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Appeal No. 167 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 11, 1962 of the Orissa High Court in First Appeal No. 61 of 1959.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the, appellant.
A. N. Sinha and B. P. Jha, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Raghubar Dayal, J.
This appeal, by special leave, is against the decree of the High Court of Orissa reversing the decree of 346 the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Berhampur and dismissing the plaintiff 's suit for recovery of Rs. 8,216 due on a promissory note executed by Kontaru Naiko, defendant No. 1 for Rs. 6,000.
The plaintiff money lender obtained a registration certificate under section 5(4) and r. 5, of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, 1939 (Act III of 1939), hereinafter called the Act, and the rules thereunder, on March 31, 1952.
He obtained another registration certificate in 1955 which said that the maximum capital for which the certificate is granted is Rs. 8,000.
The plaintiff advanced the loan to defendant No. 1 on May 19, 1954 and sued for the recovery of the amount due on this loan.
It was contended for the defendant that the suit was not maintainable as the maximum capital for which the plaintiff had required the registration certificate in 1952 was Rs. 2,000 and under the provisions of the Act.
and the rules framed thereunder, he could not have advanced loan in excess of that amount and that his doing so made the registration of the appellant as a money lender void and therefore the suit for recovery of Rs. 2,000 even was not maintainable.
These contentions were not accepted by the trial Court which decreed the suit against the defendants with 'the direction that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 sons of defendant No. 1, were not personally liable and were liable to the extent of the assets of their father in their hands.
The High Court, however, took a different view, accepted the aforesaid contentions of the defendants and dismissed the suit.
The sole contention for the appellant is that the High Court was in error in holding that the registration of the appellant as a registered money lender in March 1952 became void when he advanced a loan in suit in excess of Rs. 2,000 in 1954 and that the High Court was also in error in holding that he could not have advanced the loan in excess of the maximum capital for which the registration certificate was wanted.
The relevant provisions of the Act may now be set out. 'Capital ', is defined in section 2(c), to mean that which a moneylender invests in the business of money lending whether in money or in kind. 'Registered money lender ', according to section 2(m), means a person to whom a registration certificate has been granted under section section Section 5 provides for the registration of moneylenders and a registration fee.
Sub section
(1) thereof requires the applicant for registration to mention in the application particulars mentioned in ' that sub section and 'such other particulars as may be Sub section
(3) empowers the Provincial Government 3 47 to prescribe by rules for different classes of money lenders and for different areas a registration fee not exceeding Rs. 25 to be paid by an applicant for registration.
Sub section
(4) empowers the Sub Registrar to grant a registration in the prescribed form to the applicant except where the certificate previously granted to him has beencancelled under section 18 and the order of cancellation is in force.
Section 6 enacts that the registration certificate granted willbe in force for 5 years from the date on which it is granted.
Section 7 provides for the registered money lender to maintain accounts and to give receipts.
Section 8 which provides for suits for recovery of loans by registered money lenders reads : "Suit for recovery of loan maintainable by registered money lenders only: A money lender shall not be entitled to institute a suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by him after the date on which this section comes into force unless he was registered under this Act at the time when such loan was advanced : Provided that a money lender shall be entitled to institute a suit to recover a loan advanced by him at any time in the course of two years after the date on which the section comes into force, if he is granted a certificate of registration under section 5 at any time before the expiration of the said years.
" Section 9 provides for the maximum rates at which interest may be decreed.
Various other sections deal with other matters which the legislature thought fit to provide for in order to achieve the object of the Act which, according to the preamble, is to regulate money lending transactions and to grant relief to debtors in the State of Orissa.
Rule 1, clause (c), of the Orissa Money Lenders Rules, 1939, defines 'maximum capital ' to mean the highest total amount of the capital sums which may remain invested in a money lending business on any day during the period of the registration certificate.
Rule 3, cl.
(iii), requires every application for the registration of a money lender to mention the maximum capital for which the certificate is wanted.
Rule, 4 lays down the registration fees payable and fixes the fees according to the maximum capital in respect of which an application for such certificate is made.
Rule 5 provides that registration certificate would be in Form in and that during the currency of a registration certificate application may be made for a registration certificate of a higher 348 denomination and the provisions of rr.
3 to 5 shall, as far as may be, apply to it, credit being given to the registration fee already paid by the applicant.
The question for decision in this case is practically the same as came up for decision before this Court in Sant Saranlal vs Parsuram Sahu(1) judgment.
in which has been delivered today.
The relevant provisions of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1938 and the Bihar Money Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, Act mentioned above.
What we have said in that case appropriately covers the contentions of the panics in this case.
We do not therefore consider it necessary to repeat the discussion of the various contentions in this case.
We hold that in the absence of any specific provision in the Act in this case providing for the fixing of the maximum capital which a money lender can invest in money lending business, it was not open to the State Government to frame a rule in that regard and that the rules framed by it about mentioning, in the application, the maximum capital for which the registration certificate was wanted and the mention in the certificate of the amount of the maximum capital for which the certificate is granted, do not lead to the conclusion that the registration of the money lender will become void if he exceeds the limit of the maximum capital laid down in the registration certificate.
We do not consider it necessary now to decide the other point raised with respect to the retrospective operation of the registration certificates of higher denomination obtained during the currency of a registration certificate.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and restore the decree of the trial Court.
We direct the respondents to pay the costs of the appellant in the High Court and this Court.
Appeal allowed.
(1) [1966] S.C.R.335.

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The appellant filed a suit against the respondents for the recovery of Rs. 8216 due on a promissory note executed by respondent No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 6000.
The plea taken in defence was that the suit was not.
maintainable because the registration of the appellant under section 5(4) and r. 5 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act 1939 had become void on account of the money lent being in excess of the maximum amount of Rs. 2,000 which the appellant was authorised to invest in the business by his registration certificate.
The contention was not accepted by the trial court but the High Court.
accepting it, dismissed the suit.
In appeal, before this Court, by special leave, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the main Act did not provide for any restriction on the amount of capital that could be invested and that the rules went beyond the Act in making such a provision.
HELD : In the absence of any specific provision in the Act providing for the fixing of the maximum capital which a money lender can invest in money lending business, it was not open to the State Government to frame a rule in that regard and the rules framed by it about mentioning, in the application, the maximum capital for which the registration certificate was wanted and the mention in the certificate of the amount of the maximum capital for which the certificate is granted, do not lead to the conclusion that the registration of the money lender will become void if be exceeds the limit of the maximum capital laid down in the registration certificate.
[348 D] Sant Saranlal vs Parsuram Sahu , relied on.


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establishment of the Judge of Small Causes Court, Delhi, the name of Respondent No. 1 appears at Serial No. 9 whereas that of the appellant appears at Serial No. 19.
Both of hem satisfy the test of integrity.
The only claim the appellant can have 135 is on the principle of rotation as he is a graduate.
As that principle does apply to an appointment by promotion to the post in question, the claim of the appellant cannot be upheld.
[140F G] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 592 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.198 1 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1003 of 1974.
Prithvi Raj and T.C. Sharma for the Appellant.
Dr. Arun Kumar and V.B. Saharya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
On the retirement of one Jagan Nath Kohli, who was holding the post of Clerk of Court (Upper Division Clerk) in the grade of Rs. 130 300 (old Scale Rs.75 5 125), one post of Upper Division Clerk (U.D.C.)/English Clerk fell vacant in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi.
Five officials of that court, namely, the appellant and respondents nos.
1, 5, 6 & 7 asserted their claim to the said post.
The appellant, Chander Bhan, made his claim on the footing that he was a graduate and on the basis of the rule of rotation as embodied in Rule VI in Chapter XVIII A of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I referred to more particularly hereinafter.
Respondent No. 1, Hotilal Gupta, claimed the said post on the basis of his seniority.
We are not concerned with the claims of the other claimants because the contest before us is between the claims of the appellant and respondent No. 1.
The Judge, Small Causes Court in his order dated August 10, 1971, took the view that the appellant who is a graduate and has got 2 1/2 years office experience as Lower Division Clerk (L.D.C.), was an honest and efficient worker and was entitled to promotion in preference to respondent No. 1 because of the rule of rota tion.
The aggrieved parties filed an Administrative Appeal before the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi who passed his order dated July 17, 1973 and held that the rule of rotation did not apply to the establishment of the Judge, Small Causes Court.
