Input:
No 1 IN C.A. No 4444 of 1990 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.5.90 of the Alla habad High Court in CWP No. 5267 of 90.
Yogeshwar Prasad, Gopal Subramanium, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Arvind Verma, Aman Vachher, Pradeep Misra and R.B. Misra for the appearing parties.
The following order of the Court was delivered: The dispute in these cases relates to admission in post graduate courses of the medical wing.
There are seven medical colleges in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Sometime back in a fake writ petition the High Court of Allahabad made an order that admission could be effected on the basis of the MBBS results.
That can counter to the decision of this Court and on being looked into it transpired that the proceedings before the High Court were totally fraudulent and no one by the name given in the petition as petitioner could really be identified.
This Court at that stage had clearly indicated that the prescription by this Court has been that there should be a selection test for post graduate admission as admission has become very competitive and to have compliance of Article 14 of the Constitution a broad based arrangement should be made.
On that account this Court had clearly indicated that no admission should be permitted on the basis of the MBBS results.
In view of the fact that the Allahabad High Court 's order has already been reversed, nothing more need be done.
387 SLP (C) . . of 1990 This petition is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dated 25.5.1990.
U.P. Junior Doctors ' Action Committee in their special leave petition which has not yet been numbered challenge the order referred to above where the petitioner could not be identified and challenge was to the decision of the High Court dated 25.5.1990 which permitted admission on the basis of MBBS results.
Since we have already clarified the position and reiterated the requirement of a selection test the order of the High Court must be taken to have already been vacated.
11 is not necessary to entertain this special leave petition.
CA in SLP 15354/91 Special leave granted.
In this appeal by special leave Principal of the Agra Medical college along with some others is the appellant.
The High Court by the impugned order required provisional admis sion in M.S. (Surgery) and in M.D. (Medicine) to be given to respondents 1 and 2 respectively in the Medical College of Agra while the writ petition was yet to be heard.
The con ten tion raised before us is that grading admission at an interlocutory stage in a pending proceeding even by styling it as provisonal create lot of adderse consequences and leads to indicipline in the system of imparting education, Admission into post graduate degrees in the medical wing through out the country has become very competitive and it has become clear thatstrict regulation is necessary.
This Court by its judgement in Dr. Pradeep, Jain & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors [1984] 3 sec 654 indicated that admis sion for 25 percent of the seats in post graduate courses should be regulated on the basis of all India selection and in regard to the remainder 75 per cent of the States were left to decide the procedure for admission.
Appropriate knowledge and expertise are a prerequisite for a person to be allowed to register himself as a medical practitioner.
Very often, health problems require expert treatment.
If anyone is authorised in society to practise medicine or undertake medical care without the appropriate qualification, society exposes itself to health hazards.
The prescriptions by the Indian Medical Council and the attempts made by Government for regulating the medical study are for establishing basically uniform knowledge to be imparted to the students before they can be entrusted with the nation 's medicare.
Unless there is a sincere and thorough educational discipline to be gone through as a precondition to the grant of the requisite certificate the lives of citizens would be at peril.
388 The Indian Medical Council has prescribed a reasonable period of study on expert advice and upon taking into con sideration the experience over the years as to how much study is necessary for the requisite qualification to be gathered.
This Court has also indicated the dates of admis sion and commencement of the courses of study.
These are prescriptions for a purpose and are not intended to be empty formalities to be violated.
One of the prescriptions of the Medical Council is also the ratio between the teachers and the students.
That again is a factor which cannot be brushed aside.
It is a well known rule of practice and procedure that at interlocu .
tory stage a relief which is asked for and is available at the disposal of the matter is not granted.
The writ petitioners wanted admission into postgraduate course as the main relief in the writ petition.
To have it granted at the threshold creates a lot of difficulties.
In a case where the petitioner ultimately loses in a case of this type a very embarrassing situation crops up.
If he has by then read for two to three years, there is a claim of equity raised on the plea that one cannot reverse the course of time.
In a case of this type equities should not be claimed or grained. 'Faking an overall picture of the matter we are of the view that unless there is any special reason to be indicated in clear terms in an interlocutory order as a rule no provisional admission should be granted and more so into technical courses.
On the basis of what we have said the order of the High Court should be reversed but we are not doing so on account of the fact that nine similarly placed medical graduates have already been given admission pursuant to such interloc utory orders by the respondents without even raising a challenge.
The order was made as early as in February, 1991 and for all these nine months no steps have been taken by the appellants to comply with the order and they are in fact facing a contempt proceeding.
While on principle we indicate that such provisional admission should not be granted.
We dismiss this special leave petition and sustain the order not on merits but for the reason indicated.
The interlocuto ry application in the civil appeal need not be further dealt with in view of what we have said above.
We had issued notice to the Principals of the seven medical colleges.
They have appeared and have given a writ ten undertaking to the Court by way of affidavit that there was some misunderstanding in regard to the requirement of a selection test for post graduate admission.
There were two year and three year courses running simultaneously for some period and some confusion was there as to whether the two year course 389 students were covered by the direction of this Court.
Though we are of the view that there was hardly any scope for being misled, we are prepared to give the benefit of doubt to the Principals.
The contempt proceedings are withdrawn but the undertaking are kept on record.
G.N. Appeals dismissed.

Output:
These matters relate to admission in post graduate courses in the Medical Colleges in Uttar Pradesh.
On a Writ Petition, which later turned out to be fake, the High Court had ordered that admission could be effected on the basis of the MBBS Examination.
This has been disputed in appeal before this Court.
In another Writ Petition, pending hearing, the High Court directed that provisional admission be given to two candidates, one in MS (Surgery) and another in MD (Medicine).
The Principal of the Medical college and others preferred an appeal against the High Court 's order.
It was contended that granting admission, though provi sional, at an interlocutory stage in a pending proceeding creates a lot of adverse consequences and indiscipline in the system of imparting education.
Dismissing the matters, this Court, 385 HELD: 1.1 It transpires that the proceedings before the High Court were totally fraudulent and no one by the name given in the petition as petitioner could really be identi fied.
This Court had clearly indicated that no admission should be permitted on the basis of the MBBS results.
Noth ing survives now, as the High Court 's order has already been reversed.
[386 F,G] 2.1 It is already settled that admission for 25 per cent of the seats in post graduate courses should be regulated on the basis of all India selection and in regard to the re mainder of 75 per cent the States were left to decide the procedure for admission.
[387 E] 2.2 Unless there is a sincere and thorough educational discipline to be gone through as a precondition to the grant of the requisite certificate the lives of citizens would be at peril.
The Indian Medical Council has prescribed a rea sonable period of study, on expert advice, and upon taking into consideration the experience over the years as to how much study is necessary for the requisite qualification to be gathered.
This Court has also indicated the dates of admission and commencement of the courses of study.
These are prescriptions for a purpose and are not intended to be empty formalities to be violated.
[387 G, H; 388 A] Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, [1984] 3 S.C.C. 654, relied on.
It is a well known rule of practice and procedure that at an interlocutory stage, a relief which is asked for and is available at the disposal of the matter, is not (generally) granted.
To have it granted at the threshold creates a lot of difficulties.
In a case where the petition er ultimately loses in a case of this type a very embarrass ing situation crops up.
If he has by then read for two to three years, there is a claim of equity raised on the plea that one cannot reverse the course of time.
In a case of this type, equities should not be claimed or granted.
Unless there is any special reason to be indicated in clear terms in an interlocutory order, as a rule no provisional admis sion should be granted and more so into technical courses.
[388 C, D] 4.1 The order of the High Court in the instant case should be reversed but this is not being done so, on account of the fact that nine similarly placed medical graduates have already been given admission pursuant to such interloc utory orders by the respondents 386 without even raising a challenge.
The order was made as early as in February, 1991 and for nine months no steps have been taken by the appellants to comply with the order and they are in fact facing a contempt proceeding.
[388 F] 4.2 Notice had been issued to the Principals of the seven medi cal colleges who have appeared and given written undertakings to the Court by way of affidavit that there was some misunderstanding in regard to the requirement of a selection test for post graduate admission.
Though there was hardly any scope for being misled, the benefit of doubt is being given to the Principals.
The contempt proceedings are discharged, but their undertakings are kept on record.
[388 G, H; 389 A]


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 1296 of 1978.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 7 5 1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 9/76.
924 section section Saksena (In person) G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent.
The appellant was appointed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in November, 1954 as a temporary judicial officer.
The State Government terminated his services in December, 1962 but, on representation made by him, the termination order was withdrawn on January 16, 1963.
