Input:
vil Appeal Nos.
379 1988 and 3660 82/1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.10.87 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal in Appeal Nos.
ED/943/83 D Order No. 838/87 D ED(SB) A. No. 411 and 412/81 D ' and 787/80 D in Order No. 786 to 788/6 D. Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A.K. Srivastava and P.Parmeswaran and Mrs. Sushma Suri for the Appellants.
Soil J. Sorabjee, section Ganesh, J.R. Gagrat, P.G. Gokhale, B.R. Agarwala and C.M. Mehta for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,J.
These appeals are under Section 35L(b) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944(hereinafter to as 'the Act ') against the decision of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellant Tribunal, New Delhi ( 'Tribunal ' for short) dated 26the October,1987.
The respondent company has its factory at Chakala Andheri and is engaged in the manufacture of non alcoholic beverage bases falling under Tariff Item 68 of Central Excise Tariff.
During the course of enquiry, it was found that the company had during the period from Ist March, 1975 to 18th April,1979 manufactured non alcoholic beverage bases without holding proper Central Excise licence and had cleared the said goods without payment of the duty due thereon and had thereby evaded the duty amounting to PG NO 937 Rs.3,50,963.22.
According to the revenue, prima facie it appeared that the respondent had contravened the provisions of Rules 9(1), 53, 173 pp(I), 173 pp(3), ]73 pp(6) and 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (`Rules ' for short) inasmuch as during the period from 1st March, 1975 to 18th April, 1979 the respondent company had manufactured without valid licences required under Section 6 of the Act read with Rule 174 of the Rules, goods not elsewhere specified and falling under Tariff Item 68 of the First Schedule of the Act, viz., non alcoholic beverage bases.
The respondent company had further cleared the said goods without filing list of goods manufactured as required by Rule 173 pp(3) of the Rules.
The respondent had cleared the said goods without preparing gate passes as required under Rule 173 pp (6) of the Rules.
and had further cleared the said goods without maintaining accounts as required under Rule 53 of the Rules.
In the circumstances.
notices were issued by the relevant officer asking the respondent company to show cause for recovery of the dues and also for imposition of penalty.
When the matter came up for consideration before the Collector, Central Excise, he found that non alcoholic beverage bases were not themselves food or food products and accordingly did not quality for exemption under Notification No. 55/75 as amended.
He accordingly confirmed the demand of central excise duty of Rs.3,50,963.22 under Rule 9(2) read with Rule 10 of the Rules.
He also imposed a penalty of Rs.25,000 under Rule 173Q of the Rules.
Aggrieved thereby,the respondent company filed an appeal before the Tribunal and contended that the question of the dutiability of non alcoholic beverage bases manufactured by the respondent had been settled by the Tribunal in its decision in the case of respondent itself, i.e.
,Parle Exports (P)Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, which are the subject matter of the connected appeals, i.e. C.A. Nos. 3680 82 of 1987 The Tribunal following its earlier order allowed the appeal and hence the present appeal by the Revenue.
The First Schedule of the Act which provides for the dutiability and the rates of duty applicable to various goods mentioned therein contains the expressions "Food and Beverages It provides therein description of various types of goods and the rates of duties applicable thereto.
In the said description "Food and Beverages" many items are included, viz., sugar produced in a factory ordinarily using power in the course of production of sugar, (1A) confectionery, cocoa powder and chocolates, in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power namely.
boiled sweets, toffees, caramels, candies, nuts (including almonds) and fruit kernels coated with sweetening agent, and PG NO 938 chewing gums, cocoa powder, drinking chocolates etc.
It also includes items (1B) prepared or preserved foods put up in unit containers and ordinarily intended for sale, including preparations of vegetables, fruit, milk, cereals, etc., and as item (1C) food products, in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power, namely, biscuits, pasteurised butter, pasteurised or processed cheese, aerated waters, whether or not flavoured or sweetened and whether or not containing vegetable or fruit juice or fruit pulp etc.
Tariff Item 68 of the First Schedule of the Act provides for duty on "All other goods not elsewhere specified and manufactured in a factory" but excluding, inter alia alcohol, all sorts, including alcoholic liquor for human consumption and other items not necessary for our present purpose.
The exemption Notification No. 55/75 C.E. dated 1st March, 1975 reads as follows: "In exercise of powers conferred by sub rule (10) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts goods of the description specified in the q Schedule annexed hereto and falling under Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to the (1 of 1944), from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon .
THE SCHEDULE 1.
All kinds of food products and food preparations,including (i) meat and meat products; (ii) dairy products; (iii) fruit and vegetable products; (iv) fish and sea foods; (v) bakery products; and (vi) grain mill products.
Electric light and power.
" PG NO 939 The question is, whether by the notification of exemption non alcoholic beverage bases have been exempted from payment of duty.
The only question, therefore, in other words, is whether non alcoholic beverage bases are `food products ' or `food preparations ' covered by the exemption notification No. 55/75 CE of Ist March, 1975.
We are not concerned with the question whether in a broad general sense non alcoholic beverage base is food or not.
In Brooke Bond (India) Limited vs Union of India, the question arose before a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh whether coffee chicory blend was food product and is an item which fell under Tariff Item 68 of the Tariff.
The identical notification involved herein came up for consideration in that case.
The question was whether it was food product or food preparation, and as such exempt from excise duty.
It was held by the learned Single Judge that what was exempt under the said notification was not food but food products and food preparations and it was further held that coffee chicory blend was neither food nor food preparation.
Therefore, it was not exempt from payment of excise duty under the said notification.
The word food has no definition of universal application and it varied from statute to statute.
In some cases the dividing line between the two might be thin and in some cases it might be varied but so far as coffee chicory blend was concerned there was little doubt that it was beverage and not food.
The learned Judge referred to paragraph 109 of Volume 18 of Halsbury 's Laws of England (4th Edn).
In that paragraph, coffee chicory products are mentioned under the general heading `Food, Dairies and Salaughter Houses ' and sub heading `Food generally.
Coffee chicory blend is also mentioned in that paragraph.
But the coffee and coffee products under the heading `Food generally were in the context of the law of Food Adulteration and the Coffee and Coffee Produce Regulations, q1967 in force in England.
