Input:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 483 of 1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22 3 1979 of the Patna High Court in Crl.
A. No. 356 and 407/73.
B. P. Singh and L. R. Singh for the Appellants.
section N. Jha and U. P. Singh for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.
We have heard the arguments of appellants ' counsel with specific reference to Munni Marandi and Babua Marandi the appellants herein.
We have also read through the evidence relating to these accused persons aided by counsel for the State.
The role attributed to Munni Marandi is that he was a member of the crowd which chased the deceased and in that sense was liable under Section 149 read with 326 I.P.C.
We cannot fault the High Court for the conviction rendered, but having due regard to the age of the accused and to the absence of any overt act on his part, we consider that a sentence of two years ' R.I. will, in the circumstances of this case, meet the ends of justice.
588 Babua Marandi, a boy aged 15, was also in the crowd.
In the excited chase of the deceased, this boy also followed and when the actual sword thrust was made by Ranjit Chaudhry, this boy held the deceased.
In this sense, his part is different from that of Munni Marandi.
We are not, therefore, disposed to interfere with his conviction or the sentence.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Babua Marandi was aged 15 years at time of the offence.
It is regrettable and this Court has pointed this out more than once that there is no Children Act in Bihar, and in this International Year of the Child we have to emphasize that the Legislature is expected to do its duty by the children of Bihar by considering the passing of a measure like the Children Act which long ago had been circulated by the Central Government and which exists in some other states in the country.
Be that as it may, we are unable to deal with Babua Marandi as a child for the simple reason that absence of legislation cannot be made up for by Judicial legislation.
All that we can do, in the hapless circumstances of the case and in the helpless situation of legislative vacuum, is to direct that Babua Marandi be placed either in an open prison or in a model prison or any other prison available in the State where young offenders are kept apart from the adult offenders.
The special reason which induces us to make this direction is that, as is well known, adolescents should be separated from adults in prison campuses.
The vices are obvious and we, therefore, direct accordingly.
V.D.K. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court ^ HELD: 1.
Having due regard to the age of the accused Munni Marandi and to the absence of any overt act, a sentence of two years R.I. would, in the circumstances of his case meet the ends of justice for the offence u/s 149 read with Section 326 I.P.C. [587 G H] 2.
Absence of legislation cannot be made up for by judicial legislation, Babua Marandi was aged 15 years at the time of the offence and there is no Children Act in Bihar.
Though the conviction or sentence cannot be interfered with, in the hapless circumstances of the case and in the helpless situation of legislative vacuum all that this Court can do is to direct that Babua Marandi be placed either in an open prison or in a model prison or any other prison available in the State where young offenders are kept apart from the adult offenders.
The special directions for doing so is that adolescents should be separated from adults in prison campuses for obvious reasons.
[588C E]


Input:
Appeal No. 771 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated H May 29, 1964, of the Mysore High Court in Civil Petition No. 90 of 1964.
801 section section Khanduja and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants.
B. R. L. Iyengar, section K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos. 1 to 7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah J.
On May 5, 1964 the respondents hereinafter called 'the plaintiffs ' instituted in the High Court of Mysore an action in the nature of a passing off action against the appellants hereinafter called 'the defendants for a declaration that they "are exclusive owners of the trade mark consisting of the letters R.S.F. and No. 806", for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from passing off their washing soap as the goods of the plaintiffs and for incidental reliefs.
By section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958 a passing off action whether the trade mark is registered or unregistered may be instituted in any court not inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.
It appears that on May 5, 1964 the District Court of Mysore, within the territorial limits of which the cause of action was alleged to have arisen, was closed for the summer vacation, and it is common ground that on that day there was no Judge functioning in the District Court who was on duty and competent to exercise the powers of the District Court.
At the request of the plaintiffs the High Court entertained the plaint and also an application for interim injunction restraining "the defendants their agents or servants from using the trade mark R.S.F. on washing soap manufactured by them and from selling washing soap bearing the said offending mark pending disposal of the case.
" By order dated May 29, 1964 the High Court granted the temporary injunction in terms of the prayer in the application.
In this appeal with special leave, counsel for the defendants argues that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action instituted by the plaintiffs and had no power to make an order issuing a temporary injunction.
The action, as framed, could properly be instituted in the District Court.
The expression "District Court" has by virtue of section 2(e) of Act 43 of 1958 the meaning assigned to that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Section 2(4) of the Code defines a "district" as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil court called the District Court and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court.
If therefore a High Court is 802 possessed of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it would, when exercising that jurisdiction be included, for the purpose of Act 43 of 1958, in the expression "District Court".
Exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court of Mysore is governed by Mysore Act 5 of 1962.
The Act is purely a regulatory Act enacted for regulating the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court in relation to the administration of justice : it does not purport to confer upon the High Court any jurisdiction original or appellate.
It is true that by section 12 of the Mysore High Court Act 1 of 1884 enacted by the Maharaja of Mysore to amend the constitution of the High Court of Mysore, and to provide for the administration of justice by that Court, the Government of Mysore was authorised by notification to invest the High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a District Court in all suits of a civil nature exercisable within such local limits as the Government may from time to time declare and appoint in that behalf.
But section 12 of the Mysore Act 1 of 1884 has been repealed by section 14 of Mysore Act 5 of 1962.
The High Court of Mysore is by its constitution primarily a court exercising appellate jurisdiction : it is competent to exercise original jurisdiction only in those matters in respect of which by special Acts it has been specifically invested with jurisdiction.
The High Court is competent to exercise original jurisdiction under section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958 if it is invested with the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a District Court, and not otherwise, and the High Court of Mysore not being invested by any statute of under its constitution with that jurisdiction was incompetent to entertain a passing off action.
But it was urged that in a State the High Court is at the apex of the hierarchy of civil courts and has all the powers which the subordinate courts may exercise, and it is competent to entertain all actions as a court of original jurisdiction which may lie in any court in the State.
For this exalted claim, there is no warrant in our jurisprudence.
Jurisdiction of a Court means the extent of the authority of a Court to administer justice prescribed with reference to the subject matter, pecuniary value and local limits.
Barring cases in which jurisdiction is expressly conferred upon it by special statutes, e.g. the Companies Act; the Banking Companies Act, the High Court of Mysore exercises appellate jurisdiction alone.
As a Court of Appeal it undoubtedly stands at the apex within the State, but on that account it does not stand invested with original jurisdiction in matters not expressly declared within its cognizance.
803 Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which counsel for the plaintiffs relied lends no assistance to his argument.
Among the powers conferred upon a High Court by section 24 Code of Civil Procedure, there is enumerated the power to withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding in any Court subordinate to it, and to try or dispose of the same : [section 24(1) (b) (i)].