The appellant rejoined service and resumed his duties.
However, by an order dated May 18, 1966, his services were terminated again.
On a writ petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court, the termination order was quashed by the High Court on August 8, 1969.
The appellant was reinstated with the benefit of continuity of service.
His troubles did not end there.
Although he had served for about fifteen years, several representation made by him to the State Government for his confirmation met with no response, and he continued to remain a temporary Government servant.
Meanwhile, in June, 1973 he was allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar.
But on August 2, 1974 the State Government made an order compulsorily retiring the appellant from service.
The order purports to have been made in exercise of the powers mentioned in Note I to Article 465 A of the Civil Service Regulations, which provide for compulsory retirement of a temporary Government servant on attaining the age of SO years.
The appellant had reached the age of 54 years.
rt was recited in the order that the Governor on being satisfied that it was not in the public interest to retain the appellant, who was described as a temporary judicial officer, required him to retire from service with immediate effect, with three months ' pay in lieu of notice.
The order was assailed by the appellant by a writ petition, and a learned single judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition on September 17, 1975 and quashing the order he declared that the appellant continued to remain in service.
The learned single judge held that the appellant was not covered by the terms of Article 465 A and as regards Article 465, which was invoked in the alternative in support of the impugned order, he took the view that as the appellant was a temporary Government servant only and not entitled to pension, Article 465 also did not apply.
The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed, and a Division Bench of the High Court has, by its order dated May 7, 1976 allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition.
The Divi 925 sion Bench confirmed that as the appellant was a temporary judicial officer, Note 1 to Article 465 A could not be pressed into service by the State Government for retiring him, but it maintained the order with reference to Note 1 to Article 465 holding that the provision entitled the State Government to retire any Government servant attaining the age of SO years on three months ' notice or pay in lieu thereof.
lt observed that the power of the State Government to compulsorily retire a Government servant was not dependent on his eligibility for pension.
It was of the view that the appellant, although a temporary Government servant, could be compulsorily retired under Note 1 to Article 465.
The further contention of the appellant was also rejected that the impugned order was arbitrary inasmuch as he had been allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar in June, 1973, which could only have been if his work showed distinct ability and his integrity was beyond doubt and, he urged, nothing had taken place since to justify the order of compulsory retirement passed shortly thereafter.
Several contentions have been raised in this appeal by the appellant, who appears in person.
In our judgment, one of theem suffices to dispose of the appeal.
The contention which has found favour with us is that on a perusal of the material on the record and having regard to the entries in the personal file and character roll of the appellant, it is not possible reasonably to come to the conclusion that the compulsory retirement of the appellant was called for.
This conclusion follows inevitably from the particular circumstance, among others, that the appellant was found worthy of being permitted to cross the second Efficiency Bar only a few months before.
Ordinarily, the court does not interfere with the judgment of the relevant authority on the point whether it is in the public interest to compulsorily retire a Government servant.
And we would have been even more reluctant to reach the conclusion we have, when the impugned order of compulsory retirement was made on the recommendation of the High Court itself.
But on the material before us we are unable to reconcile the apparent contradiction that although for the purpose of crossing the second Efficiency Bar the appellant was considered to have worked with distinct ability and with integrity beyond question yet within a few months thereafter he was found so unfit as to deserve compulsory retirement.
The entries in between in the records pertaining to the appellant need to be examined and appraised in that context.
There is no evidence to show that suddenly there was such deterioration in the quality of the appellant 's work or integrity that he deserved to be compulsorily retired.
For all these reasons, we are of opinion that the order of compulsory retirement should be quash 926 ed.
The appellant will be deemed to have continued in service on the date of the impugned order.
The appellant pressed us vehemently to make an order directing his confirmation and pointed out that after he was compulsorily retired as many as 12 temporary judicial officers were considered for confirmation We consider that it would not be right to make the direction prayed for by the appellant.
Whether he should be confirmed or not is a matter for the relevant authority.
That is a matter to which the authority has yet to apply its mind, and in the circumstances it is not proper that we should pre empt its judgment.
The appeal is allowed and the order dated May 7, 1976 of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside.
The order of the learned single judge quashing the impugned order of the State Government is restored.
The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal to the appellant.
N.V.K .
Appeal allowed.

Output:
The services of the appellant who was appointed in November 1954 were terminated in December 1962, but the termination order was withdrawn on January 16, 1963 and he rejoined service and resumed his duties.
Again his services were terminated by an order dated May 18, 1966.
This order having been quashed by the High Court in August 8, 1969, the appellant was reinstated with the benefit of Continuity of service.
In June 1973 he was allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar, but on August 2, 1974 the State Government made an order compulsorily retiring him from service.
In the appellant 's writ petition, quashing the order of compulsory retirement, a single Judge of the High Court declared that the appellant continued to remain in service.
In allowing the appeal of the State, the Division Bench of the High Court rejected the appellant 's contention that the order of compulsory retirement was arbitrary because nothing to justify the order had taken place after he was allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar in June 1973.
11 Allowing the appeal this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
The compulsory retirement of the appellant was not called for on the facts of this case.
The appellant will be deemed to have I continued in service on the date of the impugned order [925 H 926A] 2.
The appellant was found worthy of being permitted to cross the second Efficiency Bar only a few months before.
Although this Court does not ordinarily interfere with the decision of the relevant authority in a case of this kind particularly when the order was made on the recommendation of the High Court, it is difficult to reconcile the apparent contradiction that for the purpose of crossing the second Efficiency Bar the appellant was considered to have worked with distinct ability and with integrity beyond question, yet with in a few months thereafter he was found so unfit as to deserve compulsory retirement.
There is no evidence to show that suddenly there was such deterioration in the quality of the appellant 's work or integrity that he deserved to be compulsorily retired.
[925 F H]


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Civil Appeal No. 35 of 1982 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 9th July, 1981 of the Gujarat High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 28 of 1980.
P,H. Parekh, Harish Salva and Gatutam Philip for the Appellant.
495 S C. Manchanda Anil Dev Singh and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AMARENDRA NATH SEN, J.
The principal question for decision 5 in this appeal by Special Leave is whether the father in exercise of his right as Patria Potestas or otherwise can effect a partial partition between himself and his minor sons of joint family properties of a Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.
The assessee, a Hindu undivided family (hereinafter referred to as H.U.F.), which consists of four members, namely,(l) Shri Apoorva Shantilal Shah, 2) his wife Smt.
Karuna and their minor sons (3) Chintan and 4) Tejal, is the appellant before us.
The members of the H.U.F. are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.
The D assessment year in question is the year 1975 76.
During the assessment pertaining to the assessment year under consideration, Shri Apoorva who is the father of the minor sons and husband of Smt.
Karuna and the Karta of the H.U.F. made an application to the Income Tax officer for recognising partial partition under section 171 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), claiming that two partial partitions bad taken place amongst the members of the said family, one on 24.12.1973 in respect of 200 shares of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and the other on 29.12.1973 in respect of 1777 shares of the same company.
On enquiry the Income Tax officer (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as I.T.O.) found that the partial partitions had been embodied in memoranda of agreements of partition.
The I.T O. however, refused to record that there had been a partial partition of joint family properties, as he was of the view that partial partitions in question could not be recognised inasmuch as the remaining shares, after making certain allocations in favour of the two minor sons were not allotted in their entirety to the remaining third coparcener, namely, Shri Apoorva separately or to Shri Apoorva and his wife Karuna jointly, describing them as members of the H.U.F.
The I.T.O. further held that the said partitions did not purport to have been made at the distance of the minor children, as this course would require the approval of the Court but the same had been purported to 496 have been made at the instance of Shri Apoorva.
The I.T.O. hinted in the order that the distribution of the shares had not been made equally either amongst the three members including the two minor sons or amongst the four members of the H.U.P., as Apoorva 's wife Karuna also became entitled to an equal share on partition between the father and the sons.
Against the order of the I.T.O. the assessee H.U.F. presented an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as A.A.C. for the sake of brevity).
The A.A.C. allowed the appeal and held that there had been genuine partial partitions between the coparceners in respect of the said shares.
The A.A.C. held that it was not necessary to obtain court 's sanction even in a case where some of the parties to the partition were minors.
As regards the print that the distribution of shareholding had not been made on equal basis, the A. A.C., taking into consideration some earlier partitions, came to the ' conclusion that the distribution had been equally made.
The A.A.C. further observed that even if the distribution had not been made on equal basis that would not affect the validity of the partitions in question and the minor sons, if they felt aggrieved in this regard, could on attainment of majority seek to avoid the said partitions.
