under the Supreme Court's implied cause-of-action case law. This case law requires consideration of factors including, whether a cause-of-action is supported by the legislative history of the statute and whether a cause-of-action would be consistent with the statute's purpose. While ICRA was designed to secure Constitutional rights to tribal members as against their tribal governments, it did not include all rights citizens enjoy under the Constitution. For example, ICRA made no mention of a prohibition on the establishment of religion or require the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. These exceptions reflect the other purpose of ICRA: to safeguard and promote tribal sovereignty. ICRA imposed an obligation on tribal governments to respect the rights enumerated, but it was tribal courts that were intended to vindicate those rights, not federal ones. Creating a cause-of-action would undermine the latter goal of ICRA and, in addition, impose significant financial burdens on the already economically disadvantaged tribes. [ 12 ]


This decision to not imply a cause-of-action was further supported by how ICRA specifically permits habeas corpus petitions in federal court. This is a less intrusive form of review than Congress otherwise could have prescribed. Additionally, the legislative history of ICRA indicated that Congress considered, but rejected, proposals that would have permitted federal review of civil ICRA violations by the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior. In light of this history, Justice Marshall decided it would be "highly unlikely" that Congress intended to create a private cause-of-action in federal courts to enforce ICRA. [ 13 ]


Justice Marshall concluded his opinion with an affirmation of tribal self-determination, the quasi-sovereign status of tribes, and how threatening federal review of ICRA claims would be to the cultural and political survival of tribes. He reiterated that Congress may authorize such federal review, but "unless and until Congress" acts, the Court would not imply a private cause-of-action for it. [ 14 ]


Justice Byron White  wrote a solo dissent, disagreeing with the majority's opinion. He acknowledged the importance of tribal culture but did not think concern for it should protect arbitrary or unconstitutional tribal official action. He was unpersuaded by the majority's position that Congress's rejection of federal review of ICRA violations, indicated Congress did not intend to create a private federal cause-of-action for ICRA violations. Those proposals would have primarily affected off-reservation violations of Indian rights by non-Indians, like illegal detentions by state officials. They had nothing to do with whether a tribal member can sue a tribe in federal court. [ 15 ]


For Justice White, the most important consideration was whether the private cause-of-action would be consistent with the purpose of ICRA. That was clearly the case because ICRA was designed, first and foremost, to safeguard to Indians the same constitutional rights other Americans enjoy. A private cause-of-action is necessary to effectuate those rights. He cited legislative history suggesting Congressional concern regarding the lack of remedies for violations of Indian rights. Justice White argued that it would be inconsistent with this purpose of ICRA to limit review of ICRA violations to tribal institutions. For instance, the judicial and legislative powers of the Santa Clara Pueblo are both vested in the Pueblo Council. This means the same body that passed the allegedly unlawful ordinance would be deciding if it violates ICRA. A private federal cause-of-action is necessary to avoid this conflict-of-interest. [ 16 ]


Finally, Justice White addressed the competing purpose of ICRA: to protect and promote tribal sovereignty. He stated that ICRA and its attendant imposition of rights on the tribes was already a major intrusion on tribal sovereignty. A federal cause-of-action would simply give meaning to those rights, as there cannot be a right without a remedy. [ 17 ]


The case greatly limited the influence of the  Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968  outside of tribal courts. In finding no private cause-of-action, the ability of individual tribe members to bring cases in a federal court for alleged violations of their rights under ICRA, was greatly diminished. As the Court recognized in  Santa Clara , the only express means to bring ICRA claims in a federal court is through a habeas corpus petition, an action explicitly authorized by the Indian Civil Rights Act. [ 18 ]  The Court's reasoning also reflects an attitude of solicitude for tribal sovereignty with respect to implied causes-of-action. It was because of the importance of tribal sovereignty that the factors the Court used to decide whether to find a cause-of-action militated against finding one.


