Input:
ivil Appeal No. 4521 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1985 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No 1133 of 1984(R).
Ashok Desai, Solicitor General, Kuldip Singh, Kapil Sibal, Additional Solicitor Generals, K.K. Venugopal, R.K. Jain, Gobind Das, R.N Sachthey, Shanti Bhushan, Dr. L.M. Singhvi, L.N. Sinha, M.L. Verma, Ranjit Kumar, K.K. Lahiri, R.F. Nariman, section Sukumaran, P.K. Jain, P. Saswidia, P. Parmeshwaran, C.V. Subba Rao, P.P. Singh, D Goburdan, S.B. Upadhyay, P.C. Kapoor, M.M Kashyap, A. Sharan, R.D. Upadh yay, S.K. Sinha, Apurb Lal, Anip Sachthey, C. Badri Nath Babu, B.B. Singh, A.K. Mitra, O.C. Mathur, A.N. Dittia, Arun Madan, Ms. A Subhashini, C.V. Subba Rao, Mrs. Sushma Suri and A.M. Ditta for the Appearing Parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J.
In these appeals a common question of law is involved whether the State of Bihar had legal authority to execute leases in favour of the respondents for collection of slurry on payment of royalty to it.
Since the question involved in these appeals are common the same are being disposed of by a common judgment.
Civil Appeal No. 4521 of 1986 and Civil Appeal Nos.
61 62 of 1987 are directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court while Civil Appeal Nos. 230 231 of 1987 are directed against the judg ment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.
In order to appreciate the controversy in question it is necessary to recapitulate the facts.
M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. appellant in of 1986 is a Government Company which carries coal mining operations in village Sudamdih in the State of Bihar.
There is a coal washery adjacent to the appellant 's coal mine in village Sudamdih.
After the coal is extracted from the mines, it is crushed into pieces of different sizes for purposes of grading.
Since the coal is mixed up with mud and other impurities, same is brought to the washery for washing and cleaning the same for reducing the ash percentage and for use by metallurgical consumers.
In the process of wash ing small coal particles escape from the washery in the form of slurry along with water and the same are deposited in the slurry ponds constructed for their storage by the appellant company.
But when the ponds are full, the slurry overflows the pond and flows down into the river Damodar.
After the water is soaked by the soil the small particles of coal get deposited in the river bed.
These coal particles are col lected and formed into briquettes which are sold in market for energy and fuel purposes.
The slurry coal has acquired high commercial value as it is of exceptional quality and high grade, it is used by steel plants and thermal power stations.
The State of Bihar granted lease in favour of Ram Nath Singh respondent No. 4 for collecting the coal parti cles settled in the Damodar fiber bed and other land includ ing plot No. 370 of Mauza Sudamdih.
The appellant claimed that plot No. 370 which formed part of river bed of Damodar belonged to it having been acquired under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957 for the purpose of mining of coal.
Pursuant to the lease, respondent No. 4 has been collecting the coal particles from plot No. 370.
The appellant company raised objection before the Revenue Authorities of the State of Bihar claiming property rights to collect and obtain slurry deposited in the river bed in plot No. 370, but its objections were over ruled and re spondent No. 4 was permitted to collect the coal particles from the aforesaid plot.
The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court of Patna challenging the State Government 's action in granting lease to respondent No. 4 for lifting slurry from the fiber bed, on the ground that the property belonged to the appellant company and the State Government had no authority in law to grant a mining lease without the prior approval of the Central Government under Section 5 of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act 1957.
Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. the appellant in Civil Appeal Nos.
61 62 of 1987, is a company incorporated under the Companies Act.
It owns steel plant at Jamshedpur and it also owns captive coal mines in the District of Hazari Bagh and Dhanbad.
These coal mines are commonly known as West Bokaro Collieties.
There is no dispute 753 that large area of land in the District of Hazari Bagh and Dhanbad have been settled with the appellant company for purposes of mining operations and the company enjoys mineral rights in respect of the surface and sub soil.
It is not necessary to refer to the historical facts relating to the acquisition of mining rights by the appellant, as there is no dispute that under Section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act the appellant 's existing mining leases became statutory leases in the State of Bihar.
The appellant has established washery plant in the District of Hazari Bagh as well as in Jama Dhoba and Zora Pokhar in District Dhanbad for purposes of washing the coal after extraction from the coal mines and crushed into different sizes.
In the process of washing the coal small particles of coal escape from the washery.
and over flow from the plant and the same are deposited in the storage pond constructed by the appellant.
But sometime they overflow from the storage pond and settle down in the Raiyati land and in the Bokaro river bed.
The appellant has been claiming right that the slurry which escaped from the washery belonged to it and no other person had right to collect the same.
The State Government did not accept the appellant 's claim instead it settled the fights of collec tion of slurry with the respondents under the indentures granted in their favour.
Under the settlement the respond ents have been authorised by the State Government to collect sludge and slurry which settles down in the Bokaro river bed or in the Raiyati land on payment of royalty to the State.
The appellant filed two writ petitions before the Patna High Court challenging the authority of the State Government 's action on the ground that slurry was a mineral being coal and as such its collection or mining was regulated by the provisions of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Develop ment) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') and the State Government had no authority to grant any lease for collection of sludge/slurry without the previous sanction of the Central Government.
The aforesaid petitions were heard and disposed of by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court (AIR 1986 Patna 242).
The Full Bench dismissed the writ petitions on the findings that the slurry was neither coal nor mineral instead it was an industrial waste of coal mine which was not regulated by the provisions of the Act.
The collection of slurry did not involve any mining operations and the settlement made by the State Government in favour of the respondents for collecting the same was not a mining lease, therefore, the State Gov ernment was not under any legal obligation to obtain previ ous sanction of the Central Government under the Act.
The High Court further held that after the slurry escaped into the river bed or to some other land, the same 754 ceased to belong to the appellants and the State Government was entitlement to execute lease for collection of the same.
Civil Appeal Nos.
230 231 of 1987 are directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (AIR 1985 Calcutta 143).
The Central Coal fields Ltd. and the Coal India Ltd. the appellants are Government Companies which own coal mines in the District of Giridih in the State of Bihar.
The appellants have set up coal washeries at Kathara, Kargali and Sawang in the District of Giridih for washing the coal extracted from its mines.
In the process of washing, particles of coal escape from the washery along with water which ultimately flows into the river Damodar.
The Mining Department of the State of Bihar granted lease to Industrial Fuel Marketing Company and Ors. respondents for removing the slurry from the river bed on payment of royalty but the appellants resisted the collection of slurry from their land and they instituted criminal proceedings against the contractors.
Thereupon, the respondents contractors filed writ petitions before the Calcutta High Court for quashing the criminal case registered against them, and also for the issue of a direction permitting them to collect slurry under the lease granted to them by the State of Bihar.
Before the High Court the appellants herein contended that the slurry belonged to them and the State of Bihar had no authority in law to grant any lease in respect of the same.
A learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the findings that the appellants herein are the owner of the slurry and the State Government had no authority to grant any lease to the respondent contractors for removal of the same.
On appeal by the contractors a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court vide its judgment (AIR 1985 Calcutta 143) held that the lease granted by the State of Bihar in favour of the contractors was not a mining lease and the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the grant of lease.
On the question of appellants ' claim to the property rights for collecting slurry, the Bench held that the slurry deposited on the appellant 's land, belonged to them and the respondents had no right to collect the same but if the slurry settled down on other 's land the respond ents have right to remove the same from the river bed.
Aggrieved, the Central Coal fields Ltd. and Coal India Ltd. have challenged the correctness of the High Court 's view by these appeals.
The main question which falls for consideration is whether the State of Bihar has authority to grant lease/settlement to the respondents for collection/lifting of coal slurry deposited in the river bed or on any other land after its escape from the appellants ' washeries.
755 Before the High Court the appellants contended that in view of the provisions of the Act the State of Bihar had no authority to grant any lease regarding collection of slurry without the prior approval of the Central Government.