Aggrieved by the order of the A.A.C., the Revenue went up in appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (referred to as tribunal hereinafter for the sake of brevity) to challenge the A.A.C 's recognition of the said partitions.
The Tribunal held for reasons recorded in the order that partial partitions in the instant case were outside the framework of the Hindu Law and as such they could not be recognised as valid for the purposes of section 171 of the Act.
In that view of the matter the Tribunal set aside the A.A.C 's order and restored the order of the I.T.O. Under section 256 (1) of the Act, the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court: (1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that Shri Apoorva Shanti1al could not himself have given consent on behalf of his minor sons to the partitions proposed by him in his individual capacity as father ? 497 (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of A the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the partial partitions were outside the framework of Hindu Law ? (3) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the partial partitions could not be recognized as valid for the purpose of section 171 of the Income tax Act, 1961 ? (4) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that partial partitions made by a Hindu father in exercise of his patria potestas cannot be recorded as a valid partitions under section 171 of the Income tax Act, 1961 ? (5) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the partial partition did not amount to a family arrangement in which the father acted as a natural guardian of the two minors sons after he had exercised his patria potestas ? (6) Whether the Income tax Department ;9 competent to challenge the exercise of patria potestas by a Hindu father in respect of coparcenery property, making a partial 1 partition ? For reasons recorded in the judgment the High Court answered all the questions in the affirmative and against the assessee.
The High Court in its judgment has held that the father under the Hindu Law has no power or authority to effect any partial partition of Joint family properties between himself and his minor sons.
The High Court has observed that apart from the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income tax vs Seth Gopaldas H.U.F (1) there was no decision of any court on the point.
The High Court also considered other decisions and books and C ' treatises on Hindu Law.
The High Court held that on a consideration of the authorities, the following propositions were established : 1.
From the stand point of ancient Hindu Law, what was recognised was only a partition in respect of all the 498 properties of the H.U.F., upon disruption of the status of H.U.F. regardless of whether the properties were actually divided by metes and bounds or whether these were there after (after disruption of joint status) held as tenants in common.
Partial partition in the sense of division in respect of part of the assets while continuing the status of HUF in respect of rest of the assets was not known to the ancient Hindu Law and was not recognised by ancient Hindu Law 3.
Partial Partition in the sense of division of some of the properties whilst continuing the status of HUF in respect of other items of property originally belonging to the HUP came to be recognised only later on by evolution of custom and by judge made law.
Such a partial partition was so recognised only if it was made by consent of all the coparceners.
In other words, partial partitions in respect of only some items of property whilst continuing the status of HUF in respect of rest of the items of property could be effected only with the consent of all the coparceners.
When there was a disruption of the status of the HUF only one or more of the coparceners could not insist for division of some items of the property without effecting division in respect of all the items of properties except by consent of all the coparceners.
Tn respect of a joint family consisting of a father and his sons, the traditional Hindu Law recognised the right of a father in his capacity as patria protestas to exercise his extraordinary power to disrupt the status of HUF and to divide his sons inter se without their consent subject to the rider that 'all ' assets of the HUF were subjected to partition.
The aforesaid extra ordinary power is subject to the qualification that he gives to his sons an equal share and division is not unfair (vide Gupte 's Hindu Law 2nd Edn., Page 259).
"The Power of the father to sever the sons inter se is a survival of the patria potestas and may be exercised 499 by him without the consent of his sons '. "Again, in all A cases his power must be exercised by him bonafide and in accordance with law; the division must not be unfair and the allotment must be equal.
He must give his sons equal share with himself " 7.
There is nothing in (I) either ancient Hindu Law or (2) customary or judge made law which authorises the father in exercise of his extraordinary power to effect a partial partition of HUF consisting of himself and his minor sons by dividing some items of properties whilst continuing the joint status in respect of the rest of the properties.
C The High Court observed: "The validity of the aforesaid propositions is incapable of being disputed and has not been disputed.
What has been contended on behalf of the assessee is that whilst there is no express provision in so many words, either in the ancient Hindu texts or Judge made law, that the power of a Hindu father to effect partition of a HUF consisting of him self and his sons including minor sons in exercise of his power as patria protestas extends even to partition in respect of only some items of property it is required to be inferred by implication.
In other words, it is argued that though there is no express reference to the power to effect that partial partition in the sense of division of some items of property while continuing the status of HUF in respect of the rest and though such power is not recognised in terms, it follows as a necessary corollary.
" The High Court noted that this contention has been negatived by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Gopaldas (supra) and the High Court for reasons recorded in "the judgment rejected this contention.
The High Court further held that the transaction in question was in any event invalid in the facts and in the circumstances of this case.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the assessee with special leave granted by this Court has preferred this appeal.
500 In this appeal before us, two main contentions have been urged on behalf of the appellant.
The first contention urged is that the High Court went wrong in holding that the father cannot effect any valid partial partition between himself and his minor sons of joint family property belonging to Hindu undivided family consisting of himself, his wife and minor sons who are governed by the Mitakashra School of Hindu Law.
The other contention raised is that the High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the partial partitions were invalid.
Mr. Desai learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has advanced the following arguments.
According to the Mitaksbara School of Hindu Law, the father has a power to divide ancestral property among his sons and the partition made by him is binding on his sons provided that the power is exercised bonafide and in accordance with law which regulates and restricts it in the interests of his sons.
This power on the part of the father is recognised in text books on Hindu Law and has been accepted in a number of decisions beginning with the case of Kondaswami vs Doraisamy Ayyar.(1) 2.
A father in any such case of ancestral property has the power to separate from all or from even some of his sons remaining joint with the other sons or leaving them to continue as a joint family with each other.
The consent of the sons is not necessary for the exercise of that power whether they are majors or minors.
In this connection reference is made to para 323 of Hindu Law by D.F. Mulla and para 458 at p. 559 of Mayne 's Hindu Law (11 the Edn.).
Para 323 of Mulla 's Hindu Law, 11th Edn.
at page 443 and 444 reads as follows: "The father of a joint family has the power to divide the family property at any moment during his life, provided he gives his sons equal shares with himself, and if he does so, the effect in law is not only a separation of the father from the sons, but a separation of the sons inter se.
The consent of the sons is not necessary for the exercise 501 of that power.
But a grandfather has no power to bring A about a separation among the grandsons.
The right of a father to sever sons inter se is a part of the patria potestas still recognised by the Hindu Law.
" Para 458 of Mayne 's Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn.
at p.559 and 560 reads as follows: "Partition may be either total or partial.
A partition may be partial either as regards the persons making it or the property divided.
It is open to the members of a joint family to sever in interest in respect of a part of the joint estate while retaining their status of a joint family and holding the rest as the properties of an undivided family.
Any one coparcener may separate from the others.
but no coparcener except the father or grandfathers, can compel the others to become separate amongst themselves.
A father may separate from all or from some of his sons, remaining joint with the other sons or leaving them to continue a joint family with each other.
A separation between coparceners, for instance, between two brothers, does neither necessarily nor even ordinarily involve a separation between either of the coparceners and his own sons " 3.
So extensive and wide is this patriarchal power of the father that it has been recognised even in cases where all the sons were minors or an only son was a lunatic.
Reference is made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bapu Hambira Patil vs Shankar Bahu Patil, (1) and to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Venkataswara Pattar vs K. Mankayammal.(2) 4.
section 171 of the Income tax Act, 1971 and section 25A of the earlier Acc have been all along accepted as machinery provisions and not charging sections.
In the earlier Act though there was no express reference to partial partitions, the preferable view expressed in deci 502 sions under that Act was that if there was a partial partition of an asset of the family or an asset of the family was divided and a partnership was constituted and the family continued joint as regards other properties, the assessment on the basis of undivided Hindu family would be confined to the income of the properties so remaining undivided and the income of the property partitioned would be excluded from the computation of the income for assessment.
It was only income received from the properties not partitioned that would be considered to be the income of the joint family.
Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Charandas Haridas vs C.l.T. Bombay.
(1) 5.
This power of the father has been described as his "superior power" or "peculiar power" or "patria potestas".
There is neither principle nor authority for the proposition that the exercise of this independent and extensive power of the father even in the context of minor sons could not take into its purview the lesser power to partition only some of the family properties without disrupting the status of the members of the joint family as regards other properties even when it is a genuine exercise of the lesser power.
At no time was there recognised any limitation or inhibition on the power of the father, though of course the partition effected by him had to be fair and equitable.
There is no text of Hindu Law which prohibits partial partition whether as to person or as to property.