He held that respondent No. 1 being the senior most official as Lower Division Clerk was entitled to the post of Upper Division Clerk and accordingly appointed respondent No. 1 as Upper Division Clerk against the said vacancy.
Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a departmental appeal against the said order to the High Court of Delhi which was heard by a learned 136 Judge on the Administrative Side of that Court who, by his order dated August 7. 1974.
accepted the appeal of the appellant and set aside the appointment of respondent No. 1.
He took the view that promotion in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi could only be made by the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi and that the vacancy should be filled in accordance with rule VI of the Rules framed by the erstwhile Punjab High Court, under section 35(3) of the punjab Courts Act, 1918, for subordinate services attached to Civil Courts other than the High Court (hereinafter referred to as 'the said rules ').
Respondent No. 1, Hotilal Gupta challenged the correct ness of the view taken by the learned Judge on the Adminis trative side by filing a writ petition being C.W. No. 1003 of 1974 in the Delhi High Court.
By an order dated 7th August, 198 1, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court allowed the said writ petition, quashed the order dated 7th August, 1974, passed by the learned Single Judge and upheld the order of the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi appoint ing respondent No. 1 to the said post.
The Division Bench took the view that not only the initial appointments but also the appointments by promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court were to be made by the Judge, Small Causes Court and not by the District and Sessions Judge, and held that the rule of rotation on the basis of which the appellant had been appointed to the said post by the order of the Single Judge on the Administrative Side was not applicable to the said appointment.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in coming to the said conclusion.
It was submitted by him that although the first appointment to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi is to be made by a Judge of Small Causes Court, promotion to that post could only be made by the District & Sessions Judge and the rule of rotation contained in the first proviso to Rule VI of the said Rules was applicable to the appointment by promotion.
order to consider the merit of the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions of law.
The relevant portion of section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act.
191S reads as follows: "(1) The ministerial officers of the District Courts and 137 Courts of Small Causes shall be appointed and may be sus pended or removed by the Judges of those Courts respective ly.
(2) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (3) Every appointment under this section shall be subject to such rules as the High Court may prescribed in this behalf, and in dealing with any matter under this section, a Judge of a Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the control of the District Court.
" The rules for subordinate services attached to Civil Courts other than the High Court were framed by the erst while Punjab High Court under section 35(4) of the Punjab Courts Act.
A perusal of Rule II of the said Rules dealing with classification, shows inter alia that Clerks of Court to Senior Subordinate Judges and Judges of Courts of Small Causes and English and Vernacular Clerks form a joint cadre.
Subrule (b) of Rule II of the said Rules inter alia provides that there shall be a separate cadre for each Revenue Dis trict and a separate cadre for each Court of Small Causes.
Rule III deals with qualifications and sub rule (2) of that Rule provides that no person shall be appointed to, or accepted as a candidate for, any clerical ministerial post, unless he has passed the Matriculation Examination of the Punjab University or an equivalent examination.
The material part of Rule 'IV runs as follows: "IV.
First appointments.
First appointment shall be made as follows: (1) By the District Judge: (a) Ministerial officers in his own court and in all courts controlled by the District Court other than Courts of Small Causes; .
(b) x x x (2) x x x (3) By the Judge of a Court of Small Causes: Ministerial Officers and menials in his own Court." . 138 Rule V deals with appointment and sub rule (1) of that Rule thereof runs as follows: "(1) Appointment to ministerial posts shall ordi narily be made either by open competition or by selection from a list of qualified candidates or apprentices accept ed by the District Judge.
Judge of a Small Causes Court,.
or Sub Judge to whom powers of appointment have been delegat ed, as the case may be.
Any departure from either of these methods should be reported to the High Court for confirma tion." Rule VI. which is of central importance in this appeal runs as follows: "VI.
Promotion (1) Appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishment should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades, provided that the official who would thus receive promotion possesses the prescribed educational qualifications and is otherwise fit to perform the duties to which he will be promoted, for which purpose tests may be imposed.
This rule does not apply to such posts as that of stenographer, for which special qualifications are needed; but preference should be given to officers with such qualifications who are already working in the lower grades: Provided that permanent vacancies in the 75 5 125 grade shall be filled by the District and Sessions Judges in the following rotation: (i) By selection on merit out of graduates who have at least two years ' experience in the work of the office, if there is no suitable graduate who fulfils this condition an 'outsider ' graduate may be appointed, but he must be one who normally resides within the jurisdiction of the District and Sessions Judge.
(ii) & (iii) By normal promotion in the office, i.e. the appointment of the next senior man whether graduate or non graduate subject to his fitness: Provided further that the rotation may be modified in 139 very exceptional cases when the direct appointment of a graduate would mean the ousting of a man who had been officiating quasi permanently in the post concerned for an appreciable period.
What is an appreciable period will depend on the circumstances of each case.
After such a modification.
the rotation should be restored as soon as possible.
(2) In making promotions preference may invariably be shown to officials who are known to be strictly honest.
No promotion should be given and no recommendation for promotion made in the case of an official who does not possess and maintain a reputation for strict integrity.
Effi ciency without honesty is not to be regarded as constitut ing a claim to promotion. ' A Notification dated October 28, 1953 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and in supersession of the Notifica tion issued earlier on February 17, 1941.
The said Notifica tion sets out that subject to such general rules as may be made by the Hon 'ble Judges of the Punjab High Court in that behalf appointments to the posts on the establishment of the Civil Courts at Delhi specified in Column (1) of the Sched ule thereto shall be made by the Authority specified in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the said Schedule.
A perusal of the Schedule shows that appointments to the posts on establishments other than process serving and menial establishments in the Small Causes Court at Delhi are ' to be made by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi.
It has been pointed out in the impugned judgment that the establishment of the District and Sessions Court and that of the Court of the Small Causes constitute separate cadres.
This is not disputed before us.
Hence, whenever a specific mention is made regarding a particular officer of an estab lishment in a rule, that particular rule would normally apply to that establishment alone and the powers conferred by that rule would be conferred on the officer mentioned in the rule.
Rule VI(1) speaks of appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishments and states that these appointments should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades provided that the official to be promoted possess the qualifications prescribed.
The first proviso to that rule goes on to say that the permanent vacancies in the original grade of Rs.75 5 125 shall be filled in by the District and Sessions Court by rotation as set out in the said sub rule (1) of Rule VI.
The first part of Rule VI deals with appointments by promotion to the higher grade of ministerial establishment.
Generally it must be 140 held applicable to the establishment of the District and Sessions Court as well as that of the Judge of the Small Causes Court.
This rule, however, does not deal specifically with the question as to who is the officer competent to promote.
In view of this, the proviso can only be construed as laying down that, where the power of appointment by promotion is vested in the District and Sessions Judge, in making appointments by promotion to fill in.the permanent vacancies in the said original grade of Rs.75 5 124, rule of rotation set out in the first proviso to clause (1) of Rule VI should ordinarily be followed.
It is not disputed that there is a separate Cadre for the Court of Small Causes.
Rule IV(3) shows that the first appointment of the ministe rial officers in the Court of Small Cause is to be made by the Judge of the Small Causes Court.
The notification dated October 28, 1953 referred to earlier provides that the appointments to the posts on establishment other than proc ess serving and menial in the Court of Small Causes are to be made by the Judge, SmaLl Causes Court, Delhi.
A reading of sub section (1) of the Punjab Courts Act and the rules and Notification discussed earlier makes it clear that appointments by promotion to the posts in the entire ministerial cadre other than in the process serving and menial establishments in the Court of Small Causes have to be made by the Judge, Court of Small Causes and the first proviso to Rule VI(1) prescribing the rule of rotation has no application to such appointments.
Moreover, it would be unreasonable to apply the principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes where there is only one U.D.C.
The principle of rotation can be made applicable to the District & Ses sions Court because there are a number of posts of Upper Division Clerks.
It would be irrational to apply that prin ciple of rotation to the Court of Small Causes in which there is only one Upper Division Clerk/English Clerk.
In the seniority list of the establishment of the Judge of Small Causes Court, Delhi, the name of respondent No. 1 appears at Serial No. 9 whereas that of the appellant ap pears at Serial No. 19.
Both of them satisfy the test of integrity.
The only claim the appellant can have is on the principle of rotation as he is a graduate.
As that principle does not apply to an appointment by promotion to the post in question, the claim of the appellant cannot be upheld.
As we have already observed, none of the other respondents have pressed their claims in the High Court or here.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

Output:
One post of Upper Division Clerk/English Clerk fell vacant in the Small Causes Court.