Reference was also made by the learned Judge to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 36 at page 1041.
The learned Judge, in our opinion, rightly observed that the aforesaid passage from the Halsbury 's Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum could not be mechanically imported into the present case more particularly when we are concerned with the situation under the Tariff Schedule.
`Food ', as has been noted, has no fixed definition of universal application and its meaning varies from statute to statute.
The dividing line, the learned Judge observed, between the beverage and food might be thin and in some case it might overlap.
The learned Judge,, however, observed that it was beverage rather than food.
The accordingly held that the notification exempted not food but food products and food preparations and as such coffee chicory blend did not come within the purview of the exemption.
The said decision was affirmed by the Division PG NO 940 Bench of that Court in Brooke Bond (lndia) Limited vs Union of India & Ors., The Division Bench after exhaustively discussing the points in controversy and after referring to several authorities referred to the decision of Justice Vivian Bose of this Court in The State of Bombay vs Vir Kumar Gulabchand Shah, [1982] SCR/877, wherein he had observed in his own and inimitable language at pages 880 883 of the report as under: "Much learned judicial thought has been expended upon this problem what is and what is not food and what is and what is not a foodstuff, and the only conclusion I can draw from a careful consideration of all the available material is that the term 'foodstuff is ambiguous.
In one sense it has a narrow meaning and is limited to articles which are eaten as food for purposes of nutrition and nourishment and so would exclude condiments and spices such as yeast, salt, pepper, baking powder and turmeric.
In a wider sense, it includes everything that goes into the preparation of food proper (as understood in the narrow sense) to make it more palatable and digestible.
In my opinion, the problem posed cannot be answered in the abstract and must be viewed in relation to its background and context.
But before I dilate on this, l will examine the dictionary meaning of the words The Oxford English Dictionary defines foodstuff a follows: "that which is taken into the system to maintain life and growth and to supply waste to tissue".
In Webster 's international Dictionary `food is defined as: "nutritive material absorbed or taken into the body of an organism which serves, for purposes of growth.
work repair and for the maintenance of the vital processes".
Then follows this explanation: "Animals differ greatly from plants in their nutritive processes and require in addition to certain inorganic substances (water, salts etc.) and organic.
substances of unknown composition (vitamins) not ordinarily ' classed as food 'though absolutely indispensable to life, and contained in greater of less quantities in the substances eaten) complex organic substances which fall into three principal groups, Proteins, Carbohydrates and Fats.
" PG NO 941 Next is given a special definition for legal purposes, namely "As used in laws prohibiting adulteration etc.
, `food ' is generally held to mean any article used as food or drink by man, whether simple, mixed or compound, including adjuncts such as condiments, etc., and often excluding drugs and natural water.
" The definition given of `foodstuff ' is "1.
Anything used as food, 2.
Any substance of food value as protein, fat etc.
entering into the composition of a food.
" It will be seen from these definitions that "foodstuff" has no special meaning of its own.
It merely carries us back to the definition of "food" because "food stuff" is anything which is used as "food".
So far as "food" is concerned, it can be used in a wide as well as a narrow sense and, in my opinion, must depend upon the context and background.
Even in a popular sense, when one asks another "Have you had your food?", one means the composite preparations which normally go to constitute a meal curry and rice, sweetmeats, pudding, cooked vegetables and so forth.
One does not usually think separately of the different preparations which enter into their making, of the various condiments and spices and vitamins, any more than one would think of separating in his mind the purely nutritive elements of what is eaten from their non nutritive adjuncts.
So also, looked at from another point of view, the various adjuncts of what I may term food proper which enter into its preparation for human consumption in order to make it palatable and nutritive, can hardly be separated from the purely nutritive elements if the effect of their absence would be to render the particular commodity in its finished state unsavoury and indigestible to a whole class of persons PG NO 942 whose stomachs are accustomed to a more spicely prepared product.
The proof of the pudding is, as it were, in the eating, and if the effect of eating what would otherwise be palatable and digestible and therefore nutritive is to bring on indigestion to a stomach unaccustomed to such unspiced fare, the answer must, I think, be that however nutritive a product may be in one form it can scarcely be classed as nutritive if the only result of eating it is to produce the opposite effect; and if the essence of the definition is the nutritive element, then the commodity in question must cease to be food, within the strict meaning of the definition to that particular class of persons, without the addition of the spices which make it nutritive.
Put more colloguially, "one man 's food is another man 's poison".
I refer to this not for the sake of splitting hairs but to show the undesirability of such a mode of approach.
The problem must, I think, be solved in a commonsense way.
" Justice Bose noted that a comparison of war time measure in English and Indian Statutes might not be safe.
But food is one which nourishes and sustains human body for the purposes of growth, work or repair and for the maintenance of the vital process.
In the Brooke Bond Ltd. 's case (supra), the Division Bench considered the meaning of the expression "coffee chickory blend" and upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge as mentioned hereinbefore.
Mr. Sorabjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, drew our attention to several items including Item 68 and the Central Excise Trade Notice dated 18th June 1975 which deals with exemption.
The said Trade Notice, inter alia, reads as follows: "A number of doubts have been raised about the general scope of the terms `food products/preparations ' vide Entry No. I in the Schedule to Notification No. 55/75 dated 1.3.75.
Specific queries have also been raised as to whether items like oil cakes, rice bran.
scented chunam, katna, starch, quargum, gur, flour, ice cream and ice candy, ice, supari, groundnut kernels, and cashew kernels could be regarded as covered under the above entry as claimed by the manufacturers of these goods.
The matter has been examined and the following clarifications are used for the information of the trade.
PG NO 943 The word `food ' is a general term and applies to all that is eaten by men for nourishment and takes in subsidiaries, further; (i) preparations for use, either directly or after processing such as cooking, dissolving or oiling in water, milk etc.
for human consumption; and (ii) preparations used because of their nutritional or flavouring properties in the making of beverages or food stuffs for human consumption, are classiable as food preparations.
But such preparations which because of their ingredients and small proportion in which they are normally used, are clearly added for other purposes, or not classiable as food preparations." (underlined by us).