The decision of the Privy Council in the case of Appovier vs Ram Subba Aiyan,(2) when it speaks of partial partition of the joint family by agreement of the coparcener cannot possibly be read as restricting the patriarchal and superior power of the father to effect division of the entire joint family properties and to exclude operation in case of exercise of the lesser right of division of only some of the family properties.
Mr. Manchanda learned counsel appearing on behalf of the department, has advanced the following arguments: 503 1.
Under ancient Hindu Law, partial partition was unknown.
Severence of status disrupted the family.
The joint family need not necessarily have any property.
If it bas property, then its separation is only an incidence of the severence of status.
Partial partition is judge made law and the earliest case where this was mooted was in 1846 in the case of Rewun Prashad vs Radha Beeby.(l) This was followed in Appovier 's case (supra) and then in certain decisions of Indian Courts.
Reference is also made to paragraph 458 of Mayne 's Book on Hindu Law and Usage for contending that agreement between the parties is a sine qua non. 3.
The powers of patria potestas are confined mainly to the power to sever the status of the joint family as a whole.
Judge.
made law which has recognised partial partition has attempted to extend the ancient, feudal archaic patriarchal powers of patria potestas to joint families so as to include the power of partial partition with the consent of the parties.
There could be no justification for now extending it, particularly as the legislature itself, as per the Finance Act (2) 1980 w.e.f. 1,4.80 has de recognised partial partition altogether.
Sub section (9) has been added to section 171 of the Act and by this provision partial partition of a HUF effected after 31.12.78 will be de recognised for income tax purposes and this sub section has been incorporated with the object of curbing the creation of multiple HUF by making partial partitions.
Where a HUF is taxed in the status of HUF it will continue to be taxed as such unless there has been a total partition of the family properties by metes and bounds and an order to that effect is recorded by I.T.O. 4.
The powers of patria potestas of a father have always been understood to be restricted and limited to a complete and whole partition.
This power can only be exercised with regard to the entire property, provided the property is divided equally and fairly by the father.
We may observe that in course of the hearing, reference was made to a number of decisions of various courts by the learned counsel for the parties.
504 We shall now proceed to consider the decisions which appear to us to leave a material bearing on the question involved in the appeal.
We shall first refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Charandas Haridas (supra).
This decision which appears to have clear bearing on the question and which considers an earlier decision of the Privy Council, does not appear to have been cited before the High Court.
The material facts of this case may be briefly noted; Charandas Haridas was the Karta of a Hindu undivided family consisting of his wife, Shantaben, three sons and himself.
He was a partner in six managing agency firms in six mills In previous years the income received by him as partner in these Managing Agencies was being assessed as the income of the Hindu undivided family.
On December 11, 1945, Charandas Haridas acting for his three minor sons and himself and Shantaben his wife, entered into an oral agreement for partial partition.
By that agreement Charandas Haridas gave one pie share to his daughter Pratibha in the managing agency commission from two of the six managing agencies held by the family.
The balance together with the other shares in the other managing agencies was divided in five equal shares between Charandas Haridas, his wife and sons.
This agreement was to come into effect from 1st January, 1946 which was the beginning of afresh accounting year.
On 11th September, 1946 Charandas Haridas acting for himself and his minor sons and Shantaben executed a memorandum of partial partition in which the above facts were recited, the document purporting to be a record of what had taken place orally earlier.
In the assessment year 1947 48 and 1948 49, Charandas Haridas claimed that the income should no longer be treated as income of Hindu undivided family but as separate income of the divided members.
The Income tax officer declined to treat the income as any but of the Hindu undivided family, and assessed the income as before.
An appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was unsuccessful and the matter was taken to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that by the document in question, the division, if any, was of the income and not of the assets from which the income was derived inasmuch as "the agreements of the managing agency with the managed com panies did not undergo any chaoge whatever as a result of the alleged partition." The Tribunal, therefore, held that the arrangement to share the receipts from this source of income was not binding on 505 the department, if the assets themselves continued to remain joint.
A It further held that the document was "a farce", and did not save the family from assessment as Hindu undivided family.
The following question as directed by the High Court on the application of Charandas Haridas was referred to the High Court.
: "Whether there were materials to justify the finding of the Tribunal that the income in the share of the com mission agency of the mills was the income of the Hindu undivided family ?" The High Court held that though the finding given by the Appellate Tribunal could not be construed as a finding that the document was not genuine, the method adopted by the family to partition the assets was insufficient to bring about the results intended by it.
According to the High Court the Tribunal was right in holding that the document was ineffective and though the income might have been purported to be divided and might, in fact, have been so divided, the source of income still remained undivided as belonging to the Hindu undivided family.
The High Court accordingly answered the question in the affirmative holding that there were materials before the Tribunal to enable the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that in so far as these income bearing assets were concerned, they still belonged to the Hindu undivided family.
The assessee Charandas Haridas filed an appeal in this Court with special leave granted by this Court.
This Court allowed the appeal.
At page 207, this Court referred to the following observations of the Privy Council in Appovier vs Rama Subba Aiyan (supra).
"Nothing can express mere definitely a conversion of the tenancy, and with that conversion a change of the status of the family quoad this property.
The produce is no longer to be brought to the common chest, as representing the income of an undivided property, but the proceeds are to be enjoyed in six distinct equal shares by the members of the family, who are thenceforth to become entitled to those definite shares.
" Thereafter this Court proceeded to hold at page 208: 506 "In our opinion, here there are three different branches of law to notice.
There is the law of partnership, which takes no account of Hindu undivided family.
There is also the Hindu Law which permits a partition of the family and also a partial partition binding upon the family.
There is then the income tax law, under which a particular income may be treated as the income of the Hindu undivided family or as the income of the separated members enjoying separate shares by partition.
The fact of a partition in the Hindu Law may have no effect upon the position of partner, in so far as the law of partnership is concerned, but it has full effect upon the family in so far as the Hindu Law is concerned.
Just as the fact of a karta becoming a partner does not introduce the member of the undivided family into the partnership, the division of the family does not change the position of the partner vis a vis the other partner or partners.
The Income tax law before the partition takes note, factually, of the position of the karta, and assessee not him qua partner but as representing the Hindu undivided family.
In doing so, the Income tax law looks not to the provisions of the Partner ship Act, but to the provisions of Hindu Law.
When once the family has disrupted, the position under the partnership continues as before, but the position under the Hindu Law changes.
There is then no Hindu undivided family as a unit of assessment in point of fact, and the income which accrues cannot be said to be of a Hindu undivided family.
There is nothing in the Indian Income tax law or the law of partnership which prevents the members of a Hindu joint family from dividing any asset.
Such division must, of course, be effective so as to bind the members; but Hindu law does not further require that property must in every case be partitioned by metes and bounds, if separate enjoyment can otherwise be secured according to the shares of the members.
For an asset of this kind, there was no other mode of partition open to the parties if they wished to retain the property and yet held it not jointly but in severalty, and the law does contemplate that a person should do the impossible.
Indeed, the result would have been the same, even if the dividing members had said in so many words that they had partitioned 507 the assets, because in so far as the firms were concerned, A the step would have been wholly inconsequential." This Court further observed at p. 209: "No doubt, there were many modes of partition which might have been adopted; but the question remains that if the family desired to partition these assets only and no more, could they have acted in some other manner to achieve the same result ? No answer to the question was attempted; It is, therefore, manifest that the family took the fullest measure possible for dividing the joint interest into separate interests.
There is no suggestion here that this division was a mere pretence nor has the Appellate Tribunal given such a finding.
The document was fully effective between the members of the family, and there was actually no Hindu undivided family in respect of these particular assets.
" In the case of Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (HUF) vs Commissioner of Income tax, Kanpur(l), this Court observed at p. 702: "Under Hindu Law partition may be either total or partial.
A partial partition may be as regards persons who are members of the family or as regards properties which belong to it.
Where there has been a partition, it is presumed that it was total one both as to the parties and property but when there is a partition between brothers, there is no presumption that there has been partition between one of them and his descendents.
It is, however, open to a party who alleges that the partition has been partial either as to persons or as to property, to establish it.
The decision on that question depends on proof of what the parties intended whether they intended the partition to be partial either as to persons or as to properties or as to both.
When there is partial partition as to property, the family ceases to be undivided as regards properties in respect of which such partition has taken place but continues to be undivided with regard to the 508 remaining family property.
After such partial partition the right of inheritance and alienation differ according as to property in question belongs to the members in their divided or undivided capacity.
Partition can be brought about, (1) by a father during his life time between himself and his sons by dividing equally amongst them, (2) by agreement, or (3) by a suit or arbitration.
