Input:
Civil Appeals Nos. 602 and 603 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order/decree dated the 30 1 1975 of the Patna High Court in C. W. J. C. No. 502 of 1973.
V. section Desai and section N. Prasad for Appellants in C.A. 602/75.
Bishan Narain, section N. Misra, section section Jauhar and A. K. Sinha for Appellants in C. A. 603/75.
section C. Misra and U. section Prasad for respondent No. 1 (In both appeals).
B. P. Singh and U. P. Singh for Respondent No. 2 (In C. A. 603) and Respondents 2 and 3 (In C. A. 602).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J.
These appeals by special leave arise out of a judgment of the Patna High Court in a writ petition filed by the 1st respondent under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the appointment of the appellants as Drugs Inspectors.
Civil Appeal No. 602 of 1975 is filed by original respondent 7 while Civil Appeal 603 of 1975 is filed by original respondents 4 to 6 to the Writ Petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the appointments of the appellants on the ground that they did not have the requisite qualification for appointment as Drugs Inspectors.
The Government of Bihar in its Health Department advertised through the Bihar Public Service Commission 12 vacancies of Inspectors of Drugs.
Twenty candidates applied for the posts out of whom 13, including respondent 1, were Pharmacy Graduates while 7 including the appellants, were Science Graduates.
The Public Service Commission held interviews in April, 1972 and selected the appellants amongst others.
Respondent 1 was rejected on the ground that he was not suitable for the post.
The appointments of the appellants were challenged by respondent 1 on the sole ground that they were not qualified to be appointed as Drugs Inspectors.
Rule 49 of the Drugs (and Cosmetics) Rules, 1945 framed by the Government of India in the Ministry of Health, prescribes qualifications for the post of a Drugs Inspector.
It reads as follows: "49.
Qualifications of Inspectors.
A person who is 771 appointed an Inspector under the Act shall be a person who (a) has a degree in Pharmacy or Pharmaceutical Chemistry or a post graduate degree in Chemistry with Pharmaceutics as a special subject of a University recognised for this purpose by the appointing authority or the associateship Diploma of the Institution of Chemists (India) obtained by passing the examination with `Analysis of Drugs and Pharmaceuticals ' as one of the subjects; or (aa) holds the Pharmaceutical Chemists Diploma granted by the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain; or (b) x x x (c) is a graduate in medicine or science of a University recognised for this purpose by the appointing authority and has at least one year 's post graduate training in a laboratory under (i) a Government Analyst appointed under the Act or (ii) a Chemical Examiner, or (iii) a Fellow of the Royal Institute of Chemistry of Great Britain (Branch E), or (iv) the head of an institution specially approved for the purpose by the appointing authority; Provided that only those inspectors who have not less than three years ' experience in the manufacture and testing of substances specified in Schedule in a laboratory approved for this purpose by the licensing authority, shall be authorised to inspect the manufacture of items mentioned in Schedule C; Provided further that only Inspectors who are graduates in veterinary science or medicine or general science or pharmacy and have had not less than three years ' experience in the manufacture or testing of biological products shall be authorised to inspect the manufacture of veterinary biological products; Provided further that for a period of four years from the date on which Chapter IV of the Act takes effect in the States, persons whose qualifications, training and experience are regarded by the appointing authority as affording subject to such further training, if any, as may be considered necessary, a reasonable guarantee of adequate knowledge and competence may be appointed as Inspectors and authorised under the preceding proviso: Provided further that for the purposes of inspection of shops in any specified area any officer of the medical or Public Health Department who is a registered medical practitioner or a graduate in science may be appointed as an ex officio Inspector.
772 Appellants do not fall within the class described in clause (a) above but respondent 1 who is a Pharmacy Graduate does.
The fact that respondent 1 is qualified to hold the post of ' a Drugs Inspector is undisputed and his application was rejected by the Public Service Commission not on the ground that he did not hold the necessary qualification for the post but on the ground that he was unsuitable for being appointed to the post.
The appellants being Science graduates fall within clause (c) of Rule 49 and there can be no doubt that in addition to being Science graduates of a recognised University, they have to possess at least "one year 's post graduate training" in a laboratory under the authorities mentioned in clause (c).
It is not disputed that the appellants and worked for a fairly large number of years in laboratories under one or the other authorities mentioned in clause (c).
but the question for decision is whether they had received any "training" and if so, the training which they had received was "post graduate training" within the meaning of clause (c).
The contention of respondent 1 which found favour with the High Court is that "post graduate training" means systematic training in a post graduate institution and since the appellants had not received such training through any post graduate institution, they were not qualified to hold the particular post.
The High Court, in our opinion, erred in accepting this contention.
The expression "post graduate training" is used in rule 49(c) in the sense of training received by a person holding a degree in medicine or science and not in the sense that such training ought to be received in or through a post graduate institution imparting instruction or education in the particular discipline.
The object of clause (c) is to ensure that to be eligible for the post of a Drugs Inspector the person concerned must have received training under any of the authorities mentioned therein after graduation in medicine or science.
Pre graduation training is often not as efficacious as post graduate training, for a person holding a higher educational qualification is in a better position to imbibe the training which he receives.
Thus, the expression "post graduate training ought to be received and not to limit the eligibility to those who have received training after enrolment in an institution imparting post graduate training.
Clause (c) specifies that the training has to be received in a laboratory under a Government Analyst or a Chemical Examiner amongst others.
It is difficult to conceive in the present educational set up that a student who has enrolled himself in a post graduate institution would receive training in a laboratory under a Government Analyst or a Chemical Examiner.
A fair indication of the true intendment of Rule 49(c) is also furnished by the requirement that one year 's post graduate training is enough to confer eligibility on a candidate applying for the post of a Drugs Inspector.
Post graduate courses normally extend over a period exceeding one year after graduation.
It could not have been intended that it would be enough to make a candidate eligible for the post of a Drugs Inspector if, after graduation in medicine or science he enrolled himself for a post graduate course and just took one year 's training as part of that course.
If enrolment in an institution imparting post graduate instruction was the object of rule (c), the minimum qualification prescribed would at least have been the successful completion of the post graduate course.
773 Rule 44 which prescribed qualifications for the post of Government Analyst throws useful light on the interpretation of rule 49.
Rule 44 provides that only those persons can be appointed as Government Analysts who are Graduates in medicine or science or pharmacy or pharmaceutical chemistry and who have had "not less than three years ' post graduate experience" in the analysis of drugs in a laboratory under the control of designated authorities.
If a post graduate course extends over a period of 2 years only, as it normally does, it is odd that in order that in order to qualify for the post of a Government Analyst a graduate in the specified discipline should be required to spend 3 years as a post graduate student.
Post graduate experience stipulated in rule 44(a) and post graduate training stipulated in rule 49(c) connote basically and for practical purposes an identical qualification.
For both posts" what is required in addition to other qualifications mentioned in the respective rules is post graduate experience or training in the sense described above, namely, that the experience or training has to be gained or received after obtaining graduation.
Maheshwar Prasad Srivastava the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 602 of 1975, passed his B.Sc. examination in 1960 and worked as a Demonstrator in the Pharmacy School, Patna under the Health Department, Government of Bihar from October, 1961 to December, 1966.
He was appointed as a Senior Scientific Assistant in the Bihar Drugs Control Laboratory on December 23, 1966 where he worked under Dr. Sheo Bihari Lal, who was the Government Analyst in charge of the Bihar Drugs Control Laboratory.
It appears that the Government of Bihar through the Health Department used to send science graduates for training under the Government Analyst.
The certificate issued by Dr. section B. Lal shows that Srivastava worked under him and had been "trained" for more than three years in the Bihar Drugs Control Laboratory.
A letter written by Dr. Lal to the Deputy Director of the Health Services, Bihar on December 22, 1970 shows that during his absence on leave, Srivastava was to hold charge of the Bihar Drugs Control Laboratory.
These facts make it impossible to accept the contention that the appellant had not received any systematic training.
In the ultimate analysis, the usefulness of any training depends as much on the ability and willingness of the student or trainee as on the academic specifications of the training itself.
The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 603 of 1975 had worked as Demonstrators in Pharmacy School, Patna for a large number of years and in regard to them also it is difficult to accept the contention that the training which, they had received was not systematic.
Dr. J. K. P. Sinha who was then the Deputy Director of Health Services, Bihar and who assisted the Public Service Commission as a Technical Expert when the interviews for the particular posts were held, obviously took the view that the appellants who were science graduates satisfied the further test of post graduate training for not less than one year.