But jurisdiction to try a suit, appeal or proceeding by a High Court under the power reserved by section 24(1) (b) (i) arises only if the suit, appeal or proceeding is properly instituted in a court subordinate to the High Court, and the suit, appeal or proceeding is in exercise of the power of the High Court transferred to it.
Exercise of this jurisdiction is conditioned by the lawful institution of the proceeding in a subordinate court of competent jurisdiction, and transfer thereof to the High Court.
Power to try and dispose of a proceeding after transfer from a court lawfully seized of it does not involve a power to entertain a proceeding which is not otherwise within the cognizance of the High Court.
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure preserves the in herent power of the Court as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
That power may be exercised where there is a proceeding lawfully before the High Court : it does not however authorise the High Court to invest itself with jurisdiction where it is not conferred by law.
Reliance was sought to be placed upon the summary of a judgment dated June 6, 1962 in a case decided by Narayana Pai, J : Kaverappa vs Narayanaswamy, which is found printed under the heading "Short Notes of Recent Decision" in the Mysore Law Journal (1962) at p. 1.
The learned Judge is reported to have observed that section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure "read along with section 151 which preserves to the High Court all inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for ends of justice necessarily implies that whenever an extraordinary situation so requires, a High Court may confer original jurisdiction upon itself to do or protect ends of justice".
It does not appear that the judgment is reported in any series of reports authorised or unauthorised, and we have not been supplied with a copy of the original judgment.
But if the learned Judge, as reported in the summary of the judgment, was of the opinion that the High Court is competent to assume to itself jurisdiction Which it does not otherwise possess, merely because an "extraordinary situation" has arisen, with respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to approve of that view.
By "jurisdiction" is meant the extent of the power Which is conferred upon the Court by its constitution to try a proceeding; its exercise 804 cannot be enlarged because what the learned Judge calls an extraordinary situation "requires" the Court to exercise it.
The appeal must therefore be allowed.
Temporary injunction granted by the High Court is vacated and the plaint is ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper Court.
As before the High Court, no objection was raised about the maintainability of the suit or the application for injunction, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
Appeal allowed.

Output:
The respondents instituted a passing off action in the High Court of Mysore for a declaration that they were exclusive owners of a certain trade mark and for a permanent injunction restraining the appellants from passing off their goods as that of respondents.
By section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Mark Act such an action may be instituted in any court not inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.
It appears that on the day the suit was instituted the District Court was closed and there was no Judge functioning in the District Court who was on duty and competent to exercise the powers of the District Court.
The High Court entertained the plaint and granted temporary injunction.
In appeal by special leave : HELD:(i) The High Court of Mysore is by its constitution primarily a court exercising appellate jurisdiction; it is competent to exercise original jurisdiction only in those matters in respect of which by special Acts it has been specifically invested with jurisdiction.
It would be competent to exercise original jurisdiction under section 105 of the Act if it was invested with ordinary original jurisdiction of a District Court and not otherwise.
[802 D F] As a Court of appeal it undoubtedly stands at the apex within the State, but on that account it does not stand invested with original jurisdiction in matters not expressly declared within its cognizance.
[802 H] (ii) Power under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to try and dispose of a proceeding after transfer from a court lawfully seized of it does not involve a power to entertain a proceeding which is not otherwise within the cognizance of the High Court.
[803 C D] (iii) Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure preserves the inherent powers of the Court, but it does not authorise the High Court to invest itself with jurisdiction where the jurisdiction is not conferred by law.
[803 D E] (iv) By "jurisdiction" is meant the extent of the power which is conferred upon the court by its constitution to try a proceeding : its exercise cannot be enlarged because an extraordinary situation "requires" the court to exercise it.
[803 H 804 A]


Input:
: Criminal Appeal Nos 485 & 486 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.8.
1990 of the Bombay High Court in Crl.
W.P. Nos. 530 and 53 1 of the 1990.
R.K. Jain and V.V. Vaze (For the State), Maqsood Khan, R.S.M. Verma, S.A. Syed, M.T. Khan and A.S. Bhasme (For the State) for the Appellants.
A. Subba Rao, A.D.N. Rao and Ms. Sushma Suri for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J.
Special leave granted.
The events leading to the filing of these two appeals, briefly stated, are that on the afternoon of March 25, 1990, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence being in possession of information intercepted a motor car at about 3.45 p.m. driven by the appellant Amir Shad Khan with the appellant Aziz Ahmad Khan as his compa 448 nion.
On search of the vehicle 1400 gold bars were recov ered.
The statements of the two appellants were recorded and thereafter they were formally arrested on March 28, 1990 and produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay.
The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate granted remand.
While the matter was under investigation a proposal was made to the first respondent.
Secretary (Preventive Detention), Govern ment of Maharashtra for invoking the powers conferred on him by Section 3 of the (hereinafter called 'the Act ').
On the very next day after the receipt of the proposal the first respondent passed the impugned orders of detention against the two appellants.
These orders were passed under sub section (1) of section 3 of the Act with a view to preventing the appellants from smuggling goods and engaging in transporting, keeping and concealing the same.
After these detention orders were passed on April 24, 1990 they were served on the appellants along with the grounds of detention and basic documents on which reliance was placed.
By clauses (iii), (iv) and (v) of paragraph 43 of the grounds of detention the appellants were informed that they had a right to make a representation to (i) the State Gov ernment; (ii) the Central Government; and (iii) the Advisory Board against the detention orders, if they so desired.
It was further stated that the representation to the State Government should be addressed to the Minister of State for Home Mantralaya, Bombay.
They were informed that to facili tate expeditious consideration thereof the Superintendent of Jails may be requested to forward the same to the detaining authority so that the Home Department can put up the case to the Minister for consideration.
It was further stated that ' the representation to the Central Government may be ad dressed to the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), New Delhi through the Superintendent of Jail.
In the case of the Advisory Board the appellants were informed that the representation may be addressed to the Chairman, Advisory Board constituted under the Act and may be forwarded through the Superintendent of Jail.
On the basis of this advice contained in the grounds of detention the appellants preferred a representation addressed to the Detaining Authority and forwarded it through the Superintendent of Jail, Arther Road Central Prison, Bombay.
It is not necessary to state the various grounds made out in the representation for the revocation of the detention orders but it would suffice to reproduce the last paragraph of the representation.
That paragraph reads as under: "I would also like to request you that the copies of these representations be sent to the State and Central Govern 449 ment for their kind consideration in view of the above facts so as to revoke and/or set aside my order of detention and order my release forth with.
" It is not disputed that the representation was considered and rejected by the State GoVernment.