" These two decisions of this Court clearly state that partial Partition under Hindu Law is permissible.
We may mention that in the case of Moti Lal Shyam Sunder vs Commissioner of Income tax, U.P.(l) a division Bench of the Allahabad High Court also recognised the validity of partial partition.
R.S. Pathak, J. (as his Lordship then was) who spoke for the Bench held for reasons stated in the judgment that the tribunal was in error in holding that there was no valid partial partition in law on 1st July, 1961.
It may be noted that in the case of Charandas Haridas (supra) decided by this Court and in the case of Motilal Sham Sunder (supra) decided by the Allahabad High Court to which we have just referred, all the sons were minor.
We have earlier quoted the relevant passages on the subject from Mulla 's Hindu Law and from Mayne 's Hindu Law and Usage.
We may now qoute the following observations appearing at p. 18 in 'Mitacshare and Daya Bhaga Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance translated by H.T. Colebrooke, Esq., ' in Ch.
I, sec.
II (2): "When a father wishes to make a partition, he may at his pleasure separate his children from himself, whether one.
two or more sons".
In 'History of Dharamshastra ' by Shri P.V. Kane (second Edition, 1973) Vol.
III at p. 592, it has been stated: "The Manager is called Karta in modern times though the smritis and digests employ words like Kutumbin (Yaj II.
45), Grhin, Grhapali, Prabhupa Kat.
543) and not Karta.
He has special powers of disposition (by mortgage, 509 sale or gift) of family property in a season of distress (for debts), for the purposes and benefit of the family (maintenance, education and marriages of members and other dependents) and particularly for religious purposes (Sradhas and the like).
The father has the same powers as manager and certain other special powers, which no other coparcener has.
The father can separate his sons from himself and also among themselves if he so desires, even if they do not desire to separate (Yaj.
114)".
There are observations more or less to the similar effect in the other commentaries on Hindu Law by other learned authors.
We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to refer to the comments of the other learned authors placed before us in course of the hearing of the appeal.
The various commentaries on Hindu Law by the various learned 1 authors go to indicate that ancient Hindu Law speaks of complete severance of joint family and partition of joint family properties and does not mention partial partition either with regard to the joint family properties or with regard to some of the members of the joint family.
The right of the father to bring about the disruption of the joint family properties in exercise of his superior right as father or of his rights as patria potestas is recongnised in ancient Hindu Law.
It is, however, well settled by judicial decisions that partial partition of a joint Hindu family qua some joint family properties or qua some members of the joint family is permissible and valid in law.
The High Court appears to have accepted this position but the High Court then proceeds to hold that the proposition laid down by judicial decisions with regard to partial partition will apply only when partial partition is effected with the consent of the members of the joint family and cannot be extended to a case where partial partition is sought to be brought about by father in exercise of his superior rights as father or his right, as patria potestas.
On an anxious and careful consideration of the matter we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the High Court.
510 If the father in execise of his superior right or of his right.
as patria potestas is entitled to bring about a complete disruption of the joint family and to effect a complete partition of joint family properties of a Hindu family consisting of himself and his minor sons even against the wishes of the minors and if partial partition be permissible with the consent of sons when they have all become major, we see no reason to limit the power or authority of tho father to effect the partition only to a case where the partition is total.
The superior right or the right of patria potestas which a father enjoys is always expected to be exercised in the best interest of the members of the family and more particularly his minor sons.
The father, undoubtedly, enjoys the right to bring about a complete disruption of the joint family consisting of himself and his minor sons and to effect a complete partition of The joint family properties even against the will of the minor sons.
It is also now recognised that partial partition of joint family properties is permissible.
When father can bring about a complete partition of joint family properties between himself and his minor sons even against the will of the minor sons and when partial partition under the Hindu Law is now accepted and recognised as valid by judicial decisions, we fail to appreciate on what logical grounds it can be said that the father who can bring about a complete partition of the joint family properties between himself and his minor sons will not be entitled to effect a partial partition of joint family properties between himself and his minor sons if the father in the interest of the joint family and its members feels that partial partition of the properties will be in the best interest of the joint family and its members including the minor sons.
Even if the test of consent is to apply, the father as the natural guardian of the minor sons will normally be in a position to give such consent and it cannot be said as a matter of universal application that in all such cases of partition, partial or otherwise, there is bound to be a conflict of interest between the father and his sons.
If the father does not act bona fide in the matter when he effects partition of joint family properties between himself and his minor sons, whether wholly or partially, the sons on attaining majority may challenge the partition and ask for appropriate reliefs including a proper partition.
In appropriate cases even during minority, the minor sons through d proper guardian may impeach the validity of the partition brought about by the father either in entirety of the joint family properties or only in respect of part thereof, if the partition had been effected by the father to the detriment of the minor sons and to the prejudice of their interests.
511 We may point out that in the case of Charandas Haridas to which we have earlier referred and in which this Court recognised the validity of partial partition brought about by the father of some joint family properties, the sons were all minors.
Also in the case of Motilal Shamsunder earlier quoted, where the Allahabad High Court recognised the validity of partial partition brought about by the father between himself and his sons, all the sons were minors.
The decision of this Court in the case of Charandas Haridas and the observations of this Court in the case of Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (supra) which we have earlier quoted, in our opinion, clinch the decision of the question.
We must, therefore, hold that partial partition of properties brought about by the father between himself and his minor sons cannot be said to be invalid under the Hindu Law and must be held to be valid and binding.
We wish to make it clear that this right of the father to effect a partial partition of joint family properties between himself and his minor sons, whether in exercise of his superior right as father or in exercise of the right as patria potestas has necessarily to be exercised bona fide by the father and is subject to the right of the sons to challenge the partition if the partition is not fair and just.
section 171 of the Income tax Act, 1971 provides as follows: (1) A Hindu family hitherto assessed as undivided shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to continue to be a Hindu undivided family, except where and in as far as a finding of partition has been given under this section in respect of the Hindu undivided family.
(2) Where, at the time of making an assessment under sec.
143 or section 144, it is claimed by or on behalf of any member of Hindu family assessed as undivided that a partition, whether total or partial, has taken place among the members of such family, the Income Income tax officer shall make an enquiry thereinto after giving notice of the enquiry to all the members of the family.
512 (3) On the completion of the enquiry, the Income tax officer shall record a finding as to whether there has been a total or partial partition of the joint family property, and, if there has been such a partition the date on which it has taken place.
(4) Where a finding of total or partial partition has been recorded by Income tax officer under this section, and the partition took place during the previous year (a) the total income of the joint family in respect of the period up to the date of partition shall be assessed as if no partition had taken place; and (b) each member or group of members shall, in addition to any tax for which he or it may be separately liable and notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of section 10, be jointly and severally liable for the tax on the income so assessed.
(5) Where a finding of total or partial partition has been recorded by the Income tax officer under this section, and the partition took place after the expiry of the previous year, the total income of the previous year of the joint family shall be assessed at as if no partition had taken place; and the provisions of clause (b) of sub section (4) shall, so far as may be, apply to the case.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section if the Income tax officer finds, after completion of the assessment of a Hindu undivided family that the family has already effected a partition, whether total or partial the Income tax officer shall proceed to recover the tax from every person who was a member of the family before the partition, and every such person shall be jointly and severally liable for the tax on the income so assessed: (7) For the purposes of this section, the several liability of any member or group of members thereunder shall be computed according to the portion of the joint family property allotted to him or it at the partition, whether total or partial.
513 (8) The provisions of this section shall, so far as may be apply in relation to the levy and collection of any penalty, interest, fine or other sum in respect of any period up to the date of the partition, whether total or partial of a Hindu undivided family as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of tax in respect of any such period. . . . . . . .
Explanation: In this section. (a) "partition" means (i) where the property admits of a physical division, a physical division of the property, but a physical division of the income without a physical division of the property producing the income shall not be deemed to be a partition; or (ii) where the property does not admit of a physical division then such division as the property admits of, but a mere sevence of status shall not be deemed to be a partition; (b) "partial partition" means a partition which is partial as regards the persons constituting the Hindu undivided family, or the properties belonging to the Hindu undivided family, or both.