In matters involving consideration of questions regarding adequacy or sufficiency of "training", the Public Service Commission, having the benefit of expert opinion, is better situated to judge whether the Particular candidate is qualified for a particular post and courts should hesitated to interfere with the direction of the appointing authority, so long as it is exercised bona fide.
774 Learned counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 602 of 1975 contended that respondent No. 1 had no locus standi to challenge the appointment of the appellant since he himself, as disclosed by the affidavit filed.
On behalf of the Public Service Commission in the High Court, was rejected on the ground that he "was not found suitable for appointment to the post" of Drugs Inspector.
In view of our conclusion that the appellants were duly qualified for the post, it is unnecessary to go into this question.
For these reasons we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and hold that the appointments of the appellants as Drugs Inspectors were lawful and valid.
The State of Bihar will pay the costs of these appeals to the appellants.

Output:
The appellants, all science graduates with laboratory training were the successful candidates for twelve vacancies of Drug Inspectors advertised by the Bihar Public Service Commission.
Respondent No. 1, Pharmacy graduate whose application was rejected on the ground of his unsuitability for being appointed to the post challenged the selection by a writ on the ground that the appellants were unqualified under Rule 49(c) of the Drugs (and Cosmetics) Rules 1945 in as much as they did not have a systematic training in a post graduate institution.
The High Court accepted the contention and set aside the selection.
On appeal by special leave he Court, ^ HELD: (1) The expression "post graduate training" is used in Rule 49(c) in the sense of training received by a person holding a degree in medicine or science and not in the sense that such training ought to be received in or through a post graduate institution imparting instruction or education in the particular discipline.
The object of clause (c) is to ensure that to be eligible for the post of a Drugs Inspector the person concerned must have received training under any of the authorities mentioned therein after graduation in medicine or science.
Pregraduation training is often not as efficacious as post graduate training, for a person holding a higher educational qualifications is in a better position to imbibe the training which he receives.
The expression "post graduate training" is used in order to signify the point of time after which the training ought to be received and not to limit the eligibility to those who have received training after enrolment in an institution imparting post graduate training.
[772D F] (ii) Clause (c) of Rule 49 specifies that the training has to be received in a laboratory under a Government Analyst or a Chemical Examiner amongst others.
It is difficult to conceive in the present educational set up that a student who has enrolled himself in a post graduate institution would receive training in a laboratory under a Government Analyst or a Chemical Examiner.
A fair indication of the true intendment of Rule 49(c) is also furnished by the requirement that one year 's post graduate training is enough to confer eligibility on a candidate applying for the post of a Drugs Inspector.
It could not have been intended that it would be enough to make a candidate eligible for the post of a Drugs Inspector if, after graduation in medicine or science he enrolled himself for a post graduate course and just took one years ' training as part of that course.
If enrolment in an institution imparting post graduate instruction was the object of rule (c), the minimum qualification prescribed would at least have been the successful completion of the post graduate course.
[772F H] Rule 44(a) throws useful, light on the interpretation of Rule 49.
Post graduate experience stipulated in Rule 44(a) and "post graduate training" cannot basically and for practical purposes identical qualifications.
For both posts, what is required in addition to other qualifications mentioned in the respective rules is post graduate experience or training in the sense, namely that the experience or training has to be gained or received after obtaining graduation.
[773 B C] 770 In matters involving considerations of questions regarding adequacy or sufficiency of "training" the Public Service Commission having the benefit of expert opinion, is better situated to judge whether the particular candidate is qualified for a particular post and courts should hesitate to interfere with the discretion of the appointing authority so long as it is exercised bona fide.
[773 G H] [Their Lordships considered that, in view of the conclusion that the appellants were duly qualified it was unnecessary to go into the question of "Locus Standi" of respondent No. 1 a rejected candidate on the ground of his unsuitability to file the writ petition.]


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(Civil) No. 2 123 of 1982.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
184 R.K. Garg and H.K. Puri for the Petitioners.
D.P. Mukherjee, G.S. Chatterjee, Ms. C.K. Sucharita, Ms. A. Subhashini and S.R. Grover for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J.
The Parliament enacted the (hereinafter called the Act) with the object of abolition of contract labour in respect of such categories as may be notified by the Appropriate Government in the light of criteria laid down in the Act and also regulating the service conditions of contract labour where abolition is not possible.
Section 10 of the Act which is relevant is as under: "Prohibition of employment of contract labour (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government may, after consultation with the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board prohibit, by noti fication in the Official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process; operation or other work in any establishment.
(2) Before issuing any notification under sub section (1) in relation to an establish ment, the appropriate Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in that establishment and other relevant factors such as (a) Whether the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the estab lishment; (b) Whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, it is of sufficient duration having regard to the nature of industry, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that establishment; (c) Whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment or an establishment similar thereto; 185 (d) Whether it is sufficient to employ consid erable number of whole time workmen.
Explanation If a question arises whether any process or operation or other work is of perennial nature, the decision of the appro priate Government thereon shall be final.
" In exercise of the powers under Section 10(1) of the Act, the Government of West Bengal issued a notification dated February 9, 1980 prohibiting the employment of con tract labour in 16 departments covering 65 jobs in the establishments of M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called the company) situated at Burnpur in the State of West Bengal.
The list of the departments and the jobs is given in the schedule attached to the notification and paragraph 9 therein, relating to the Brick Department, is as under: "Cleaning and stacking and other allied jobs except loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks.
" It is thus obvious that the job of loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks in the Brick Department has been specifically excluded from the beneficial purview of the notification.
The said action of the State Government has been challenged in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the affected workmen on the ground that the petitioners have been subjected to hostile discrimination so much so that the workmen doing the same job in other departments and allied jobs in the same depart ment have been rescued from the archaic system of contract labour whereas the petitioners have been singled out and left to be grinded under the pernicious effect of this primitive system.
The action according to the petitioners is arbitrary, discriminatory and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Mr. R.K. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the peti tioners has contended that the job of loading and unloading is not peculiar to the Brick Department rather such jobs are being operated in the stores (iron and steel), Traffic (steel) and Coke ovens Departments.
The benefit of notifica tion dated February 9, 1980 has been extended to the loaders in all these departments.
He further argued that the work of stacking is directly dependent on the loading and unloading of bricks.
The two jobs according to him are allied and incidental and as such the workmen holding these jobs cannot be treated differently.
186 The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has argued that the job of loading and unloading of bricks in the Brick Department is not of perennial nature, the supply of bricks is intermitent depending upon the requirement, availability of bricks as also the availability of the wagons and trucks.
It is further submitted that the decision of the appropriate Government to the effect that the job is not of perennial nature is final under the Act.
It is surprising that more than forty years after the independence the practice of employing labour through con tractors by big companies including public sector companies is still being accepted as a normal feature of labour em ployment.
There is no security of service to the workmen and their wages are far below than that of the regular workmen of the company.
This Court in Standard Vaccum Refining Co. of India Ltd. vs Its Workmen, ; and Catering Cleaners of Southern Railway vs Union of India & Anr., ; has disapproved the system of contract labour holding it to be 'archaic ', 'primitive ' and of 'baneful nature '.
The system, which is nothing but an im proved version of bonded labour, is sought to be abolished by the Act.
The Act is an important piece of social legisla tion for the welfare of labourers and has to be liberally construed.
It is not denied that the bricks handled by the Brick De partment are used in furnaces of the company as refractory.
Therefore the work done by the Brick Department including loading and unloading of bricks is incidental to the indus try carried on by the company.
It is also not denied that the petitioners are employed as contract labour by the company for the last 15/20 years.
Then where is the justifi cation to treat the petitioners differently and deny them the right of regular appointment? We may examine the case from another aspect.
The peti tioners have specifically averred in paras 7 and 11 of the writ petition that the job of loading and unloading of bricks is allied and incidental to the job of stacking of bricks.
Para 7 is as under: "It is submitted that loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks is an essential feature of; and/or a job allied and/or incidental to the job of stacking of bricks.
It is further submitted that the job of loading and unload ing of bricks from wagons and trucks cannot be separated from the job of stacking and other allied jobs in the case of the petitioners.
" 187 Further para 11 is as under: "It may be stated here that"stacking" as such was never the job of contract labour.
The job of stacking and the job of loading and unload ing of bricks are job ancillary, including and/or supplemented to each other.