Appellant made his claim to the post on the footing that he was a graduate and on the basis of Rule of Rotation embodied in Rule VI of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume 1, Respondent No. 1 made his claim on the basis of seniority.
The Judge, Small Causes Court took the view that the appellant was entitled to promotion in preference to Respondent No. 1 because of the rule of rotation.
On an Administrative Appeal, the District applicable to the establishment of Judge, Small Causes Court, and appointed Respondent No. 1 as Upper Division Clerk.
The Appellant preferred a departmental appeal which was heard by a Single Judge on the Administrative side of the High Court.
He took the view that the promotion in question could be made by the District & Sessions Judge, and should be in accordance with the rule of rotation.
Respondent No. 1 challenged the said decision by way of a Writ Petition.
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and held that not only initial appointments but also ap pointments by promotion were to be made by the Judge, Small Causes Court and not by the District & Sessions Judge, and that the rule of rotation was not applicable.
Against the High Court 's decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal contending that the promotion in question could only be made by the District & Sessions Judge and that the rule of rotation was applicable even to the appointment by promotion.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
Whenever a specific mention is made regarding a 134 particular officer of an establishment in a rule, that particular rule would normally apply to that establishment alone and the powers conferred by that rule would be con ferred on the officer mentioned in the rule.
Rule VI(1) of the High Court Rules speaks of appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishments and states that these appointments should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades provided that the officer to be promoted possesses the qualifications prescribed.
The first proviso to that rule goes on to say that the permanent vacancies in the original grade of Rs.75 5 125 shall be filled in by the District & Sessions Court by rotation as set out in the said sub rule (1) of Rule VI.
The 1st part of Rule VI deals with appointments by promotion to the higher grade of ministerial establishment.
Generally it must be held applicable to the establishment of the District & Sessions Court as well as that of the Judge, Small Causes Court.
This part, however, does not deal specifically with the question as to who is the officer competent to promote.
In view of this, the proviso can only be construed as laying down that, where the power of appointment by promotion is vested in the District & Sessions Judge, in making appointments by promotion to fill in the permanent vacancies in the said original grade of Rs.75 5 125, rule of rotation set out in the first provi so to clause (I) of Rule VI should ordinarily be followed.
It is not disputed that there is a separate Cadre for the Court of Small Causes.
Rule IV(3) shows that the first appointment of the ministerial officers in the Court of Small Causes is to be made by the Judge of the Small Causes Court.
[139F H; 140A C] 2.
A reading of sub section (1) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 the High Court Rules, and Notification issued makes it clear that appointments by promotion to the posts in the entire ministerial cadre other than those in the process serving and mental establishments in the Court of Small Causes have to be made by the Judge, Court of Small Causes and the first proviso to Rule VI(1) prescribing the rule of rotation has no application to such appointments.
Moreover, it would be unreasonable to apply the principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes where there is only one U.D.C.
The principle of rotation can be made applicable to the District & Sessions Court because there are a number of posts of Upper Division Clerks.
It would be irrational to apply that principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes in which there is only one Upper Division Clerk/English Clerk.
[140D E]


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PPeal NO 4454 of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.2.1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 224 of 1984.
V.M. Tarkunde, Miss Meenakshi Arora, R.N. Karanjawala and Mrs. Manik Karan jawala for the Appellant.
K.K Jain, A.D. Sanger, Ajay K. Jain, Pramod Dayal, B.R. Appeal, P.G. Gokhale, Janendra Lal and Miss Yashmin Tarapore for the Respondents.
PG NO 705 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, J.
The only question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether an employee promoted to a post reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is entitled to have his seniority determined from the date of his appointment to the post or his seniority inter se will be reckoned as it was in the class or grade from which he was promoted to a post in a higher rank.
The appellant, who is a Scheduled Caste joined service as a Clerk in the Electricity Branch of the Punjab Public Works Department on February 20, 1954.
The terms and conditions of his service were governed by the Punjab P.W.D. (Electricity Branch) Provincial Service Class 111 (Subordinate posts) Rules, 1952.
In February, in and Punjab State Electricity Board was constituted under Section 3 of the and the employees of the Electricity Branch were transferred to the Board.
The conditions of service of the employees were governed by their existing terms and conditions as well as existing service Rules.
In 1967 the Haryana State Electricity Board was constituted and the appellant was allocated to the Haryana State Electricity Board with existing terms and conditions of service.
The Board being a statutory corporation was requested by letter dated December 13, 1972 by the Government to provide for reservation of 22% of vacancies initial recruitment and promotion posts for being filled up by members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well as by members of backward classes.
The Haryana State Electricity Board adopted the above circular by its Resolution dated March 1976 providing for reservation of posts both for initial requirement as well as for promotion.
The appellant was promoted on September 1973 as Deputy Superintendent the respondent No.2, Rajinder Singh Marya was also promoted by the same order as Deputy Superintendent.
In the said order of appointment the following note was appended: The earlier promotion of the above officials as Deputy Superintendent will not confer upon them any right to claim seniority over those who may otherwise be senior to them due to any reason whatsoever.
On April 27, 1972 a circular was issued by the Chief Secretary Government of Haryana to all its departments regarding reservation for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in service and fixation of seniority Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the said circular which are relevant are quoted hereinbelow: PG NO 706 "2.
It has to be pointed out that this was irregular and inter se seniority of all the candidates taken together (i.e. whether appointed against reserved vacancies or against open ones) must be fixed according to the combined merit list and not otherwise.
Vacancies assigned to Scheduled Castes/Backward Classes under block system are so assigned for the purposes of reservation only and are not intended for fixing inter se seniority of the candidates contrary to their order in the combined merit list prepared by the Public Service Commission/Subordinate Service Selection Board.
The above instructions, regarding determination of inter se seniority will however? apply only in those cases where the departmental service rules do not provide for seniority being determined from the date of joining or from the date of confirmation or by a method otherwise than the merit determined by the Public Service Commission/S.S.S. Board.
In other words, in all cases where the service rules have not yet been framed, or where the service rules provide for seniority being determined according to the merit laid down by the Commission/S.S.S. Board, the seniority of the officials shall be determined in the manner stated above.
In other cases, where the service rules specifically provide for seniority being determined from the date of joining or from the date of confirmation by the recruiting authority the seniority shall be determined by such different methods.
" As the seniority of the appellant was not determined from the date of his appointment to the post of Deputy Superintendent he made a representation to the Board requesting for determination of his seniority from the date of his appointment to the promoted post and also for considering his case for promotion to the post of Superintendent.
This representation of the appellant was rejected on the ground that: "The officials belonging to the scheduled castes/tribes and backward classes who are promoted against the posts reserved for them under the block system and for reasons other than inefficiency of their seniors will not be assigned seniority from the date of their joining in the PG NO 707 promoted rank.
They shall be assigned seniority in the promoted rank with reference to their inter se seniority of their previous posts.
Thereafter, on January 20, 1977 the appellant was finally informed that his seniority will not be computed from the date of his promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent.
On January 12, 1977 the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. Rajinder Singh Marya and Jagdish Lal Lamba who were junior to the appellant as Deputy Superintendents, were promoted as Superintendents superseding the claim of the appellant.
Aggrieved by this, the appellant instituted an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana praying for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to consider his case for promotion to the post of Superintendent on the basis of his being seniormost Deputy Superintendent according to the continuous length of service on that post and to promote him to the post of Superintendent with effect from the date his juniors have been promoted and for other consequential reliefs.
An affidavit was filed on behalf of Respondent No. 1 verified by Shri R. Prakash, Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board wherein in para 3 it has been submitted that: " . .the seniority of the petitioner has been determined in the post of Deputy Superintendent in accordance with the exception below Rule 9 of the 1952 Rules.
" In Para 5 it has been admitted that the appellant was promoted as Deputy Superintendent on 25th September, 1973 and since then he is continuing on the said post.
It has further been submitted that the promotion of the appellant was in an officiating capacity and he still continues to officiate as Deputy Superintendent.
The appellant was promoted to the post of Deputy Superintendent against a post which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes, though he was far junior in the cadre of Assistants.
In para 7 it has been stated that: ".
The petitioner cannot claim seniority above those two officials in the rank of Deputy Superintendent.