Santa Clara  has been cited and discussed by the Supreme Court in a diverse set of subsequent Indian law decisions. Notable examples include:


Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe , 455 U.S.  130  (1982): In upholding a tribal tax of on-reservation oil and gas production as an exercise of the inherent sovereignty of a tribe to govern its internal affairs, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Marshall) cited the passage in  Santa Clara  stating that it will "tread lightly" where Congress has not expressly indicated its intent as to whether it has used its plenary power to abridge tribal sovereignty. [ 19 ]  In his dissent in the case,  Justice Stevens  cited  Santa Clara  for the proposition that the equal protection principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not limit tribal power in the same way they limit state and federal power. [ 20 ]  This means, according to Justice Stevens, tribal sovereignty over members is, in some ways, greater than a state's power over its citizens. [ 20 ]


Rice v. Cayetano , 528 U.S.  495  (2000): In this case, the majority struck down a Hawaii state law that restricted voting in elections for Trustees of the  Office of Hawaiian Affairs  to persons with a specific degree of Native Hawaiian ancestry, for being an unconstitutional, race-based classification. [ 21 ]   Justice Breyer , concurring in the judgment, cited  Santa Clara  to illustrate the principle that tribes possess broad authority to define their membership. [ 22 ]  He nevertheless agreed with the majority's conclusion that the "race-based" classification was unconstitutional. [ 22 ]  This was in part because it was the state of Hawaii, rather than Native Hawaiians, who created the problematic classification. [ 22 ]


Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S.  353  (2001): The  Hicks  Court held that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over state officials who act on a reservation to investigate off-reservation violations of state law. [ 23 ]   Justice Souter , concurring in the judgment, cited  Santa Clara  to illustrate a tension in the Court's Indian law jurisprudence on the role of tribal courts. He first observed that  Santa Clara  affirmed the appropriateness of tribal courts as the exclusive forum for adjudicating disputes involving "important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." [ 24 ]  He contrasted this holding of  Santa Clara  with cases like  Oliphant  and  Montana , which suggest tribes and their courts lack jurisdiction over non-members. [ 25 ]


Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U.S.  782  (2014): The Supreme Court held that tribal sovereign immunity protects a tribe from suit for operating a casino outside Indian lands. [ 26 ]  In her majority opinion,  Justice Kagan  cited  Santa Clara  for the proposition that in spite of federal plenary power, tribes remain separate sovereigns who pre-exist the Constitution. She further cited  Santa Clara 's holding that tribes enjoy sovereign immunity and that any Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity must be explicit. [ 27 ]  Justice Kagan, like Justice Marshall in  Merrion , cited the "tread lightly" language of  Santa Clara  to emphasize the importance of demanding an express Congressional statement as to whether it is changing the extent of tribal sovereignty. [ 28 ]


United States v. Bryant , 136 U.S.  1954  (2016): In this case, the Court held that tribal criminal court convictions for domestic violence that were obtained against a defendant not represented by counsel, were admissible in a subsequent federal criminal case (where they empowered prosecutors to seek a higher sentence for the defendant). This was because the  Sixth Amendment  right to counsel does not apply to the tribes. [ 29 ]   Justice Ginsburg , writing for the majority, cited  Santa Clara  for the principle that the Constitution and its limits on state and federal power do not apply to the tribes, as they are separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution. This was critical in reaching the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribes. [ 30 ]


The Supreme Court's decision in  Santa Clara  has also been cited in administrative agency rules and decisions. Notable examples include:


Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings . 81  FR   38778  (2016).  25 CFR 23 . This Final Rule improves implementation of the  Indian Child Welfare Act  (ICWA), including requirements imposed on State courts to fully comply with ICWA and to maintain certain records. [ 31 ]  The Final Rule cites  Santa Clara  to affirm that delineating membership requirements is a sovereign function of tribes. [ 32 ]


Procedures for Reestablishing a Formal Government-to-Government Relationship With the Native Hawaiian Community.  81  FR   71278  (2016).  43 CFR 50 . This Final Rule establishes an administrative process and criteria for the Secretary of the Interior to use to re-establish a formal government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian Community if the Community ever forms a government and seeks such a relationship. The Final Rule cites  Santa Clara  for the principle that Native communities may define their own membership [ 33 ]  and concludes that the Native Hawaiian community can decide what "tests" they wish to use to ascertain whether an individual can be a member. [ 34 ]