It may be made clear that the job of stacking and/or loading and unloading of bricks has to be done by competent and technical hands.
The bricks used in the furnace are a very costly and technical material requiring perfect dimen sions and precision These bricks are also imported from outside India.
Such bricks are manufactured indigenously too, but depending upon the consumption and demand, the bricks arc purchased locally and/or imported from outside India.
Such a costly material has to be handled by skilled workmen.
The job of loading and unloading of such bricks their stacking is done by skilled workmen and this work cannot be done by casual labour which may be engaged disengaged as contract labour depending upon the sweet will of the manage ment.
It is submitted that loading and unload ing and stacking of bricks are jobs which are supplementary to each other carried out by the same set of workmen and is essential for the day to day production.
The petitioners submit that it is not possible to engage one set of workmen for stacking and another set of work men for loading and unloading of bricks.
" In the counter affidavit on behalf of the company filed by its Dy.
Chief Personnel Manager, there is no specific denial to the above averments.
Though it has been stated that the petitioners are not doing the job of stacking the bricks, there is no denial nor any averment or material on the record to show that the job of loading and unloading of bricks is not incidental or allied to the stacking of the bricks.
Even otherwise we fail to understand how the stack ing of bricks is a job which is not incidental to loading and unloading.
The purchase of bricks, transportation to the factory, unloading, stacking and use in the furnace are the jobs in one continuing process and it is difficult to accept that these jobs are not incidental or allied to each other.
That being so all the workmen performing these jobs are to be treated alike.
On the same reasoning it cannot be said that the loader 's job is not, and other jobs in the Brick Department are, of perennial nature.
In any case there is no material or basis to show that the job of loading and un loading of bricks is not of perennial nature.
188 We, therefore, see no justification for excluding the job of loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks from the purview of the notification dated February 9, 1980.
We allow the writ petition and strike down the words "except loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks" in paragraph 9 of the said notification issued by Government of West Bengal being discriminatory and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
We direct that the petitioners and other workers doing the job of loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks in the Brick Deptt.
be treated at par, with effect from the date of nonfication, with those who are doing the job of cleaning and stacking m the said department.
It is further directed that the workmen doing the job of loading and unloading who have been retrenched during the pendency of the writ petition be put back into service with all back wages and consequential benefits.
There shall be no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Petition allowed.

Output:
Section 10(1) of the empowered the appropriate Government to prohibit employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment.
The Government of West Bengal issued a notification on February 9, 1980 under section 10(1) of the Act prohibiting the employment of contract labour in certain departments in the establishments of M/s Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. Paragraph 9 of the Schedule thereto listing the departments, included cleaning and stacking and other allied jobs in the brick department, except loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks.
In the writ petition, the affected workmen assailed this action of the State Government in excluding them from the beneficial purview of the notification as arbitrary, dis criminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
It was contended for them that the job of loading and un loading was not peculiar to the brick department alone, that the work of stacking was directly dependent on the loading and unloading of bricks, and that the two jobs being allied and incidental the workmen holding these jobs could not be treated differently.
For the respondents, it was contended that the job of loading and unloading of bricks in the brick department was not of perennial nature, the supply of bricks being intermittent depending upon the requirement, avail ability of bricks as also the availability of the wagons and trucks.
Allowing the writ petition, HELD: 1.1 The is 183 an important piece of social legislation for the welfare of the labourers and has to be liberally construed.
[186D] Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India Ltd. vs Its Work men; , and Catering Cleaners of Southern Railway vs Union of India & Anr., ; , referred to. 1.2 In the instant case, it was not denied that the bricks handled by the brick department were used in furnaces of the company as refractory.
Therefore, the work done by the brick department including loading and unloading of bricks was incidental to the industry carried on by the company.
It was also not denied that the petitioners were , employed as contract labour by the company for the last 15/20 years.
There was, therefore, no justification to treat the petitioners differently and deny them the right of regular appointment.
[186E F] 1.3 The purchase of bricks, transportation to the facto ry, unloading, stacking and use in the furnace were the jobs in one continuing process.
It could not thus be said that all these jobs were not incidental or allied to each other.
That being so, all the workmen performing these jobs were to be treated alike.
On the same reasoning it could not be said that the loader 's job was not, and other jobs in the brick department were, of perennial nature.
There was, therefore, no justification for excluding the job of loading and un loading of bricks from wagons and trucks from the purview of the notification dated February 9, 1980.
[187G 188A] 2.
The words "except loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks" in paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the notification are struck down being discriminatory and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
[188A B] [The petitioners and co workers to be treated at par with effect from the date of notification with those who were doing the job of cleaning and stacking in the brick department, and such of them who have been retrenched during the pendency of the writ petition to be put back into serv ice with all back wages and consequential benefits.] [188B C]


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Appeal No. 105 of 1953.
Appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court 's Order dated the 24th September, 1951 from the Judgment and Decree dated the 2nd day of September, 1949 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 274 of 1948 from Original Decree arising out of the Decree dated the 30th day of July, 1946 of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division at Hubli in Special Suit No. 56 of 1944.
K. R. Bengeri and Sardar Bahadur for the appellant.
section B. Jathar and I. N. Shroff for respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5.
December 10.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.
This appeal raises a question of importance "whether a widow can exercise a power of adoption conferred on her or possessed by her at any time during her life irrespective of any devolution of property or changes in the family or other circumstances and even after a grandson has come on the scene but has subsequently died without leaving a widow or a son".
The situation in which this question arises can properly be appreciated by reference to the following genealogy: 1137 Dyamappa I I I Kalasappa I I Krishtarao Radhabai=Gangabai (deft.2) (Deft.1) (Senior widow) (Junior window) | Gurunath | (Appellsnt adopted | by Gsngsbai on | | 18 11 53) | | | Dattatraya (son) (died 1913) | | =Sundarabai (died after | | her husband in 1913) Kamalabai Yamunabai (Resp.1) (Resp.2) | | | | | | | Kalasappa Jagannath (predeceased (died 1914) Dattatraya) Girimaji | Hanamanta | | | | | | Malhar Ganesh (Resp.3) (Resp.5) Venkatesh Hanamant (Resp.4) (Resp.6) 1138 Gurunath, the plaintiff, claims that he was adopted in 1943 by Gangabai, widow of Krishtarao.
Krishtarao died in 1890, leaving him surviving two widows Radhabai and Gangabai and a son Dattatraya.
Dattatraya died in 1913 leaving him surviving a widow Sundarabai and a son Jagannath.
Sundarabai died shortly after Dattatraya while Jagannath died in the year 1914.
After an interval of about 30 years since his death, it is alleged that Gangabai who survived both her son, and grandson adopted the plaintiff, and thus raised the problem which we are called upon to solve.
On the 15th of March, 1944 the appellant instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises in forma pauperis on the allegation that he was the adopted son of Krishtarao and adopted to him by Gangabai, his junior widow, and as such was entitled to the possession of his adoptive father 's properties comprised in the suit.
He also claimed a declaration regarding the amount of compensation money payable to the plaintiff 's family for the land acquired by Hubli Municipality.
The defendants who are the sons and grandsons of the first cousin of Krishtarao disputed the plaintiff 's adoption on the ground that Gangabai 's power to adopt was extinguished when Dattatraya died in 1913, leaving behind him a widow Sundarabai and a son Jagannath who could continue the family line.
Gangabai in her written statement supported the plaintiff 's claim and asserted that the senior widow Radhabai had given consent to her adopting the plain tiff.
The trial judge upheld the defendants ' contention and dismissed the plaintiff 's suit.
The factum of the plaintiff 's adoption was however upheld, and it was further held that Radhabai did not give her consent to the adoption.
On appeal this decision was affirmed by the High Court and it was held that Gangabai 's power to adopt came to an end at the time when her son died leaving a son and a widow to continue the family line.
No finding was given on the question whether Radhabai had given her consent to the adop tion.
That perhaps would have been the simplest way to end the dispute.
Against the decision of the High 1139 Court this appeal in forma pauperis is now before us by special leave.
The only question canvassed in the appeal is in respect to the validity of the plaintiff 's adoption.
It was contended that Hindu Shastric Law itself sets no limit to the exercise of the widow 's power of adoption once she has acquired that power or is possessed of it, and that being so, the power can be exercised by her during her life time when necessity arises for the exercise of it for the purpose of continuing the line of her husband.