It was, however, not forwarded to the Central Government and hence the Central Government had no occasion to consider the representation of the appellants for the revocation of the detention orders.
As the detention orders were not revoked the appellants preferred separate habeas corpus writ petitions which were numbered Criminal Writ Petitions Nos.
530 31 of 1991 in the High Court of Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court on a detailed consideration of the various contentions raised by the appellants dismissed both the writ petitions.
On the question whether the detention orders were vitiated as the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government had failed to forward their representations to the Central Government, the High Court answered in the negative for the reason that the detenus who had failed to follow the clear and specific instructions given in the grounds of detention regarding the manner and mode of ad dress to various authorities could not be allowed to reap the benefit of their own default.
On the question whether the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution was violated, the High Court observed as under: "So far we have not come across any authority of this court or of the Supreme Court wherein it has been ruled that despite this express communication to the detenu, if the detenu makes any representation, the Detaining Authority is under obligation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to take out xerox copies of the same and forward to the State Government or the Central Government.
We are afraid, we cannot infer such obligation on the Detaining Authority or the State Govern ment under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
But, however, it is advisable that upon re ceipt of such representation from the detenu, the Detaining Authority may immediately inform the detenu about the procedure that he has to follow in forwarding representations to the State Government, the Central Government or the Advisory Board against the order of deten tion.
" It is this view of the High Court which was vehemently challenged before us by learned counsel for the appellants.
In support of his contention counsel placed strong reliance on four decisions of this 450 Court reported in (i) Razia Umar Bakshi vs Union of India & Ors., ; (ii) Rattan Singh vs State of Punjab & Ors.
, ; (iii) Sat Pal vs State of Punjab & Ors., and (iv) Smt.
Gracy vs State of Kerala & Anr., JT On the other hand counsel for the State Government as well as the Central Government supported the view taken by the High Court and contended that the appellants cannot make a grievance if they have despite a clear direction in the grounds of deten tion chosen to deviate therefrom.
Once the procedure estab lished by law is followed by the respondents the failure on the part of the Detaining Authority or the State Government to accede to the request made by the appellants in the last paragraph of their representation to take out copies thereof and forward the same to the Central Government cannot viti ate the detention order.
It was further pointed out that a subsequent representation dated June 5, 1990 made to the Central Government was considered with despatch and was rejected on June 12, 1990.
We may at this stage state that we are not concerned with the subsequent representation.
The point which we have been called upon to consider is whether failure on the part of the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government to accede to the request of the appel lants to take out copies of the representations and forward the same to the Central Government for consideration has resulted in violation of their constitutional/statutory right to have their representation considered by the Central Government, and if yes, whether the detention orders are liable to be quashed on that ground.
The law of preventive detention is harsh to the person detained and, therefore, there can be no doubt that it must be strictly construed.
Article 22(3)(b) denies to a person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention the protection of clauses (1) and (2) of the said Article.
Clause (4) thereof enjoins that the preventive detention law must conform to the limitations set out thereunder.
Clause (5) of Article 22 reads as under: "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
" This clause casts a dual obligation on the Detaining Author ity, namely, (i) to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the 451 detention order has been made; and (ii) to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order.
Consequently the failure to communicate the grounds promptly or to afford the detenu an opportunity of making a representation against the order would clearly violate the constitutional guarantee afforded to the detenu by clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitu tion.
It is by virtue of this right conferred on the detenu that the Detaining Authority considers it a duty to inform the appellant detenu of his right to make a representation to the State Government, the Central Government and the Advisory Board.
The right to make a representation against the detention order thus flows from the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 22(5) which casts an obliga tion on the authority to ensure that the detenu is afforded an earliest opportunity to exercise that right, if he so desires.
The necessity of casting a dual obligation on the authority making the detention order is obviously to ac quaint the detenu of what had weighed with the Detaining Authority for exercising the extraordinary powers of deten tion without trial conferred by section 3(1) of the Act and to give the detenu an opportunity to point out any error in the exercise of that power so that the said authority gets an opportunity to undo the harm done by it, if at all, by correcting the error at the earliest point of time.
Once it is realised that Article 22(5) confers a right of represen tation, the next question is to whom must the representation be made.
The grounds of detention clearly inform the detenu that he can make a representation to the State Government, the Central Government as well as the Advisory Board.
There can be no doubt that the representation must be made to the authority which has the power to rescind or revoke the decision, if need be.
Our search for the authority must, therefore, take us to the statute since the answer cannot be found from Article 22(5) of the Constitution read in isola tion.
As pointed out earlier that clause casts an obligation on the authority making the detention order to afford to the detenu an earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention order.
If we are to go by the state ment in the grounds of detention our search for that author ity would end since the grounds of detention themselves state the authorities to which the representation must be made.
The question must be answered in the context of the relevant provisions of the law.
Now as stated earlier by clause (5) of Article 22 a dual obligation is cast on the authority making the detention order one on which is to afford to the detenu an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order which obligation has been met by informing the detenu in the grounds of detention to whom his representation should be addressed.
But the author ity to which the representation is addressed must have statutory backing.
In 452 order to trace the source for the statutory backing it would be advantageous to notice the scheme of the Act providing for preventive detention.
Section 2(b) defines a detention order to mean an order made under section 3.
Sub section (1) of section 3 empowers the Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empow ered for the purposes of this section by that Government, to make an order of detention with respect to any person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from doing any one of the five prejudicial acts enumerated thereunder.
Subsection (2) of that section provides that when any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order.
It is evident from this provision that whenev er a detention order is made by the State Government or its officer specially empowered for that purpose an obligation is cast on the State Government to forward a report to the Central Government in respect of that order within ten days.
The purpose of this provision is clearly to enable the Central Government to keep an eye on the exercise of power under section 3(1) by the State Government or its officer.
Then comes sub section (3) which reads as under: "For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circum stances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.
" This provision is clearly intended to meet the obligation cast by Article 22(5) that the grounds of detention shall be communicated 'as soon as may be '.
The legislation has, therefore, fixed the outer limit within which the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu.
Thus the first part of the obligation cast by Article 22(5) is met by section 3(3) of the Act.
Section 8 provides for the Consti tution of Advisory Boards.
This section is clearly to meet the obligation of 453 sub clause (a) of clause 4 and sub clause (c) of clause 7 of Article 22 of the Constitution.
Section 8(f) which has some relevance provides that in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Govern ment may confirm the detention order and continue the deten tion of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Govern ment shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith.
This provision clearly obliges the appropriate Government to order revocation of the detention order if the Advisory Board reports want of sufficient cause for detention of that person.
Then comes section 11 which reads as under: "Revocation of detention orders (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the , a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Gov ernment.