Secretary of Labor v. Navajo Forest Products Industries ,  8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2094 (1980) . Shortly after  Santa Clara  was decided, the  Occupational Safety Health Review Commission  decided that a Navajo Nation tribal enterprise was exempt from the  Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 , including the application of citations and penalties levied against the enterprise pursuant to the Act. The Commission cited  Santa Clara  for the proposition that tribes retain the sovereign authority to establish substantive law and regulate their own internal affairs. This understanding of tribal sovereignty was considered in connection with a treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States limiting the kinds of federal officials who could be present and act on the reservation. The treaty was read to preserve, rather than cede, the tribal sovereignty affirmed in  Santa Clara . The Commission thus concluded that the treaty precluded enforcement of the Act against the tribal enterprise. [ 35 ]


Larry Martin v. Billings Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs ,  19 IBIA 279  (1991): The Interior Board of Indian Affairs (IBIA), [ 36 ]  which reviews decisions by the  Bureau of Indian Affairs  (BIA) involving Indian affairs, was asked to consider an appeal by a subcontractor who was performing home renovations on the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, under an  Indian Self-Determination Act  (ISDA) contract. [ 37 ]  The IBIA cited the discussion of the dual purposes of ICRA in  Santa Clara  to find that, like ICRA, ISDA does not have an implied cause-of-action to challenge tribal action. The Indian Self-Determination Act has only one purpose: promoting tribal sovereignty. This means the reasoning of  Santa Clara  applies even more forcefully, as there are no countervailing purposes that might support an implied cause-of-action. Finding a cause-of-action would undermine the purpose of ISDA, just like how finding a cause-of-action in  Santa Clara  would have undermined the purpose of ICRA. [ 38 ]


Welmas and Dukic v. Sacramento Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs ,  24 IBIA 264  (1993): The BIA was asked by members of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians to review sanctions imposed on them by the Band's tribal council. [ 39 ]  The IBIA analyzed  Santa Clara  in its determination that ICRA did not grant the BIA authority to review the tribal action at issue. The IBIA referenced  Santa Clara 's discussion of an administrative review process that Congress rejected in passing ICRA as evidence that the review sought by the Band members was "specifically rejected" by Congress and thus not authorized by ICRA. [ 40 ]


As the Court did not reach the merits, the questions of whether a "compelling tribal interest" is required to justify tribal laws that discriminate on the basis of sex, and if one is, what constitutes such an interest, were not resolved. The Briefs did, however, present arguments on this important issue.


The Petitioners' Brief emphasized how ICRA rights guarantees are not as strong as constitutional ones and so the standard in equal protection cases should be lower than  strict scrutiny  (the standard signalled by the 10th Circuit's use of the "compelling tribal interest" phrase). [ 41 ]  It contended for the lowest established standard of review, the "rational relation" test, which would only require a rational relationship to exist between the law and its intended purpose. This was the case here, as the tribe's political and cultural independence depended on its ability to maintain its patrilineal social order. This interest in the tribe's survival was "compelling," and certainly "rationally related" to the ordinance. [ 42 ]


The Respondents' Brief argued for a higher form of review as the tribal law at issue involved a sex-based discrimination. The Brief pointed to the fact that recent Supreme Court  precedent  established a higher standard for state and federal sex-based classifications:  intermediate scrutiny . [ 43 ]  Additionally, the mere fact that the Pueblo had a tradition of treating male and female members differently, is not sufficient to justify the classification. [ 44 ]


The decision spurred a robust debate within legal academia. For example,  Catherine MacKinnon  wrote that the tribal ordinance was patriarchal, aimed at perpetuating male supremacy in the Pueblo. [ 45 ]  While she recognized the importance of tribal sovereignty, she contended that by disadvantaging women, the ordinance ultimately undermined the tribe's autonomy as a distinct community. This was because, to MacKinnon, the law was a concession to male-supremacist, colonialist United States policy. MacKinnon believed the law was passed because the tribal council feared the U.S. government might impose  allotment  on the tribe. MacKinnon asserted that in many other tribes whose land had been allotted, much of the land passed out of tribal hands when female members married male non-members, as the husbands would acquire control of the land. This would not happen when male members married female non-members. Thus, the ordinance was aimed at protecting the integrity of the tribe's land holdings. Yet, by giving preference to male intermarriage while punishing female intermarriage, the tribe was cowing to the U.S. government's threat of allotment, thereby undermining tribal autonomy. [ 46 ]