On the other hand, it was argued that though Hindu Shastric Law itself sets no limit to the exercise of the power, yet it has long been judicially recognised that the power is not an unlimited and absolute one, and that it comes to an end when another heir has come on the scene and he has passed on to another the duty of continuing the line.
The question at what point of time the widow 's duty of continuing the line of the husband comes to an end has been the subject matter of a number of decisions of Indian High Courts and of the Privy Council and the point for our consideration is whether the limits laid down in these decisions have been arbitrarily fixed and are not based on sound principles and should be reviewed by us.
A brief reference to the different decisions of the Privy Council is necessary for a proper appreciation of the state of law on this subject at the present moment.
The two leading cases on this point are the decisions of the Privy Council arising out of the adoption made by Shrimati Chundrabullee and decided in 1876 and 1878.
The judgment in the first of these cases, i.e. in Bhoobun Moyee vs Ram Kishore(1) was delivered by Lord Kingsdown.
What happened there was that one Gour Kishore died leaving a son Bhowanee and a widow, Chundrabullee, to whom he gave authority to adopt in the event of his son 's death.
Bhowanee married and died at the age of 24 without issue, but leaving him surviving his widow Bhoobun (1) (1965] 10 M.I.A. 279. 146 1140 Moyee.
Chundrabullee then adopted Ram Kishore.
Ram Kishore brought a suit against Bhoobun Moyee for the recovery of the estate.
The Privy Council held that the claim of Ram Kishore failed on the ground that even if he had been in existence at the death of Bhowanee he could not displace the widow of the latter.
It was further held "that at the time when Chundrabullee professed to exercise her power of adoption, the power was incapable of execution on the ground that Bhowanee had married and left a widow as his heir".
The following quotation from the judgment of Lord Kingsdown may be cited as indicating the reasons for the decisions: "In this case, Bhowanee Kishore had lived to an age which enabled him to perform and it is to be presumed that he had performed all the religious services which a son could perform for a father.
He had succeeded to the ancestral property as heir; he bad full power of disposition over it; he might have alienated it; he might have adopted a son to succeed to it if he had no male issue of his body.
He could have defeated every intention which his father entertained with respect to the property.
On the death of Bhowanee Kishore, his wife succeeded as heir to him and would have equally succeeded in that character in exclusion of his brothers, if he had any.
She took a vested estate, as his widow, in the whole of his property.
It would be singular if a brother of Bhowanee Kishore, made such by adoption, could take from his widow the whole of his property, when a natural born brother could have taken no part.
If Ram Kishore is to take any of the ancestral property, he must take all he takes by substitution for the natural born son, and not jointly with him. .
The question is whether the estate of his son being unlimited, and that son having married and left a widow his heir, and that heir having acquired a vested estate in her husband 's property as widow, a new heir can be substituted by adoption who is to defeat that estate, and take as an adopted son what a legitimate son of Gour Kishore would not have taken.
1141 This seems contrary to all reason and to all the principles of Hindoo law, as far as we can collect them. .
If Bhowanee Kishore had died unmarried, his mother, Chundrabullee Debia, would have been his heir, and the question of adoption would have stood on quite different grounds.
By exercising the power of adoption, she would have divested no estate but her own, and this would have brought the case within the ordinary rule; but no case has been produced, no decision has been cited from the Text books, and no principle has been stated to show that by the mere gift of a power of adoption to a widow, the estate of the heir of a deceased son vested in possession, can be defeated,.
and divested".
In the result the suit of Ram Kishore was dismissed.
After the deaths of Bhoobun Moyee and Chundrabullee, Ram Kishore got possession of the property under a deed of relinquishment executed in 1869 in his favour by Chundrabullee, who herself had entered into possession of the property as mother and next heir of Bhowanee Kishore after the death of Bboobun Moyee in 1867.
If Ram Kishore 's adoption was good he was undoubtedly the next heir to the property.
A distant collateral however claimed the estate on the ground that his adoption was invalid.
The Privy Council then held that "upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of Bhowanee, the power of adoption of Chudrabullee was at an end and incapable of execution" and that Ram Kishore had therefore no title.
This was the decision in Padma Coomari vs Court of Wards(1) wherein a second effort to maintain the validity of his adoption by Chundrabullee was made but without success.
The High Court in its judgment in Padma Coomari 's case(1) remarked that the decision in Bhoobun Moyee vs Ram Kishore(2) did not decide that Chundrabullee could not adopt on the extinction of the issue either of natural born son or of the first to be adopted son, and that if Chundrabullee had on the death of Bhoobun Moyee made the adoption and so divested her own estate,, there would be (1) [1881] L.R. 8 I.A, 229.
(2) [1865] 10 M.I.A. 279, 1142 nothing in the judgment of the Privy Council and nothing in the law to prevent her doing that which her husband authorised her to do, and which would certainly be for his spiritual benefit, and for that of his ancestors and even of Bhowanee Kishore.
The learned Judges of the High Court proceeded then to observe as follows: "With all respect, therefore, we imagine that Lord Kingsdown must have said by inadvertence, in reference to the idea of adopting a son to the great grandfather of the last taker, that at that time 'all the spiritual purposes of a son, according to the largest construction of them, would have been satisfied '; and again, Bhowanee Kishore had lived to an age which enabled him to perform, and it is to be presumed that he had performed, all the religious services which a son could perform for a father.
There is really no time at which the performance of these services is finally completed, or at which the necessity for them comes to an end".
To this Sir Richard Couch, who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council, gave a very emphatic answer in these terms: "The substitution of a new heir for the widow was no doubt the question to be decided, and such.
substitution might have been disallowed, the adoption being held valid for all other purposes, which is the view that the lower Courts have taken of the judgment, but their Lordships do not think that this was intended.
They consider the decision to be that, upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of Bhowanee, the power of adoption was at an end, and incapable of execution.
And if the question had come before them without any previous decision upon it, they would have been of that opinion.
The adoption intended by the deed of permission was for the succession to the zemindary and other property, as well as the performance of religious services; and the vesting of the estate in the widow, if not in Bhowanee himself, as the son and heir of his father, was a proper limit to the exercise of the power".
The question of limitations upon the power of the 1143 widow to adopt thus stated in the Chundrabulle series of decisions was again affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Thayammal and Kuttiswami Aiyan vs Venkatarama Aiyan(1) decided in 1887 and in Tarachurn vs Suresh Chunder(2) decided in 1889.
In the year 1902 this question came up for consideration before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramkrishna Ramchandra vs Shamrao(3).
There a grandmother succeeded to her grandson who died unmarried andit was held that her power to make an adoption hadcome to an end and that the adoption was invalid.
Chandavarkar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, enunciated the principle in these words: "Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving a natural born or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never afterwards be revived".
This principle was approved and applied by the Judicial Committee in Madana Mohana vs Purushothama Deo(4) in these words: "Their Lordships are in agreement with the principle laid down in the judgment of the Full Court of Bombay as delivered by the learned judge, and they are of opinion that, on the facts of the present case, the principle must be taken as applying so as to have brought the authority to adopt conferred on Adikonda 's widow to an end when Brojo, the son she originally adopted, died after attaining full legal capacity to continue the line either by the birth of a natural born son or by the adoption to him of a son by his own widow".
The next and the most important decision of the Judicial Committee in regard to this matter was given in the year 1933 in Amarendra Mansingh vs Sanatan(5) where there was a departure from or at least a reorientation of the old doctrine, and stress was laid on the spiritual rather than on the temporal aspect (1) (1887] L.R. 14 I.A. 67.
(3) Bom.
(2) [1889] L.R. 16 I.A. 166.
(4) [1918] L.R. 45 I.A. 150.
(5) [1933] L R. 60 I.A. 242.
1144 of adoption, linking it up with the vesting and divesting of the estate.
There a Hindu governed by the Benaras school was survived by an infant son and a widow, to whom he had given authority to adopt in the event of the son dying.
The son succeeded to his father 's impartible zamindari but died unmarried at the age of 20 years and 6 months.
By a custom of the family which excluded females from inheritance the estate did not go to his mother but became vested in a distant collateral.
A week after the son 's death she made an adoption.
It was held that the adoption was valid and it divested the estate vested by inheritance in the collateral.
All the previous decisions were reviewed in this case by Sir George Lowndes who delivered the judgment of the Board.
At page 248 of the report it is said as follows: "In their Lordships ' opinion, it is clear that the foundation of the Brahminical doctrine of adoption is the duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestors to provide for the continuance of the line and the solemnization of the necessary rites.