(b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government.
" Sub section (2) is not relevant for our purpose.
It is obvious from a plain reading of the two clauses of sub section (1) of section 11 that where an order is made by an officer of the State Government, the State Government as well as the Central Government are empowered to revoke the detention order.
Where, however, the detention order is passed by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government, the Central Government is empowered to revoke the detention order.
Now this provision is clearly without prejudice to section 21 of the which lays down that where by any Central Act a power to issue orders is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to rescind any order so issued.
Plainly the authority which has passed the order under any Central Act is empowered by this provision to rescind the order in like manner.
This provision when read in the context of section 11 of the Act makes it 454 clear that the power to rescind conferred on the authority making the detention order by section 21 of the is saved and is not taken away.
Under section 11 an officer of the State Government or that of the Central Government specially empowered under section 3(1) of the Act to make a detention order is not conferred the power to revoke it; that power for those officers has to be traced to section 21 of the .
Therefore, where an officer of the State Government or the Central Government has passed any detention order and on receipt of a represen tation he is convinced that the detention order needs to be revoked he can do so by virtue of section 21 of the since section 11 of the Act does not entitle him to do so.
If the State Government passes an order of deten tion and later desires to revoke it, whether upon receipt of a representation from the detenu or otherwise, it would be entitled to do so under section 21 of the but if the Central Government desires to revoke any order passed by the State Government or its officer it can do so only under clause (b) of Section 11(1) of the Act and not under section 21 of the .
This clari fies why the power under section 11 is conferred without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the .
Thus on a conjoint reading of section 21 of the and section 11 of the Act it becomes clear that the power of revocation can be exercised by three authorities, namely, the officer of the State Government or the Central Government, the State Government as well as the Central Government.
The power of revocation conferred by section 8(f) on the appropriate Government is clearly inde pendent of this power.
It is thus clear that section 8(f) of the Act satisfies the requirement of Article 22(4) whereas section 11 of the Act satisfies the requirement of the latter part of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The statu tory provisions, therefore, when read in the context of the relevant clauses of Article 22, make it clear that they are intended to satisfy the constitutional requirements and provide for enforcement of the right conferred on the detenu to represent against his detention order.
Viewed in this perspective it cannot be said that the power conferred by section 11 of the Act has no relation whatsoever with the constitutional obligation cast by Article 22(5).
We may now turn to the case law on which reliance was placed.
In Razia Umar 's case, section Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. sitting singly during vacation was concerned with a more or less similar situation.
In that case a detention order was passed by the State Government against which the detenu had made a representation to the said Government.
By that repre sentation he also prayed that his representation may be 455 forwarded to the Central Government for being considered.
That representation was disposed of by the State Government but it was not forwarded to the Central Government, notwith standing the specific prayer of the detenu.
The defence taken was that the detenu had himself sent a copy of his representation to the Central Government and, therefore, the Detaining Authority did not consider it necessary to forward the representation to the Central Government.
The defence of the State Government was held to be wholly unacceptable on the following line of reasoning: "Section 11 of the Act confers a constitution al right on the detenu to have his representa tion considered by the Central Government.
It is true that the Central Government has a discretion to revoke or confirm the detention but the detenu has undoubtedly a right that his representation should be considered by the Central Government for whatever worth it is.
The mere fact that the detenu had sent a copy to the Central Government does not absolve the detaining authority from the statutory duty of forwarding the representation to the Central Government." (Emphasis supplied) This observation would show that the power of revocation conferred by section 11 of the Act has a nexus with the fight of representation conferred on the detenu by Article 22(5) and, therefore, the State Government when requested to forward a copy of the representation to the Central Govern ment is under an obligation to do so.
The learned counsel for the appellant further pointed out that our case stands on a stronger footing because, admittedly, the appellants had not forwarded a copy of their representation to the Central Government as in Razia Umar 's case.
The High Court distinguished this decision on the ground that the facts of Razia Umar 's case reveal that the detenu had sent a separate representation to the Detaining Authori ty with a request to forward the same to the State Govern ment and the Central Government whereas in our case only one representation was sent to the Detaining Authority with a request that copies thereof be taken out and sent to the State Government as well as the Central Government for their consideration.
With respect, this distinction has nothing to do with the ratio of the decision; if at all, as rightly pointed out counsel for the appellants, the facts of this case are stronger than those of Razia Umar 's case.
456 In Rattan Singh 's case the facts reveal that the detenu had written a letter to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Amritsar, enclosing therewith two representations one of which was addressed to the Joint Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Punjab, Chandigarh, and the other to the Secretary, Union Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi.
The Jail Superintendent was requested to forward the representations to the State Government as well as the Central Government.
In the counter filed on behalf of the Central Government it was stated that no representation by or on behalf of the detenu had been received by the Central Government.
It was contended that failure to forward the representation to the Central Government and the consequent failure of the Central Government to apply its mind to the representation vitiated the detention order.
This Court held that the detenu was unaccountably deprived of a valuable right to defend and assert his fundamental right to personal liberty.
Chandrachud.
who spoke for the three Judge Bench, observed as under: "But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons de tained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safe guards are not denied to the detenus.
Section 11(1) of COFEPOSA confers upon the Central Government the power to revoke an order of detention even if it is made by the State Government or its officer.
That power, in order to be real and effective, must imply the right in a detenu to make a representation to the Central Government against the order of detention.
The failure in this case on the part either of the Jail Superintendent or the State Government to forward the detenu 's representation to the Central Government has deprived the detenu of the valuable right to have his detention revoked by that Government.
The continued detention of the detenu must, therefore, be held illegal and the detenu set free.
" In taking this view reliance was placed on an earlier deci sion of this Court in Tara Chand vs State of Rajasthan, In Sat Pal 's case also counsel for the detenu had for warded two representations one meant for the Central Govern ment and other for the State Government for exercise of power under section 11 of the Act.
The Jail Superintendent who was requested by a forwarding letter 457 to sent the representations to the appropriate Governments after obtaining the signatures of the detenu thereon for warded them to the Joint Secretary in the State Government with an endorsement that one of them may be forwarded to the Central Government.
The representation of the detenu to the Central Government was not forwarded to that Government by the State Government promptly.
It was; therefore, contended that the detention order was rendered illegal and liable to be quashed.
Dealing with this contention this Court observed that the making of an application for revocation of the order of detention by the Central Government under section 11 of the Act is part of the constitutional right a citizen has against his detention under a law relating to preventive detention.