Francine Skenandore responded to MacKinnon's position with an account of Indian feminism that presents tribal identity and tribal women's identity as deeply linked. This results in an emphasis less on gender equality and more on tribal survival and autonomy. Skenandore argues that MacKinnon is trying to force Native women to choose between their identity as women and identity as tribal members, whereas she believes the two work together. Thus, the decision in  Santa Clara  advanced Indian feminism insofar as it preserved tribal sovereignty and the ability of the tribe to work through its understanding of gender equality outside the control of United States law and empire. She points out that MacKinnon does not understand how tribal membership is a privilege, not a right and that MacKinnon uses rights language to wholly dismiss tribal culture and tradition. [ 47 ]  The Petitioners' Brief provides support for Skenandore's critique. The Brief noted that the membership ordinance simply codified an unwritten tribal rule that had existed from time immemorial. [ 4 ]


Rina Swentzell, a Santa Clara Pueblo member, wrote of how the decision affirming the tribe's self-determination to decide who is a member was critical to the Pueblo's continuance as an independent community. [ 48 ]  It was a community issue that ought be handled internally by the members, not imposed on them by the Supreme Court. In her article, "Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman," she discusses how balance, in life and between the sexes, is an important part of Santa Clara Pueblan culture and tradition. She notes that the 1936 Santa Clara Constitution, pursuant to which the membership ordinance was passed, was primarily written by non-pueblo individuals. [ 49 ]


Judith Resnik provides a similar critique of the decision as MacKinnon. She questions the role of tradition and history in the rule, instead identifying the ordinance as a product of U.S. influence, if not encouragement. It reflects the long-standing U.S. tradition of subjugating women. [ 50 ]  Skenandore responded to Resnik as well, noting that her argument suggests tribes have been assimilated into the dominant legal culture of the United States and questions their existence as distinct communities. This ignores the long, and continuing, history of tribal resistance to assimilation. Skenandore reiterates that Native feminists understand the connection between gender identity and tribal identity and how critical the preservation of tribal sovereignty is to their feminism. [ 51 ]


Santa Clara's membership ordinance was similar to Canadian policy governing the status of First Nations or Indian women under the  Indian Act of 1951 . This was different from the Santa Clara Pueblo case, in that the government was imposing rules on all Indians or First Nations. But it was discriminatory against Indian women and their children. The Act said that First Nations/Indian women who married a non-First Nations man or non-status man, would lose their status as Indians. If they married a man from another tribe, they would lose rights in their birth tribe, as would their children. They could not return to their original tribe and get benefits they had received before. But First Nations men who married a non-Indian or non-status woman, or a woman from another First Nation, suffered no such loss or change in status.


Women organized and finally got this law changed, challenging it in court and appealing to the  United Nations Human Rights Committee . In 1981, the UN found Canada in breach of the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . In 1982 Canada amended its constitution, establishing the  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . In 1985 it passed Bill C-31, which "revised Indian status to address the gender discrimination of the Indian Act." [ 52 ]


A  sibling  is a relative that shares at least one  parent  with the other person. A  male  sibling is a  brother , and a  female  sibling is a  sister . A person with no siblings is an  only child .


While some circumstances can cause siblings to be raised separately (such as  foster care ), most societies have siblings grow up together. This causes the development of strong  emotional bonds , with siblinghood considered a unique type of relationship. The emotional bond between siblings is often complicated and is influenced by factors such as parental treatment,  birth order ,  personality , and personal experiences outside the family. [ 1 ]


Medically, a full-sibling is a  first-degree relative  and a half-sibling is a  second-degree relative  as they are related by 50% and 25%, respectively. [ 2 ] [ 3 ]


The word  sibling  was reintroduced in 1903 in an article in  Biometrika , as a translation for the German  Geschwister , having not been used since Middle English, specifically 1425. [ 4 ] [ 5 ]


Siblings or  full-siblings  ([ full ]  sisters  or  brothers ) share the same biological parents. Full-siblings are also the most common type of siblings. [ citation needed ]   Twins  are siblings that are born from the same pregnancy. [ 6 ]  Often, twins with a close relationship will develop a  twin language  from infanthood, a language only shared and understood between the two. Studies corroborate that identical twins appear to display more twin talk than fraternal twins. At about 3, twin talk usually ends. [ 7 ]  Twins generally share a greater bond due to growing up together and being the same age.