The State of Bihar and other respondents contended before the High Court that the slurry was not a mineral, and its col lection or lifting from the river bed involved no mining operations, therefore, the Act did not apply and the State Government was free to grant leases for collection of the same.
The appellants further pleaded before the High Court that since slurry after its escape from their washeries settled down in their own land, it continued to be their property and the State of Bihar had no authority to grant lease for collection of the same from their land.
The Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that the slurry was neither coal nor a mineral instead it was a reject residue or waste of an industrial process consisting of mud, ash and oily substances having carbonaceous ingredients.
Since collection of slurry did not involve any mining operations the provisions of the Act did not apply and the State Gov ernment had authority to settle the removal of slurry with private parties.
With regard to the appellants ' claim of ownership of the slurry deposited on the appellants ' land, the Full Bench did not decide the question, on the ground that these issues involved disputed questions of fact which could properly be adjudicated in a civil suit.
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the lease granted by the State of Bihar was not a mining lease as the river bed or the land from where the slurry was collected was not a mine as no winning or mining operations were involved in collecting the same.
The Bench further held that the lease granted by the State Government in favour of the respondents for collecting the slurry did not confer any right in them for carrying out coal mining operation nor such right relates to winning or mining of coal.
However the Bench held that the slurry deposited on the appellants ' land belonged to them and the respondents lessee had no right to collect slurry from the appellants ' land.
But if the slurry was deposited on the land not owned by the appellants, the lessee was entitled to remove the same under the settlement made by the State of Bihar.
Thus, both the High Courts held that the slurry which escaped from the washeries and depos ited in the river bed or on other land did not constitute a mineral and it was not regulated by the Central Act, conse quently, the State of Bihar had authority to settle the collection of slurry.
Learned counsel for the parties made elaborate submis sions, before us in support of their case.
On behalf of the appellants it was ' 756 urged that slurry/sludge the subject matter of dispute in the instant cases, in substance is coal, a mineral specified in the First Schedule to the Act.
The State Government had no authority in law to grant any lease to the respondents for the collection or removal or lifting of the slurry coal deposited in the river bed or on any Raiyati land without obtaining the sanction of the Central Government under Section 5 of the Act.
The counsel for the appellants further emphasised that slurry which escaped from washery of the coal mines, contains small particles of coal having carbona ceous character, and it is used for energy and fuel pur poses.
Assailing the findings of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, the appellants ' counsel submitted that slurry coal was not deposited in the river bed or other land by any artificial mode instead the same were deposited in the river bed and the land by natural process of flow of water dis charged from the washeries.
The process of collection or removal of the same from the river bed or Raiyati land by the respondent/lessees involved winning operations.
Winning or mining operation according to the learned counsel did not always require excavation or extraction of a mineral from the bowels of the earth instead a mineral like sand or gravel may be deposited on the earth and removal of the same would also involve winning or mining operation.
The appel lants further urged that if the slurry which is the subject matter of the lease or settlement, is not a mineral, the State Government had no authority in law to authorise any other person to remove the same from the appellants ' land.
There is no law made by the State Legislature authorising the State Government to interfere with the appellants ' property rights.
In the absence of any law the State of Bihar had no authority to interfere with the appellants ' property rights by executive orders.
In the alternative learned counsel for the appellants urged that on the admit ted pleadings of the parties slurry discharged from the washeries of the appellants ' coal mines constituted waste and effluent of coal mines, its disposal was exclusively within the legislative competence of the Parliament.
In view of the Parliament 's declaration under Section 2 read with Sections 13 and 18 of the Act, the State Government was denuded of all its powers in the matter relating to the disposal of slurry which would include its removal or col lection.
Since the State Legislature is denuded of its legislative competence to make any law with regard to dis posal of waste or effluent discharge of coal mines, the State Government has no executive power to deal with the same.
Learned counsel for the State of Bihar and other respondents reiterated their stand as taken by them before the High Court that the slurry was not a mineral and its removal did not involve any mining operations, consequently the settlement deed was not a mining 757 lease under the Act.
On behalf of the State Government it was further contended that once the slurry escaped from the washcry plants of the appellants it ceased to belong to them and as it polluted the river water and affected the fertili ty of Raiyati land the State Government was justified in providing for its collection and removal to prevent pollu tion.
The appellants could not have any right in the goods which they abandoned.
It was further urged that the washer ies do not form integral part of the mining operations, therefore the slurry could not be treated as a waste of coal mine.
In the alternative learned counsel contended that even if slurry was a waste of a coal mine the State Government was competent to provide for its collection and removal as the Central Government had failed to make any rule under Section 18 of the Act regulating disposal of the slurry.
Before, we consider the contentions of the parties, we think it necessary to briefly discuss the nature and charac teristic of the slurry.
There is no dispute that coal is found in seams mixed with mud and other impurities.
After its extraction from the mines, it is crushed into different sizes, thereafter it is washed in the washeries of the coal mines for removing its impurities for purposes of making it fit for use for metallurgical purposes.
In the washery plants, coal is washed with the medium of water mixed with pine oil and sand through mechanical process.
In the process of washing, large quantity of water is discharged through pipes which carry the discharged water to storage ponds constructed for the purpose of retaining the slurry.
Along with the discharged water, small particles of coal are carried away to the pond where the coal particles settle down on the surface of the pond, and the same is collected after the pond is de watered.
The coal particles so collect ed are of fine quality, ash free and the same is used as fuel.
The slurry is a descriptive expression, it may be cement sluny or coal slurry, depending upon the character or quality of the mixture of mineral in the liquid form.
In Websters New 20th Century Dictionary, 'slurry ' is defined as follows: "A thin mixture of water and any of several fine, insoluble materials as clay, cement, soil etc.
" In common parlance slurry is a liquid form mixed with some other material.
In Encyclopedia Britannica 'slurry ' is defined as under: "Slurry watery mixture or suspension of insoluble matter.
In the manufacture of portland cement, a mixture of the raw materials with water is called a slurry.
Cement may be 758 piped as a slurry in building construction.
Coal may be transported over long distances as a slurry via pipeline; this method of transmission is economical between large producing areas and markets where large tonnages are used at a fairly uniform rate.
The shipment of iron ore as slurry, either by pipeline or by tanker, also has increased.
When slurry reaches its destination, the material is separated from the water before use or further processing." Viewed in the light of the above meaning of slurry, there is no doubt that in the instant cases slurry is coal slurry, as admittedly small particles of coal escape from the washery plant alongwith water.
After it overflows the storage pond the slurry flows into the river and is deposit ed on the river bed, which is later on collected and used as fuel after it is formed into briquettes.
The deposit which is collected from the river bed continues to be carbonaceous in character having all the elements of coal.
Thus, the slurry is coal in liquid form.
A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Kesari Mal Jain vs State of Bihar, AIR 1985 Patna 114 placing reliance on Nelson 's Dictionary of Mining which defined 'slurry ' as 'slurry inter alia means fine carbonaceous discharge from a colliery washery" held that the carbonaceous particles so discharged from the coal washery is used for producing energy or heat therefore it was coal.
The Bench further held that coal particles which flow out with the water from the coal washeries are formed into balls or briquettes for sale in the market for purposes of producing energy or heat, therefore, slurry was coal.
The Division Bench 's view was not accepted by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court as it held that the slurry deposit did not constitute a mineral.
We agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in Kesari Mal 's case (supra) as in our opinion the slurry coal deposited in the river bed or land, in substance as well as in its character continues to be coal.
If slurry is coal, the question is whether the leases in dispute granted by the State of Bihar constitute mine leases as contemplated by Section 5(2)(a) of the Act.
"Mining lease" as defined by Section 3(c) means "a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations and include a sub lease granted for such purpose.
"Mining operations" as defined by Section 3(d) means "any operations for the pur pose of winning any mineral.
" Section 5(1) places restric tion on the grant of mining leases by a State Government.
Section 5 (2)(a) lays down that except with the previous approval of the Central Government no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted in respect of any material specified in the First Schedule.