It was, therefore, observed: "It is, therefore, idle to contend that this State Government had no duty to forward the representation made by the detenu to the Central Government for revocation of his order of detention under section 11 of the Act." In taking this view the Court placed reliance on Rattan Singh 's case Gracy 's case may not be entirely apposite because the question which the court was required to consider in that case was that the representation made to the Advisory Board was not taken into consideration by the Central Government after the papers were laid before it with the opinion of the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause to justify the preventive detention.
That was, therefore, a case in which the representation was very much before the Central Government and it failed to consider the same before con firming and fixing the duration of the detention order.
In that case, therefore, the question for consideration was whether it was incumbent on the part of the Central Govern ment to consider a representation addressed to the Advisory Board notwithstanding its rejection by the Advisory Board.
Such is not the question before us but counsel for the appellants invited our attention to certain observations made in paragraphs 8 and 9 which indicate that the detenu 's right for consideration of his representation by the Central Government flows from Article 22(5), irrespective of the fact whether the representation is addressed to the Detain ing Authority or to the Advisory Board or both.
These obser vations though made in a different fact situation do support the submission made on behalf of the appellants.
But counsel for the respondents argued that the observations were too broadly stated.
It is not necessary for us to examine this contention as the earlier decisions are sufficient to uphold the appellants ' contention.
458 In the case before us the facts.clearly show that the appellants had made a request to the Detaining Authority to take out copies of his representation and forward them to the State Government as well as the Central Government for consideration.
Counsel for the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government contended that no such duty was cast on the said respondents to take out copies and forward them to the Central Government for consideration.
Counsel for the Union of India contended that since no such representation had reached the Central Government there was no question of the Central Government applying its mind thereto and taking a decision thereon.
In support, reliance was placed on Phil lippa Anne Duke vs The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., ; a judgment rendered by O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. sit ting singly.
In that case the two petitioners who were British nationals were detained for smuggling electric equipments and goods secreted in specially made compart ments/cavities of their Mercedez Benz Van.
Representations were presented on their behalf to the Prime Minister of India during her visit to England.
No decision was taken on those representations and hence it was contended that the detention orders deserved to be quashed.
This Court held that representation from whatever source addressed to whoso ever officer of one or other department of the Government cannot be treated as representations under the Act.
It was further held that the Bout De Papier presented to the Prime Minister of India during her visit to Britain and the subse quent reminder addressed to the External Affairs Ministry could not be treated as representations to the Central Government.
It is, therefore, obvious that this decision turned on its special facts and is no authority for the proposition that the Detaining Authority or the State Gov ernment was under no obligation to forward the representa tions to the Central Government.
It must be realised that when a person is placed under detention he has certain handicaps and if he makes a request that a representation prepared by him may be forwarded to the Central Government as well as the State Government for consideration after taking out copies thereof it would be a denial of his right to represent to the Central Government if the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government refuse to accede to his request and omit to forward his representation to the Central Government for consideration.
It is difficult to understand why such a technical and rigid view should be taken by the concerned authorities in matters of personal liberty where a person is kept in preventive detention without trial.
Detenus may be literate or illiter ate, they may have access to legal advice or otherwise, they may or may not be in a position to prepare more than one copy of the 459 representation and if they make a request to the authorities which have the facilities to take out copies to do so and forward them for consideration to the Central Government, would it be just and fair to refuse to do so? In such cir cumstances refusal to accede to their request would be wholly unreasonable and in total disregard of the right conferred on the detenu by Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 11 of the Act.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government were not justified in taking a hyper technical stand that they were under no obligation to take out copies of the representations and forward them to the Central Government.
We think that this approach on the part of the Detaining Authority and the State Government has robbed the appellants of their constitutional right under Article 22(5) read with section 11 of the Act to have their representation considered by the Central Government.
The request of the detenus was not unreasonable On the contrary the action of the Detaining Authority and the State Government was unrea sonable and resulted in a denial of the appellants ' consti tutional right.
The impugned detention orders are, there fore, liable to be quashed.
In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the order of the High Court and quash the detention orders on this single ground.
We direct that both the appellants who are in detention shall be set free at once unless they are required in any other pending matter.
PUNCHHI, J.
I agree to the release of the detenus, but in the facts and circumstances of the case.
I have reserva tions to section 11 of the being treated part of the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
Section 11 of the Act does not confer any constitutional right on the detenu to have his representation thereunder considered as if under Article 22(5), but merely a provision enabling the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be, to revoke or modify detention orders.
Have section 11 of the Act repealed, it causes no affectation to the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
Corre spondingly, section 11 of the Act derives no sustenance from the said Article.
Both operate in mutually exclusive fields, though not as combatants.
Both the detenus may be set free as proposed by my learned brother, A.M. Ahmadi, J. V.P.R. Appeals allowed.

Output:
On March 25, 1990, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence intercepted a motor car driven by the appellant No. 1 with the other appellant as his companion and recovered 1400 gold bars.
The statements of the two appellants were recorded and they were formally arrested on March 28, 1990 and produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who granted re mand.
While the matter was under investigation, a proposal was made to the first respondent Secretary (Preventive Deten tion), Government of Maharashtra for invoking the powers conferred on him by Section 3 of the .
On the very next day after the receipt of the proposal the first respondent passed the orders of detention against the two appellants under sub section (1) of section 3 of the Act.
After these detention orders were passed on April 24, 1990 they were served on the appellants along with the grounds of detention and basic documents on which reliance was placed.
The appellants were informed that they had a right to make a representation to (i) the State 444 Government; (ii) the Central Government; and (iii) the Advisory Board against the detention order, if they so desired.
They were informed that to facilitate expeditious consideration thereof, 'the Superintendent of Jails may be requested to forward the same to the detaining authority.
The appellants preferred a representation addressed to the Detaining Authority and forwarded it through the Superin tendent of Jail.
In the last paragraph of that representa tion a request was made that copies of the representation may be taken out and the same may be forwarded to the State Govt.
and the Central Govt.
The representation was considered and rejected by the State Government.
It was, however, not forwarded to the Central Government and hence the Central Government had no occasion to consider the representation of the appellants for the revocation of the detention orders.
As the detention orders were not revoked the appellants preferred separate habeas corpus writ petitions in the High Court which dismissed both the writ petitions, answering in negative on the question whether the detention orders were vitiated as the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government had failed to forward their representations to the Central Government for the reason that the detenus who had failed to follow the clear and specific instructions given in the grounds of detention regarding the manner and mode of address to various authorities, could not be allowed to reap the benefit of their own default.
This view of the High Court was challenged before this Court by the appellants.
The State Government as well as the Central Government supported the view taken by the High Court contending that the appellants cannot make a grievance if they have despite a clear direction in the grounds of detention chosen to deviate therefrom.