Half-siblings  ( half-sisters  or  half-brothers ) are people who share one parent. They may share the same mother but different fathers (in which case they are known as  uterine  siblings or  maternal half-siblings ), or they may have the same father but different mothers (in which case, they are known as  agnate  siblings or  paternal half-siblings . In law, the term  consanguine  is used in place of agnate). [ citation needed ]  In law (and especially  inheritance  law), half-siblings have often been accorded treatment unequal to that of full-siblings. Old English  common law  at one time incorporated inequalities into the laws of  intestate succession , with half-siblings taking only half as much property of their intestate siblings' estates as siblings of full-blood. Unequal treatment of this type has been wholly abolished in  England , [ 8 ]  but still exists in Florida. [ 9 ]


Three-quarter siblings  share one parent, while the unshared parents are  first-degree relatives  to each other, for example, if a man has children with two women who are sisters, or a woman has children with a man and his son. In the first case, the children are half-siblings as well as first cousins; in the second, the children are half-siblings as well as an avuncular pair. They are genetically closer than half-siblings but less genetically close than full-siblings, [ 10 ]  a degree of genetic relationship that is rare in humans and little-studied. [ 11 ]  One notable example of three-quarter siblings is the family of American aviator  Charles Lindbergh , who fathered children with two German sisters, Brigitte and Marietta Hesshaimer.


Diblings , a portmanteau of donor sibling, or donor-conceived sibling, or donor-sperm sibling, are biologically connected through  donated eggs  or  sperm . [ 12 ] [ 13 ]  Diblings are biologically siblings though not legally for the purposes of family rights and inheritance. The anonymity of donation is seen to add complication to the process of courtship.


Related through affinity:


Not related:


Consanguinity  is the measure of how closely people are related. [ 23 ]  Genetic relatedness measures how many genes a person shares. As all humans share over 99% of the same genes, consanguinity only matters for the small fraction of genes which vary between different people. [ 24 ]  Inheritance of genes has a random element to it, [ 24 ]  and these two concepts are different. [ 25 ]  Consanguinity decreases by half for every generation of reproductive separation through their most recent common ancestor. Siblings are 50% related by consanguinity as they are separated from each other by two generation (sibling to parent to sibling), and they share two parents as common ancestors (

 (

 1
 2

 )

 2

 +

 (

 1
 2

 )

 2

 {\displaystyle \left({\tfrac {1}{2}}\right)^{2}+\left({\tfrac {1}{2}}\right)^{2}}

 ).


A fraternal twin is a sibling and, therefore, is related by 50% consanguinity. [ 26 ]   Fraternal twins  are no more genetically similar than regular siblings. As  identical twins  come from the same zygote, their most recent common ancestor is each other. They’re genetically identical and 100% consanguineous as they’re separated by zero generations (

 (

 1
 2

 )

 0

 {\displaystyle \left({\tfrac {1}{2}}\right)^{0}}

 ). [ 24 ]   Twin studies  have been conducted by scientists to examine the roles that  genetics and environment  play in the development of various traits. Such studies examine how often identical twins possess the same behavioral trait and compare it to how often fraternal twins possess the same trait. [ citation needed ]  In other studies twins are raised in separate families, and studies compare the passing on of a behavioral trait by the family environment and the possession of a common trait between identical twins. This kind of study has revealed that for personality traits which are known to be  heritable , genetics play a substantial role throughout life and an even larger role during early years. [ 27 ]


Half-siblings are 25% related by consanguinity as they share one parent and separated from each other by two generations (

 (

 1
 2

 )

 2

 {\displaystyle \left({\tfrac {1}{2}}\right)^{2}}

 ).