In view of the exception to Rule 9, if a member of service is promoted temporarily to a post earlier than his senior for PG NO 708 reasons other than the inefficiency of the senior person, they will take rank inter se according to their relative seniority in the class from which they were promoted and junior persons thus promoted shall not be confirmed from a date earlier than the date of confirmation of his senior except on the score of inefficiency of the latter.
In the present case, the petitioner was promoted temporarily to the post of Deputy Superintendent earlier to the other two officials on the ground that the petitioner belonged to the scheduled castes.
The other two officials were not superseded on the ground of inefficiency . " On February 4, 1984 the learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding inter alia that the instructions governing the matter of promotion in favour of the Scheduled Caste candidates had nothing to do with the determination of the seniority of these candidates.
Moreover, in the letter promotion the petitioner it was specifically mentioned that the earlier promotion would not confer on him any right or claim to seniority over and above those who were otherwise senior to him in the cadre from which he had been promoted.
It was further held that m the light of exception to Rule 9, the petitioner being promoted temporarily, his seniority cannot be counted from the date of his appointment in the higher post and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 would be treated senior to him in the rank of Deputy Superintendent as they were senior to the petitioner in the grade of Assistants.
It was therefore, found that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were entitled to be promoted as Superintendents earlier to the petitioner .
Against this judgment and order Letters Patent Appeal being LPA No. 224 of 1984 was filed.
The said appeal was however.
dismissed summarily as being without any merit.
The appellant, thereafter, filed the instant appeal assailing the said judgment.
Before proceeding to consider the question whether the appellant 's seniority was properly determined under Rule 9 of the Punjab P.W.D. (Electricity Branch) Provincial Service Class 111 (Sub ordinate posts) Rules 1952 (in short to be referred herein as the said Rules) it is necessary to set out herein the relevant provision of Rule 9: "9. Seniority of the members of the Service The seniority of the members of the Service for the time being serving in each class of appointment shown in Appendix `A ' shall be determined as follows: PG NO 709 (i) Prior to confirmation (i.e. in the case of persons serving on probation or in an officiating capacity) in the order of the dates of their appointment or if such date be the same in respect of two or more persons, in the order of their ages, the older being placed above the younger.
(ii) After confirmation by their respective dates of confirmation, provided that where two or more members are confirmed w.e.f.
the same date they will retain the order to confirmation.
Exception: If a member of the service is promoted temporarily to a post earlier than his senior, for reasons other than the inefficiency of the senior person they will take rank inter se according to their relative seniority in the class from which they were promoted and the junior person thus promoted shall not be confirmed from a date earlier than the date of confirmation of his senior except on the score of inefficiency of the latter.
Provided further that if a member is appointed to a higher class later than a person who was junior to him in the lower class for reasons which the appointing authority may certify in writing to be connected with the Public interest the person so appointed shall be given the same seniority in the higher class vis a vis such junior as he held in the lower class.
Thus, on a plain reading of the Rule it appears that the seniority of the members of the Service serving in an officiating capacity shall be prior to confirmation `in the order of the dates of their appointment ' and after confirmation by their respective dates of confirmation.
There is an exception to this Rule to the effect that if a member of the Service is promoted temporarily to a post earlier than his senior for reasons other than inefficiency of the senior person they will take rank inter se according to their relative seniority in the class from which they were promoted and the junior person so promoted shall not be confirmed from a date earlier than the date of confirmation of the senior.
The provision contained in the exception to Rule 9 is applicable only in the case of temporary promotion of a member of the service to a post earlier than his senior for the purposes other than inefficiency of the senior persons.
PG NO 710 In the instant case admittedly the appellant has been promoted to the post of Deputy Superintendent which was reserved under the block system for members of the Scheduled Castes.
The appointment to the said reserved post on promotion is a regular one and this has been admitted in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit referred to hereinbefore.
The appointment letter does not articulate that the promotion of the appellant to the post of Deputy Superintendent was purely temporary.
The promotion has been made on a regular basis to the post of Deputy Superintendent reserved on the basis of quota of vacancies for being filled up by promotion of members belonging to the Scheduled Castes.
The appointment of the appellant to the said promotional post of Deputy Superintendent, in our considered opinion cannot be designated to be purely a temporary promotion.
This being the position the exception to Rule 9(ii) of the said rules cannot be applied to determine the seniority of the appellant in the post of Deputy Superintendent and his seniority cannot be based in accordance with the inter se seniority of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the cadre of Assistants from which the appellant and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were promoted to the post of Deputy Superintendent.
Rule 9(i) of the said Rules is applicable in this case and the seniority of the appellant is to be reckoned from the date of his appointment In the post of Deputy Superintendent.
The appellant is thus senior to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the rank of Deputy Superintendent as he was promoted to the said post earlier than the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and as such his claim for promotion to the post of Superintendent on the dates when the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were promoted to such post is legal and valid.
It may be mentioned that during the pendency of the writ petition, the appellant had been promoted to the post of Superintendent on 29.5.1981 and as such he pleaded in para 6 of the special leave petition that his seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent should not be affected on the basis of the judgments rendered by the High Court.
On a consideration of the facts and circumstances stated hereinbefore, the finding of the High Court that the appellant was promoted temporarily and so exception to Rule 9(ii) applies for determination of seniority of the appellant as Deputy Superintendent, in our considered opinion, cannot be sustained as we have already held that the promotion of the appellant in a reserved vacancy, is a regular one and it does not smack of purely temporary character.
The seniority of the appellant is to be reckoned from the date of his appointment to the said post according to the provisions of Rule 9(i) of the said Rules.
The judgments of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 224 of 1984 as well as in the writ petition No. 773 of 1977 are PG NO 711 set aside and the appeal is allowed.
The respondent No. 1 is directed to treat the appellant promoted to the post of Superintendent from the date the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were promoted to the said post and to pay him the emoluments attached to the said post of Superintendent minus the emoluments paid as Deputy Superintendent from that date till the date of his actual appointment as Superintendent, i.e. May 29, 1981.
The appeal is thus allowed with costs.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

Output:
The appellant, who belongs to the Scheduled Castes community, joined service as a clerk on February 20, 1954 in the Electricity Branch of the Punjab Public Works Department.
In February 1959, the Punjab State Electricity Board was constituted and the employees of the Electricity Branch were transferred to the said Board.
The conditions of service of the employees were governed by the existing terms and conditions.
as well as the existing service rules.
In 1967, the Haryana State Electricity Board was constituted and the appellant was allocated to the said Board.
The Electricity Board by its resolution dated March 16.
1976 adopted the circular letter dated December 18, 1972 providing for reservation of 22% of Vacancies both for initial recruitment as well as for promotion to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well as to members of the backward classes.
The appellant was promoted on September 25, 1973 as Deputy Superintendent.
The respondent No. 2 was also promoted by the same order as Deputy Superintendent.
However, in the said order, it was made clear by a note appended thereto that the earlier promotion of the officials will not confer on them any right to claim seniority over others.
On April 27, 1972, a circular was issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana to all the Departments regarding the criteria for reservation for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the service and fixation of their seniority.
As the seniority of the appellant was not determined from the date of his appointment to the post of Deputy Superintendent, he made a representation to the Board requesting for its determination.
This representation was, however, rejected on the ground that seniority in the promoted rank would be accorded only with reference to the inter se seniority in the previous post, and on January 21, 1977, the appellant was finally informed that his seniority will not be computed PG NO 702 PG NO 703 from the date of his promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent.
On January 12, 1977 respondents 2 and 3 who were junior to the appellant as Deputy Superintendent were promoted as Superintendent superseding the claim of the appellant.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the first respondent in promoting respondents 2 and 3, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court for a mandamus directing respondent 1 to consider his case for promotion for the post of Superintendent on the basis of his being the senior most Deputy Superintendent.
The writ petition was contested on behalf of the respondent l who stated in its counter affidavit that the petitioner could not claim seniority above the respondents 2 and 3 in the rank of Deputy Superintendent on the ground that his seniority had already been fixed in accordance with the exception below rule 9 of the 1952 Service Rules.
A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the instructions governing the matter of promotion in favour of Scheduled Castes candidate had nothing to do with the determination of the seniority of these candidates and that the letter promoting the petitioner had specifically mentioned that the earlier promotion would not confer on him any right of claim to seniority over and above those who are otherwise senior to him in the cadre from which he was promoted and that in the light of the exception to rule 9 of the 1952 Service Rules, the petitioner being promoted temporarily, his seniority cannot be counted from the date of his appointment in the higher post and that respondents 2 and 3, who could be treated senior to him in the rank of Deputy Superintendent as the were senior to the petitioner in the grade of assistants.