Mr. Sorabjee also drew our attention to the explanatory note in Heading No. 21.07 of CCCN which states, inter alis as follows: "21.07 FOOD PREPARATIONS NOT ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED OR lNCLUDED.
Provided that they are not covered by any other heading of the Nomenclature the present heading covers: (A) Preparations consisting wholly or partly of foodstuffs, used in the making of beverages or food preparations for human consumption.
The heading includes preparations consisting of mixtures of chemicals (organic acids, calcium salts, lecithin etc.) with food stuffs (flour, sugar, milk, milk powder, etc.) for incorporation in food preparations either as ingredients or to improve some of their characteristics (appearance keeping qualities etc.)" Clause (2) of the said explanatory notes in heading No. 20.17 of CCCN contains the following: "(2) Flavouring powders for making beverages, whether or not sweetened with a basis of bicarbonate of soda and glycyrrhizin or liquorice extract (sold on the Continent as "Cocoa powder").
" PG NO 944 Our attention was also drawn to Item ( 12) of the same which runs as follows: "(12).
Non alcoholic compound preparations (often known as "concentrated extracts") used for making beverages (liqueurs, etc.) unless they are included elsewhere in the Nomenclature.
These preparations are obtained by compounding vegetable extracts of heading 13.03 with lactic acid, tartaric acid, citric acid, phosphoric acid, preserving agents, foaming agents, fruit juices, etc., and sometimes with essential oils.
Alcoholic preparations of this type are excluded (heading 22.09)" Mr. Sorabjee further drew our attention to the Appendix 17 of Import Policy of 1981 82 which was relied upon by the Tribunal in the second decision, i.e. the Parle Exports (P) Ltd. case which is the subject matter of the connected appeals, i.e. C.A. Nos. 3680 82 of 1987.
It was pleaded that it was always understood and treated as a part of the food product.
Reliance was also placed on the reports of the Chief Chemist of the Central Excise Regional Laboratory, Baroda to which Mr. Sorabjee drew our attention.
The reports dealing inter alia with some items stated as follow: "Gold Spot Base: S.R.No. 1 Base A (Lab. No.10) The sample is in the form of orange coloured liquid containing flavouring agents free from Alcohol.
(Please see note attached).
No 2 Base (Lab. No. 11) The sample is in the form of white powder.
It is sodium Benzoate a chemical known to be used as a preservative.
S.R. No.3 .
Base C (Lab. No. 12) The sample is in the form of white powder.
It is vitamin `C '(ascorbic acid) an organic chemical.
Limca Base: PG NO 945 S.R. No. 4 Base A (Lab. No. 13) The sample is in the form of white liquid containing flavouring agents.
It is free from Alcohol.
(Please see note attached.) S.R. No. 5 Base B (Lab. No. 14) The sample is in the form of white powder.
It is sodium Benvonate a chemical known to be used as a preservative.
" The note appended to these reports stated inter alia the following: "NOTE" "The term "food ' ' as defined in the meant any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes: (a) Any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human foods; and (b) any flavouring matter or condiments.
Food products which are excluded from item (C) would fall under Item 68 of Central Excise, Tariff read with the Notification 62/78 dated 1.3.78 excluded as amended.
The term "Food preparations" on the other hand would cover; (a) Preparation for use either directly or after processing (such as cooking, dissolving or boiling in water, milk etc.) for human consumption.
(b) Preparation consisting wholly or partly of food stuffs used in making of Beverages or food preparation for human consumption.
This would also include concentrated extract for making non alcoholic beverages.
B.T.N. heading 21.07) PG NO 946 In this connection attention is also invited to Bangalore Collectorate trade notice No. 103/75 dated 18.6.75.
In view of that has been stated above samples at Sl.
No. 1, 4, 8, 9, 13 and 15 may be deemed to fall in the category of food preparations.
However, before finalising the assessment, it may be worthwhile ascertaining whether the above products are also known as food preparations in common parlance and trade.
The views of the Director.
Drugs & Food Laboratory, Baroda may also sought, if necessary." Mr. Sorabjee submitted that the Tribunal has relied on the Bangalore Collectorate Trade Notice as referred hereinbefore, order of the Appellate Collector in the case of Bush Boake Allan (India) Limited, and Heading No. 21.07 of CCCN, Import Policy of the Government of India for 1981 82 as well as the observations in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 13 at pages 420 421.
It was submitted that the said orders of the Tribunal had considered and taken into consideration all the relevant factors.
The Tribunal has acted on the varied materials, and therefore, such decision of the Tribunal should not be altered or deviated from.
Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Collector of Customs, Bombay v, Swastic Woollen (P) Ltd. and Ors., at paragraph 9.
The expression "food products" is not defined in the Act The product exemption includes `food and food preparations ' and provides an inclusive definition of `food products ' and 'food preparations '.
But the correct and the appropriate meaning of the expressions covered in the said notification has to be found out.
The question is whether non alcoholic beverage base is either `food product ' or `food preparation ' in terms of the notification in question.
Mr. Sorabjee tried to suggest that fruit and vegetable juice might become fruit or vegetable products to come under Item 1(iii) of the Schedule to the exemption notification.
Learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Kuldip Singh, on the other hand submitted that non alcoholic beverage base though having some food value, is not food product or food preparation, at any rate, in the context of the Act and notification as such.
lle drew our attention to the first heading in the First Schedule to the Act dealing with "Food and Beverages" and pointed out that items 1 to IC deal with Food and Food Products while item 1D deals with beverages separately.
He submitted before us that this indicates that PG NO 947 the expression "food products and food preparations" are used in contrast to "beverages" so far as the present Act and notifications thereunder are concerned.
There is force in the submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General.
Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Government of India in Re: Asian Chemical Works, where the Government of India opined that `Food flavours ' and `food preparations, might improve taste or appearance of food products and/or food preparations, but by themselves could not be legitimately consumed directly or after processing such as cooking, dissolving, or boiling in water for human consumption independently.
Mr. Singh submitted that in ordinary common and commercial parlance also the goods in question are not known as food products and/or food preparations as such, therefore, these are not to be treated as exempt under the notification.