A person may share more than the standard consanguinity with their sibling if their parents are related (the  coefficient of inbreeding  is greater than zero). [ citation needed ]   Interestingly, half-siblings can be related by as "three-quarters siblings" (related by 3/8) if their unshared parents have a consanguinity of 50%. This means the unshared parents are either siblings, making the half-siblings  cousins , or parent and child, making them half-  aunt - uncle  and  niece - nephew . [ 28 ]


In practice, full siblings do not share exactly 50% of their DNA, as  chromosomal crossover  only occurs a limited number of times and, therefore, large chunks of a chromosome are shared or not shared at one time. In fact, the mean DNA fraction shared is 50.28% with a standard deviation of 3.68%, [ 29 ]  meaning approximately 1/4 of sibling pairs share more than 52.76% of their DNA, while 1/4 share less than 47.8%. [ 30 ]


There is a very small chance that two half-siblings might not share any genes if they didn't inherit any of the same chromosomes from their shared parent. This is possible for full-siblings as well, though even more unlikely. But because of how  homologous chromosomes  swap genes (due to  chromosomal crossover  during  meiosis ) during the development of an egg or sperm cell, however, the odds of this ever actually occurring are practically non-existent. [ 25 ]


Birth order is a person's rank by age among his or her siblings. Typically, researchers classify siblings as "eldest", "middle child", and "youngest" or simply distinguish between "first-born" and "later-born" children.


Birth order is commonly believed in  pop psychology  and popular culture to have a profound and lasting effect on psychological development and  personality . For example, firstborns are seen as conservative and high-achieving, middle children as natural mediators, and youngest children as charming and outgoing. Despite its lasting presence in the public domain, studies have failed to consistently produce clear, valid, compelling findings; therefore, it has earned the title of a  pseudo-psychology  amongst the scientific psychological community. [ 31 ]


The theorizing and study of birth order can be traced back to  Francis Galton 's (1822–1911) theory of birth order and  eminence  and  Alfred Adler 's (1870–1937) theory of birth order and personality characteristics. [ citation needed ]


In his book  English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture  (1874), Galton noted that prominent composers and scientists are over-represented as first-borns. [ 32 ]  He theorized three main reasons as to why first-borns are generally more eminent:


Today, the flaws and inconsistencies in birth order research eliminate its validity. It is very difficult to control solely for factors related to birth order, and therefore most studies produce ambiguous results. [ 33 ]  Embedded into theories of birth order is a debate of nature versus nurture. It has been disproved that there is something innate in the position one is born into, and therefore creating a preset role. Birth order has no genetic basis. [ 35 ]


The social interaction that occurs as a result of birth order however is the most notable. Older siblings often become role models of behaviour, and younger siblings become learners and supervisees. Older siblings are at a developmental advantage both cognitively and socially. The role of birth order also depends greatly and varies greatly on family context. Family size, sibling identification, age gap, modeling, parenting techniques, gender, class, race, and temperament are all confounding variables that can influence behaviour and therefore perceived behaviour of specific birth categories. [ 36 ]  The research on birth order does have stronger correlations, however, in areas such as intelligence and physical features, but are likely caused by other factors other than the actual position of birth. Some research has found that firstborn children have slightly higher  IQs  on average than later born children. [ 37 ]  However, other research finds no such effect. [ 38 ]  It has been found that first-borns score three points higher compared to second borns and that children born earlier in a family are on average, taller and weigh more than those born later. [ 31 ]  However, it is impossible to generalize birth order characteristics and apply them universally to all individuals in that subgroup.


(Blake, 1981) provide three potential reasons for the higher scoring of older siblings on IQ tests: [ 32 ]


Robert Zajonc  proposed that the intellectual environment within a family is ever-changing due to three factors, and therefore more permissive of first-born children's intellectual advancement: [ 32 ]


In 1996, interest in the science behind birth order was re-sparked when  Frank Sulloway ’s book  Born To Rebel  was published. In this book, Sulloway argues that firstborns are more conscientious, more socially dominant, less agreeable, and less open to new ideas compared to later-borns. While being seemingly empirical and academic, as many studies are cited throughout the book, it is still often criticized as a biased and incomplete account of the whole picture of siblings and birth order. Because it is a novel, the research and theories proposed throughout were not criticized and peer-reviewed by other academics before its release. [ 39 ]
 Literature reviews  that have examined many studies and attempted to control for confounding variables tend to find minimal effects for birth order on personality. [ 40 ] [ 41 ]
In her review of the scientific literature,  Judith Rich Harris  suggests that birth order effects may exist within the context of the family of origin, but that they are not enduring aspects of personality. [ 42 ]


In practice, systematic birth order research is a challenge because it is difficult to control for all of the variables that are statistically related to birth order. For example, large families are generally lower in socioeconomic status than small families, so third-born children are more likely than first-born children to come from poorer families. Spacing of children, parenting style, and gender are additional variables to consider.