The First Schedule to 759 the Act specifies minerals as contemplated by Section 5(2)(a) and "coal" is specified therein at Item No. 4.
The Patna and Calcutta High Courts have held that the collection of slurry did not involve any mining operations, therefore, the lease in question was not a mining lease.
Consequently, the State Government was not under any legal obligation to obtain approval of the Central Government before granting leasses for collection of slurry.
These findings are assailed and the appellants contend that mining operations need not always involve extraction of mineral from the bowels of the earth, a mineral like sand, gravel may be deposited on the surface of the earth, and still its collection involves mining operations.
It was strenuously urged that it is wrong to assume that mines and minerals must always be embedded under the sub soil and There can be no mineral on the surface of the earth.
See: Bhagwan Das State of U.P. & Ors.
, ; The definition of "mining operation" and "mine" are very wide.
The expression "mining of mineral" in the definition of "mining operation" under section 3(d) of the Act is spacious enough to comprehend every activity by which a minerals extracted or obtained from the earth irrespective of whether such activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of the earth.
It is not a requirement of the definition of "mining operation", that the activity for winning the miner al must necessarily be an underground activity.
The essence of 'mining operation ' is that it must be an activity for winning a mineral whether under the surface or winning the surface of earth, vide: Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu vs B.D. Dey & Co. & Ors.
, ; The slurry which is deposited on the river bed is not dumped there artificially by any human agency instead coal particles are carried to the river bed by the flow of water through natural process.
Therefore the view taken by the High Court that the slurry which is deposited in the river bed is dumped by the appel lants by artificial process is incorrect.
Once the coal particles are carried away by the water which is discharged from the washery and the same are settled in the river bed, any operation for the extraction or lifting of the coal particles from the river bed would involve winning opera tions within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act.
We do not think it necessary to express any final opinion on this question as the appeals bound to succeed on the ground of absence of legislative competence of the State Legislature.
Shri K.K. Venugopal learned counsel for the appellant urged that the recovery of coal from slurry irrespective of whether slurry is a mineral, or its collection involved mining operations or not, the State 760 of Bihar has no authority in law to regulate disposal of slurry.
Under the Constitution 'conservation and development of mines and minerals ' is exclusively assigned to the Cen tral Government, and the State Legislature has no power to make any lease with regard to the disposal of coal slurry which is waste of coal mining.
He referred to the provisions of the Act and particularly to Sections 2 and 18 in support of his contention that in view of Parliamentary Legislation, the State Legislature has no legislative competence to enact any law on the subject, consequently the State Government has no executive authority to deal with the disposal of slurry.
In order to appreciate this submission it is neces sary to consider the Constitutional provisions and the Act.
Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution read with Seventh Schedule and the legislative lists therein prescribe the extent of legislative competence of Parliament and,State Legislature.
Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule.
Similarly, State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II.
Parliament and the State Legislature both have legislative power to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in List III, the Concurrent List.
This is the legislative scheme under the Constitution, but certain matters of legislation are overlapping which present difficulty.
The subject matter of legislation with respect of regulation of Mines and Mineral development is enumerated under Entry 23 of List II and Entry 54 of List I.
These Entries are as under: "23.
Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union." "54.
Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.
" The State Legislature is competent to enact law for the regulation of mines and mineral development under Entry 23 of State List but this power is subject to the declaration which may be made by Parliament by law as envisaged by Entry 54 of Union List.
Thus the legislative competence of the State Legislature to make law on the topic of mines and mineral is subject to Parliamentary Legislation.
The Parlia ment has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and 761 Development) Act, 1957.
By section 2 of the Act the Parliament has declared that it is expedient in public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act.
In view of Parliamentary declaration as made in section 2 of the Act, the State Legislature is denuded of its legislative power to make any law with respect to the regu lation of mines and mineral development to the extent as provided by the Act.
In order to ascertain the extent of Parliamentary declaration, it is necessary to have a glance at the provision of the Act.
Section 3 of the Act defines various expressions occurring in the Act.
Sections 4 to 9 prescribe restrictions on undertaking, prospecting and mining operations under licence or lease.
Section 10 to 12 prescribe procedure for obtaining prospecting licences or mining lease in respect of the land in which minerals vest in Government.
Sections 13 to 16 provide for framing of rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences or mining leases.
In particular section 13 empowers the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of pros pecting licences and mining leases in respect of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith.
Section 13(2) lays down that rules may provide for all or any of the matters as enumerated under various clauses therein.
Clause (0) of section 13(2) before its amendment by the Amending Act 37 of 1986 conferred power on the Central Government to frame rules for the disposal or discharge of any tailings, slime or other waste products arising from any mining or metallurgical operations carried out in a mine.
This provision empowered the Central Government to frame rules for the disposal of waste products or effluent discharge from mines including a coal mine.
Section 14 makes the provisions of sections 4 to 13 inapplicable to minor minerals.
Section 15 empowers the State Government to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases and other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and purposes connected there with.
Since in the instant cases, we are not concerned with the minor minerals, it is not necessary to deal with the question in detail.
Section 17 confers special powers on Central Government to undertake prospecting or mining opera tions in certain lands.
Section 18 and 18A relate to the development of minerals.
Sections 19 to 33 deal with miscel laneous matters.
Section 18(1) provides for mineral development, this Section prior to its amendment by the Amending Act 37 of 1986 read as under: "Sec.
18(1): It shall be the duty of the Central Government to take such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India and for that 762 purpose the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as it thinks fit.
" Section 18(1) as amended by the Amending Act 37 of 1986 reads as under: "Sec.
18(1): It shall be the duty of the Central Government to take such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and systematic development of minerals in India and for the protection of environment by preventing or controlling any pollution which may be caused by prospecting or mine opera tions and for such purpose the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as it thinks fit.
" The amended and unamended sections both lay down that it shall be the duty of the Central Government to take all such steps as may be necessary "for the conservation and develop ment of minerals" in India and for that purpose it may make such rules as it thinks fit.
The expression "for the conser vation of minerals" occurring under section 18(1) confers wide power on the Central Government to frame any rule which may be necessary for protecting the mineral from loss, and for its preservation.
The expression 'conservation ' means "the act of keeping or protecting from loss or injury." With reference to the natural resources, the expression in the context means preservation of mineral; the wide scope of the expression "conservation of minerals" comprehends any rule reasonably connected with the purpose of protecting the loss of coal through the waste of coal mine, such a rule may also regulate the discharge of slurry or collection of coal particles after the water content of slurry is soaked by soil.
In addition to the general power to frame rules for the conservation of mineral, Sec.
18(2) confers specific power for framing rules regulating disposal of waste of a mine.
The Amending Act 37 of 1986 deleted clause (0) of section 13(2) and added the same as clause (k) to section 18(2) of the Act.
After the amendment Sec.
18(2)(k) reads as under: "18(2): In particular, and without prejudice to the general ity of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: (k): "the disposal or discharge of waste slime or tailing 763 arising from any mining or metallurgical operations carried out in a mine." Section 18(2)(k) confers express power on the Central Gov ernment for framing rules for the conservation and the development of mineral including the disposal or discharge of waste arising from any mining operations of a mine.
Such a rule may regulate disposal of slurry discharged from a washery which is an integral part of mining operations.
The aforesaid analysis of the provisions of the Act makes the extent of Parliamentary declaration clear that the disposal and discharge of sludge or slurry emanating or coming from the washery of a coal mine is exclusively within the legislative power of Parliament.
The Act further pro vides that the Central Government has exclusive power to frame any rule either u/s 13(2)(0) or under the amended section 18(2)(k) of the Act regulating disposal of slurry.
The effect of the Parliamentary declaration as contained in the Act is that the matters referred to in the declaration, stand abstracted from List II and those become matters of legislation in List I of the Seventh Schedule.
As a result of the declaration made by Parliament, under section 2 of the Act, the State Legislature is denuded of its legislative power with respect to the regulation of mines and mineral development and the entire legislative field has been taken over by Parliament.