The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant having been dismissed summarily, the appellant appealed to this Court by special leave.
Allowing the Appeal, HELD. 1.
On a plain reading of Rule 9 it appears that the seniority of the members of the service serving in an officiating capacity shall be determined prior to confirmation `in the order of the dates of their appointment ' and after confirmation by their respective dates of confirmation.
The exception to this Rule is that if a member of the is promoted temporarily to a post earlier than his senior for reasons other than inefficiency of the senior person they will take rank inter se according to PG NO 704 their relative seniority in the class from which they were promoted and the Junior person so promoted shall not be confirmed from a date earlier than the date of confirmation of the senior.
[709F G] In the Instant case, the appellant has been promoted to the post of Deputy Superintendent which was reserved under the block system for members of the Scheduled Castes.
The appointment to the said reserved post on promotion is a regular one.
The appointment letter does not that the promotion of the appellant to the post of Deputy Superintendent was purely temporary.
This being the position the exception to Rule 9(11) cannot be applied to determine the seniority of the appellant in the post of Deputy Superintendent, and his seniority cannot be based in accordance with the inter se seniority of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 wee promoted to he post of Deputy Superintendent.
[710A D] 2.
The appellant is thus senior to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the rank of Deputy Superintendent the was promoted to the said post earlier them the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and as such his claim for promotion to the post of Superintendent on the dates when the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were promoted to such post is legal and valid.
[710E] 3/ Respondent No. 1 is directed to treat the appellant promoted to the post of Superintendent from the date respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were promoted to the said post and to pay him the emoluments attached to the said post of Superintendent minus the emoluments paid us Deputy Superintendent from that date till May 29, 1981 date of actual appointment is Superintendent.
[711A B]


Input:
iminal Appeal No.159 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 24, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Misc. "Application No. 323 of 1965.
S.C. A garwala, for the appellant.
M.S.K. Sastri and S.P. Nayar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High Court passed in exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction by which the ,appellants were found guilty of having committed contempt of Mr. Justice Tarkunde in his judicial capacity and of the court.
Appellant No. 2 D.R. Goel, who is the Editor, Printer and Publisher of Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. appellant No. 1, was sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month together with fine amounting to Rs. 1,000/ , in default of payment of fine he was to undergo further simple imprisonment 781 for the same period.
The appellants were also directed to pay the costs incurred by the State.
On behalf of the first appellant it has been stated at the bar that the appeal is not being pressed.
The background in which the impugned article was published ' on April 24, 1965, in a weekly periodical called "Mainstream" which is a publication brought out by the first appellant may be set out.
In the year 1960 a suit was filed by one Krishnaraj Thackersey against the weekly newspaper "Blitz" and its Editor and others claiming Rs. 3 lacs as damages for libel.
The hearing in that suit commenced on the original side of the Bombay High Court on June 24, 1964.
The delivery of the judgment commenced on January 19, 1965 and continued till February 12, 1965.
After June 24, 1964, that suit was heard from day to day by Mr. Justice Tarkunde.
The suit was decreed in the sum of Rs. 3 lacs.
An appeal is pending before a division bench of the High Court against that judgment.
The impugned article is stated to have been contributed by a person under the name of "Scribbler" but appellant No. 2 has taken full responsibility for its publication.
Its heading was "STORY OF A LOAN and Blitz Thackersey Libel Case".
It is unnecessary to reproduce the whole article which appears verbatim in the judgment of the High Court.
The article has been ingeniously and cleverly worded.
The salient matters mentioned in the article are these: After paying a tribute to the Indian judiciary the writersays that according to the report in "Prajatantra" a Gujarati paper architects Khare Tarkunde Private Limited of Nagpur, hereinafter called "Khare Tarkunde" (which is described a Firm in the article) got a loan facility of Rs. 10 lacs from the Bank of India on December 7, 1964.
The partners of Khare Tarkunde included the father, two brothers and some other relations of Justice Tarkunde who awarded a decree for Rs. 3 lacs as damages against Blitz and in favour of Thackersey.
It is pointed out that the date on which Rs. 10 lacs loan facility was granted by the Bank of India was about five and a half months after the Thackersey Blitz libel suit had begun and just over six weeks before Justice Tarkunde began delivering his "marathon judgment" on January 19, 1965.
It is then said that for Rs. 10 lacs loan facility granted to Khare Tarkunde, the New India Assurance Co. stood guarantee and that the two Directors of the Bank of India who voted in favour of the credit of Rs. 10 lacs being granted to Khare Tarkunde were Thackersey and Jaisinh Vithaldas (believed to be a relative of Thackersey).
Next it is stated that one of the Directors of the New India Assurance that stood guarantee for the loan facility was N.K. Petigara, who was also a senior partner of M/s. Mulla & Mulla Craigie Blunt & Caroe, Solicitors of Thackersey in the Blitz Thackersey Libel Case before Justice Tarkunde 4 Sup.
CI/69 17 782 Emphasis is laid on the fact that Khare Tarktunde had a capital of Rs. 5 lacs only and the balance sheet of the firm of June 1964 revealed indebtedness to various financiers to the tune of Rs. 14 lacs.
Thus Khare Tarkunde is stated to be "lucky to get against all this a handsome loan of Rs. 10 lacs from the Bank of India".
The writer refers to the Code among college teachers and university professors of not examining papers when their own children and near relatives sit for examination and adds that Justice Tarkunde himself will recognize the rightness of such a Code.
Referring to the unimpeachable integrity and reputation of judges of the Bombay High Court, the writer proceeds to say "there must not be allowed to be raised even the faintest whisper of any misgiving on that score.
" Paragraph 24 deserves to be reproduced : "If Sri Krishna Thackersey did not lay it bare at the time of the suit that he was one of the sponsors of a contract of which the judge 's relations were the beneficiaries, it is up to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court including Justice Tarkunde as also the ever vigilant members of the Bar to consider all the implications of these disclosures which have distressed a common citizen like me, so that the finest traditions of our judiciary may be preserved intact.
" A petition was filed before the Bombay High Court by the State of Maharashtra pointing out that the aforesaid article contained scandalous allegations and was calculated to obstruct the administration of justice and constituted gross contempt of court.
The article purported to state certain facts relating to the transaction between Khare Tarkunde and the Bank which were false and there were several mis statements and suppression of facts some of which were: (a) The article wrongly stated that the father of Mr. Justice Tarkunde was a partner in Khare Tarkunde; and (b) The article falsely described the transaction as a 'loan ' by the Bank to Khare Tarkunde.
In fact the said transaction was only a guarantee given by the Bank which undertook to pay to the Govt.
any amount not exceeding Rs. 10 lacs in the event of Khare Tarkunde being unable to perform its obligations.
The Bank was secured by a further guarantee given by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. undertaking to secure the Bank in the event of the Bank having to pay the said amount or any part thereof.
Appellant No. 2 who also happens to be a Director and Principal Officer of the first appellant, filed a reply raising some objec 783 tions of a legal and technical nature ,and took up the position that the impugned article was based on a report published in "Prajatantra" from which all the facts stated in the article were incorporated.
It was asserted that certain 'major facts ' had been verified by the appellant and found to be true.
It was admitted that upon reading the petition for taking contempt proceedings it was found by appellant No. 2 that there were certain incorrect statements in the article.
It was claimed that the article had been published in a bona fide belief that whatever was stated in the article in "Prajatantra" was true.
The intention was to convey to the public at large that it was incumbent on the plaintiff Thackersey and Pettigara, one of the partners of Mulla & Mulla etc.
, his attorneys to inform Justice Tarkunde that the plaintiff had voted for a resolution of the Board of Directors of the Bank of India which, without reasonable doubt, would help Khare Tarkunde in which Tarkunde happened to be a brother of the Judge.
The High Court analysed the implications of the facts stated in each paragraph of the impugned article in great detail and observed : " . . reading the article as a whole, taking care not to read into it anything more than its plain language implies and making every allowance for literary style and rhetorical flourish expressions which were often used in the arguments for the.
respondents it is impossible to avoid the conclusions that this article exceeds the bounds of fair and reasonable criticism.
