AIXCC-C-Challenge
/
local-test-libxml2-delta-02
/fuzz-tooling
/docs
/advanced-topics
/bug_fixing_guidance.md
| layout: default | |
| title: Bug fixing guidance | |
| nav_order: 6 | |
| permalink: /advanced-topics/bug-fixing-guidance | |
| # Bug fixing guidance | |
| {: .no_toc} | |
| This page provides brief guidance on how to prioritise and fix bugs reported by | |
| OSS-Fuzz. | |
| - TOC | |
| {:toc} | |
| ## Threat modelling | |
| In general the severity of an issue reported by OSS-Fuzz must be determined | |
| relative to the threat model of the project under analysis. Therefore, although | |
| the fuzzers OSS-Fuzz makes an effort into determining the severity of the bug | |
| the true severity of the bug depends on the threat model of the project. | |
| ## Bug prioritisation | |
| ### Security issues | |
| These are the top priority of solving. A label is attached to these on | |
| the OSS-Fuzz testcase page and you can also search up all of these on monorail | |
| using the search pattern `-Bug=security`. | |
| Issues of this kind include issues reported by Address Sanitizer, e.g. | |
| heap-based buffer overflows, stack-based buffer overflows and use-after-frees. | |
| ### Functional issues and memory leaks | |
| These are issues that in general can tamper with the functionality of the | |
| application. The bugs that have highest priority in this case are those that | |
| can be easily triggered by an untrusted user of the project. | |
| ### Timeouts and out-of-memory | |
| These are in general the least prioritised issues to solve. | |
| ### Bug prioritisation of non C/C++ projects | |
| Currently there is no prioritisation of bugs in non C/C++ projects. As such, in | |
| this scenario it is crucial you do the analysis yourself relative to the threat | |
| model of your project. | |
| ## Non-reproducible bugs | |
| OSS-Fuzz will report some bugs that are labeled `Reliably reproduces: NO` and | |
| these can be tricky to deal with. A non-reproducible bug is an issue that | |
| OSS-Fuzz did indeed discover, however, OSS-Fuzz is unable to reproduce the bug | |
| with `python infra/helper.py reproduce`. In general, our suggestion is to do | |
| analysis of the bug and determine whether there in fact is an issue. | |
| The non-reproducible bugs can be of varying nature. Some of these bugs will be | |
| due to some internal state of the target application being manipulated over the | |
| cause of several executions of the fuzzer function. This could be several | |
| hundreds or even thousands of executions and the bug may not be reproducible by | |
| a single fuzzer test-case, however, there is indeed a bug in the application. | |
| There are other reasons why bugs may be non-reproducible and in general any | |
| non-determinism introduced into the application can have an effect on this. | |
| In the case of non-reproducible bugs our advice is to put effort into analysing | |
| the potential bug and also assess whether this is due to some internal state | |
| that persists between each fuzz run. If that is indeed the case then we also | |
| suggest investigating whether the fuzzer can be written such that the internal | |
| state in the code will be reset between each fuzz run. | |
| ## Should all reported issues be solved? | |
| It is reported by some project maintainers that fixing timeout issues reported | |
| by OSS-Fuzz can increase the complexity of the project’s source code. The | |
| result of this is that maintainers put effort into solving a timeout issue and | |
| the fix results in additional complexity of the project. The question is | |
| whether in a scenario like this if the overall result actually improves the | |
| state of the application. | |
| In order to answer this question we must assess the issue relative to the | |
| threat model. Following the timeout anecdote then some timing issues can have | |
| severe security implications. For example, if the timeout issue can cause | |
| manipulation of control-flow then the timing issue may be of high security | |
| severity. As such, it is difficult to say in the general case whether or not | |
| some bugs should not be solved, as it should be analysed and determined on a | |
| project-by-project basis. | |
| In the event that a bug is reported by OSS-Fuzz that is not relevant to | |
| security or reliability of the application then there may still be a point to | |
| fixing the bug. For example, if the issue is often run into by the fuzzer then | |
| the fuzzer may have difficulty exploring further code in the target, and thus | |
| fixing the bug will allow the fuzzer to explore further code. In this case some | |
| suggested examples of resolving the issue could be: | |
| * Perform a hot-patch that is only applied during fuzzer executions and does | |
| not overcomplicate the project’s code. | |
| * Patch the code of the fuzzer to avoid the timeout. For example, some fuzzers | |
| restrict the size of the input to avoid certain deep recursions or | |
| time-intensive loops. | |
| * Patch the code in the target despite complicating things. | |