Regressive behaviors are the child's way of demanding the parents' love and attention.


The arrival of a new baby is especially stressful for firstborns and for siblings between 3 and 5 years old. In such situations, regressive behavior may be accompanied by aggressive behavior, such as handling the baby roughly. All of these symptoms are considered to be typical and developmentally appropriate for children between the ages of 3 and 5. While some can be prevented, the remainder can be improved within a few months. Regressive behavior may include demand for a bottle, thumb sucking, requests to wear diapers (even if toilet-trained), or requests to carry a  security blanket .


The  American Academy of Pediatrics  suggests that instead of protesting or telling children to act their age, parents should simply grant their requests without becoming upset. The affected children will soon return to their normal routine when they realize that they now have just as important a place in the family as the new sibling. Most of the behaviors can be improved within a few months.


The  University of Michigan Health System  advises that most occurrences of regressive behavior are mild and to be expected; however, it recommends parents to contact a pediatrician or child psychologist if the older child tries to hurt the baby, if regressive behavior does not improve within 2 or 3 months, or if the parents have other questions or concerns.


"Sibling rivalry" is a type of competition or animosity among brothers and sisters. It appears to be particularly intense when children are very close in age or of the same gender. [ 43 ]  Sibling rivalry can involve  aggression ; however, it is not the same as  sibling abuse  where one child victimizes another.


Sibling rivalry usually starts right after, or before, the arrival of the second child. While siblings will still love each other, it is not uncommon for them to bicker and be malicious to each other. [ 44 ]  Children are sensitive from the age of 1 year to differences in parental treatment and by 3 years they have a sophisticated grasp of family rules and can evaluate themselves in relation to their siblings. [ 1 ]  Sibling rivalry often continues throughout childhood and can be very frustrating and stressful to parents. [ 45 ]  One study found that the age group 10–15 reported the highest level of competition between siblings. [ 46 ]  Sibling rivalry can continue into adulthood and sibling relationships can change dramatically over the years. Approximately one-third of adults describe their relationship with siblings as rivalrous or distant. However, rivalry often lessens over time and at least 80% of siblings over age 60 enjoy close ties. [ 1 ]


Each child in a family competes to define who they are as persons and want to show that they are separate from their siblings. Sibling rivalry increases when children feel they are getting unequal amounts of their parents' attention, where there is stress in the parents' and children's lives, and where fighting is accepted by the family as a way to resolve conflicts. [ 45 ]   Sigmund Freud  saw the sibling relationship as an extension of the  Oedipus complex , where brothers were in competition for their mother's attention and sisters for their father's. [ 47 ]   Evolutionary psychologists  explain sibling rivalry in terms of  parental investment  and  kin selection : a parent is inclined to spread resources equally among all children in the family, but a child wants most of the resources for him or herself. [ 46 ]


Jealousy  is not a single emotion.  The basic emotions expressed in jealous interactions are  fear ,  anger , relief,  sadness , and anxiety. [ 48 ]   Jealousy occurs in a social triangle of relationships which do not require a third person. The social triangle involves the relationships between the jealous individual and the parent, the relationship between the parent and the rival, and the relationship between jealous individual and the rival. [ 48 ]


First-borns' attachment to their parents is directly related to their jealous behaviour. In a study by Volling, four classes of children were identified based on their different responses of jealousy to new infant siblings and parent interactions.
 Regulated Exploration Children : 60% of children fall into this category. [ 48 ]  These children closely watch their parents interact with their newborn sibling, approach them positively and sometimes join the interaction. [ 48 ]  They show fewer behaviour problems in the months following the new birth and do not display problematic behaviours during the parent-infant interaction. [ 48 ]  These children are considered  secure  as they act how a child would be expected to act in a familiar home setting with their parents present as secure bases to explore the environment. [ 48 ]
 Approach-Avoidant Children : 30% of children fall into this category. [ 48 ]  These children observe parent-infant interaction closely and are less likely to approach the infant and the parent. They are anxious to explore the new environment as they tend to seek little comfort from their parents. [ 48 ]
 Anxious -Clingy Children :  6% of children fell into this category.  These children have an intense interest in parent-infant interaction and a strong desire to seek proximity and contact with the parent, and sometimes intrude on parent-child interaction. [ 48 ]
 Disruptive Children : 2.7% of children fall into this category. [ 48 ]  These children are emotionally reactive and aggressive. They have difficulty regulating their negative emotions and may be likely to externalize it as negative behaviour around the newborn. [ 48 ]