Once the procedure established by law is followed by the respondents the failure on the part of the Detaining Authority or the State Government to accede to the request made by the appellants in the last paragraph of their representations to take out copies thereof and forward the same to the Central Government cannot vitiate the deten tion order.
The Union of India contended that since no representa tion had reached the Central Government there was no ques tion of the Central Government applying its mind thereto and taking a decision thereon.
445 On the question whether failure on the part of the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government to accede to the request of the appellants to take out copies of the representations and forward the same to the Central Government for consideration has resulted in violation of their considerational/statutory right to have their repre sentation considered by the Central Government, and if yes, whether the detention orders are liable to be quashed on that ground, allowing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
The Detaining Authority as well as the State Government were not justified in taking a hypertechnical stand that they were under no obligation to take out copies of the representations and forward them to the Central Government.
Such action of the Detaining Authority and the State Government was unreasonable and resulted in a denial of the appellants ' constitutional right.
The impugned deten tion orders are liable to be quashed and directed that the appellants, who were in detention, to be set free.
[459B E] Per A.M. Ahmadi, J. on his behalf himself and V. Ramas wami, J. 1.
Article 22(3)(b) (5) casts a dual obligation on the Detaining Authority, namely, (i) to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the detention order has been made; and (ii) to afford to the detenu the earliest opportu nity of making a representation against the detention order.
Consequently the failure to communicate the grounds promptly or to afford the detenu an opportunity of making a represen tation against the order would clearly violate the constitu tional guarantee afforded to the detenu by clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution.
It ' is by virtue of this right conferred on the detenu that the Detaining Authority considers it a duty to inform the appellant detenu of his right to make a representation to the State Government, the Central Government and the Advisory Board.
The right to make a representation against the detention order thus flows from the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 22(5) which casts an obligation on the authority to ensure that the detenu is afforded an earliest opportunity to exercise that right, if he so desires.
[450H 451C] 2.
The necessity of casting a dual obligation on the authority making the detention order is obviously to ac quaint the detenu of what had weighed with the Detaining Authority for exercising the extraordinary powers of deten tion without trial conferred by section 3(1) of the Act and to give the detenu an opportunity to point out any error in the exercise of that power so that the said authority gets an opportunity to undo the harm done by it, if at all, by correcting the error at the earliest point of time.
[451C D] 446 3.
Under section 11 an officer of the State Government or that of the Central Government specially empowered under section 3(1) of the Act to make a detention order is not conferred the power to revoke it; that power for those officers has to be traced to section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
Therefore, where an officer of the State Gov ernment or the Central Government has passed any detention order and on receipt of a representation he is convinced that the detention order needs to be revoked he can do so by virtue of section 21 of the General Clauses Act since sec tion 11 of the Act does not entitle him to do so.
[454A C] 4.
If the State Government passes an order of detention and later desires to revoke it, whether upon receipt of a representation from the detenu or otherwise, it would be entitled to do so under section 21 of the General Clauses Act but if the Central Government desires to revoke any order passed by the State Government or its officer it can do so only under clause (b) of Section 11(1) of the Act and not under section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
[454C D] 5.
On a conjoint reading of section 21 of the General Clauses Act and section 11 of the Act it becomes clear that the power of revocation can be exercised by three authori ties, namely, the officer of the State Government or the Central Government, the State Government as well as the Central Government.
The power of revocation conferred by section 8(f) on the appropriate Government is clearly inde pendent of this power.
It is thus clear that section 8(f) of the Act satisfies the requirement of Article 22(4) whereas section 11 of the Act satisfies the requirement of the latter part of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The statu tory provisions, therefore, when read in the context of the relevant clauses of Article 22, make it clear that they are intended to satisfy the constitutional requirements and provide for enforcement of the right conferred on the detenu to represent against his detention order.
Viewed in this perspective it cannot be said that the power conferred by section 11 of the Act has no relation whatsoever with the constitutional obligation cast by Article 22(5).
[454D G] 6.
It must be realised that when a person is placed under detention he has certain handicaps and if he makes a request that a representation prepared by him may be for warded to the Central Government as well as the State Gov ernment for consideration after taking out copies thereof it would be a denial of his right to represent to the Central Government if the Detaining Authority as well as the State Government refuse to accede to his request and omit to forward his 447 representation to the Central Government for consideration.
In such circumstances refusal to accede to their request would be wholly unreasonable and in total disregard of the right conferred on the detenu by Article 22(5) of the Con stitution read with section 11 of the Act.
[458F G, 459B] Razia Umar Bakshi vs Union of India & Ors., ; Rattan Singh vs State of Punjab & Ors., ; Sat Pal vs State of Punjab & Ors., and Smt.
Gracy vs State of Kerala & Anr., JT ; Tara Chand vs State of Rajasthan, ; referred to.
Per M.M. Punchhi, J. 1.
Section 11 of the Act does not confer any constitutional right on the detenu to have his representation thereunder considered as if under Article 22(5), but merely a provision enabling the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be, to revoke or modify detention orders.
Have section 11 of the Act re pealed, it causes no affectation to the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
Corre spondingly, section 11 of the Act derives no sustenance from the said Article.
Both operate in mutually exclusive fields, though not as combatants.
[459F G]


Input:
Appeal No. 92 of 1966.
, Appeal from the order dated May 30, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 148 of 1963.
R. V. section Mani and M. L. Agarwal, for the appellants.
Dipak Dutt Chaudhuri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respon dents.
section K. Mehta, and K. L. Mehta, for the interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J.
The appellants are members of a Hindu undivided family of which the first appellant is the Karta.
Prior to August 21, 1956, the family owned 64.35 standard acres of land in village Kurali, District Patiala.
The land stood in the revenue records in the name of the first appellant.
On December 23, 1957, the first appellant transferred 26 standard acres to one Babu Singh by a registered deed.
According to them, they had Planted an orchard in 10 acres of land.
Their contention was that the said 26 standard acres and the said 10 standard acres could not be taken into account while ascertaining surplus land under the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, XIII of 1955.
Both these claims were rejected by the authorities.
By his order dated January 20, 1961 ', respondent 'No. 3 declared 34.35 standard acres out of the said 64.35 standard acres as 'Surplus land.
The appeal filed by the appellants against the said order was rejected.
They then filed a revision application before respondent No. 1.
While that was pending they filed a writ petition in the High Court.
During the pendency of that writ petition.
the Punjab Legislature passed the Amendment Act, XVI of 1962 inserting section 32 KK in the principal Act.
The learned Single Judge,.
who heard the writ petition, held (1) that the finding that the appellants had not planted the said orchard within the statutory period was one of fact and could not be challenged in the writ petition and (2) that the said transfer of 26 standard acres was hit by section 32 FF and therefore was rightly ignored while ascertaining the surplus land.