In Baijnath Kedia vs State of Bihar & Ors., ; this Court dealing with the extent of Parliament 's declaration made under section 2 of the Act, ob served as follows: "To what extent such a declaration can go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest.
Once this declaration is made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation to the extent laid down becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament.
Any legislation by the State after such declaration and trenching upon the field disclosed in the declaration must necessarily be unconstitutional because that field is ab stracted from the legislative competence of the State Legis lature.
" This Court has consistently taken this view in The Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors.
vs The State of Orissa & Ors., [1961] 2 SCR537; State of Orissa vs M.A. Tulloch & Co., ; and State of Tamil Nadu vs Hind Stone, ; 764 The Central Government has not framed any rule either under Section 13 or under Section 18 of the Act.
Does it affect the legal position as discussed earlier? The answer must be in the negative.
Prior to the Amending Act 37 of 1986 Section 13(2)(o) conferred power on the Central Govern ment to frame rules for the purpose of granting prospecting licences and mining leases including the disposal or dis charge of any tailings, slime or other waste products.
Sub clause (0) of section 13(2) was transposed into section 18(2) as sub clause (k) by the Amending Act 37 of 1986.
As noted earlier, section 18(1) confers general power on the Central Government to frame rules and to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India.
Section 18(2) does not affect or restrict the generality or width of legislative power under Section 18(1) as the mat ters specified in various sub clauses of section 18(2) are illus trative in nature.
Even in the absence of sub section
(2) or its various sub clauses, the Central Government was invested with the power of subordinate legislation in respect of any matter which could reasonably be connected with the purpose of "conservation and development of minerals" by section 18(1) of the Act.
Thus, power to frame rules, regulating the dis charge or disposal of slime or slurry emanating from a coal mine including its collection from the river bed or from Raiyati land after its escape from the washery of the coal mines, would clearly fail within the expression "conserva tion of mineral".
Slurry admittedly contain coal particles.
its collection from land or river is reasonably connected with the 'conservation of mineral '.
Section 18(2)(k) which expressly confers power on the Central Government to regu late disposal or discharge of waste of a mine makes the Parliamentary declaration apparent that the State Legisla ture is not competent to regulate waste discharge of a coal mine.
Mere absence of any rule framed by the Central Govern ment under sections 13 or 18 of the Act with regard to the dis posal of slime or waste of a coal mine does not confer legislative competence on the State Legislature to make any law or rule.
Once a particular topic of legislation is covered by the Parliamentary declaration, the State Legisla ture is denuded of its power to make any law or rule in respect of that topic or subject matter and the absence of Rules would not confer legislative competence on the State.
In Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors.
vs The State of Orissa & Ors., this Court held: "In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that required is a declaration by Parliament that it was expedi ent in the public interest to take the regulation of devel opment of mines under the control of the Union.
In 765 such a case the test must be whether the legislative decla ration covers the field or not." Since Section 18 of the Act covers the field with respect to disposal of waste of a mine, there is no scope for the contention that until rules are framed the State Legislature has power to make law or rules on the subject.
Once the competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces its legislative intent to cover the entire field on a topic, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne.
Mere absence of rules framed by the Central Government, does not confer power on the State Legislature to make law on the subject.
Since the legislative field with regard to the framing of rules relating to the disposal of slime and waste of ' coal mine is fully covered by section 18, the State Legisla ture is denuded of its power of making any law with regard to those matters.
It was then urged that in the absence of a law being made by the State Legislature, the State Government 's action in executing lease/ settlement in respondent 's favour for collection of slurry is relatable to exercise of its execu tive powers.
Learned counsel for the appellants contended that since Entry 23 of List II of the Seventh Schedule confers legislative power on the State Legislature for making laws regulating mines and minerals, the State Govern ment in the absence of any rule made by the Central Govern ment has power to regulate disposal and collection of slur ry.
The State Government was justified in exercising its executive power making arrangements for the collection or removal of slurry which has been polluting the river water and affecting the Raiyati land 's fertility.
Article 162 prescribes the extent of executive power of the State, it lays down that the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws.
Thus, the executive power of the State Government is co extensive with the legislative power of the State Legislature.
If the State Legislature has power to enact laws on a matter enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List the State has executive power to deal with those matters subject to other provisions of the Constitution.
If a subject matter falls within the legisla tive competence of State Legislature, the exercise of execu tive power by the State Government is not confined, as even in the absence of a law being made, the State Government is competent to deal with the subject matter in exercise of its executive power.
See: Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors.
vs The State of Punjab, In the absence of any law, the State Government or its officers in exercise of executive authority cannot infringe citizens fights merely because the 766 State Legislature has power to make laws with regard to subject, in respect of which the executive power is exer cised.
See: State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
vs Thakur Bharat Singh, ; , No doubt under Entry 23 of List II, the State Legislature has power to make law but that power is subject to Entry 54 of List I with respect to the regula tion and development of mines and minerals.
As discussed earlier the State Legislature is denuded of its power to make laws on the subject in view of Entry 54 of List I and the Parliamentary declaration made under Section 2 of the Act.
Since State Legislature 's power to make law with re spect to the matter enumerated in Entry 23 of List has been taken away by the Parliamentary declaration, the State Government ceased to have any executive power in the matter relating to regulation of mines and mineral development.
Moreover, the proviso to Article 162 itself contains limita tion on the exercise of the executive power of the State.
It lays down that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of State shall be subject to limitation of the executive power expressly conferred by the Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authority thereof.
The limitation as contained in the proviso to Article 162 was necessary to avoid conflict in the exercise of executive power of State and the Union Government in respect of matters enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule.
If Parliament and the State Legisla ture both have power to make law in a matter, the executive power of the State shall be subject to the law made by the Parliament or restricted by the executive power of the Union expressly conferred on it by the Constitution or any law made by Parliament.
Parliament has made the law as contem plated by Entry 54 of List I and the law so made confers exclusive power on the Central Government to frame rules regulating the disposal of waste or industrial effluent of a mine, the State Legislature has, therefore no power either to make law under Entry 23 of List II or to exercise execu tive power to regulate the disposal of slurry, a waste effluent discharge of a coal mine.
Learned counsel for the State of Bihar as well as for the respondent contractors contended that the lease executed by the State Government in their favour was not a mining lease within the provisions of the Act, therefore, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to it.
This submis sion is rounded on the assumption that the slurry is not coal.
We have already discussed the characteristic of slurry which shows that the coal can be transported in liquid form of slurry.
The slurry which gets deposited on the river bed and on Raiyati land contains fine particles of coal, on its resumption it is used for energy and 767 fuel purposes.
It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that the coal particles which escape from the washery and get deposited in the river bed or in Raiyati land do not have the character of mineral.
It is not, howev er, open to the State to raise this contention as while making settlement and granting lease in favour of the re spondents for lifting or collecting slurry deposits the State itself proceeded on the assumption that the coal particles as deposited in the river bed and in the Raiyati land on its escape from the coal washeries constituted 'mineral '.
Since under the Bihar Land Reforms Act the miner als vest in the State, it claimed right to grant lease in favour of the respondents for collecting the same.
In the indenture of settlement dated 9.4.1975 granted in favour of the M/s. Industrial Fuel Marketing Company and Ors.
in Civil Appeal No. 230 231 of 1987 the State Government itself stated: "and whereas these rejects/sludge being a mineral (emphasis supplied) the State Government is the owner of the same by virtue of the entire State including the minerals having vested in the State Government under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act." The indenture purported to confer right on the lessee for lifting rejects also known as sludge comprising fine particles of coal which are ejected in the process of coal being washed in the coal washeries and which flow into the nearby river or to the lands held by the Raiyats.
The lease was granted by the Mining Department of the State Government dealing with minerals.
Similarly, the indenture of settlement dated 9.4.1981 granted in favour of respondent No. 4 in Civil Appeal Nos.
61 62 of 1987 permitting him to collect slurry after it is deposited in the river bed or in the land as specified in the lease, was also executed by the State of Bihar on the premise that the slurry as deposited in the river bed was a mineral, namely, coal.