In so far as it suggests that there is some sort of casual connection between the granting of the loan to M/s. Khare Tarkunde Pvt. Ltd., and the judgment of Mr. Justice Tarkunde in the Blitz Thackersey case, it clearly attempts to lower the learned judge in his judicial capacity not to mention the fact that it would also tend to shake the confidence of the lay public in the High Court and impair the due administration of justice in that Court.
In so far as there is a suggestion made be it ever so faint that Mr. Justice Tarkunde knew or must have known of the loan to his brother 's firm before he delivered the judgment in the case, the article is malicious and 'not in good faith." The High Court also examined the misstatements and inaccuracies in the impugned article and held that there was no foundation for the suggestion that Khare Tarkunde was an impecunious concern and therefore was "lucky" to get the handsome loan nor for the suggestion that either Thackersey and his co Directors in the Bank of India or Thackersey 's solicitor and his co Directors in the New India Assurance Co. went out of their way to grant accom 784 modation to Khare Tarkunde.
The High Court found no basis for the insinuation that there was any connection between the loan and the judgment in the Blitz Thackersey case or that Justice Tarkunde knew or might have Known about any loan having been granted to his brother 's firm.
No attempt was made to justify these suggestions in the return or in the argument before the High Court and all that was urged was that the words used by contestable did not give rise to the said imputations or innuendos and that the contemnor was only trying to communicate to the public at large what has been stated before.
It is needless to refer to the other points raised before and decided by the High Court because none of them has been argued before us.
In this appeal, counsel for appellant No. 2 has made some attempt to establish that no aspersion was cast on the integrity of Justice Tarkunde in the article nor was any imputation of dishonesty made.
His second contention is that proceedings for contempt for scandalising a Judge have become obsolete and the proper remedy in such a situation is for the Judge to institute action for libel.
Thirdly, it is said that there was no evidence before the High Court that Justice Tarkunde did not know about the transaction or the dealings between the firm in which his brother was a partner and the bank of which Thackersey was a director.
If, it is submitted, the allegations made in the article were truthful or had been made bona fide in the belief that they were truthful the High Court ought not to have found appellant No. 2 guilty of contempt.
At any rate, according to counsel, the statements contained in the article only made out a charge of bias against the Judge and if such a charge is made it cannot be regarded as contempt.
On the first point our attention has been invited to the paragraphs in the article containing expression of high opinion held by the writer of the judiciary in India.
It is suggested that his attempt was only to make a fair and legitimate criticism of the proceedings in the Thackersey suit against the "Blitz" weekly.
It has been emphasised in the article that the damages which were awarded to the tune of Rs. 3 lakhs were almost punitive and that it was a rare phenomenon that the plaintiff (Thackersey) did not step into the witness box and also a permanent injunction had been granted preventing Blitz from printing anything based on the subject matter of litigation.
The law involving freedom of press fully warranted such criticism of a judgment or of the proceedings in a suit in a court of law.
It is true that the writer of the article could exercise his right of fair and reasonable criticism and the matters which have been mentioned in some of the paragraphs may not justify any proceedings being taken for contempt but the article read as a whole leaves 785 no doubt that the conclusions of the High Court were unexceptionable.
It was a skillful attempt on the part of the writer to impute dishonesty and lack of integrity to Justice Tarkunde in the matter of Thackersey Blitz suit, the imputation being indirect and mostly by innuendo that it was on account of the transaction and the dealings mentioned in the article that the suit of Thackersey was decreed in the sum of Rs. 3 lakhs which was the full amount of damages claimed by Thackersey.
It may be that the article also suggests that Thackersey and his ,attorneys were to blame inasmuch as they did not inform the Judge about the transactions of Khare Tarkunde with the Bank of India with which Thackersey was associated in his capacity as a director but that cannot detract from the obvious implications and insinuations made in various paragraphs of the article which immediately create a strong prejudicial impact on the mind of the reader about the lack of honesty, integrity and impartiality on the part of Justice Tarkunde in deciding the Thackersey Blitz suit.
On the second point counsel for appellant No. 2 has relied a great deal on certain decisions of the Privy Council and the Australian and American courts.
In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands(1) a letter was published in a colonial newspaper containing sarcastic allusions to a refusal by the Chief Justice to accept 'a gift of pineapples.
No judgment was given by the Privy Council but their lordships made a report to Her Majesty that the impugned letter though it might have been made subject of proceedings for libel was not, in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of ,law and, therefore, did ,not constitute contempt of court.
In that case there was no question of scandalising the court nor had any imputation been made against the Chief Justice in respect of any judicial proceedings pending before him or disposed of in his court.
It is the next decision of the Privy Council in McLeod vs St.
Aubyn(2) on which a great deal of argument has been built up before us that the courts, at least in England, have stopped committing anyone for contempt for publication of scandalising matter respecting the court after adjudication as well as pending a case before it.
That case came by way of an appeal from an order of the Acting Chief Justice St. Aubyn of the Supreme Court of St. Vincent committing one McLeod to prison for 14 days for alleged contempt of court.
It was said inter alia in the impugned publication that in Mr. Trifford the public had no confidence and his locus tenons, Mr. St. Aubya was reducing the judicial character to the level of a clown.
There were several other sarcastic and libelous remarks made about the Acting Chief Justice.
While recognizing publication of scandalous matter of the court itself ,as a head of contempt of court as (1) (2) 786 laid down by Lord Hardwicke in Re: Read and Huggonson(1), Lord Morris proceeded to make the oft quoted observation "committals for contempt of Court 'by itself have become obsolete in this country even though in small colonies consisting principally of coloured population committals might be necessary in proper cases".
Only a year later Lord Russel of Killowen C.J., in The Queen vs Gray(2) reaffirmed that any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court in contempt, or to lower his authority, was a contempt of court.
The learned Chief Justice made it clear that judges and courts were alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation was offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good no court could or would treat that as contempt of court but it was to be remembered that the liberty of the press was not greater and no less than the liberty of every subject.
In that case it was held that there was personal scurrilous abuse of a judge and it constituted contempt.
All the three cases which have been discussed 'above were noticed by the Privy Council in Debi Prasad Sharma & Ors.
vs The King Emperor(3) where contempt proceedings had been taken in respect of editorial comments published in a newspaper based or a news item that the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court in his administrative capacity had issued a circular to judicial officers enjoining on them to raise contributions to the war fund and it was suggested that he had done a thing which would lower the prestige of the court in the eyes of the public.
This is what was said at page 224 : "In In re a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands , the test applied by the very strong Board which heard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due, administration of the law.
In Reg.
vs Gray [1900] 2Q.B. 36 it was shown that the offence of scandalising the court itself was not obsolete in this country.
A very scandalous attack had been made on a judge for his judicial utterances while sitting in a criminal case on circuit, and it was with the foregoing opinions on record that Lord Russel of Killowen C.J. adopting the expression of Wilmot C.J. in his opinion in Rex vs Almon (1765) Wilmot 's Notes of Opinions 243, which is the source of much of the present law on the subject, spoke of the article complained of as calculated to lower the authority of the judge.
" It is significant that their lordships made a distinction between a case where there had been criticism of the administrative act of (1) (2) (3) 70 I.A. 216.
787 a Chief Justice and an imputation on him for having done or omitted to have done something in the administration of justice.
It is further noteworthy that the law laid down in McLeod vs St. Aubyn(1) was not followed and it was emphasised that Reg.
vs Gray(2) showed that the offence of scandalising the court itself was not obsolete in England.
In Rex vs Editor of the New Statesman(3) an article had been published in the New Statesman regarding the verdict by Mr. Justice Savory given in a libel action brought by the Editor of the "Morning Post" against Dr. Marie Slopes (the well known advocate of birth control) in which it was said, inter alia, "the serious point in this case, however, is that an individual owning to such views as those of Dr. Marie Stores cannot 'apparently hope for a fair hearing in a Court presided over by Mr. Justice Avory and there are so many Avorys".
On behalf of the contemnor McLeod vs St. A ubyn(1) was sought to be pressed into service.
The Lord Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the Court said that the principle applicable to such cases was the one stated in Reg.
vs Gray(2) and relied on the observations of Lord Russel at p. 40.
It was observed that the article imputed unfairness and lack of impartiality to a judge in the discharge of his judicial duties.
The gravamen of the offence was that by lowering his authority it interfered with the performance of his judicial functions.
Again in Ambard vs Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago(4) the law enunciated in Reg.
vs Gray(2) by Lord Russel of Killowen was applied and it was said at page 335: "But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice.