The main contention urged before the High Court, however, was that each of the three appellants who constituted the said family was entitled to ,retain 30 standard acres, that as the total holding was only 64.35 605 standard acres, there was no surplus land liable to be acquired under the Act and, therefore, the order declaring 34.35 Standard acres, as surplus land was illegal.
The High Court following its earlier decision in Bhagat vs State of Punjab(1) "missed the writ petition.
A Letters Patent Appeal against that judgment was dismissed in limine.
The present appeal by certificate is directed against the dismissal of the said writ petition.
Mr. Mani 's contentions were: (1) that under Hindu Law every coparcener in a Hindu undivided family acquires right in the property of such coparcenery on birth and is entitled to a right of joint possession and enjoyment of its entire property, that section 32KK deprives such a coparcener of his rights of property in that that it takes away the rights of the descendants of the landowner to claim for themselves the permissible area and vest them in the head of the family alone so that there is not only an infringement of the right to hold property under article 19 (1 ) (f ) but also dis crimination in favour of the head of the family infringing thereby article 14; (2) that the effect of section 32 KK is that where an undivided family is possessed of land, instead of each of the descendants getting a ceiling area of 30 standard acres, the head of the family alone gets 30 standard acres and therefore the section is violative of article 31; (3) that the section, being applicable only to Hindu undivided families infringes article 15(1) inasmuch as it discriminates by reason only of religion such families as against other undivided families in Punjab amongst communities other than Hindus and (4) that the section cannot be said to be legislation whose object is agrarian reform and, therefore, is not protected by article 31 A. Section 32 KK, the validity of which is impeached in this appeal, reads as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force : (a) where, immediately before the commencement of this Act, a landowner and his descendants constitute a Hindu undivided family, the land owned by such family shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the land of that landowner and no descendant shall, as member of such family, be entitled to claim that in respect of his share of such land he is a landowner in his own right".
The section first lays down a fiction and then its result.
The fiction is that where a landowner and his descendants form a Hindu undivided family, the land owned by such a family shall be, deemed to be.
the land of that landowner.
The fiction so en (1) I.L.R. (1963) 16 (1) Punjab 5O. 6O6 acted is limited only for the purposes of the Act.
The result of the fiction again for the purposes of the Act is that no descendant shall, as a member of such family, be entitled to claim that in respect of his share of such land he is a landowner in his own right.
There is no doubt that the section has a direct adverse ,effect on the rights of the descendants of a landowner.
It treats such a family as one unit equating the landowner and his descendants with an individual landowner depriving by such equation the descendant of the right to hold a ceiling area for himself.
Prima facie, such a provision would infringe article 19(1) (f) and article 31 and would be hit by article 13.
Article 31 A, however, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any ,estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by articles 14, 19 or 31.
If, therefore, section 32 KK falls within the scope of article 31 A, it is obviously protected there under and the validity of the section is placed beyond any ,challenge on the ground of its infringing any of the rights under articles 14, 19 or 31.
In K. K. Kochuni vs The State of Madras(1), this Court laid ,down that article 31 A properly construed envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the 'estate ' solely for that purpose and must be limited to it.
The Court held that the Act impugned there did not ,contemplate any agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between the landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining to janmam right leaving all the characteristics intact and, therefore, did not come within the purview of article 31 A. In Ranjit Singh vs The State Punjab (2), this Court considered the scope of that decision and held that the 'Word 'estate ' in article 31 A should be given a liberal meaning and that the changes proposed by the Punjab Consolidation Acts passed since 1948 and onwards were included in the general scheme of planning of rural areas and the productive utilisation of vacant and waste lands, that if agrarian reforms were to succeed, mere distribution of land to the landless was not enough, that there should be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and that a scheme which makes villages self sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of larger reforms which consolidation ,of holdings, fixing of ceilings on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.
It is not necessary to refer to other decided cases as this decision clearly points out that the fixing of ceiling on lands and provisions (1) (2) [1965]1 S.C.R. 82.
607 relating to it would form part of and constitute agrarian reform and, therefore, such provisions would have the protection of article 3 1 A. A brief outline of the provisions of the Act will show the objects and the policy the legislature had in mind in passing the Act and while amending it from time to time.
The Act declares that it was passed to amend and consolidate law relating to tenancy and agricultural lands and to provide for certain measures of land reforms.
Section 3 defines " permissible limit" as meaning 30 standard acres of land.
Section 5 entitles ,very landowner owning land exceeding the permissible limit to select for personal cultivation from the land held by him any parcel or parcels of land not exceeding in aggregate the permissible area.
Chapter III provides for the rights of tenants and section 7 therein lays down that no tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or except on any of the grounds therein set out.
Section 7 A lays down additional grounds for termination of tenancy in cases such as where the land comprising the tenancy has been reserved by the landowner for his personal cultivation or where the landowner owns 30 standard acres or less of land and the land falls within the permissible limit.
Section 9 provides the maximum amount of rent payable by a tenant.
Chapter IV deals with acquisition or proprietary rights by a tenant on such tenant paying compensation determined in accordance with the principles set out in section 26.
Chapter IV A, which was added by Act 15 of 1956, deals with ceiling on lands and acquisition and disposal of surplus land.
Section 32 A provides that no person shall be entitled to own or hold as landowner or tenant land exceeding the permissible limit.
Section 32 B obliges a person owning or holding as landowner or tenant land which exceeds the permissible limit to furnish to the Collector a return giving particulars of all his land and stating therein his selection of land not exceeding the permissible limit which he desires to retain and of lands in respect of which he claims exemption from the ceiling.
Section 32 D directs the Collector to prepare a draft statement on the basis of the information given in the said returns showing the total area of land owned or held by such person and the land selected by him by way of permissible limit the exemption claimed by him and the surplus area.
Section 32 E provides that in the case of surplus area of a landowner or a tenant which is not included within the permissible limit such area shall on the date on which possession thereof is taken by the State Government, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government for a public purpose.
Section 32 F authorises the Collector to direct the landowner or the tenant in possession of the surplus area to deliver possession thereof within the prescribed time.
Section 32 FF provides that no transfer or 608 other disposition of land made after August 21, 1956 shall affect the right of the State Government to the surplus area to which it would be entitled to but for such transfer or disposition.
Section 32 G lays down principles on which compensation in respect of surplus area is to be determined.
Section 23 J deals with disposal of such surplus area.
Section 32 KK already recited above was inserted in the Act by Punjab Act XVI of 1962.