Mr. Singh submitted that when a person says "I have consumed food" he does not mean or says that he has consumed non alcoholic beverage bases.
Therefore, those goods cannot be understood as covered by the notification of exemption.
It was submitted that how Government understood a matter at the time of the notification, is a relevant factor and that is a factor which one should bear in mind in view of the principles enunciated by this Court in K.P. Verghese vs Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr., ; It is a well settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute or notification will give much weight to the interpretation put up on it at the time of enactment or issue, and since by those who have to construe.
execute and apply the said enactments.
How then should the courts proceed? The expressions in the Schedule and in the notification for exemption should be understood by the language employed therein bearing in mind the context in which the expressions occur.
The words used in the provision, imposing taxes or granting exemption should be understood in the same way in which these are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by the people who ordinarily deal with them.
It is, however, necessary to bear in mind certain principles.
The notification in this case was issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules and should be read along with the Act.
The notification must be read as a whole in the context of the other relevant provisions.
When a notification is issued in accordance with power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and validity and, therefore, the exemption under the notification is, as if it were contained in the Act itself.
See in this connection the PG NO 948 observations of this Court in Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. vs The Union of India, [1962] Supp.
3 SCR 481.
See also Kailash Nath vs State of U.P., AIR The principle is well settled that when two views of a notification are possible, it should be construed in favour of the subject as notification is part of a fiscal enactment.
But in this connection, it is well to remember the observations of the Judicial Committee in Coroline M. Armytage & Ors.
vs Federick Wilkinson, at 370 that it is only, however, in the event of there being a real difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of a particular enactment that the question of strictness or of liberality of construction arises.
The Judicial Committee reiterated in the said decision at page 369 of the report that in a taxing Act provisions establishing an exception to the general rule of taxation are to be construed strictly against those who invoke its benefit.
While interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed.
It must, however, be borne in mind that absurd results of construction should be avoided.
In Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [1982] l SCR 129 this Court emphasised that the notification should not only be confined to its grammatical or ordinary parlance but it should also be construed in the light of the context.
This Court reiterated that the expression should be construed in a manner in which similar expressions have been employed by those who framed relevant notification.
The Court emphasised the need to derive the intent from a contextual scheme.
In this case therefore, it is necessary to endeavour to find out the true intent of the expressions "food products and food preparations" having regard to the object and the purpose for which the exemption is granted bearing in mind the context and also taking note of the literal or common parlance meaning by those who deal with those goods, of course bearing in mind.
that in case of doubt only it should be resolved in favour of the assessee or the dealer avoiding, however.
an absurd meaning.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, in our opinion, the revenue is right that the nonalcoholic beverage bases in India cannot be treated or understood as new `nutritive material absorbed or taken into the body of an organism which serves for the purpose of growth, work or repair and for the maintenance of the vital process ' and an average Indian will not treat non alcoholic beverage bases as food products or food preparations in that light.
PG NO 949 We have also noted how these goods were treated by the Government as mentioned hereinbefore.
There is no direct evidence as such as to how in commercial parlance unlike in ordinary parlance, non alcoholic beverage bases are treated or whether they are treated as food products or food preparations.
The purpose of exemption is to encourage food production and also give boost to the production of goods in common use and need.
After all the purpose of exemption is to help production of food and food preparations at cheaper price and also help production of items which are in common use and need, like electric light and power.
The question of interpretation involves determining the meaning of a text contained in one or more documents.
Judges are often criticised for being tied too closely to the statutory words and for failing to give effect to the intention of the Parliament or the lawmaker.
Such language, it has been said, in Cross 's "Statutory Interpretation" (Second Edn.) at page 21, appears to suggest that there are two units of enquiry in statutory interpretation the statutory text and the intention of the Parliament and the Judge must seek to harmonise the two.
This, however, is not correct.
According to the tradition of our law, primacy is to be given to the text in which the intention of the law giver has been expressed.
Cross refers to Blackstone 's observations that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the law maker is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.
And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law.
We have no doubt, in our opinion, that having regard to the language used it would not be in consonance with the spirit and the reason of law to give exemption for non alcoholic beverage bases under the notification in question.
Bearing the aforesaid purpose, in our opinion, it cannot be contended that expensive items like Gold Spot base, Limca base or Thumps up base were intended to be given exemption at the cost of public exchequer.
For the aforesaid reasons, the appeals have to be allowed and the decision of the Tribunal reversed.
We, however.
need not go into the question of penalty as well as the question of limitation which have been left open by the Tribunal in its order.
It will be open for the parties to urge these points afresh before the Tribunal.
We express no opinion on these aspects.
The appeals to the extent indicated above are allowed.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
R.S.S. Appeals allowed.

Output:
The respondent company was engaged in the manufacture of nonalcoholic beverage bases falling under Tariff Item 68 of Central Excise Tariff.
According to the Revenue, the company manufactured the nonalcoholic beverage bases without holding proper Central Excise Licence, and had cleared the said goods without payment of the duty due thereon.
The stand of the company was that the goods were exempt from duty under Notification No. 55/75 C.E. dated 1st March, 1975 which inter alia exempted "all kinds of food products and food preparations".
The Customs and Excise Collector confirmed the demand of central excise duty against the company.
In appeal, the Confirmed the demand of and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the company.
The Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the appellants contended that (i) non alcoholic beverage base though having some food value, was not food product or food preparation.
at any rate, in the context of the Act and notification as such; (ii) the expression "food products and food preparations" was used in contrast to "beverages" so far as the present Act and notifications thereunder were concerned; (iii) in ordinary common and commercial parlance also the goods in question were not known as food products and/or food preparations as such, and therefore these were PG NO 933 PG NO 934 not to be treated as exempt under the notification; and (iv) how Government understood a matter at the time of the notification, was a relevant factor and that was a factor which one should bear in mind.
K.P. Verghese vs Income Tax Officer Ernakulam, ; and Government of India 's decision in Re: Asian Chemical Works, , relied upon.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the Tribunal had acted on the varied materials, and therefore, such decision of the Tribunal should not be altered or deviated from.
Collector of Customs, Bombay vs Swastic Woollen (P) Ltd., , relied upon.