And it may well be that if this duty has been passed on to a new generation, capable itself of the continuance, the father 's duty has been performed and the means provided by him for its fulfilment spent: the "debt" be owed is discharged, and it is upon the new generation that the duty is now cast and the burden of the "debt" is now laid.
It can, they think, hardly be doubted that in this doctrine the devolution of property, though recognised as the inherent right of the son, is altogether a secondary consideration. . that the validity of an adoption is to be determined by spiritual rather than temporal considerations; that the substitution of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence of the thing, and the consequent devolution of property a mere accessory to it.
Having regard to this well established doctrine as to the religious efficacy of sonship, their Lordships feel that great caution should be observed in shutting the door upon any authorised adoption by the widow of a sonless man, The Hindu law itself sets no limit 1145 to the exercise of the power during the lifetime of the widow and the validity of successive adoptions in continuance of the line is now well recognised.
Nor do the authoritative texts appear to limit the exercise of the power by any considerations of property.
But that there must be some limit to its exercise, or at all events some conditions in which it would be either contrary to the spirit of the Hindu doctrine to admit its continuance, or inequitable in the face of other rights to allow it to take effect, has long been recognised both by the Courts in India and by this Board, and it is upon the difficult question of where the line should be drawn, and upon what principle, that the argument in the present case has mainly turned".
In another part of the judgment their Lordships observed as follows: "It being clear upon the decisions above referred to that the interposition of a grandson, or the son 's widow, brings the mother 's power of adoption to an end, but that the mere birth of a son does not do so, and that this is not based upon a question of vesting or divesting of property, their Lordships think that the true reason must be that where the duty of providing for the continuance of the line for spiritual purposes which was upon the father, and was laid by him conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by the son and by him passed on to a grandson or to the son 's widow, the mother 's power is gone.
But if the son die himself sonless and unmarried, the duty will still be upon the mother, and the power in her which was necessarily suspended during the son 's lifetime will revive".
The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the last sentence in the passage in the Privy Council judgment quoted above and contended that if the power of the widow which remained suspended during the lifetime of the son could revive on the son dying sonless and unmarried, logically the power must also revive when the son and his widow and the grandson and his widow all died out.
Reliance was also placed on the passage already cited in which 1146 their Lordships laid emphasis on the proposition that the substitution of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence of the thing, and the consequent devolution of property a mere accessory to it and it was contended that the grounds on which an outside limit was laid on the exercise of the widow 's power in the Chundrabullee series of decisions no longer survived, in view of the ratio in Amarendra 's decision and that it having been held that the power of adoption did not depend on and was not linked with the devolution of property or with the question of vesting or divesting of property and could be exercised whenever necessity for continuing the line arose, it should be held that when the son and his widow were dead and the grandson to whom he handed the torch for continuing the line also died, the power of Gangabai to make the adoption revived and thus the adoption was valid.
This argument, in our opinion, is not well founded as it is based on an incorrect apprehension of the true basis of the rule enunciated in this judgment, the rule being that "where the duty of providing for the continuance of the line for spiritual purposes which was upon the father and was laid by him conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by the son and by him passed on to the grandson or to the son 's widow, the mother 's power is gone".
In the words of Chandavarkar, J. affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Madana Mohana vs Purushothama Deo(1) "the power having once been extinguished it cannot afterwards be revived".
In other words the true rule is this: "When a son dies before attaining full legal competence and does not leave either a widow or a son or an adopted son then the power of the mother which was in abeyance during his lifetime revives but the moment he hands over that torch to another, the mother can no longer take it".
The contention of the learned counsel therefore that even if the second generation dies without taking steps to continue the line the grandmother still (1) [1918] L R. 45 I.A. 156.
1147 retains her authority and is still under a duty to continue the line cannot be sustained.
The three propositions that the Privy Council laid down in Amarendra 's case therefore cannot now be questioned.
These propositions may be summed up in these terms: (1) That the interposition of a grandson, or the son 's widow, competent to continue the line by adoption brings the mother 's power of adoption to an end; (2) that the power to adopt does not depend upon any question of vesting or divesting of property; and (3) that a mother 's authority to adopt is not extinguished by the mere fact that her son had attained ceremonial competence.
The rule enunciated in Amarendra 's case was subsequently applied in Vijaysingji vs Shivsangji(1) and was again restated and reaffirmed as a sound rule enunciating the limitations on the widow 's power to adopt in Anant Bhikappa Patil vs Shankar Ramchandra Patil(2).
One of the propositions enunciated in this decision was not accepted by this court in Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango vs Narayan Devji Kango(3), but that apart no doubt was cast in this decision on the above rule.
The result of these series of decisions is, that now for about three quarters of a century the rule that "the power of a widow to adopt comes to an end by the interposition of a grandson or the son 's widow competent to adopt" has become a part of Hindu Law.
though the reasons for limiting the power may not be traceable to any Shastric text; and may have been differently stated in the several judgments.
It is well known that in the absence of any clear Shastric text the courts have authority to decide cases on principles of justice, equity and good conscience and it is not possible to bold that the reasons stated in support of the rule are not consistent with these principles.
During the arguments no substantial grounds have (1) [1935] L.R 62 I.A. 161.
(2) [1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 232.
(3) ; 147 1148 been suggested for holding that the rule is either in equitable or unjust or is repugnant to or inconsistent with any doctrine or theory of Hindu Law of adoption.
In this situation we are bound to hold that it is too late in the day to say that there are no limitations of any kind on the widow 's power to adopt excepting those that limit the power of her husband to adopt, i.e. that she cannot adopt in the presence of a son, grandson or great grandson.
Hindu Law generally and in particular in matters of inheritance, alienation and adoption gives to the widow powers of a limited character and there is nothing in the limitations laid down by the course of decisions above referred to repugnant to that law.
For the reasons given above, we are unable to depart from the rule that a widow 's power to make an adoption comes to an end by the interposition of a grandson or the son 's widow competent to continue the line by adoption.
The learned counsel for the appellant placed considerable reliance on two decisions of the Indian High Courts in support of his contention and suggested that the rule laid down in Amarendra 's case had no application to the situation that has arisen in the present case and that on the death of the grandson the widow 's power to adopt which was in abeyance during his life revived.
Reference in this connection was made to the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Bapuji vs Gangaram(1).
There a Hindu died leaving a widow and his son and the son died leaving a widow only who re married.
It was held that the power of the mother revived on the re marriage of the son 's widow.
Reliance for this proposition curiously enough was placed on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Amarendra 's case as appears from the following quotation from that judgment: "If the observation quoted from Amarendra Mansingh vs Sanatan Singh(2) be understood as limited to the case where the widow D or the grandson E stands between (is interposed) the grand widow C and her power, everything is clear except for the (1) (1941) I.L.R. Nagpur 178.
(2) Pat.
642, 658.
1149 words "and can never be revived" quoted from Ramkrishna vs Shamrao(1).
Strictly the above is the true meaning of their Lordships ' words.
That amounts to nothing more than this: that while D or E is alive and competent to adopt his or her existence prevents any adoption being made by C.
That leaves at large what happens when the "interposition" is ended.
Logic says that as the death of the son removes his "inter position" whereupon C 's power revives so the death of D removes her interposition and so C 's power revives".
In our judgment there is not only an obvious fallacy in this reasoning but it is based on a wrong apprehension of the true reasons stated for the rule in Amarendra 's case.
The reason for the rule in Amarendra 's case was "where the duty of providing for the continuance of the line for spiritual purposes which was upon the father, and was laid by him conditionally upon the mother, has been assumed by the son and by him passed on to a grandson or to the son 's widow, the mother 's power is gone".
If that is the true reason, obviously the duty having come to an end cannot be revived on logical grounds.
We are therefore clearly of opinion that the ratio of the decision in Bapuji vs Gangaram(2) was erroneous.
The second decision to which reference was made is a decision of the Lucknow Court reported in Prem Jagat Kuer vs Harihar Bakhsh Singh(3).
The learned Judges in that case followed the decision of the Nagpur High Court above quoted, and further added (though under some misapprehension) that this decision had been approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council.
As a matter of fact, there was another decision reported in the same report on a different question that had been upheld by the Privy Council and not the decision above referred to.
The authority of this later decision therefore is considerably shaken by this error and even otherwise the decision gives no independent reasons of its own apart from those contained in the Nagpur case.
(1) Bom.
(2) (3) Luck.
1. 1150 For the reasons given above, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case we will make no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.