It may be noted that the following further provision was included in the said section as sub section (9) by the Finance (No. w. e. f. 1st April, 1980 : G (9) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, where a partial partition has taken place after the 31st day of December, 1978 among the members of a Hindu undivided family hitherto assessed as undivided: 514 (a) no claim that such partial partition has taken place shall be inquired into under sub section (2) and no finding shall be recorded under sub section (3) that such partial partition had taken place and any finding recorded under sub section (3) to that effect whether before or after the 18th day of June, 1980 being the date of introduction of the Finance (No 2) Bill 1980, shall be null and void; (b) such family shall continue to be liable to be assessed under this Act as if no such partial partition had taken place; (c) each member or group of members of such family immediately before such partial partition and the family, shall be jointly and severally liable for any tax, penalty, interest, fine or other sum payable under this Act by the family in respect of any period whether before or after such partial partition; (d) the several liability of any member or group of members aforesaid shall be computed according to the portion of the joint family property allotted to him or it at such partial partition: and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.
This sub section (9) was not in existence at the relevant time and has no retrospective operation and it is of no material consequence in deciding the present case.
The aforesaid provisions of the Income tax Act, as they stood at the material time, clearly recognise partial partition.
The definition of partial partition in explanation (b) makes it clear that partial partition as regards the persons constituting the Hindu undivided family or as regards properties belonging to the Hindu undivided family, or both, is recognised.
In the present case, the partial partition of the shares belonging to the Hindu undivided family cannot, therefore, be said to 515 be bad either under the Hindu Law or under the Indian Income tax Act.
We must, therefore, hold that the High Court went wrong in deciding that partial partition of the joint family properties of the Hindu joint family by the father was invalid and could not be recognised under the Income tax Act.
The subsequent amendment of section 171 by the inclusion of sub section (9) does not require any consideration as the said, sub section was not in existence in the relevant assessment year and is only operative from 1st April, 1980.
The other question which falls for determination is whether the partition can be said to be bad at the time of the partition there was no equal division of the shares by the father amongst himself and his minor sons and a part of the share holding had not been distributed to the father or to the father and mother jointly.
We may point out that the A.A.C. has found that at the time of division of the shares, the shares had been distributed equally taking into consideration the shares which had earlier been distributed amongst the parties.
In our opinion, a partial partition of any joint family property by the father between himself and his sons does not become invalid on the ground that there has been no equal distribution amongst the co sharers.
It is expected that the father who seeks to bring about a partial partition of joint family properties will act bonafide in the interest of the joint family and 13 its members, bearing in mind in particular the interests of the minor sons.
If however, any such partial partition causes any prejudice to any of the minor sons and if any minor son feels aggrieved by any such partial partition, he can always challenge the validity of such partial partition in an appropriate proceeding and the validity of such partition will necessarily have to be adjudicated upon in the proceeding on a proper consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case.
Till such partial partition has been held to be invalid by any competent court, the partial partition must be held to be valid.
It is not open to the Income tax Authorities to consider a partial partition to be invalid on tho ground that shares have not been equally divided and to refuse to recognise the same.
It is undoubtedly open to the Income tax officer before recognising the partition to come to a conclusion on proper enquiry whether tho partition is genuine or not.
If the Income tax officer on enquiry comes to a finding that the partition is sham or fictious, he will be perfectly within his right to refuse to recognise the same.
In the instant case, there is no finding that the partial partition is sham or 516 fictitious or that the partial partition is not a genuine one and has not been acted upon.
As there is no finding that the partial partition is sham or fictitious or not a genuine one, on enquiries made by the Income tax officer, and as the partial partition is otherwise valid under the Hindu Law, the partial partition has necessarily to be recognised under the provisions of section 171 of the Income tax Act and the assessment must be necessarily made on the basis that there is Partial partition of the said shares.
In the result, the appeal succeeds.
The judgment and order of the High Court are hereby set aside.
The partial partition is held to be valid and the Income tax Officer is directed to recognise the same and to proceed to make the assessment on the basis that there has been a partial partition of the said shares between the parties.
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not propose to make any order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

Output:
The assessee is a Hind undivided Family consisting of four members, namely, Sri Apoorva Shantilal Shah, his wife Smt.
Karuna and their minor sons Chintan and Tejal.
During the assessment pertaining to the assessment year 1975 76.
Shri Apoorva as a Karta of the H.U.F. made an application to the Income Tax officer for recognising partial partition under section 171 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming that two partial partitions had taken place amongst the members of the said family, one on 24.12.1973 in respect of 200 shares of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and the other on 29.12.1973 in respect of 1?77 shares of the same Company.
The Income Tax officer refused to record them for three reasons, namely (i) the partitions have not been made at the instance of the minor sons; (ii) after making certain allocations in favour of the two minor sons.
he remaining shares were not allotted in their entirety to tho remaining third coparcener, normally Apoorva separately or Apoorva and Smt.
Karuna jointly describing them as U P. and (iii) the distribution of shares had not been made equally either amongst the three members including the two minor sons or amongst the four members of the U.P, as Apoorva s wife Karuna also became entitled to an equal share on partition between the father and sons.
The appeal preferred before the Assistant Appellate Commissioner was accepted.
The further appeal, by Revenue to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was allowed since the Tribunal was of the opinion that the partial partitions in the instant case, beings outside the framework at the Hindu Law could not be recognised as valid for the purposes of Section 171 of the Income Tax Act.
All the questions refferd to in the reference under Section 256 (1) to the High Court were answered against the assessee.
The High Court held that under Hindu Law the father has no power or authority to effect any partial partition of joint family properties between himself and this minor sons.
Hence the appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court 493 ^ HELD: 1.1.
Partial Partition of the shares belonging to the Hindu A undivided Family cannot be said to be bad either under the Hindu Law or under the Indian Income Tax Act.
[514 H, 515 A] 1.2.
Partial partition of properties brought about by the father between himself and his minor sons is valid and binding under the Hindu Law.
This right of the father to effect a partial partition of joint family properties between himself and his minor sons, whether in exercise of his superior right as father or in exercise of the right as patria potestas has necessarily to be exercised bonafide by the father and is subject to the right of the sons to challenge the partition, if the partition is not fair and just.
[511 C E] 1.3.
The right of the father to bring about the disruption of the joint family properties in exercise of his superior right, as father or of his rights as patria potestas is recognised in ancient Hindu Law.
[509 D E] 1.4.
The stand taken by the High Court to the effect that the proportion laid down by judicial decisions to the effect that partial partition of a joint Hindu family qua some joint family properties or qua some members of the joint family is permissible and valid in law, will apply only when partial partition is effected with the consent of the members of joint family and cannot be extended to a case when partial partition is sought to be brought by father in exercise of his superior rights as father or his right as patria potestas is incorrect.
[509 F H] If the father in exercise of his superior right or of his right as patria potestas in entitled lo bring about a complete disruption of the joint family and to effect a complete partition of joint family properties of a Hindu joint family consisting of himself and his minor sons even against The wishes of the minors and if partial partition be permissible with the consent of sons when they have all become major, the power or authority of the father to effect the partition of properties cannot be limited only to a case where the partition is total.
Even if the test of consent is to apply, the father as the natural guardian of the minor sons will normally be in a position to give such consent and it cannot be said as matter of universal application that in all such cases of partition, partial or otherwise, there is bound to be a conflict of interest between the father and his sons.
If the father does Dot act bonafide in the matter when he effects partition of joint family properties between himself and his minor sons, whether wholly or partially the sons on attaining majority may challenge the partition and ask for appropriate reliefs including a proper partition.
In appropriate cases even during minority the minor sons through a proper guardian may impeach the validity of the partition brought about by the father either in entirety of the joint family properties or only in respect of part thereof, if the partition had been effected by the father to the detriment of the minor sons and to the prejudice of their interest.
[510 A H] Charandas Haridas vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (HUF) vs Commissioner of Income J. J Tax.
Kanpur (1982)133 I.T.R. 690 (S.C.) followed: 494 1.5.
The provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 before the amendment by Finance Act (No. 2 of 1980) also clearly recognise partial partition.
The definition of partial partition in Explanation (b) makes it clear that partial partition as regards the persons constituting the Hindu undivided family or as regards proper ties belonging to the Hindu Undivided family, or both, is recognised.
[514 P G] 2.1.
A partial partition of any joint family property by the father between himself and his sons does not become invalid on the ground that there has been Do equal distribution amongst the co sharers It is expected that the father who seeks to bring about a partial partition of joint family properties will act bonafide in the interest of the joint family and its members bearing in mind in particular the interest of the minor sons.
If, however, any such partial revision causes any prejudice to any of the minor sons and if any minor son feels aggrieved by any such partial partition, he can always challenge the validity of such partial partition in an appropriate proceeding and the validity of such partial partition will necessarily have to be adjudicated upon in the proceeding on a proper consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case till such partial partition has been held to be invalid by any competent court, the partial partition must he held to be valid.
[515 D F] 2.2.