Thus, it is apparent that the State of Bihar itself has been treating the 'slurry deposits ' as mineral and on that assumption it has been executing leases conferring rights on the respondents to collect the same on payment of royalty.
In this view, it is not open to the State of Bihar and the lessees to contend that slurry is not coal or miner al within the meaning of the Act.
Learned counsel for the respondents attempted to justify State 's action on the ground that the slurry as settled down in river bed or in Raiyati land was not waste or industrial effluent of coal mines as the washeries are not part of coal mines.
We find no merit in the submission.
Section 3 of the Act defines 'mining operations ' which means any operation undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral.
The expression 'mine ' is not defined by the Act instead Section 3(1) says that the expression 'mine ' has the same meaning as assigned to it in the .
"Mine" as defined by Section 2(1)(j) of 768 1952 means any excavation where any operation for the pur pose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on and it includes: (xii) "any premises in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine on which any process ancillary to the getting, dressing or preparation for sale of minerals or of coke is being carried on.
" The inclusive definition of mine is wide enough to include any premises belonging to a mine where any ancillary process is carried on for preparing the minerals or coke for sale.
There is no dispute between the parties that the coal as extracted from the coal mine is crushed into pieces and thereafter it is washed to remove its impurities and ash contents to make the coal fit for sale.
After the coal is washed, it assumes the form of coke which is sold to consum ers.
The washery, wherein the process of washing coal is carried on, for the purpose of preparing the coal for sale is an integral part of a mine as it involves ancillary process.
Washery is included within the definition of mine under the .
Any waste discharge from the washery carrying small particles of coal in the form of slurry is the waste slime arising from operations carried out in a mine.
Moreover, it is not open to the respondents to contend that slurry is not a waste discharged from the washeries of coal mines.
The respondents have all along pleaded before the High Court as well as before this Court that slurry is a waste discharged from the washery of the appellants ' coal mines.
In Civil Appeal No. 4521 of 1986 Ram Nath Singh respondent No. 4 has stated in paragraph 2 of his affidavit before this Court that slurry/sludge is a waste substance of Sudamdih coal washery and in order to keep the river water clean and pollution free and to earn revenue the State Government settled the collection of slurry from the river bed in his favour.
The State of Bihar also in its affidavit filed before the High Court expressly stated that the sludge/ slurry was rejected property from the coal washery and the State of Bihar made settlement in favour of the respondents for collection of the waste deposits from the river bed and other land.
The full Bench of the Patna High Court also observed: "the sludge/slurry could not be raised to the status of being coal, as it was the consequen tial wastes of coal mining process, therefore the true nature of slurry was that it was a mere residue reject or waste of an industrial process consisting of mud, ash, oily substances water and carbonaceous ingredients.
" The respond ents have all along proceeded on the assumption that sludge/ 769 slurry was an industrial waste arising out of the mining operations of coal.
The State of Bihar as well as the re spondents in whose favour the right of collection of sludge/slurry has been settled have all along taken the stand that the discharge of slurry/sludge by the appellant 's washcry into the river has been polluting the river and affecting the fertility of land, therefore the State Govern ment, permitted the removal of the slurry/sludge with a view to prevent pollution of the fiber and the land.
On the admitted facts the entire activity relating to disposal of the industrial waste, slime or tailing in the shape of sludge/slurry escaping from the washeries of the appellant 's coal mines including the prevention of pollution of river water or land is covered by Sec. 18 of the Act.
The High Courts confined themselves to the question whether sludge/ slurry was a mineral under the Act and failed to consider the scope and effect of Section 18 of the Act.
We are there fore of the opinion that in view of the admitted case of the parties disposal of sludge/slurry coming out from the wash eries of appellants ' coal mines is covered by the Act and the State Government had, no authority in law to grant any lease or settlement authorising collection of the same from the five bed or from any other land.
Consequently, the respondents in whose favour settlements have been made by the State Government have no right to authority to collect sludge/slurry either from the five bed or from any other land.
In Civil Appeal No. 4521 of 1986 the appellants ' claim that plot No. 370 situated in village Sudamdih belonged to them and the sludge/ slurry discharged from their washery as settled down on that land also belonged to them therefore the State Government had no authority in law to permit respondents to collect slurry coal from their land.
The High Court held that since the appellant 's ownership fights in respect of Plot No. 370 of village Sudamdih was seriously disputed the question should be decided by the civil court.
Mr. Kapil Sibal learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court committed serious error as there was no scope for any dispute regarding the question of ownership of Plot No. 370.
We find force in his submission.
There is suffi cient material on record to show that Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. is the owner of the plot No. 370 situated at village Sudamdih and the respondents have failed to place any mate rial before the court that the appellant is not owner of Plot No. 370.
A Notification was issued by the Central Government on 6.8.1960 under sub section (1) of Section 4 of the Coal Beating Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, for purpose of prospecting coal in the land specified in the Schedule to the Notification included the entire land of village Sudamdih District Dhanbad.
By another Notifica tion dated August 30, 1961 issued under 770 Section 7 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Devel opment) Act, 1957 the Central Government declared its inten tion to acquire the lands measuring 778.45 acres specified in Schedule A to the Notification Sudamdih village was mentioned in the Schedule.
Plot No. 370 of Sudamdih was expressly specified therein.
By another Notification dated December 16, 1961 the Central Government declared under Section 9 of the Coal Beating Areas (Acquisition and Devel opment) Act 1957 that the land measuring 778.45 acres de scribed in Schedule A and the rights to mine, quarry, bore, dig and search for win work and carry away minerals in the lands measuring 625.73 acres described in Schedule B are acquired.
The Schedule to the Notification clearly stated that all rights in village Sudamdih were acquired and plot No. 370 was expressly specified in the Schedule to the Notification.
On the issue of the aforesaid Notifications the lands specified therein vested in the Central Govern ment.
The Central Government by its order dated 27th January 1962 transferred the aforesaid lands including plot No. 370 situated in village Sudamdih to the National Coal Develop ment Corporation, a Government Undertaking.
In 1975 the Central Government reorganised the management structure of the coal industry in the public sector and a central compa ny, i.e. Coal India Limited, was constituted having Bharat Coking Coal Limited as one of its subsidiary.
The Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. was incorporated for running and managing the Sudamdih and Monidih coal mines of National Development Corporation.
Since then the Sudamdih coal mines and the land in dispute have been under the control and management of the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court proceedings were initiated against re spondent No. 4 for the violation of interim orders of this Court.
In the contempt proceedings Respondent No. 4 contend ed that plot No. 370 of village Sudamdih belonged to the State of Bihar and the appellants had no ownership rights therein.
This Court held that since plot No. 370 of Sudamdih has been acquired under Section 9(1) of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act 1957 the appellant company was its owner, and it was idle to contend the con trary.
We therefore hold that the appellant is the owner of plot No. 370 of village Sudamdih and the State Government had no authority in law to make any arrangement or to settle any right with respondents for collecting slurry deposits from that Plot No. 370 of Sudamdih.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that the slurry which escapes from the appellants ' washeries is mineral and its regulation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Government.
We further hold that in view of the Parliamentary declaration made by 771 Section 2 of the Act and having regard to Section 18 of the Act the State Government has no authority in law to make any settlement or grant any lease to any person for the collec tion of slurry deposits either from the river bed or other land.
The impugned settlements made in favour of the re spondents by the State Government are illegal and the re spondent lessees have no right or title to collect the slurry deposits, therefore, they are restrained from lifting or collecting the same from the land in dispute.
We, accord ingly, allow Civil Appeal No. 4521 of 1986 and Civil Appeal Nos.
61 62 of 1987 and set aside the order of the High Court of Patna and allow the writ petitions filed by the appel lants before the Patna High Court.
We further allow Civil Appeal Nos.
230 231 of 1987 and set aside the order of the High Court of Calcutta and dismiss the writ petitions filed by Industrial Fuel Marketing Company & Ors.
We further direct that the money deposited pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court and this Court will be paid to the successful party.
There will be no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeal al lowed.