Output:
It is well settled according to Hindu Law that a widow 's power to adopt comes to an end by the interposition of a grandson or the son 's widow competent to continue the line by adoption.
The mother 's authority to adopt is not extinguished by the mere fact that her son had attained ceremonial competence.
The power to adopt does not depend upon any question of vesting or divesting of property.
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Anant Bhikappa Patil vs Shankar Ramchandra Patil (L.R. 70 I.A. 232) is not sound in so far as it relates to the properties inherited from collaterals prior to adoption.
In respect of such properties the adopted son can lay no claim on the ground of relation back.
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango vs Narayan Devji Kango ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1), followed.
Amarendra Mansing vs Sanatan ([1933] L. R. 60 I. A. 242), explained.
Anant Bhikappa Patil vs Shankar Ramchandra `Patil ([1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 232), not relied on in part.
Bhoobun Moyee vs Ram Kishore ([1865] 10 M.I.A. 279); Pudma Coomari vs Court of Wards ([1881] L.R. 8 I.A. 229); Thayammal and Kuttisami Aiyan vs Venkatarama Aiyan ([1887] L.R. 14 I.A. 67); Tarachurn vs Suresh Chunder ([1889] L.R. 16 I.A. 166); Ramkrishna 1136 Ramchandra vs Shamrao ([1902] I.L.R. ; Madana Mohana vs Purushothama Deo ([1918] L.R. 45 I.A. 156); Vijaysingji vs Shivsangji ([1935] L.R. 62 I.A. 161); Bapuji v Gangaram ([1941] I.L.R. Nagpur 178); and Prem Jagat Kuer vs Harihar Bakhsh Singh ([1945] I.L.R. 21 Lucknow 1), referred to.


Input:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 615 of 1981.
356 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th May, 1981 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 562 of 1979.
Uma Datta, T.C. Sharma and A.D. Malhotra for the Appellant.
R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, dismissing Criminal Revision Case No. 562 of 1979 which was filed by the appellant against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon who affirmed the judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurgaon sentencing the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 16 (1) (c) of the as amended from time to time.
We dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction and sentence on 5.4.
1983 for reasons to be giving later.
We hereby give the reasons.
The charge against the appellant was that when the Food Inspector, Gurgaon, Sant Lal Anand (P.W.2) went to the appellant 's grocery shop at Farrukh Nagar at about 4 p.m. on 27.8.1976 he prevented P.W.2 from taking a sample of dhania from the stock kept for sale by slipping away from the shop under some pretext.
The case of prosecution was that when the Food Inspector (P.W.2) visited the appellant 's grocery shop accompanied by Dr. Aggarwal, Medical officer Incharge, Primary Health Centre, Farrukh Nagar (P.W.1) and Dr. Yadav, Chief Medical Officer (Health), Gurgaon (P.W.3).
The appellant was found to have stored 6 kgs.
of dhania for sale in his shop.
P.W. 2 disclosed his identity to the appellant and demanded a sample of the dhania for analysis and sought to serve the notice Ex P/B and tendered Rs. 4.80 as the price of 600 gms.
of dhania asked for.
The appellant went away from the shop under the pretext of passing urine without accepting the notice exhibit P/B or the sum of Rs. 4.80 tendered by P.W.2 and he did not come back to the shop though P.Ws. 1 to 3 waited there for about 11/2 hours.
There after P.W.2 took a sample from the shop in the absence of the appellant and prepared the spot memo exhibit P/A in the presence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 and subsequently filed the complaint exhibit P/C in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurgaon against the appellant for contravention of s.16 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration as amended, by preventing him from taking a sample of the article of food.
After the examination of P.Ws. 1 to 3 a charge was framed against the appellant for the offence punishable under section 16 (1) (c) of the Act and he pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution relied on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 who deposed to the facts mentioned above.
The appellant stated when examined under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code, that he is running a cloth business at Delhi and had casually visited his father 's grocery shop at Farrukh Nagar on 27.8.1976 when P.Ws. 1 to 3 came there and he went to call his father Uggar Sain (D.W. 1) and came back to the shop alongwith D.W. 1 after about 6 or 7 minutes and that P.Ws. 1 to 3 had gone from the shop by that time.
The appellant examined his father as D.W. 1 in his defence.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurgaon who tried the case rejected the evidence of D.W. 1 as being interested and unreliable and accepted the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 of whom P.W. 1, however, could not identity the appellant as the person who went away from the shop without accepting the notice and cash tendered by P.W 2 and found following judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Krisha Lal & Ors.
vs State of Haryana(1) that the appellant was guilty of having prevented the Food Inspector (P.W. 2) from taking a sample of the article of food by going away from the shop without accepting the notice and cash tendered by P.W. 2.
Accordingly, the learned Magistrate convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 16 (1) (c) of the Act.
The conviction and sentence were confirmed on appeal by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon who found that the appellant was more than 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of section 360 Cr.
P.C. in view of section 20 AA of the Act according to which section 360 Cr.
P.C. is not applicable to the case of the accused who was more than 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence.
The Criminal Revision Case filed by the appellant in the Punjab and Haryana High Court against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon was dismissed by S.S. Dewan, J. who confirmed the conviction and sentence.
Hence, this appeal by special leave.
358 The prevention of Food Inspector from taking a sample of an article of food as authorised by the Act is an offence punishable under section 16 (1) (c) with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than on thousand rupees.
Mr. Uma Datta, appellant 's learned counsel invited our attention to paragraph 10 of the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon where it has been found that the Food Inspector (P.W. 2) had in fact taken a sample in the presence of P.Ws. 1 and 3.
But this must be noted that this was done after the appellant went away from the shop under the pretext of passing urine and did not return for about 1 1/2 hours, during which period P.Ws. 1 to 3 waited for him at the shop.
The finding of fact that the appellant went away from the shop under the pretext of passing urine when the Food Inspector (P.W. 2) tendered the notice exhibit P/B and the cash of Rs. 4.80 for purchasing a sample of dhania and did not return for about 1 1/2 hours, during which period P.Ws. 1 to 3 waited at the shop for him cannot be canvassed in this appeal.
The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to two decisions and submitted that the mere disappearance of the appellant from the shop after the sample was asked for by the Food Inspector without anything more did not amount to prevention of the Food Inspector from taking the sample.
The first of those decisions is of C.P. Sen, J of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jagannath vs State of Madhya Pradesh(1) where the facts found were that when the accused was taking 5 litres of milk in his kothi for sale the Food Inspector stopped him as he suspected the milk to be adulterated and asked him to accompany him to the Municipal office for taking a sample and that on reaching the Municipal office the accused bolted away leaving the kothi of milk, and the learned Judge held that the accused did not prevent the Food Inspector from taking a sample simply because he bolted away from the spot and that the Food Inspector was free to take the sample from the kothi of milk left behind by the accused even in the absence of the accused.
In holding so the learned Judge differed from the view taken in Municipal Board, Sambhal vs Jhamman Lal(2) where it has been held that the disappearance of the seller from the shop amounts to prevention of the Food Inspector from taking the sample and that over act on the part of the seller is not necessary to constitute an offence under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act as it then stood which corresponds to the present section 16 (1) (c).
The second decision 359 relied upon by the learned counsel of the appellant is of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Narain Prasad vs State of Rajasthan & Anr.(1) where Shrimal, J., speaking for the bench has observed: "Thus the consensus of the opinion of almost all the High Court barring a few on the point is that section 16 (1) (b) of the Act makes a person liable to punishment, who prevents the Food Inspector from taking the sample as authorised by the Act.
Section 10 (1) (a) (i) gives the Inspector power to take sample of article of food from any person selling such article.
Sub sec.
(2) of Sec. 10 gives the Food Inspector power to enter any place where the article of food is exposed for sale.
Sub sec.
(4) of Sec.
10 provides for seizure of adulterated food.
The Inspector has also power to break open the door or any package in which the article of food is kept.
For all the purposes the Inspector has power to exercise the power of search and seizure of a police officer under the Crl.
The Food Inspector is also authorised to exercise powers of a police officer under Section 57 of the Code i.e. to arrest an offender, if he refuses to tell his name and residence.
Section 11 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Food Inspector while taking sample.
Therefore, the Food Inspector can follow one of the two modes; one where the vendor co operates, the other when he refuses to co operate.
To prevent the Food Inspector from taking a sample, the accused must do something which makes it impossible for him to take the sample.