Allowing the appeals, it was, HELD: (1) The word `Food ' has no fixed definition of universal application and its meaning varies from statute to statute.
But food is one which nourishes and sustains human body for the purposes of growth, work or repair and for the maintenance of the vital process.[939D] Brooke Bond (India) Limited vs Union of India, ; Brooke Bond (India) Limited vs Union of India.
119%41 and The State of Bombay vs Virkumar Gulabchand Shah, ; , referred to.
(2) The expression `food products ' is not defined in the Act.
The exemption includes food products and food preparations ' and provides an inclusive definition of `food products ' and food preparations '.
[946E] (3) The words used in the provision, imposing taxes or granting exemptions, should be understood in the same way in which these are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by the people who ordinarily deal with them.
[947F] (4) It is a well settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute or notification will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at the time of enactment or issue, and since by those who have to construe, execute and apply the said enactments.
l947E] PG NO 935 (5) The notification should not only be confined to its grammatical or ordinary parlance but it should also be construed in the light of the context.
The expression should be construed in a manner in which similar expressions have been employed by those who framed the relevant notification, [948E] Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. vs State of Uttar Pradesh, ; , referred to.
(6) The question of interpretation involves determining the meaning of a text contained in one or more documents.
Judges are often criticised for being tied too closely to the statutory words and for failing to give effect to the intention of the Parliament or the law maker.
[949C] (7) According to the tradition of our law, primacy is to be given to the text in which the intention of the law giver has been expressed.
[949D] (8) The principle is well settled that when two views of a notification are possible, it should be construed in favour of the subject as notification is part of a fiscal enactment avoiding, however, as absurd meaning.
[948F] Coroline M. Armytage & Ors.
vs Frederick Wilkinson, , referred to.
(9) The notification must be read as a whole in the context of the other relevant provisions.
When a notification is issued in accordance with power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and validity and, therefore, the exemption under the notification is, as if it were contained in the Act itself [947G H] Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. vs Union of India, [1962] Supp.3 SCR 481 and Kailash Nath vs State of U.P., AIR 1975 SC 790, referred to.
(10) The purpose of exemption is to encourage food production and also give boost to the production of goods in common use and need.
After all, the purpose of exemption is to help production of food and food preparations at cheaper price and also help production of items which are in common use and need, like electric light and power.
[949A B] PG NO 936 (11) Having regard to the language used it would not be in consonance with the spirit and the reason of law to give exemption for non alcoholic beverage bases under the notification.
Bearing the aforesaid purpose, it cannot be contended that expensive items like Gold spot base, Limca base or Thumps up base were intended to be given exemption at the cost of the public exchequer.[949E F] (12) Non alcoholic beverage bases in India cannot be treated or understood as new 'nutritive material absorbed or taken into the body of an organism which serves for the purpose of growth, work or repair and for the maintenance of the vital process ' and an average Indian will not treat non alcoholic beverage bases as food products or food preparations in that light.[948G H]


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1981.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 4th September, 1980 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 2155 of 1979.
U.R. Lalit, C.B. Singh and P.H. Parekh for the Appellants.
Jitendra Sharma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.
Land bearing Survey No. 1052 admeasuring 16 acres situated within the revenue limits of Village Sonai Taluka Nawasa Distt.
Ahmendnagar, belonged to Tarachand Chopra Janardhan, the father of the respondent was admittedly the tenant of this land on April 1, of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as amended from time to time provided that on the 1st day of April, 1957 styled as the tillers ' day every tenant shall subject to other provisions of the section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the same date the land held by him as a tenant if other conditions of the section are satisfied.
Thus by operation of law, Janardhan, who was the tenant of the land on the tillers ' day became the deemed purchaser thereof.
Landlord Tarachand died on August 12, 1959.
Before his death, landlord Tarachand had executed a will and bequeathed the suit land to Ashoklal Gugale who was petitioner No. 5 before the High Court Acting upon the will of Tarachand, Ashoklal got his 241 name mutated in the revenue record in respect of suit land in his favour as owner.
On the date of mutation, Ashoklal was a minor.
A Sec.
32 G imposes a statutory duty on the Agricultural l ands Tribunal ( 'Tribunal ' for short) to commence enquiry for determining the price of the land which is the subject matter of compulsory purchase.
The Tribunal is required to issue notice to (a) all tenants who u/s 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands (b) all landlords of such lands and (c) all other persons interested therein to appear before it on the date specified in the notice.
Pursuant to such notice when the parties appeared before the Tribunal it was claimed on behalf of landlord that Ashoklal, the recorded owner was a minor and therefore the sale was postponed u/s 32 F. The Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction in not noticing the obvious fact that the relevant date on which compulsory sale takes place is April 1, 1957 and on that date Tarachand Chopra the landlord was the recorded owner and he was under no disability as envisaged by sec.
32 F and therefore the sale had become effective and could not be postponed u/s 32 F.
However, the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by mis stating an obvious irrelevant fact that as recorded owner was a minor, compulsory sale was postponed as envisaged by sec.
32 F. It appears that the Tribunal again commenced proceedings in the year 1967 u/s 32 G and concluded the proceedings by its order dated July 13, 1967 repeating the jurisdictional errors and thereby failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it.
In the meantime, minor landlord through his next friend commenced proceedings in Case No. 36 of 1967 in the court of Tenancy Avail Karkoon having jurisdiction in the area for recovery of possession from tenant Janardhan who had become a deemed purchaser, u/s 14 read with sec.
29 of the Tenancy Act Sec.
14 enables the landlord to recover possession if tenant commits default in payment of rent for certain number of years.
The Tenancy Avail Karkoon entertained the petition which it had no jurisdiction because there was no subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant between Ashoklal and Janardhan as Janardhan had already become deemed purchaser on April 1, 1957.
However, the Tenancy Aval Karkoon taking note of the earlier decisions of the Tribunal holding that the date of compulsory sale was postponed directed possession to be handed over to the landlord holding that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent.
Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for the appellant at this stage pointed out that in the proceeding u/s 14 read with sec.