It is not open to the Income tax Authorities to consider a partial partition to be invalid on the ground that shares have not been equally divided and to refuse to recognise the same.
It is undoubtedly open to the Income tax officer before recognizing the partition to come to a conclusion on proper enquiry whether the partition is genuine or not.
If the Income tax officer on enquiry comes to a finding that the partition is sham or fictitious, he will be perfectly within his right to refuse to recognise the same.
[515 F G] 2.3.
In the instant case, there is no finding that the partial partition is sham or fictitious or that the partial partition is not a genuine one and has not been acted upon.
As there is no finding that the partial partition is sham or fictitious or not a genuine one, on enquiries made by the Income tax officer, and as the partial partition is otherwise valid under the Hindu Law, the partial partition has necessarily to be recognised under the provisions of section 171 of the Income Tax Act and the assessment must be necessarily made on the basis that there is partial partition of the said shares.
[515 H,.
516 A B]


Input:
DICTION: Writ Petitions Nos.
7477 79 of 1981 33 (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) AND SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.
9116 & 8735 of 1981 From the judgment and order dated the 15th October, 1981 and 22nd September, 1981 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petitions Nos.
4734/81 & 4370/81 respectively.
B. Datta for the Petitioners in Writ Petitions.
Ravindra Bana for the Petitioners in both SLPs.
O. P. Sharma and M. section Dhillon for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J.
These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution and the connected special leave petitions mainly challenge the constitutional validity of the second proviso to sub cl.(1) of cl 11 of the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order, 1978 (for short 'the Order '), as inserted by the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing and Price Control (First Amendment) Order, 1980, with effect from March 27, 1980, as violative of articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, as also the legality and propriety of the action of the licensing authorities in suspending the licences held by the petitioners.
It appears that the licences held by the petitioners who are foodgrains dealers in the State of Punjab, have been suspended by orders passed by the District Food and Supplies Controllers, Faridkot and Bhatinda, for a period not exceeding ninety days under the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order.
The orders of suspension of licence in each of these cases rest on the allegation that the licensee has committed a breach of conditions Nos. 4, 8 and 10 of the licence.
The petitioners have all been served with notices under the first proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order to show cause why their licences should not be cancelled.
Some of the petitioners accept that in the recent past their licences were suspended under the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order for alleged breach of the licence conditions 34 for having sold large quantities of wheat to dealers outside the State without disclosing the names of the purchasers in their stock registers.
It, therefore, appears that the present suspension is for a repeated breach.
These petitioners have filed the petitions under article 32 of the Constitution for protection of their fundamental rights to carry on trade or business as foodgrains dealers within the meaning of article 19 (1) (g) read with article 301 thereof.
The other petitioners allege that because they approached the High Court by way of petitions under article 226 of the Constitution, complaining against restrictions placed on movement of wheat by rail, their licences have been suspended under the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl.11 of the order as a punitive measure.
Incidentally, these petitioners had first moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, but the High Court dismissed their writ petitions summarily.
The connected special leave petitions are directed against the order of the High Court.
The State of Punjab in the counter affidavits filed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Food and Supplies Department, Chandigarh, and the District Food and Supplies Controller, Faridkot, controvert the allegations of the petitioners.
It is stated that the petitioners have been served with show cause notices under the first proviso to sub cl.(1) of cl. 11 of the Order for cancellation of their licences, for breach of the licence conditions.
Learned counsel for the petitioners seek to assail the constitutional validity of the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl.11 of the Order on two grounds.
First of these is that the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order, inserted by the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing and Price Control (First Amendment) Order, 1980, confers upon the licensing authority unguided, uncontrolled and arbitrary power to suspend a licence and it, therefore, infringes the fundamental right to carry on trade or business guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.
It is also urged that the conferral of such unguided, uncanalised and arbitrary power on the licensing authority, without any guidelines whatsoever, makes the impugned proviso unconstitutional as offending article 14 of the Constitution.
The second contention is that the suspension of the foodgrains dealers ' licences held by the petitioners was mala fide and motivated, as in reality it was not on account of any breach of the licence conditions on their part, but on extraneous considera 35 tions.
It is said that the real purpose was to prevent them from exporting wheat from the State of Punjab to various other States in the course of inter State trade and commerce within the meaning of article 301 of the Constitution.
We are unable to accept any of these contentions.
To make the point intelligible, it is necessary to deal with the scheme of the Order.
3 of the Order provides that no person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted by the licensing authority.
Cl. 7 (3) thereof provides that where an application for grant of a licence is not refused, the licensing authority shall grant a licence in Form B subject to the conditions specified therein.
Condition No. 4 of the licence enjoins that the licensee shall submit to the licensing authority concerned fortnightly returns in Form C of the stock receipts and deliveries.
Condition No. 8 of the licence lays down that the licensee shall exhibit the price list of foodgrains held by him for sale and it shall indicate separately the prices of different varieties of foodgrains.
Condition No. 10 thereof interdicts that the licensee shall give all facilities at all reasonable times to the licensing authority or any officer authorised by it or the State Government, for the inspection of his stocks and accounts at any shop, godown or other place used by him for the storage, sale or purchase of foodgrains etc.
11 of the Order provides for cancellation or suspension of a licence.
The power of cancellation or suspension of a licence which was subject to the giving of a reasonable opportunity to the lincensee of stating his case was not adequate and sufficient to effectively check and control flagrant breaches of the provisions of the order, during the pendency of the proceedings for cancellation of a licence.
The State Government, therefore, inserted the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order.
11 of the Order, as amended, in so far as material, reads: "Cancellation or suspension of licence: (1) If a licensee or his agent or any person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the terms and conditions of his licence or any provision of this Order then, without prejudice to any action that may be taken against him, the licensing authority may by an order in writing, cancel or suspend licence in so far as it relates to the foodgrains in respect of which contravention has been made.
36 Provided that no order shall be made under this clause unless the licensee has been given a reasonable opportunity of stating his case; Provided further that the licensing authority may suspend a licence without giving a reasonable opportunity to the licensee of stating his case for a period not exceeding ninety days during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of his licence.
" It is plain upon the terms of sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the order that it deals with the substantive punishment of cancellation or suspension of a licence.
The power of cancellation or suspension of a licence of a foodgrains dealer under sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order is, however, subject to the limitation contained in the first proviso.
The power of cancellation or suspension of a licence is, therefore, not exercisable by the licensing authority until it affords a reasonable opportunity to the licensee of stating his case.
This necessarily entails the holding of an inquiry into the question of the alleged breach.
The making of an inquiry into the breach of licence conditions by a foodgrains dealer is a time consuming process which may many a time verily frustrate the purpose and object of the Order.
The State Government was evidently of the opinion in the light of the experience gained in the recent past, that for effective control and regulation of the trade in foodgrains, it was necessary and expedient that the licensing authority should be clothed with powers to suspend a licence on the spot when it detects contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the provisions of the Order.
Otherwise, a foodgrains dealer after committing flagrant breaches of the terms and conditions of his licence and the provisions of the Order, may, with impunity, carry on his trading activities without any check or control.
The power of suspension conferred by the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order is by way of an interim measure, pending the holding of an inquiry as to whether there is any breach which must result in cancellation of the licence.
It is true that the suspension of licence is a drastic measure, if taken without affording to the dealer a reasonable opportunity of stating his case, but it is 37 a measure of social control in the interests of the community.
The power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of the power to grant a privilege or a licence.
By reason of cl. 3 of the Order, no dealer can engage in the business of purchase and sale of foodgrains except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued by the licensing authority in that behalf.
The dealers are free to carry on their trade or business in foodgrains, subject to their complying with the terms and conditions of their licence and the provisions of the Order.
But, if they commit a breach, they must face the consequence that their licence may be cancelled or suspended under sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order.
They must face the further consequence of suspension of their licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of the licence, if the breach is of such a nature that it must result in the cancellation of a licence.
As already stated, the power of suspension is a necessary adjunct of the power to grant a licence.
In view of the acute shortage of foodstuffs in the country, the Government is bound to take all effective steps to implement the provisions of the Act and the various orders issued under section 3 thereof, from time to time.
The conferral of the power of suspension of the licence of a foodgrains dealer under the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of his licence, is an important step taken by the Government to subserve the object of the legislation and is in public interest.
It cannot be said that the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order does not satisfy the test of reasonableness.
It seeks to strike a proper balance between the freedom of trade or business guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by cl.
(6) of article 19 of the Constitution.
It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order is of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of the general public.
There is no warrant for the submission that the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order confers upon the licensing authority unguided, uncontrolled and uncanalised power to suspend a licence and is, therefore, void by reason of article 14 of the Constitution.