The path of criticism is a public way; the wrong headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice, or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.
Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though spoken, comments of ordinary men.
" It was, however, held that there was no evidence upon which the court could find that the alleged contemnor had exceeded fair and temperate criticism and that he had acted with untruth or malice (1) [1899] A .C. 549.
(2) (3) (4) 788 and with the direct object of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.
Lord Denning M.R. in Reg vs Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2)(1) made some pertinent observations about the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair and even outspoken comment on matters of public interest.
In the words of the Master of Rolls, "those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice.
They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not.
All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticism.
We cannot enter into public controversy.
Still less into political controversy.
We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.
" In that case Mr. Quintin Hogg had written an article in "Punch" in which he had been critical of the Court of Appeal and had even made some erroneous statements.
But reading of the article the salient passage of which is set out in the judgment of the Master of the Rolls makes it quite clear that there was no attempt to scandalise the Court and impute any dishonourable or dishonest motives or to suggest any lack of integrity in any particular Judge.
Oswald in his book on the Contempt of Court has expressed the view that it would be going a great deal too far to say that commitments for contempt of court by scandalising the Court itself have become obsolete, and that there does not seem to be any good reason for ignoring the principles which govern the numerous early cases on the subject.
The American and the Australian cases viz., John D. Pennekamp and The Miami Herald Publishing Co. vs State of Florida(2) and Bell vs Stewart(a) to which reference h.as been made on be half of appellant No. 2 can hardly be of much assistance because in this country principles have become crystallized by the decisions of the High Courts and of this Court in which the principles followed by English Courts have been mostly adopted.
We would now advert to the decisions of this Court.
It was held in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy vs The State of Madras(4) that the fact that the defamation of a Judge of a subordinate court constitutes an offence under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code did not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of the act as a contempt of court.
In that .case in an article in a Telugu weekly it was alleged that the Stationary Sub Magistrate of Kovvur was known to the people of the locality for harassing (1) [1968].2 W.L.R. 1206.
(2) ; (3 ) (4) ; 789 litigants in various ways etc.
Mukherjea, J., (as he then was) who delivered the judgment described the article as a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer.
It was observed that if the allegations were false, they could not undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and bring the judiciary into disrepute.
The .appellant there had taken the sole responsibility regarding the publication of the article and was not in a position to substantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein.
It was held that he could not be said to have acted bona fide, "even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt".
The decision in Re: The Editor, Printer and Publisher of "The Times of India" and In re Aswini Kumar Ghose and Anr.
vs Arabinda Bose & Anr.(1) is very apposite and may be.next referred to.
In a leading article in "The Times of India" on the judgment of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose vs Arabinda Bose & Ant.(2) the burden was that if in a singularly oblique and infelicitous manner the Supreme Court had by a majority decision tolled the knell of the much maligned dual system prevailing in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts by holding that the right to practise in any High Court conferred on advocates of the Supreme Court had made the rules in force in those High Courts requiring advocates appearing on the original side to be instructed by attorneys inapplicable to them.
This is what was said by Mahajan, J., (as he then was) speaking for the Court: "No objection could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the courts of law the sermon of divine detachment.
But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency 'to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court.
The article in question was thus a gross contempt of court.
It is obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest Court in the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined." The Editor, Printer and Publisher of the newspaper tendered an apology which was accepted; but this Court concurred in the expression of views in Ambard vs Attorney General of Trinidad(3), a passage from which has already been extracted.
The guiding principles to be followed by courts in contempt proceedings were enunciated in Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors.
vs The State of (1) ; (2) ; (3) 790 Uttar Pradesh(1).
The judgment again was delivered by Mukherjea, J., (as he then was) and the English decisions including those of the Privy Council were discussed.
It is necessary to refer only to the principles laid down for cases of the present kind i.e. scandalising the court.
It has been observed that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise summary power in cases of contempt committed by "scandalising" the court itself.
In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt, if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice.
Secondly, when .attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on a judge and what really amounts to contempt of court.
If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt.
"it will be 'an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court 's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.
It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends is ,any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law.
" In that case it was held that the contempt was of a technical nature.
This was based apparently on the reason that the Members of the Bar who had passed a resolution attributing incompetency, lack of courtesy etc.
and had referred to complaints against two officers, one a Judicial Magistrate and the other a Revenue Officer and had sent those complaints to the District Magistrate, Commissioner and the Chief Secretary in the State and secondly because very little publicity had been given to the statement.
In Re: Hira Lal Dixit & two Ors.(2) the above principles were ,applied and reaffirmed.
In that case words which had been used in a poster which was published had the necessary implication that the judges who decided in favour of the Government were rewarded by the Government with appointments to this Court.
Although this case was not one of scandalizing of the court but the question that was posed was whether the offending passage was of such character and import or made in such circum (1) (2) ; 791 stances as would tend to hinder or obstruct or interfere with the due course of administration of justice by this Court and it was answered in the affirmative and the contemnor was held guilty of Contempt of Court.
In State of Madhya Pradesh vs Revashankar(1) an application was made under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in certain criminal proceedings containing serious aspersions against a Magistrate, Mr. N.K. Acharya.
Reliance was once again placed on Brahm Prakash Sharma 's(2) case and the principles laid therein.
It was held that the aspersions which had been made amounted to something more than a mere intentional personal insult to the Magistrate; they scandalised the court itself and impaired the administration of justice and that proceedings under the contempt of court could 'be taken against the contemnor.
There can be no manner of doubt that in this country the principles which should govern cases of the present kind are now fully settled by the previous decisions of this Court.
we may re; state the result of the discussion of the above cases on this head of contempt which is by no means exhaustive.
(1 ) It will not be right to say that committals for contempt for scandalizing the court have become obsolete.
(2) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice.
(3) It is open to anyone to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him because "justice is not a cloistered virtue and she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men".
(4) A distinction must be made between .a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a contempt of the court.
The test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by his court.
It is only in the latter case that it wilt be punishable as Contempt.
(1) (2) 792 (5 ) Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public.
To borrow from the language of Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) (Brahma Prakash Sharma 's case)(1) the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court 's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.
As regards the third contention no attempt was made before the High Court to substantiate that the facts stated in the article were true or were rounded on correct data.
It may be that truthfulness or factual correctness is a good defence in an action for libel, but in the law of contempt there are hardly any English or Indian cases in which such defence has been recognized.
It is true that in the case of Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy(2) there was some discussion about the bona fides of the person responsible for the publication but that was apparently done to dispose of the contention which had been raised on the point.
It is quite clear that the submission made was considered on the assumption that good faith can be held to be a defence in a proceeding for contempt.
The words "even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt" show that this Court did not lay down affirmatively that good faith can be set up as a defence in contempt proceedings.
At any rate, this point is merely of academic interest because no attempt was made before the High Court to establish the truthfulness of the facts stated in the article.
On the other hand, it was established that some of the material allegations were altogether wrong and incorrect.
Lastly the submission that the statements contained in the article made out only a charge of bias against the judge and this cannot constitute contempt has to be stated to be rejected.
It is a new point and was never raised before the High Court.
Moreover the suggestion that the charge in the article was of legal bias which meant that Justice Tarkunde had some sort of pecuniary interest in Khare Tarkunde which had the transactions with the bank of which Thackersey was a Director is wholly baseless.
Counsel had to agree that Justice Tarkunde was neither a shareholder nor was there anything to show that he had any other interest m Khare Tarkunde.
The mere fact that his brother happens (1) (2) ; , 793 to have a holding in it cannot per se establish that Justice Tarkunde would also have some financial or pecuniary interest therein.
It is not possible to accept nor has such extreme position been taken by the counsel for appellant No. 2 that there is any bar to a brother or 'a near relation of a judge from carrying on any business, profession or avocation.
The entire argument on this point is wholly without substance.
The appellant No. 2 showed no contrition in the matter of publication of the impugned article.
lie never even tendered an unqualified apology.
The High Court, in these circumstances, was fully justified in punishing him for contempt of court and in awarding the sentence which was imposed.
In the impugned article there was a clear imputation of impropriety, lack of integrity and oblique motives to Justice Tarkunde in the matter of deciding the Thackersey Blitz suit which, on the principles already stated, undoubtedly constituted contempt of court.
The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
One T filed a suit claiming Rs. 3 lacs damages for libel against a newspaper.
The suit was decreed by a Judge of the Bombay High Court.