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The three appellant companies claimed their respective right to the slurry that escaped from their washery plant/pond and got deposited in the Bokaro and Damodar River beds, as also in certain Raiyati land.
The State Government did not accept their plea and leased out the right to remove the said slurry to the respondent on payment of royalty.
The first two appellants filed Writ Petitions before the Patna High Court challenging the State Government 's action in leasing out the right to the Respondent 's for removing the slurry.
The third company instituted criminal proceedings against the contractors, who in turn filed Writ Petitions before the Calcutta High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings and for a direction permitting them to collect slurry under the lease granted by the State Government.
745 The Full Bench of the Patna High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions and held that slurry was neither coal nor mineral; it was an industrial waste of coal mine which was not regulated by the provisions of the Act.
It also held that collection of slurry did not involve any mining opera tions and the settlement made by the State Government in favour of the respondents was not a mining lease and so the State Government was not under any legal obligation to obtain previous sanction of the Central Government under the .
It further held that after the slurry escaped into the river bed or to some other land, it ceased to belong to the appel lants and the State Government was entitled to execute the lease for collection of the slurry.
The Writ Petitions filed by the Contractors before the Calcutta High Court were dismissed by a Single Judge who held that the third appellnat company was the owner of the slurry and the State Government had no authority to grant any lease to the respondent contractorS for removal of the same.
On appeal by the contractors the Division ' Bench held that the lease granted by the State of Bihar in favour of the contractors was not a mining lease and the provisions of the Mines and ' Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, were not applicable to the grant of lease.
On the question of appellants ' claim to the property rights for collecting slurry, the Bench held that the slurry deposited on the appellants ' land, belonged to them and the respondents had nO right.
to collect the same but if the slurry settled down on other 's land the respondents have right to remove the same.
Against the above decisions of the two High Courts, the appellant companies have preferred the present appeals.
On behalf of the appellants, it was inter alia contended that the slurry/sludge was in substance coal, a mineral specified in the First schedule to the Act; that the State Government had no authority in law to grant any lease to the respondents for the collection, removal Or ' lifting of the slurry coal deposited in the river bed or on any Raiyati land without obtaining the sanction of the Central Govern ment under Section 5 of the Act; that the deposit of the slurry in the river bed and the land was by natural process of flow of water discharged from the washeries; that there was no law made by the State Legislature authorising the State Government to interfere with the appellants ' property right by way of executive orders; that slurry discharged from the washeries of the appellants ' coal mines constituted waste and effluent of coal mines, its disposal was exclu sively within the legislative compe 746 tence of the Parliament; and that in view of the Parlia ment 's declaration under Section 2 read with Sections 13 and 18 of the Act, the State Government was denuded of all its legislative competence to make any law with regard to dis posal of waste or effluent discharge of coal mines.
and hence the State Government had no executive power to deal with the same.
The main contentions on behalf of the respondents were that once the slurry escaped from the washery plants of the appellant it ceased to belong to them and as it polluted the river water and affected the fertility of Raiyati land the State Government was justified in providing for its collec tion and removal to prevent pollution; that the appellants could not have any right in the goods which they abandoned; that the washeries do not form integral part of the mining operations, and therefore the slurry could not be treated as a waste of coal mine.
Alternatively it was contended that even if slurry was a waste of coal mine the State Government was competent to provide for its collection and removal as the Central Government had failed to make any rule under Section 18 of the Act regulating the disposal of the slurry.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
Slurry is a descriptive expression, it may be cement slurry or coal slurry, depending upon the character or quality of the mixture of mineral in the liquid form.
There is no doubt that in the instant cases, slurry is coal slurry, as admittedly small particles of coal escape from the washery plant alongwith water.
After it overflows the storage pond the slurry flows into the river and is deposit ed on the river bed, which is later on collected and used as fuel after it is formed into briquettes.
The deposit which is collected from the river bed continues to be carbonaceous in character having all the elements of coal.
Thus, the slurry is coal in liquid form, and slurry coal deposited in the river bed or lands in substance as well as in its char acter continues to be coal.
[757F; 758C D] Kesari MaI Jain vs State of Bihar, AIR 1985 Patna 114, ap proved.
Websters New 20th Century Dictionary; Encyclopaedia Britannica, referred to.
The definition of "mining operation" and "mine" are very wide.
The expression "mining of mineral" in the defini tion of "mining operation" under Section 3(d) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & 747 Development) Act, 1957 is spacious enough to comprehend every activity by which a mineral is extracted or obtained from the earth irrespective of whether such activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of the earth.
It is not a requirement of the definition of "mining operation", that the activity for winning the mineral must necessarily be an underground activity.
The essence of 'mining operation ' is that it must be an activity for win ning a mineral whether under the surface or winning the surface of earth.
The slurry which is deposited on the river bed is not dumped there artificially by any human agency instead coal particles are carried to the river bed by the flow of water through natural process.
Therefore the view taken by the High Court that the slurry which is deposited in the river bed is dumped by the appellants by artificial process is incorrect.
Once the coal particles are carried away by the water which is discharged from the washery and the same are settled in the river bed, any operation for the extraction of lifting of the coal particles from the river bed would involve winning operations within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act.
However.
in the instant cases, it is not necessary to express any final opinion on this ques tion.
[759D G] Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu vs B.D. Dey & Co. & Ors., ; relied on.
Bhagwan Das vs State of U. P. & Ors.
, ; , referred 3.
The State Legislature is competent to enact law for the regulation of mines and mineral development under Entry 23 of State List but this power is subject to the declara tion which may be made by Parliament by law as envisaged by Entry 54 of Union List.
Thus the legislative competence of the State Legislature to make law on the topic of mines and minerals is subject to Parliamentary Legislation.
The Par liament has enacted the .
By Section 2 of the Act the Parlia ment has declared that it is expedient in public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act.
In view of Parliamentary declaration as made in section 2 of the Act, the State Legislature is denuded of its legislative power to make any law with re spect to the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent as provided by the Act.
[760G H; 761A] 4.1 An analysis of the provisions of the Act makes the extent of 748 Parliamentary declaration clear that the disposal and dis charge of sludge or slurry emanating or coming from the washery of a coal mine is exclusively within the legislative power of Parliament.
The Act further provides that the Central Government has exclusive power to frame any rule either under Section 13(2)(0) or under the amended Section 18(2)(k) of the Act regulating disposal of slurry.
The effect of the Parliamentary declaration as contained in the Act is that the matters referred to in the declaration, stand abstracted from List II and these become matters of legislation in List I of the Seventh Schedule.
As a result of the declaration made by the Parliament, under Section 2 of the Act.
the State Legislature is denuded of its legisla tive power with respect to the regulation of mines and minerals development and the entire legislative field has been taken over by Parliament.
[763C E] 4.2 The Central Government has not framed any rule either under Section 13 or under Section 18 of the Act.
Prior to the Amending Act 37 of 1986 Section 13(2)(0) con ferred power on the Central Government to frame rules for the purpose of granting prospecting licences and mining leases including the disposal of discharge of any tailings, slime or other waste products.
Sub clause (0) of Section 13(2) was transposed into Section 18(2) as sub clause (k) by the Amending Act 37 of 1986.
Section 18 (1) confers general power on the Central Government to frame rules and to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India.
Section 18(2) does not affect or restrict the generality or width of legislative power under Section 18(I) as the matters specified in var ious sub clauses of Section 18(2) are illustrative in na ture.
Even in the absence of sub section (2) or its various sub clauses, the Central Government was invested with the power of subordinate legislation in respect of any matter which could reasonably be connected with the purpose of "conservation and development of minerals" by Section 18(1) of the Act.
Power to frame rules, regulating the discharge or disposal of slime or slurry emanating from a coal mine including its collection from the river bed or from Raiyati land after its escape from the washery of the coal mines.
would clearly fall within the expression "conservation of mineral".
Slurry admittedly contain coal particles, its collection from land or river is reasonably connected with the 'conservation of mineral '.