Children are more jealous of the interactions between newborns and their mothers than they are with newborns and their fathers. [ 48 ]  This is logical as up until the birth of the infant, the first-born child had the mother as their primary care-giver all to themselves. Some research has suggested that children display less jealous reactions over father-newborn interactions because fathers tend to punish negative  emotion  and are less tolerant than mothers of clinginess and visible distress, although this is hard to generalize. [ 48 ]


Children that have parents with a better marital relationship are better at regulating their jealous emotions. [ 48 ]  Children are more likely to express jealousy when their parents are directing their attention to the sibling as opposed to when the parents are solely interacting with them. [ 48 ]  Parents who are involved in good marital communication help their children cope adaptively with jealousy.  They do this by modelling problem-solving and conflict resolution for their children.  Children are also less likely to have jealous feelings when they live in a home in which everyone in the family shares and expresses love and happiness. [ 48 ]


Implicit theories about relationships are associated with the ways children think of strategies to deal with a new situation.
Children can fall into two categories of implicit theorizing. They may be malleable theorists and believe that they can affect change on situations and people. Alternatively, they may be fixed theorists, believing situations and people are not changeable. [ 49 ]  These implicit beliefs determine both the intensity of their jealous feelings, and how long those jealous feelings last. [ 49 ]
 Malleable Theorists  display engaging behaviours, like interacting with the parent or sibling in an attempt to improve the situation. [ 49 ]  They tend to have more intense and longer-lasting feelings of jealousy because they spend more time ruminating on the situation and constructing ways to make it better. [ 49 ]
 Fixed Theorists  display non-engaging behaviours, for example retreating to their room because they believe none of their actions will affect or improve the situation. [ 49 ]  They tend to have less intense and shorter lasting feelings of jealousy than malleable theorists. [ 49 ]


Older children tend to be less jealous than their younger sibling. [ 48 ]   This is due to their ability to mentally process the social situation in a way that gives them more positive, empathetic feelings toward their younger sibling. [ 48 ]  Older children are better able to cope with their jealous feelings toward their younger sibling due to their understanding of the necessary relationship between the parent and younger sibling. [ 48 ]  Older children are also better at self-regulating their emotions and are less dependent on their caregivers for external regulation as opposed to their younger siblings. [ 48 ]
Younger siblings' feelings of jealousy are overpowered by feelings of anger. [ 48 ]  The quality of the relationship between the younger child and the older child is also a factor in jealousy, as the better the relationship the less jealous feelings occurred and vice versa. [ 48 ]


Sibling conflict is pervasive and often shrugged off as an accepted part of sibling dynamics. In spite of the broad variety of conflict that siblings are often involved in, sibling conflicts can be grouped into two broader categories. [ 50 ]  The first category is conflict about equality or fairness. It is not uncommon to see siblings who think that their sibling is favored by their teachers, peers, or especially their parents. In fact it is not uncommon to see siblings who both think that their parents favor the other sibling.  Perceived inequalities in the division of resources such as who got a larger dessert also fall into this category of conflict. This form of conflict seems to be more prevalent in the younger sibling. [ 50 ]


The second category of conflict involves an invasion of a child's perceived personal domain by their sibling. An example of this type of conflict is when a child enters their sibling's room when they are not welcome, or when a child crosses over into their sibling's side of the car in a long road trip. These types of fights seem to be more important to older siblings due to their larger desire for independence. [ 50 ]


Sibling warmth is a term for the degree of affection and companionship shared by siblings. Sibling warmth seems to have an effect on siblings. Higher sibling warmth is related to better  social skill  and higher perceived social competence. Even in cases where there is a high level of sibling conflict if there is also a high level of sibling warmth then social skills and competence remain unaffected. [ 51 ]