" The learned Judges of the Full Bench appear to have held that some overt act on the part of the seller apart from mere refusal to sell the article of food to the Food Inspector is necessary to constitute an offence of prevention of the Food Inspector from taking the sample.
On the other hand, Mr. R. N. Poddar, learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana, invited our attention to two decisions and submitted that the conduct of the appellant in slipping 360 away from the shop when the Food Inspector disclosed his identity and asked for sale of a sample of dhania from his grocery shop, amounts to prevention of the Food Inspector from taking the sample as per the provisions of the Act.
The first of those decisions is to H.C.P. Tripathi, J. in Mamchand vs State(1) where the learned Judge has observed: "The sample had to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules thereunder.
As soon as the owner of the milk disappeared from the scene the Food Inspector could not have obtained the sample as required under law.
By running away from the place the applicant did prevent the Food Inspector from taking sample as required under the Act though not from taking away the entire quantity of the milk which the Food Inspector could do in exercise of his powers under Section 10 (iv) of the Act.
In the case of Municipal Board, Sambhal vs Jhamman Lal (AIR 1961 AII.
103), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that if a person selling article leaves the shop he prevents Food Inspector from taking sample as authorised by the Act.
In the instant case, the applicant left the milk, which he was exposing for sale, and thereby prevented the Food Inspector from taking its sample.
" A learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken a similar view in Habib Khan vs State of Madhya Pradesh.(2) In that case a milk vendor on being accosted by the Food Inspector kept his milk can in the canteen and bolted away, and it has been held that the milk vendor prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample and thus committed an offence under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act as it stood than.
The learned Judge has observed in his judgment thus: "The power of taking the sample has been conferred on the Food Inspector so that he may prosecute the person found selling adulterated food stuff or found in possession thereof for the purposes of sale.
Now, if a person bolts away and thus his identity remains undis 361 closed, the whole purpose of the exercise of the power conferred under section 10 on the Food Inspector is defeated.
In such a case, it will have to be held that in bolting away the person prevented the effective exercise of the power by the Food Inspector.
If this is so, it is difficult to see how the same action on the part of a known person would make any difference.
If he bolts away, an additional burden will be cast on the Inspector if he decides to prosecute him for selling or keeping for sale adulterated food articles, to prove that the person who bolted away was the accused and that the article left by him was in his possession.
Witnesses may not be available at the nick of the time and here, again, the result would be the same.
This is why it is necessary to interpret the two expressions "prevents" and "in exercise of the powers under the Act" in the manner interpreted by the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Sambhal vs Jhamman Lal (supra)", We are of the opinion that the view of the Allahabad High Court expressed in Municipal Board, Sambhal vs Jhaman Lal (supra) reiterated in Mamchand vs State referred to above and taken by the learned single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Habib Khan vs State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the judgment under appeal in this case is the correct view and that appellant in this case who bolted away from the shop under the pretext of passing urine when the Food Inspector (P.W. 2) went to his shop alongwith P.Ws. 1 and 3 and disclosed his identity and tendered the notice exhibit P/B and cash of Rs. 4.80 and asked for a sample of the dhania kept for sale in his grocery shop without accepting the notice and the cash prevented the Food Inspector (P.W. 2) from taking a sample in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and that no other overt act is necessary on the facts of this case to constitute the offence for which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced and that he has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the Court below under section 16 (1) (c) of the Act.
We accordingly, dismiss the appeal and confirm the conviction of the appellant and the sentence awarded to him.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
A Food Inspector visited the appellant 's grocery shop and demanded a sample of dhania for analysis.
Leaving the shop on a false pretext, the appellant did not return to the shop for quite a long time.
Thereupon after following the requisite procedure the Food Inspector took a sample of dhania in the absence of the appellant.
On a charge under Section 16(1)(c) of the that the appellant had prevented the Food Inspector from taking a sample of the article of food, the trial court convicted and sentenced him.
The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.
The High Court dismissed his criminal revision petition.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that mere disappearance from the shop after the sample was demanded by the Food Inspector, without anything more, did not constitute an offence of prevention of the Food Inspector from taking a sample.
Dismissing the appeal.
^ HELD: The appellant had been rightly convicted and sentenced under section 161(1) (c) of the Act.
The appellant 's disappearance from the shop for a long time, amounted to prevention of the Food Inspector from taking a sample in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
No other overt act is necessary to constitute the offence.
[361 F H] Municipal Board.
Sambhal vs Jhaman Lal, AIR 1961 All.
103; Mam Chand vs State, ; Habib Khan vs State of Madhya Pradesh, , approved.
Jagannath vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 Crl.
L.J. 974; Narain Prasad vs State of Rajasthan, AIR overruled.


Input:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1977.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 20 10 75 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 1 379/75.
77 M. C. Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Panduval and Mrs. section Bhandare for the Appellant.
G. L. Sanghi and A. K. Verma for Respondent No. 1.
M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A Prefatory statement KRISHNA IYER, J.
In this appeal, by special leave, we are called upon to interpret a benign provision enacted to ameliorate the economic condition of neglected wives and discarded divorcees, namely.
s 125.
P.C. Welfare laws must be so read as to be effective delivery systems of the salutary objects sought to be served by the Legislature and when the beneficiaries are the weaker sections, like destitute women, this spirit of article 15(3) of the Constitution must belight the meaning of the Section.
The Constitution is a pervasive omnipresence brooding over the meaning and transforming the values of every measure.
So, section 125 and sister clauses must receive a compassionate expansion of sense that the words used permit.
The Brief Facts The respondent (husband) married the appellant (wife) as a second wife, way back in 1956, and a few years later had a son by her.
15 The initial warmth vanished and the jealousies of a triangular situation erupted, marring mutual affection.
The respondent divorced the appellant around July 1962.
A suit relating to a flat in which the husband had housed the wife resulted in a consent decree which also settled the marital disputes.
For instance, it recited that this respondent had transferred the suit premises, namely, a flat in Bombay, to the appellant and also the shares of the Cooperative Housing Society which built the flat concerned.
There was a reference to mehar money (Rs. 5,000/ and 'iddat ' money, Rs. 180/ ) which was also stated to have been adjusted by the compromise terms.
There was a clause in the compromise: G "The plaintiff declares that she has now no claim or right whatsoever against the defendant or against the estate and the properties of the defendant.
" And another term in the settlement was that the appellant had by virtue of the compromise become the absolute owner of the flat and various deposits in respect of the said flat made with the cooperative housing society.
78 For some time there was flickering improvement in the relations between the quondum husband and the quondum wife and they lived together.
Thereafter, again they separated, became entranged.
The appellant, finding herself in financial straits and unable to maintain herself, moved the magistrate under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, for a monthly allowance for the maintenance of herself and her child.
She proceeded on the footing that she was still a wife while the respondent rejected this status and asserted that she was a divorce and therefore ineligible for maintenance.
The Magistrate who tried the petition for maintenance held that the appellant was a subsisting wife and awarded monthly maintenance of Rs. 300/ for the son and Rs. 400/ for the mother for their subsistence, taking due note of the fact that the cost of living in Bombay, where the parties lived, was high, and that the respondent had provided residential accommodation to the appellant.
This order was challenged before the sessions Judge by the aggrieved husband, who on a strange view of the law that the court, under section 125, had no jurisdication to consider whether the applicant was a wife, dismissed the petition in allowance of the appeal.
The High Court deigned to bestow little attention on the matter and summarily dismissed a revision petition.
This protracted and fluctuating litigation misfortune has leu to the appeal, by special leave, before this Court.
The Questions Mooted Shri Bhandare appearing for the appellant contended that the Courts below had surprisingly forgotten the plain provision in the Explanation (b) to section 125(1) of the Code, which reads: "wife ' includes a woman who has been divorced by.
or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.
On this foundation, he urged that accepting the contention of the respondent that the appellant was a divorcee? his client was still entitled to an allowance.
This is obviously beyond dispute or.
a simple reading of the sub section and it is curious how this innovative and sensitive provision with a benignant disposition towards destitute divorcees has been overlooked by all the courts below.
We hold that every divorce otherwise eligible, is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance and the dissolution of the marriage makes no difference to this right under the current Code.
In the normal course, an order for maintenance must follow, the quantum having been determined by the learned Magistrate at the trial level.
79 However, Shri Sanghi, appearing for the respondent, sought sustain the order in his favour on three grounds They arc of pubic importance since the affected party in such a fact situation is the neglected divorcee.