29 of the Tenancy Act, the tenant Janardan had made a Statement on October 5, 1967 242 that he had no objection to handing over possession of the land to A the land to the landlord as he was old and could not cultivate the land personally.
On the same day, surprisingly the Tenancy Aval Karkoon also recorded the statement of present respondent that in the lifetime of his father Janardhan he had no title to the land involved in the dispute.
It appears that the Tenancy Aval Karkoon made the order dated oct. 6, 1967 evicting Janardhan from the land on the footing that he was a tenant liable to pay rent and had committed defaults.
This wholly null and void order enabled the minor landlord to sell the land by a registered deed on Nov. 13, 1967 to the petitioner No. 1 and one Haribhav and the latter in turn transferred his interest in favour of other petitioners, Misled by the two orders of the Tribunal holding that the sale was postponed Janardhan served a notice on oct. 6, 1971 as envisaged by sec.
32 F that as the landlord has attained majority he is entitled to purchase the land and that the price of land be determined.
Presumably, pursuant to this notice, the Tribunal commenced proceedings under sections 32 G and 32 F of the Tenancy Act for determining the purchase price.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners transferees from Ashoklal before the Tribunal that as Janardhan has already handed over possession to Ashoklal he had no subsisting interest in the land and therefore he had no right to purchase the land u/s 32 F and that the proceedings be dropped.
This contention found favour with the Tribunal which overlooked the legal position that Janardhan had become the deemed purchaser on April 1, 1957.
Janardhan died on November 29, 1976 leaving respondent his son as the sole heir.
After the death of Janardhan an enquiry was commenced to ascertain whether Janardhan the deceased tenant had already become the deemed purchaser on April 1, 1957 and that all the subsequent proceedings were Abington void.
There were some proceedings in between u/s 84 which are hardly relevant The Tribunal went into the matter in depth, examined all proviso orders and finally reached an affirmative conclusion that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the recorded landlord and being under no disability and Janardhan being tenant of the land, by operation of law, Janardhan become the deemed purchaser and all subsequent proceedings were null, void and non est.
The Tribunal accordingly determined the purchase price.
The present petitioners after unsuccessfully appealing to the Assistant Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal u/s 76 of the Tenancy Act, reached the High Court under Article 2 27, 243 A parallel proceeding was initiated by the respondent u/s 84 of the Tenancy Act for recovery of possession which was illegally taken from him.
The Assistant Collector held that occupation of the suit land by the petitioners was contrary to the provisions of law as Janardhan had already become the deemed purchaser and no title could be acquired by the petitioners from the sale by Ashoklal and therefore the respondent is entitled to recover possession.
The direction was issued to hared over possession to the respondent.
This order was confirmed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in Revision as per its judgment dated July 16, 1973.
Two petitions were moved by transferee petitioners in the High Court of Bombay against two orders one of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in a proceeding u/s 32 G and another in a proceeding u/s 84 against the present respondent.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court by a common judgment dismissed bottle the petitions of the petitioners holding that as Janardhan had become the deemed purchaser on the tillers ' day i. e. April 1, 1957 all subsequent proceedings u/s 32 F were ab initio void and without jurisdiction and nullity is the eyes of law.
The High Court also held that the petitioners acquired no title under the purported sale by Ashoklal because Ashoklal had no title to the land have receiving the purchase price from Janardhan or his heir as determined u/s 32 G.
The High Court accordingly dismissed both the petitions with costs.
Hence these two appeals by special leave.
Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned counsel appearing for the appellants strenuously urged that the orders made by the Tribunal u/s 32 F and by the Tenancy Aval Karkoon in a proceeding u/s 14 read with sec.
29 of the Tenancy Act and the statement of Janardhan and the respondent would clearly show that these orders were at best erroneous but not void and cannot be ignored as nullity in subsequent proceedings.
The Tenancy Act was comprehensively amended by Amending Act IS of 1957.
The amendment brought in a revolutionary measure of agrarian reforms making tiller of the soil the owner of the land.
This was done to achieve the object of removing all intermediaries between tillers of the soil and the State.
32 provides that by mere operation of law, every tenant of agricultural land situated in the area to which the Act applies shall become by the operation of law, the owner thereof.
He is declared to be a deemed purchaser without anything more on his part.
A Constitution Bench of this 244 Court in Sri Ram Narain Medhi vs The State of Bombay(1) held that: "the title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers ' day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant.
The title of the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers ' day and this title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or commit default in payment of the price thereto as determined by the Tribunal.
" Therefore, it is unquestionably established that on the tillers ' day, the landlord 's interest in the land gets extinguished and simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or created in the tenant.
That very moment landlord tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end.
The link and chain is broken.
The absent non cultivating landlord ceases to have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof This is unquestionable.
The landlord from the date of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal u/s 32 G.
In other words, the landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and comes in direct contact with the State.
Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser.
It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant.
Tarachand landlord was under no disability as envisaged by sec. 32 F. Therefore on April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser.
and Mr. Lalit could not controvert this position.
If Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on tillers ' day, the relationship of landlord and tenant between Tarachand and Janardhan came to be extinguished and no right could be claimed either by Tarachand or anyone claiming through him such as Ashoklal or the present purchasers on the footing that they are the 245 Owners of the land on or after April 1, 1957.
This basic fact is A incontrovertible.
It may be mentioned that sec.
32 F has no application to the facts of this case.
Section 32 F postponed the date of compulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability on the tillers ' day.
32 F bas an overriding effect over section 32 as it opens with a non obstante clause.
The combined effect of sec.
32 F and 32 would show that where the landlord is under no disability as envisaged by sec.
32 F the tenant of such landlord by operation of law would become the deemed purchaser but where the landlord is of a class or category as set out in sec.
32 F such as a minor, a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the date of compulsory sale would be postponed as therein provided.
Now, if Tarachand, the landlord was under no disability and he was alive on April 1, 1957 and he was the owner, his tenant Janardhan became the deemed purchaser.
This conclusion, in our opinion, is unassailable.
If Janardhan became the owner on April 1, 1957 all subsequent proceedings in which the Tribunal held that the date of purchase was postponed because the recorded owner Ashoklal was a minor were without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal had absolutely no jurisdiction to proceed on the footing that the date of sale was postponed.