Section 18(2)(k) which ex pressly confers power on the Central Government to regulate disposal or discharge of waste of a mine makes the Parlia mentary declaration apparent that the State Legislature is not competent to regulate waste discharge of a coal mine.
Mere absence of any rule framed by the Central Government under Sections 13 or 18 of the Act with regard to the dis posal of slime or waste of a coal mine does not 749 confer legislative competence on the State Legislature to make any law or rule.
Once a particular topic of legislation is covered by the Parliamentary declaration, the State Legislature is denuded of its power to make any law or rule in respect of that topic or subject matter and the absence of Rules would not confer legislative competence on the State.
[764A G] 4.3 Since Section 18 of the Act covers the field with respect to disposal of waste of a mine.
there is no scope for the contention that until rules are framed the State Legislature has power to make law or rules on the subject.
Once the competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces its legislative intent to cover the entire field on a topic.
the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne.
Mere absence of rules framed by the Central Government.
does not confer power on the State Legislature to make law on the subject.
Since the legislative field with regard to the framing of rules relating to the disposal of slime and waste of coal mine is fully covered by Section 18.
the State Legislature is denuded of its power of making any law with regard to those mailers.
[765B C] Baijnath Kedia vs State of Bihar & Ors. ; Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors.
vs State of Orissa & Ors.
, ; ; State of Orissa vs M.A. Tulloch & Co., ; and State of Tamil Nadu vs Hind Stone, ; relied on.
The executive power of the State Government is co extensive with the legislative power of the State Legisla ture.
If the State Legislature has power to enact laws on a matter enumerated in the State List or in the concurrent list the State has executive power to deal with those mat ters subject to other provisions of the Constitution.
If a subject matter fails within the legislative competence of State Legislature.
the exercise of executive power by the State Government is not confined, as even in the absence of a law being made, the State Government is competent to deal with the subject matter in exercise of its executive power.
In the absence of any law, the State Government or its officers in exercise of executive authority cannot infringe citizens rights merely because the State Legislature has power to make laws with regard to subject, in respect of which the executive power is exercised.
No doubt under Entry 23 of List 1I, the State Legislature has power to make law but that power is subject to Entry 54 of List 1 with respect to the regulation and development of mines and minerals.
Since State Legislature 's power to make law with respect to the matter enumerated in Entry 23 of List II has been taken away by the Parliamentary declaration, the State Government ceased to have any executive power in the matter relating 750 to regulation of mines and mineral development.
Moreover, the proviso to Article 162 itself contains limitation on the exercise of the executive power of the State.
If Parliament and the State Legislature both have power to make law in a matter, the executive power of the State shall be subject to the law made by the Parliament or restricted by the execu tive power of the Union expressly conferred on it by the Constitution or any law made by Parliament.
Since Parliament has made the law as contemplated by Entry 54 of List I and the law so made confers exclusive power on the Central Government to frame rules regulating the disposal of waste or industrial effluent of a mine, the State Legislature has, therefore no power either to make law under Entry 23 of List II or to exercise executive power to regulate the disposal of slurry, a waste effluent discharge of a coal mine.
[765F H; 766A F] Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors.
vs State of Punjab, and State of M.P. & Anr.
vs Thakur Bharat Singh, ; , referred to.
It is apparent that the State of Bihar itself has been treating the 'slurry deposits ' as mineral and on that assumption it has been executing leases conferring rights on the respondents to collect the same on payment of royalty.
Hence it is not open to the State of Bihar and the lessees to contend that slurry is not coal or mineral within the meaning of the Act.
[767F] 7.
The inclusive definition of 'mine ' as contained in Section 2 of the Act is wide enough to include any premises belonging to a mine where any ancillary process is carried on for preparing the minerals or coke for sale.
The washery, wherein the process of washing coal is carried on, for the purpose of preparing the coal for.
sale is an integral part of a mine as it involves ancillary process.
Washery is included within the definition of mine under the .
Any waste discharge from the washery carrying small particles of coal in the form of slurry is the waste slime arising from operations carried out in a mine.
Moreover, it is not open to the respondents to contend that slurry is not a waste discharged from the washeries of coal mines, since they have all along pleaded that slurry is a waste dis charged from the washery of the appellants ' coal mines.
[768C; D E] 8.
The slurry which escapes from the appellants ' wash eries is mineral and its regulation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Government.
In view of the Parliamentary declaration made by Section 2 of the Act and having regard to Section 18 of the Act, the State 751 Government has no authority in law to make any settlement or grant any lease to any person for the collection of slurry deposits either from the river bed or other land.
The im pugned settlements made in favour of the respondents by the State Government are illegal and the respondent lessees have no right nor title to collect the slurry deposits and they are restrained from lifting or collecting the same from the land in dispute.
[771H; 772A] [This Court directed that the money deposited pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court and this Court will be paid to the successful party.
[771C]


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98 of 1956.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights.
N. C. Chatterjee and section C. Majumdar, for the petitioner.
P. A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents NOS. 1, 2, 3 and 5. 1957.
May 8.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOVINDA MENON, J.
This application under article 32 of the Constitution raises the question of the constitutionality of section 178 A, inserted in the Sea Customs Act, (VIII of 1878), by section 14 of the Amending Act XXI of 1955, and the chief ground on which it is sought to be struck down is that it offends article 14 of the Constitution.
From the affidavits of both the parties to which there are annexures the following facts emerge: The petitioner carries on business as a broker in diamonds and precious stones in Calcutta and, according to him, he enjoys credit and reputation in the market as a well known and respectable broker of such goods.
On May 4, 1955, the Rummaging Inspector (Intelligence), Customs House, Calcutta, Respondent No. 3, armed with a search warrant from the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, Respondent No. 4, searched the residential room of the petitioner, situated at No. 32, Sir Hariram Goenka Street, Calcutta, and after a minute search of the steel almirah in which according to the statement of the petitioner, he used to keep his stock in trade and finding none there questioned him as to where he had secreted the diamonds to which the 1112 reply given by him was in the negative.
Thereupon a wall almirah, wherein washed clothes, and other articles were stored, was searched and therein in an old jacket 475 pieces of diamonds were discovered along with one piece of synthetic stone.
A statement signed by him was taken from which we find that his explanation for the possession was that Rs. 10,000/ worth of diamonds were received by him from M/s. Ratilal Amritlal, of 89 Zaveri Bazar, Bombay, and the rest were purchased locally in Calcutta.
He did not remember the names and address of the parties from whom the local purchases were made, nor did he have in his possession any documents covering the purchase.
Thereafter the Rummaging Inspector escorted the petitioner to the Customs House where the Assistant Collector, Customs, asked him to produce evidence showing that the goods were not smuggled goods but were legally imported on payment of duty.
The Assistant Collector then permitted the petitioner to go and gave him time till May 7, 1955, to produce evidence showing that the goods were imported on payment of customs duty and under a valid import licence.
On the same day, i.e., May 4, 1955, a notice was served on the petitioner by the Customs authorities stating that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the goods seized by the Rummaging Inspector had been illegally imported into India and, therefore, before further action was taken under as.
167(8) and 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act, the petitioner should submit by May 7, 1955, any documents which might be in his possession showing that the goods in question were legally imported into India on payment of proper Customs duty and on production of a valid import trade control licence.
It is also stated that if the goods were not imported by the petitioner, but were bought from another party he should submit by the same date any evidence in his possession showing the purchase of the goods.
In answer to this, on behalf of the petitioner ' Messrs. section K. Sawday and Company, a firm of Advocates, Calcutta, wrote to the Assistant Collector, Customs, on May 7, 1955, reciting the circumstances under which the petitioner came to 1113 be in possession of the seized articles alleging that in the circumstances the presumption of an offence having been committed in contravention of section 86 of the Sea Customs Act attracting a punishment under section 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act was unwarranted and requested to be furnished with a statement of the reasons for the seizure as soon as possible.
The letter went on to request for ten days ' time for procuring and producing certificates etc.
from the Bombay trade and Calcutta trade about the authenticity of the petitioner 's business.
and also how he came to be in possession of the goods.