It is clear from these provisions that the objects of the Act are : (a) to secure the rights of tenants, (b) to provide for acquisition of proprietary rights in the land,to the tenant, (c) to provide for permissible limit of 30 standard acres, (d) to acquire surplus areas and distribute them amongst certain classes of persons including landless persons, and (e) to provide for compensation at prescribed rates payable by tenants and by Government on its acquiring surplus land.
The principle laid down by the, Act is that no person, whether a landowner or tenant, should hold land more than the permissible area so that the surplus land can be distributed amongst the more needy sections of society.
In following this principle the Act lays down two corollaries, namely, (1) not to recognise any transfer or disposition made by a landowner after a certain date as otherwise the scheme of distribution of surplus land would be frustrated, and (ii) to equates an individual landowner and a Hindu undivided family consisting of a landowner and his descendants so that both the units are entitled to hold only the permissible area of 30 standard acres.
In our view, it cannot be gainsaid that section 32 KK deals with an estate within the meaning of article 31 A and is concerned with agrarian reform.
The decision in Kochuni 's case(1) cannot, therefore, avail the appellants.
In Pritam Singh vs The State of Punjab (2) , this Court up held the validity of section, 32 FF and held that that section was protected by article 31 A against any challenge under article 19.
If a transfer or a disposition of land can validly be ignored under section 32FF for the purpose of ascertaining surplus land and acquisition of such surplus land by the State and that section is protected by article 31 A, it is difficult to say why section 32 KK which, as aforesaid, equates a Hindu undivided family with an individual landowner for the limited purpose of the Act without affecting the other rights of its members is not equally protected by that Article.
The object of enacting section 32 KK was to prevent the landowner and his descendants by reason of their constituting a Hindu undivided family from each of them claiming in his own right the permissible area from the joint holding of the family and thus retain for themselves in the aggregate area larger than 30 standard ' acres and preventing thereby distribution of surplus area.
As to (1) (2) ; 609 the pros and cons of such a provision much can be said on either side.
The appellants could have perhaps contended that such a provision amounted to an unreasonable restriction.
But such a contention is debarred by article 31 A an d a challenge to the validity of that Article is no longer possible in view of the recent decision in 1.
C. Golak Nath vs The State of Punjab(1).
The contention that the section is not one relating to agrarian reform is hardly sustainable in view of the above mentioned objects of the Act in general and of section 32 KK in particular.
Similarly, the contention that the section has the affect of defeating the rights of a member of a Hindu undivided family from the family property also cannot be sustained because his rights in the permissible area retained by the landowner and his right to compensation in respect of the surplus area are not touched by the section.
Nor is it possible to say that 'the section results in the transfer of rights of the descendants of a landowner in the permissible or surplus area in favour of such landowner.
The section does not effect any change in the rights of the descendants as members of a Hindu undivided family or the relationship of the family inter se except to the extent of depriving the descendants of their right to claim the ceiling area for each of them.
The contention as to the validity of section 32 KK, therefore, must fail.
The next contention was that the section infringes article 15 inasmuch as by limiting it only to Hindu undivided families it discriminates against descendants forming such families on the ground of religion only.
It was argued that the customary law in Punjab recognises joint and undivided families amongst non Hindu persons also and since the section affects only the Hindu undivided families, it violates article 15.
In support of this contention passages from Rattigan 's Digest of Customary Law, 14th Ed. pp. 35 to 36 were relied on to show that the institution of undivided family exists amongst certain classes of Muslims in certain districts of Punjab.
Support was also sought from the decisions in Banarsi Das vs Wealth Tax Officer.(2) and Mammad Kevi vs Wealth Tax Officer (3).
The former was concerned with the question whether a Hindu undivided family is embraced within the term 'individuals ' in Entry 56 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution for purposes of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
The latter decision does not touch the question under article 15.
Neither of the two decisions, therefore, can assist.
On the other hand, in the case of Bhagat vs State of Punjab(4) the High Court of Punjab has held that section 32 KK does not create any discrimination on the ground of religion.
In 'the present case, it is not possible to give (1) ; (3) L7Sup.
Cl/67 9 (2) (4) I.L.R. [1963] 16 (1) Punj.
610 any concluding answer to the contention raised by Mr. Mani firstly because such a point was not raised in the writ petition and secondly because the appellants have not placed before us sufficient data to enable us to go into the question.
We, therefore, refrain from examining that contention.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Y.P. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
While ascertaining the surplus land under the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the excess over 30 acres owned by the appellants, a Hindu undivided family was declared surplus.
In ascertaining the surplus, the authorities ignored the transfer of land by the Karta of the family to an outsider by a registered deed.
The appellants unsuccessfully filed writ petition.
In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that section 32 KK deprives a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family of his rights of property.
in that it takes away the rights of the descendants of the land owner to claim for themselves the permissible area and vest them in the head of the family alone so that there is not only an infringement of the right to hold property under article 19(1) (f) but also discrimination in favour of the head of the family infringing thereby article 14 and that the section cannot be said to be legislation whose object is agrarian reform and, therefore, is not protected by article 31 A. HELD:The appeal must fail.
In Pritam Singh vs State of Punjab [(1967) 2 S.C.R. 536] this Court upheld the validity of section 32 FF and held that that section was protected by article 31 A against any challenge under article 19.
If a transfer or a disposition of land can validly be ignored under section 32 FF for the purpose of ascertaining surplus land and acquisition of such surplus land bit he State and that section is protected by article 31 A, it is difficult to say why section 32 KK which, equates a Hindu undivided family with an individual landowner for the limited purpose of the Act without affecting the other rights of its members is not equally protected by that Article.
The object of enacting section 32 KK was to prevent the landowner and his descendants by reason of their constituting a Hindu undivided family from each of them claiming in his own right the permissible area from the joint holding of the family and thus retain for themselves in the aggregate area larger than 30 standard acres and preventing thereby distribution of surplus area.
[608 F H] The contention that the section is not one relating to agrarian reform is hardly sustainable in view of the objects of the Act in general and of section 32 KK in particular.
Similarly, the contention that the section has the affect of defeating the rights of a member of a Hindu undivided family from the family property also cannot be sustained because his rights in the permissible area retained by the landowner and his right to compensation in respect of the surplus area are not touched by the section.
Nor is it possible to say that the section results in the transfer of rights of the descendants of a landowner in the permissible or surplus area in favour of such landowner.
The section does not effect any change in the rights of 604 the descendants as members of a Hindu undivided family or the relationship of the family inter se except to the extent of depriving the descendants of their right to claim the ceiling area for each of them.
[609 B E] The decision of Ranjit Singh vs The State of Punjab ([1965] 1 S.C.R. 82) points out that the fixing of ceiling on lands and provisions relating to it would form part of and constitute agrarian reform and, therefore, such provisions would have the protection of article 31 A. [607 H]