It is neither an incorrect order nor an erroneous order as was sought to be made out but Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to proceed section 32 F because when the proceedings section 32 F were commenced, Janardhan had long since become the deemed purchaser.
Therefore all sub sequent proceedings were an initio void and without jurisdiction and the High Court was right in holding that orders passed therein were nullity.
The attempt to overcome this position by urging that the order was erroneous was rightly repelled by the High Court holding that the orders were null and void, proceeding on an erroneous assumption of jurisdictional fact that the recorded owner was a minor on the tillers day.
When a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction clutches at a jurisdiction by ignoring a statutory provision and its consequences in law on the status of parties or by a decision wholly unwarranted, with regard to the jurisdictional fact, its decision is a nullity and can be set up in collateral proceeding.
The Tribunal clutched at a jurisdiction not vested in it and in such a situation it cannot be 246 disputed that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to entertain any A proceeding purporting to be between landlord and tenant on the erroneous assumption that tenant was still a tenant though he had long since become the deemed purchaser.
The tenant has ceased to be a tenant much prior to the orders passed by the Tribunal on April 24, 1961 and July 13, 1967 holding that the date of compulsory purchase was postponed.
The compulsory purchase by the operation of law had taken place as early as April 1, 1957 and that legal position cannot be wished away.
Mr. Lalit, however, contended that the statement of Janardhan in the proceeding u/s 14 read with sec.
29 of the Tenancy Act stating that he had become old and was unable to cultivate the land and he is willing to hand over possession would estop the respondent from contending to the contrary.
It was further urged that respondent himself was present on the date on which Janardhan gave his statement on October S, 1967 and he concurred with the statement of Janardhan.
We are not unaware of the landed gentry exercising such influence over the tenants that in the absence of legal literacy they may make any statement contrary to their legally protected interest.
A measure of agrarian reform cannot be permitted to be defeated by such devious means of the landlords.
However apart from ignorance of his position assuming that Janardhan relinquished his right as tenant, landlord Ashoklal was nontheless not entitled to recover possession because, when Janardhan, the deemed purchaser agreed to hand over possession subject to the provision of sec.
IS, the land would be at the disposal of Collector under sec.
32 P. Landlord even in such a situation is not entitled to be restored to possession without bringing his case under sec.
15 which appears not to be the case of landlord.
And look at the bona fides of the landlord.
Ashoklal as soon as he managed to obtain wholly void order for possession, managed to transfer the lands to the petitioners within a span of less than 2 weeks.
It would thus appear that even Ashoklal and his next friend must be presumably aware of the void character of the order and therefore posthaste with a view to thwarting any further legal proceeding and confuse Janardhan, Ashoklal through his next friend managed to transfer the land to the petitioners and let the petitioners fight the deemed purchaser.
A measure whereby tenant was to be made the owner of the land cannot be permitted to be defeated by such jugglery of orders by low level revenue officers who hardly knew what they were doing.
Look at the lack of knowledge of law of the Tribunal.
While overlooking the relevant date, and it took into account the subsequent date which was wholly irrelevant and impermissible.
Though 247 landlord Tarachand had died much after 1.4.1957 in proceeding u/s 32 G minor Ashoklal whose name was mutated on death of A Tarachand, the authority declared the sale having been postponed even though statute had already operated and sale taken place.
Can a statutory Tribunal charged with a duty to implement the law betray such total lack of knowledge so as to be counter productive ? Same is the case with the decision of Tenancy Aval Karkoon.
A proceeding u/s 14 read with sec.
29 of the Tenancy Act, started on the footing that the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted should have been thrown out at the threshold because a decade back the then tenant Janardhan had become the deemed purchaser.
Therefore these orders were wholly null and void and hence non est and cannot thwart subsequent proceedings.
The nullity can be set up in subsequent proceedings.
Janardhan was deprived of his possession by an order which had no legal sanction.
He was deprived of possession on the footing that he was a tenant ignoring and overlooking the statutory event that he had become the owner.
Even when the Legislature passed such a revolutionary measure its knowledge was not transmitted to the persons for whose benefit the measure was enacted and there was no awakening to one 's right.
Undoubtedly, a communication gap and for want of legal literacy Janardhan was taken on a joy ride and was illegally made to part with possession.
Subsequently everyone realised the blunder committed by them and therefore when the proceedings started on the notice given by Janardhan, the Tribunal determined the price.
Appeal of the petitioners to Assistant Collector failed, revision petition to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at the instance of the petitioners failed so also the writ petition u/s 227 of the petitioners failed.
All authorities concurrently held that Janardhan had become the owner and the Tribunal was right in determining the price.
The authority u/s 84 held that petitioners were not entitled to retain possession as their occupation was contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and they had acquired no title to the land by the purported sale by Ashoklal.
The direction for restoring possession to Janardhan was rightly given.
A revision petition and a writ petition to the High Court at the instance of the petitioners failed.
248 We find that the High Court was right in rejecting both the A petitions.
These were all the contentions in this appeal and as we find no merit in it, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
When this Court issued notice, appellants were directed to deposit Rs. 1500 for costs of respondent.
Respondent came here in rags and urged that he was too poor to engage a counsel.
We therefore direct that the amount of Rs. 1500 deposited in this Court by appellants be paid to respondent.
We record our appreciation of assistance to the Court by Mr. Jitendra Sharma who appeared amicus curie at the request made by the Court while granting special leave.
He should withdraw the amount and take all steps to pay the same to the respondent.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended from time to time provided that on the 1st day of April, 1957 styled as the "tiller 's day" every tenant shall subject to other provisions of the next succeeding sections be deemed to have purchased from his landlord free from all encumbrance subsisting thereon, on the said date the land held by him as a tenant if other conditions of the section are satisfied.
By operation of this law, one Janardhan, the father of the respondent, became the "deemed purchaser" effective from April 1,1957, of the land bearing survey No. 1052 and F measuring 16 acres situated within the revenue limits of village Sonai Taluka Nawasa, District Ahmednagar which belonged to Tarachand Chopra.