He first argued that section 125(4) would apply in the absence of proof that the lady was not living separately by mutual consent.
His next plea was that there must be proof of neglect to maintain to attract s.125 and his third contention was that there was a settlement by consent decree in 1962 whereby the mehar money had been paid and all claims adjusted, and so no claim for maintenance could survive.
The third contention is apparently based upon contractual arrangement in the consent decree read with section 127(3) (b) which reads: C "(b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was payable on such divorce cancel such order, (i) in the case where such sum was paid before such order, from the date on which such order was made.
(ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman; We must state, however, that there was no specific plea, based upon the latter provision, set up anywhere in the courts below or urged before us.
But if one were to locate a legal ground to raise The contention That the liability to pay maintenance had ceased on account of the payment of mehar, it is section 127(3) of the Code.
So we must deal with the dual sub heads of the third ground.
The meaning of meanings is! derived from values in a given society and its legal system.
Art.15(3) has compelling, compassionate relevance in the context of section 125 and the benefit of doubt.
If any in statutory interpretation belongs to the ill used wife and the derelict divorcee.
This social perspective granted, the resolution of all the disputes projected is easy.
Surely, Parliament, in keeping with article 15(3) and deliberate by design, made a special provision to help women in distress cast away by divorce.
Protection against moral and material abandonment manifest in article 39 is part of social and economic justice, specificated in article 38, fulfilment of which is fundamental to the governance of the country (Art.37).
From this coign of vantage we must view the printed text of the particular Code.
80 section 125 requires, as a sine qua non for its application, neglect by husband or father.
The magistrate 's order proceeds on neglect to maintain; the sessions judge has spoken nothing to the contrary; and The High Court has not spoken at all.
Moreover, the husband has not examined himself to prove that he has been giving allowances to the divorced wife.
His case, on the contrary, is that she has forfeited her claim because of divorce and the consent decree.
Obviously, he has no case of non neglect.
His plea is his right to ignore.
So the basic condition of neglect to maintain is satisfied.
In this generous jurisdiction, a broader perception and appreciation of the facts and their bearing must govern the verdict not chopping little logic or tinkering with burden of proof.
The next submission is that the absence of mutual consent to live separately must be made out if the hurdle of section 125(4) is to be over come.
We see hardly any force in this plea.
The compulsive conclusion from a divorce by a husband and his provision of a separate residence as evidenced by the consent decree fills the bill.
Do divorcees have to 1) prove mutual consent to live apart? Divorce painfully implies that the husband orders her out of the conjugal home.
If law has nexus with life this argument is still born.
The last defence, based on mehar payment, merits more serious attention.
The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail.
The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual rights.
No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right of the divorcee under section 125 can operate to negate that claim.
Nor can s.127 rescue the respondent from his obligation.
Payment of mehar money, as a customary discharge, is within the cognisance of that provision.
But what was the amount of mehar ? Rs. 5000/ , interest from which could not keep the woman 's body and soul together for a day, even in that city where 40% of the population are reported to live on pavements, unless she was ready to sell her body and give up her soul ? The point must be clearly under stood that the scheme of the complex of provisions in Chapter IX has a social purpose.
Ill used wives and desparate divorcees shall not be driven to material and moral dereliction to seek sanctuary in the streets.
This traumatic horror animates the amplitude of s.127.
Where the husband, by customary payment at the time of divorce, has adequately provided for the divorce, a subsequent series of recurrent does is 81 contra indicated and the husband liberated.
This is the teleological A interpretation, the sociological decoding of the text of s.127.
The keynote thought is adequacy of payment which will take reasonable care of her maintenance.
The payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal law requirement will be considered in the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate that rate unless it is a reasonable substitute.
The legal sanctity of the payment is certified by the fulfilment of the social obligation, not by a ritual exercise rooted in custom.
No construction which leads to frustration of the statutory project can secure validation if the court is to pay true homage to the Constitution.
The only just construction of the section is that Parliament intended divorcees should not derive a double benefit.
If the first payment by way of mehar or ordained by custom has a reasonable relation to the object and is a capitalised substitute for the order under section 125 not mathematically but fairly then section 127(3) (b) subserves the goal and relieves; the obligor, not pro tanto but wholly.
The purpose of the payment 'under any customary or personal law ' must be to obviate destitution of the divorcee and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself.
The whole scheme of section 127(3) (b) is manifestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lump sum payment organised by the custom of the community or the personal law of the parties.
There must be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance.
To interpret otherwise is to stultify the project.
Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot he pedantic but purposeful.
The proposition, therefore, is that no husband can claim under section 127(3)(b) absolution from this obligation under section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance.
The conclusion that we therefore reach is that the appeal should be allowed and it is hereby allowed, and the order of the trial court restored.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

Output:
Explanation (b) to section 125(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not re married.
Section 127(3) (b) provides that where any order has been made under section 125 in favour of a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from her husband, the Magistrate shall if he is satisfied that the woman has been divorced by her husband and has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was payable on such divorce cancel such order in the circumstances stated therein.
The respondent (husband) married the appellant (wife) and had a son by her.
A few years later the respondent divorced his wife.
By a consent decree, in the suit filed by the wife, he transferred to her the flat in which she was living and agreed to pay mehar money.
The compromise stated that the "plaintiff declares that she has now no claim or right whatsoever against the defendant".
For some time thereafter they lived together but again separated.
The wife moved the magistrate under section 125 Cr.P. for grant of maintenance to her and her son.
This was granted.
On appeal the Sessions Judge held mat the Court had no jurisdiction under section 125.
The High Court dismissed the wife 's appeal.
On further appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the respondent that (i) section 125(4) would apply in the absence of proof that the wife was not living separately by mutual consent; (ii) to attract section 125 there must be proof of neglect to maintain the wife and (iii) no claim for maintenance in this case can survive in the face of the consent decree whereby mehar money had been paid and all claims adjusted.
Allowing the appeal the Court, G ^ HELD: Every divorcee, otherwise eligible, is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance and the dissolution of the marriage makes no difference to this right under the current Code.
[78H] 1.
There is no force in the argument that the absence of mutual consent to live separately must be made out if the hurdle of section 125(4) is to be overcome.
The compulsive conclusion from a divorce by a husband and his provision of a separate residence as evidenced by the consent decree fills the bill.
Divorce plainfully implies that the husband orders.
the wife out of the conjugal home.
[80D] 76 2.
The husband 's plea is his right to ignore.
So the basic condition of neglect to maintain is satisfied.
In this generous jurisdiction the broader perception and appreciation of the facts and their bearing must govern the verdict not chopping little logic or tinkering with burden of proof.
[80C] 3.
(a) The consent decree resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available.
The new statutory right which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the consent decree in 1962 had been created by the Code of 1973.
No settlement of claim which does not have the special statutory right of the divorcee under section 125 can operate to negate that claim.
[80F] (b) No husband can claim under section 127(3)(b) absolution from his obligation under section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance.
[81F] (c) Section 127 cannot rescue the husband from his obligation.
The scheme of Chapter IX has a social purpose.
Ill used wives and desperate divorcees shall not be driven to material and moral dereliction to seek sanctuary in the streets.
Where the husband, by customary payment at the time of divorce, has adequately provided for the divorcee.
a subsequent series of recurrent doles is contra indicated and the husband liberated.
The key note thought is adequacy of payment which will take reasonable care of the wife 's maintenance.
[80H] (d) The payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal law requirement will be considered in the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate that rate unless it is a reasonable substitute The legal sanctity of the payment is certified by the fulfilment of the social obligation, not by a ritual exercise rooted in custom.
No construction which leads to frustration of the statutory project can secure validation if the Court is to pay true homage to the Constitution.
The only just construction of the section is that Parliament intended divorcees should not derive a double benefit If the first payment by way of mehar or ordained by custom has a reasonable relation to the object and is a capitalised substitute for the order under section 125 then section 127(3) (b) subserves the goal and relieves the obligor.
not pro tanto but wholly the purpose of the payment "under any customary or personal law" must be to obviate destitution of the divorcee and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself There must be a rational relation between the cum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance.
[81B C] 4.
Welfare laws must be so read as to be effective delivery systems of the salutary objects sought to be served by the Legislature and when the beneficiaries are the weaker sections, like destitute women, the spirit of article 15(3) must belight the meaning of the section.
The Constitution is a pervasive omnipresence brooding over the meaning and transforming the values of every measure.