Thereafter, an article was published in a publication brought out by the first appellant and of which the second appellant was the editor, printer and publisher.
The article contained insinuations that there was a connection between a loan of Rs. 10 lacs, granted to a firm in which the Judge 's brother was a partner, and the judgment m the defamation case; and that the Judge knew, about the loan having been granted to the firm.
The appellants were found guilty of contempt of court.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that: (1) In the article no aspersion was cast on the integrity of the Judge nor was any imputation of dishonesty made; (2) Proceedings for contempt for scandallzing a Judge have become obsolete, the proper remedy being for the/judge to take action for libel; (3) The allegations were made in the bona fide belief that they were truthful and there was no evidence that the Judge did not know about the transaction; and (4) The statements, if at all, amounted to a charge of bias against the Judge and could not be regarded as contempt.
HELD: (1 ) The obvious implications and institutions made in the various paragraphs of the article, read as a whole, create a strong judicial impact on the mind of the reader about the Jack of honesty, integrity and impartiality on the part of the Judge in deciding the defamation suit.
[785 C D] It is open to anyone to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a Judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him.
But, if an article attributes improper motives to the Judge, it not only transgresses the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but has a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of the court and would amount to contempt of court.
[785 A, 791 F] (2) It will not be right to say that committals for contempt of court for scandalizing the court have become obsolete.
[791 D] (a) But such summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice.
[791 E] (b) There is a distinction between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to contempt of court.
The tests are: (i) Is the impugned publication a mere defamatory attack.
on the Judge or is it calculated to interfere with the due course of Justice or the proper administration of law by his court? and (ii) Is the wrong done to the Judge personally or is it done to the public? The publication of a disparaging 780 statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the courts administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.
[791 G H; 792 A C] B.R. Reddy vs State of Madras, ; , Re: The Editor.
Printer and Publisher of the 'Times of India ' and in re: Aswini Kumar Ghose vs Arabinda Bose, ; , Brahm Prakash Sharma vs State of U.P., ; Re: Hira Lal Dixit & Ors. ; and State of M.P. vs Revashankar , followed.
Re: Read and Huggonson, 2 Atk. 471, In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands , McLeod vs St. Aubyn, , Reg.
vs Gray, ; Rex vs Editor of the New Statesman ; Ambard vs Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, (.1936) A.C. 322, Debi Prasad Sarma .v.
The 'King Emperor.
70 I.A. 216 and Reg.
vs Commissioner of Police the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn, , referred to.
(3) Assuming good faith can be held to be a defence in a proceeding for contempt, in the present case, no attempt was made to substantiate 'that the facts stated in the article were true or were rounded on correct data.
On the other hand, it was established that some of the material allegations were altogether wrong and incorrect.
[792 E F] B.R. Reddy 's case; , , referred to.
(4) The mere fact that his brother happened to have a pecuniary interest in the firm could not per se establish that the Judge would also have a financial interest therein so as to constitute legal bias.
[792 H; 793 A]


Input:
Appeals Nos. 195 and 196 of 1959.
Appeals by special leave from the Award dated April 15, 1957, of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII 7 of 1956.
B. Sen, P. K. Chakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 195 of 59) and respondents (in C. A. No. 196 of 59).
N. C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in C. A. No. 195 of 59) and appellants (in C. A. No. 196 of 59).
March 30.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.
These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and shall be disposed of by this judgment.
Appeal No. 195 is by Messrs. Burn and Co. Limited (hereinafter called the company) and Appeal No. 196 is by the workmen of Messrs. Burn and Co. Limited (hereinafter called the workmen).
There were disputes between the company and the workmen on various matters, which were referred to the tribunal for adjudication.
Of these disputes, only two now survive in the two appeals.
The company 's appeal is with respect to that part of the award which deals with incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff while the workmen 's appeal is with respect to that part of the award which appeals with the cash benefit of Annas eight per head per working day for the period the canteen was not in operation.
We shall first take up the company 's appeal.
The company has introduced incentive bonus for manual workers including Sarkars and Checkers but there is no provision for incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff.
The workmen therefore claimed that these two categories should also be given incentive bonus like the manual workers and pointed out 425 that in other concerns this was done.
The company resisted the claim on two grounds: (i) that the clerical staff got what is known as the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance, which is higher than, the dearness allowance paid to the manual workers and (ii) that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not actually produce anything and if they are given incentive bonus it will mean that they would be paid on the 'production of others, namely, the manual workers.
The tribunal was of the view that the fact that the clerks got the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance was no reason for their total exclusion from the benefit of the incentive bonus scheme.
It also pointed out that the subordinate staff did not get the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance and there was no difference between their dearness allowance and the dearness allowance of the manual workers.
Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no justification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also.
It therefore ordered that the company should extend the scheme of incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also and lay down the rates and conditions for the same.
The main contention of the company before us is that as the clerical staff and the subordinate staff have no part in actual production they should not be given any incentive bonus, particularly as their work does not increase at all because of the increased production.
It is, however, difficult to accept that there will be no increase in the work of the clerical staff in particular and also of the subordinate staff because of higher production, though it may be accepted that the increase may not be in proportion to the increase of production.
It is also true that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods like manual workers and that may be a reason 426 for treating them somewhat differently in the matter of incentive bonus and that is what the tribunal seems to have done, for it has directed the company to extend the scheme of incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff and to lay down the rates and conditions of the same and has not said that exactly the same rates and conditions should apply, to the clerical and subordinate staff as apply to the manual workers.
But there can be no doubt that economically speaking the clerical staff and the subordinate staff also take part in the production and there is no reason therefore for excluding them altogether from the scheme of incentive bonus.
Besides, as the tribunal has pointed out, in other comparable concerns incentive bonus is being paid to the clerical and subordinate staff.
The fact that dearness allowance was paid to the clerical staff at a higher scale is also, in our opinion, no reason for depriving them altogether of the benefits of the incentive bonus scheme.
It is also urged on behalf of the company that the introduction of incentive bonus is a management function and the tribunal should not impose it on the management and reference in this connection has been made to Messrs. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs Their Workmen (1).
In the present case, however, the incentive bonus scheme has already been introduced by the company for the major part of its workmen and all that is now asked for is that the benefit of the scheme should be extended to the remainder of the workmen.
This prayer is, in our opinion, very different from asking a tribunal to impose an incentive bonus scheme for the first time in a concern.
We can see no reason why where an incentive bonus is in force in a concern for the majority of its workmen, the tribunal should not be able to extend the same to the remainder of the workmen.
We therefore see no reason to interfere with the order of the tribunal in this behalf Turning now to the appeal of the workmen with respect to eight annas tiffin allowance during the period the canteen was riot working, it is enough to say that this matter was examined at length by the (1) [1959] SUPP.
2 S.C.R. 1012.
427 tribunal.
It has dealt with the history relating to this tiffin allowance and exhaustively considered all the points raised on behalf of the workmen.
Nothing has been brought to our notice which would induce us to interfere with the considered order of the tribunal in this behalf.
All the points that Sri Chatterjee has raised on behalf of the workmen have been dealt with by the tribunal and the conclusion it has reached is that halving regard to the circumstances, the workmen were not eligible to the tiffin allowance of annas eight per head per working day.
All that we need say is that the correspondence between the workmen and the company shows that though the workmen were keen on the provision of a canteen before the tiffin allowance was granted by the award dated July 24, 1953, their keenness disappeared after the award.
The company seems to have taken steps even before the award to start a canteen and pursued the matter vigorously after the award; but the workmen started objecting to the arrangements made and some of the objections were fantastic.
It seems that having been given the tiffin allowance they preferred to have it rather than go to the canteen.
In the circumstances we are of opi nion that the conclusion of the tribunal is correct and there is no reason for interference.
The appeals are hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
Appeals dismissed.

Output:
There can be no doubt from the point of view of Economics that the clerical and subordinate staff of an industry like its manual workers contribute to its production and there can, therefore, be no reason for excluding them wholly from the benefits of a scheme of incentive bonus.
The fact that the clerical staff are paid dearness allowance at a higher scale can be no reason for their exclusion.
(1)[1956] 424 Where, as in the instant case, the company had already Introduced a scheme of incentive bonus for the majority of its workmen, there could be no reason why the Industrial Tribunal should not be able to extend that scheme to the clerical and subordinate staff.
M/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs Their Workmen, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 1012, considered.