It is urged that the impugned orders of suspension in these cases are for a period of 89 days, and the licensing authority would, as in the past, pass fresh orders of suspension ad infinitum 38 completely paralysing the business of the petitioners.
There is no substance in the contention that repeated orders of suspension of a licence can be passed under the second proviso in respect of the same breach.
The second proviso expressly states that the licensing authority may suspend a licence for a period not exceeding ninety days.
It, therefore, fixes the period of suspension.
From its very terms, it is obvious that there cannot be repeated orders of suspension of a licence under the second provision in respect of the same breach.
Normally, the order of suspension under the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order after the expiry of the period of 90 days, would automatically lapse.
However, if the licensee commits another breach, after the expiry of the period of suspension, there is nothing to prevent the licensing authority to suspend his licence afresh.
On a fair reading of the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order, it cannot be said that it commits to the unrestrained will of the District Food and Supplies Controller, who is the licensing authority, the power of suspension of a licence.
It does not confer arbitrary and uncontrolled power because the suspension can only be for specified reasons and the second proviso lays down the circumstance or grounds on which the power may be exercised.
Such guidelines are expressly and specifically stated.
In the first place, the power of suspension is not exercisable unless there is a breach and the breach is of such a nature that it must entail cancellation of the licence.
The substantive provision contained in sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order provides for the power of cancellation or suspension, if any dealer commits any contravention of the 'terms and conditions of his licence or any provision of this order '.
The first proviso is in the nature of a limitation on the power contained in sub cl.
(1), and there can be no cancellation or suspension of a licence unless the licensee is afforded a reasonable opportunity of stating his case.
The proper function of the second proviso is to carve out an exception to the first proviso.
It dispenses with the requirement of affording a reasonable opportunity to the licensee in case of suspension of his licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation.
It must, however, be read along with the main enacting provision in sub cl.
(1), and, if so construed, the power of suspension during the pendency of an inquiry cannot be exercised unless there is contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the 39 provisions of the Order.
Secondly, it provides for a reasonable safeguard, in that it limits the period of suspension.
The period of suspension would necessarily depend upon the nature of the breach, and in no case, can it exceed ninety days.
During this period, the licensing authority is expected to complete the inquiry and take a decision as to the cancellation or otherwise of the licence.
Thirdly, as a check upon possible injustice that might result from an improper exercise of the power of suspension of a licence by the licensing authority under the second proviso, there is an additional safeguard to a dealer by way of an appeal to the Director, Food and Supplies, under cl. 13 of the Order.
This Court has repeatedly laid down that where the discretion to apply the provisions of a particular statute is left with the Government or one of the highest officers, it will be presumed that the discretion vested in such highest authority will not be abused.
It would, therefore, appear that the second proviso to sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order furnishes sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power of suspension of a licence during the pendency of or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation thereof, and it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, not violative of article 14 of the Constitution.
On the contrary, as already indicated, it affords reasonable safeguards.
There still remains the question whether the impugned orders of suspension are mala fide or motivated.
We are unable to hold from the material on record that the licensing authorities acted with improper motives or were actuated with bias in directing the suspension of the licences held by the petitioners.
All that is averred in para 9 is: "(Under oral instructions of the Punjab Government from the Civil Supplies and Food Department to all the Licensing Authorities, including the Food Department and Supplies Controllers, instructions were issued that if any one dealer is found exporting wheat to another State, there being no direct or indirect ban on such movement, he should be punished at the spot by way of suspension of licences so that the dealer may not export wheat to any other State for which there are no restrictions imposed by 40 any law or notified order or even the terms and conditions of the licence." The petitioners then go on to say in para 12: "Under oral instructions from the Secretary, Food and Supplies Department, the Director Food and Civil Supplies, and up to the District Food and supplies Controller, the Punjab Government has imposed restriction on inter State movement of foodgrains.
There are already restrictions on stock holding and dealer to dealer sale.
The petitioners have never violated any conditions of the licence except that they have been, in exercise of their fundamental rights, exporting foodgrains to various destination outside the State of Punjab. " In the case of M/s Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar in support of the petition, there is an affidavit of one Raj Kumar, claiming to be a partner, who asserts that the allegations in paras 9 and 12 are 'correct to the best of my knowledge '.
To say the least, this is no affidavit at all.
Under order XIX, Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it was incumbent upon the deponent to disclose the nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient particularity.
The allegations in the petition are, therefore, not supported by an affidavit as required by law.
That being so, the State Government was fully justified in answer, 'Denied.
There is no restriction on the movement of wheat '.
The Deputy Secretary in his counter affidavit has further denied that the impugned orders of suspension were passed on the direction of the State Government.
In our view, the allegations in the writ petitions are not sufficient to constitute an averment of mala fides so as to vitiate the impugned orders of suspension.
The Court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition.
The burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it.
The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned orders of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias or misuse by the Government of its powers.
The impugned orders of suspension ex facie show breaches of conditions Nos. 4, 8 and 10 of the licence by the petitioners.
The question whether or not, they committed the breaches is a matter for 41 inquiry by the licensing authorities under sub cl.
(1) of cl. 11 of the Order.
In the result, the petitions must fail and are dismissed with costs.
P.B.R. Petitions dismissed.

Output:
Clause 11 of the Punjab Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Price Control Order 1978 (as amended in 1980) empowers the licensing authority to cancel or suspend a licence if the licensee contravenes any of the terms and conditions of his licence or any provision of the order.
The first proviso to this clause enjoins on the authority to give to the licensee a reasonable opportunity of stating his case before cancelling or suspending his licence.
The second proviso provides that "the licensing authority may suspend a licence without giving a reasonable opportunity to the licensee of stating his case for a period not exceeding 90 days during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of his licence.
" The petitioners, whose licences had been suspended under clause 11, contended that the second proviso to clause 11(1) of the Order conferred on the licensing authority unguided, uncontrolled and arbitrary power to suspend a licence which infringed their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and that conferral of such unguided power offended Article 14 of the Constitution and (2) that the suspension of the licence was mala fide and motivated because it was passed on extraneous considerations namely, to prevent them from exporting wheat from the State to other parts of the country in the course of inter state trade and commerce.
Dismissing the petitions, ^ HELD: The power conferred on the licensing authority under the second proviso to clause 11(1) of the Order is not of an excessive nature and beyond what is required in the interest of general public.
The power of suspension conferred by the second proviso to clause 11 is by way of an interim measure, pending an enquiry as to whether there was any breach which must result in cancellation of the licence.
The power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of the power to grant a privilege or a licence.
32 So long as the dealers complied with the conditions of licence and the provisions of the Order they are free to carry on their trade or business in foodgrains.
If they commit a breach they must face the consequences that their licence may be cancelled or suspended and also face further consequence of suspension of their licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for such cancellation if the breach is of such a nature that it must result in the cancellation of a licence.
The power of suspension conferred under the second proviso is an important step taken by the Government to subserve the object of the legislation and in is public interest.
Nor could it to be said that it does not satisfy the test of reasonableness.
[37 A G] Nor again could it be said that there is warrant for the submission that the second proviso confers upon the licensing authority unguided, uncontrolled and uncanalised power to suspend a licence.
It does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
[37 G] It cannot be said that licensing authority has an unrestrained power of suspension of licence because the suspension can only be for specified reasons which are spelt out in the second proviso.
The power of suspension is not exercisable unless there is a breach and the breach is of such a nature that it must entail cancellation of the licence.
The first proviso is in the nature of limitation on the power contained in clause 11(1) and the second proviso carves out an exception to the first proviso by dispensing with the requirement of affording a reasonable opportunity to the licensee in case of suspension of his licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation.
The power of suspension during the pendency of an enquiry cannot be exercised unless there is contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the provisions of the Order.
Secondly, it provides for a reasonable safeguard in that it limits the period of suspension which would necessarily depend upon the nature of the breach which in no case can exceed 90 days.
Thirdly, as a check on improper exercise of power of suspension by the licensing authority an additional safeguard is provided by way of appeal to the Director of Food Supplies.
[38 E H] On the material on record there is nothing to show that the licensing authority acted with improper motives or was actuated with bias in directing the suspension of the licence held by the petitioners.
The affidavit filed by a partner of one of the petitioners does not fulfil the requirements of Order XIX rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which it is incumbent upon the deponent to disclose the nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient particularity.
The allegations in the writ petition are not sufficient to constitute an averment of mala fide so as to vitiate the orders of suspension.
The burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it.
[39 E F]