Subsequent to this admitted fact, several incidents took place which have led to the present appeal raising the question of the legal effect of the several steps taken by different persons; ignorant of the factum of Janardhan having become the deemed purchaser".
They are (a) Landlord Tarachand died on August 12,1959, after two and a quarter years after Janardhan became the statutory purchaser; (ii) Tarachand executed a will, before his death, bequeathing the suit land to Ashoklal Gugale, a minor; (iii) the revenue authorities, who must be aware of the provisions of the Act, wrongly mutated the name of Ashoklal in the revenue records as the landlord in terms of the will; (iv) in spite of the mandatory duty imposed upon the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, under Section 32G, to issue notice to all tenants who under section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands, all landlords of such lands and all other persons interested to appear before 238 it for the determination of the price of the land which is the subject matter of compulsory purchase, strangely accepted the plea for the postponement of the inquiry under section 32F of the Act and later again commenced the proceedings in the year 1967 and concluded the proceedings by its order dated July 13 1967 repeating the jurisdictional errors; (v) in the interregnum, Ashoklal through his next friend commenced proceedings in case No. 36 of 1967 in the Court of Tenancy Aval Karkoon for the recovery of the possession; (vi) the Tenancy Aval Karkoon, not only entertained the petition, but also got recorded two statements, on 5.10.1967, from Janardhan, "the deemed purchaser" to the effect that he had no objection to handing over the possession of the land to the landlord as he was old and could not cultivate the land personally and another from the present respondent to the same effect even though in the life time of his father Janardhan, he had no title to the land involved in the dispute, and, thereafter made the order dated October 6, 1967 exacting Janardhan from the land; (vii) this wholly null and void order enabled the minor landlord to sell the land by a registered deed on November 13, 1967 to one Haribhav and another, the former later transferred his interest in favour of some of the petitioners before the High Court; (viii) On October 6, 1971, Janardhan moved the Tribunal under section 32F of the Act to the effect that as the landlord Ashoklal had attained majority he was entitled to purchase the land; (ix) the Tribunal started the proceedings under section 32G and after bringing the present respondent on record due to the demise of Janardhan on November 29, 1976, went into the matter in depth, examined all previous orders and came to the conclusion that Janardhan having become the "deemed purchaser. ' all subsequent.
proceedings were null and void, which was affirmed by tho Assistant Collector, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the High Court later; (x) a parallel proceeding initiated by the respondent for the recovery of possession was decided in his favour by all Courts including the High Court Dismissing the appeals by the special leave, the Court ^ HELD: 1:1 on the tiller 's day, the landlord 's interest in the land gets extinguished and simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or created in the tenant.
That very moment landlord tenant relationship as understood ill common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end, the link and chain is broken.
The absent non cultivating landlord ceases to have that ownership element on the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof.
This is unquestionable, the landlord from the date of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal under section 32G.
In other words, landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and comes in direct contact with the state.
Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser.
It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant Tarachand landlord was under no disability as envisaged by Section 32F. Therefore or April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser.
[244 C G] 239 Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs State of Bombay, [1959] Supp.
I S.C.R. 489 @ 518 followed.
If, in the instant case., Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on tillers ' day, the relationship of landlord and tenant between Tarachand and Janardhan came to be extinguished and no right could be claimed either by Tarachand or anyone claiming through him such as Ashoklal or the present purchasers on the footing that they are the owners of the land on or after April 1, 1957.
[244 G H, 245 A] 2:1.
Section 32F of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, has no application to the facts of the ease.
Section 32F postponed the date of compulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability on the tillers ' day.
Section 32F has an overriding effect over Section 32 as it opens with a non obstante clause.
The combined effect of Section 32F and 32 would show that there the landlord is under no disability as envisaged by Section 32F the tenant of such landlord by operation of law would become the deemed purchaser but where the landlord is of a class or category as set out in section 32F such as a minor, a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the date o, compulsory sale would be postponed as therein provided.
Now, if Tarachand the landlord was under no disability and he was alive on April 1, 1957 and he was the owner, his tenant Janardhan became the deemed purchaser.
[245 A D] 2:2.
If Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on April 1, 1957 all subsequent proceedings in which the Tribunal held that the date of purchase was postponed because the recorded owner Ashoklal was a minor were without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal had absolutely no jurisdiction to proceed on the footing that date of sale was postponed.
It is neither an incorrect order nor an erroneous order as was sought to be made out but Tribunal lacked tho jurisdiction to proceed under section 32F because when the proceedings under Section 32F were commenced, Janardhan had long since become the deemed purchaser.
Therefore all subsequent proceedings were ab initio void and without jurisdiction.
[245 D F] 2:3.
When a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction clutches at a jurisdiction by ignoring a statutory provision and its consequences in law on the status of parties or by a decision wholly unwarranted with regard to the jurisdictional fact, its decision is a nullity and can be set up in collateral proceeding.
The Tribunal clutched at a jurisdiction not vested in it and in such a situation it can not be disputed that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding purporting to be between landlord and tenant on the erroneous assumption that tenant was still a tenant though he had long since become the deemed purchaser, The tenant has ceased to be a tenant much prior to the orders passed by the Tribunal on April 24, 1961 and July 13, 1967 holding that the date of compulsory purchase was postponed.
The compulsory purchase by the operation of law had taken place as early as April 1, 1957 and that legal position cannot be wished away.
[245 F H, 246 A Bl 240 3:1 When several orders passed by different authorities are wholly null and void and hence non est, such orders cannot thwart subsequent proceedings.
The nullity can be set up in subsequent proceedings.
The plea of estoppel by conduct also cannot be allowed to be raised, since a measure of agrarian reform cannot be permitted to be defeated by such devious means of the landlords trying to take advantage of any statement made contrary to their legally protected interest, in the absence of legal literacy and by such jugglery of orders of low level revenue officers who hardly knew what they were doing.
[246 C H, 247 G] 3:2.
In the instant case, even assuming Janardhan relinquished his right as a tenant, even then Ashoklal cannot recover possession as the land would be at the disposal of the Collector under Section 32P.
Further, the posthaste steps taken by Ashoklal and others in transferring the lands to several others speak of malafides of the landlord.
[246E F]