Another letter was written by the same firm of Advocates on May 9, 1955, the details of which it is unnecessary to refer.
On May 16, 1955, a further letter was written enclosing two certificates and containing further particulars.
This also reiterated the request for the supply of specific reasons for the seizure.
On May 23, 1955, the Assistant Collector replied to the Advocates informing them that the diamonds in question were seized on reasonable suspicions that the same had been imported into India illegally and as such were liable to seizure under the Sea Customs Act.
Further correspondence followed by a letter dated June 20, 1955, to which there was a reply on June 25, 1955, wherein there was a detailed reference to everything that had taken place till then and especially with regard to the earlier denial of the petitioner about there being any diamonds with him and the discovery of the same later on in a used jacket in a wall almirah.
This is a comprehensive letter containing the justification for the proceedings taken by the search officers and finally the Assistant Collector observed that if the petitioner failed to submit a written explanation in time or did not appear before him when the case was fixed for hearing, the case would have to be decided on the basis of the evidence on the record without any further notice; On July 1, 1955, Messrs. section K. Sawday & Company wrote a further letter on behalf of the petitioner reiterating their objections and showing why action should not be taken.
This was followed by letters dated July 4 and 20, 1955.
A personal hearing was granted on July 21, 1955, followed by a letter from the Advocates 143 1114 dated July 22, 1955.
It is unnecessary for the present to elaborate the contents of these letters or to refer to the statement enclosed therewith from M/s. Ratilal Amritlal, Bombay.
The Collector of Customs thereupon, after considering the entire matter placed before him, passed an order dated September 12, 1955, which was dispatched on November 5, 1955, containing an elaborate discussion of the various facts and circumstances and finally concluding that since the petitioner had failed to discharge the onus under section 178 A of the Sea Customs Act in respect of the diamonds seized on May 4, 1955, orders had been passed confiscating the same under sections 167 (8) and 167 (39) of the Sea Customs Act and that the confiscation would be absolute in terms of the provisions of sections 3 (2) and 4 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947.
The reasons given in the above order were that the subsequent statements were contrary to what had been stated in the first instance, that at the time of the raid, an attempt was made to hide the diamonds in a suspicious manner and lastly that the petitioner was making statements which were in the nature of an afterthought, and not supported by facts.
On account of these and other reasons the Collector was of the opinion that the presumption under section 178 A had not been rebutted.
The order stated that an appeal against it lay to the Central Board of Revenue within three months of the date of the dispatch and also contained information as to the court fee stamps etc., which would have to be affixed.
Without availing himself of that remedy the petitioner has come up to this Court by way of an application for a writ under article 32 of the Constitution.
Though Mr. Chatterjee faintly argued that the provisions of article 19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution had been violated, he did not seriously press those contentions.
The main point of the attack was centered on the contention that section 178 A was violative of the principles of equal protection of the laws guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.
Before we discuss the validity of section 178 A, it would be useful to consider the circumstances which led to 1115 the enactment of that statutory provision and for that purpose a brief outline of the relevant sections of the Act would be necessary.
Section 19 of the , enables the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette to prohibit or restrict importation or exportation of goods into or out of India, and section 20 enumerates the dutiable goods.
When any person imports goods into India, the owner of such goods is required, after the delivery of the manifest by the master of the vessel in which they are imported, to make an entry of the goods for home consumption or warehousing by delivering to the Customs collector a bill of entry containing particulars which shall correspond with the particulars given of the same goods in the manifest of the ship (section 86).
This is intended to give an idea to the Customs collector as to whether what the owner claims is different or the same as what the master of the vessel has intimated by the delivery of the manifest.
On the delivery of such a bill, if any duty is payable on such goods, the same shall be assessed and it is only after payment of the duty so assessed that the owner may proceed to clear the same (section 87).
Clearance of the goods after the payment of such duty is provided in section 89 and if everything has been done according to law, the owner can take away the goods.
Chapter XVI deals with offences and penalties and section 167 of the same Chapter contains three columns in a schedule, the first of which mentions the offence, the ,second, which does not have the force of law, gives the section of the Act to which the offence has reference and the third lays down the penalty which may be imposed.
With regard to the third column a distinction has to be made between the penalty to be imposed by the customs authorities and the. punishment that can be imposed by a court of law for the infringement of certain provisions.
Offences mentioned in entries Nos. 26, 72 and 74 to 76 (both inclusive) have reference to prosecution and conviction before a Magistrate, whereas most of the others concern penalties imposed by the Customs authorities.
This distinction will be important when referring to section 182.
We are in this 1116 case concerned with entries Nos. 8 and 39.
The penalty of confiscation is provided in the third column of entry No. 8, if any goods, the importation or exportation of which is prohibited or restricted, are imported contrary to such prohibition or restriction.
It lays down that in addition to the confiscation of the goods, the persons concerned shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding three times the value of the goods, or not exceeding one thousand rupees.
This Court has held that the minimum is the alternative: see Maqbool Hussain vs The State of Bombay(1).
Entry No. 39 also provides for a penalty not exceeding Rs. 500 and the confiscation of the goods if they are taken or passed out of any custom house or wharf without an entry duly made.
Smuggled goods when traced and seized come under this category.
Though the word 'smuggling ' is not defined in the Act, it must be understood as having the ordinary dictionary meaning namely carrying of goods clandestinely into a country.
Chapter XVII relates to searchers and recovery of smuggled goods, as well as offences, appeals, etc.
Section 169 gives power to any customs officer, duly employed in the prevention of smuggling, to search any person on board of any vessel in any part in (India) or any person who has landed from any vessel, provided that such officer has reason to believe that such person has dutiable or prohibited goods secreted about his person.
A safeguard is provided under section 170 by which any person about to be searched may require the said officer to take him, previous to search, before the nearest Magistrate or Customs collector.
The important factor in this case is that the person making the search or attempting to do it must have a reason to believe that such person has dutiable or prohibited goods.
These two sections refer to the time at which a person brings dutiable goods into India but the later provisions of the Chapter lay down the procedure to be followed where goods have been smuggled without being detected at the port or the wharf.
Power to issue search warrants is given to any Magistrate under section 172 which is to the following effect: (1) ; ,742. 1117 " Any Magistrate may, on application by a Customs collector, stating his belief that dutiable or prohibited goods (or any documents relating to such goods) are secreted in any place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Magistrate, issue a warrant to search for such goods (or documents).
Such warrant shall be executed in the same way, and shall have the same effect, as a search warrant issued under the law relating to Criminal Procedure.
" The warrant, as will be noticed, may be issued only on the application of a Customs collector who is a responsible senior officer and that is certainly a safeguard against indiscriminate issue of search warrants.
Section 178 speaks of the seizure of goods liable to confiscation in any place either upon land or water by any officer of customs or any other person duly employed for the prevention of smuggling.
The impugned section 178 A comes next which is quoted below: " 178 A (1): Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized.
(2)This section shall apply to gold, gold manufactures, diamonds and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics and any other goods which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.
" The presumption under section 178 A is equally applicable to seizure as a result of a search warrant under section 172 or seizure made under section 178.
How the things seized are to be dealt with can be seen from section 179, and section 181 lays down that when a seizure or arrest is made, a statement in writing of the reasons therefor should be given to the person who is arrested or from whom goods are seized.
When an article is seized under sections 172 and 178, except in cases falling under entries Nos. 26, 72 and 74 to 76 of section 167, the confiscation or penalty or duty may be adjudged by the officer mentioned therein, i.e., the person from whom the articles are seized is entitled to an adjudication 1118 regarding either confiscation or penalty or duty.
This gives the valuable right of having the adjudication of the claim made by a superior officer, and despite such adjudication if the confiscation is still made, under section 188 an appeal lies from the subordinate to the Chief Customs authority within three months from the date of such a decision.
In the present case the confiscation was made by the Collector of Customs and an appeal lay from him to the Central Board of Revenue.
Section 191 enables the Central Government on the application of any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by an officer of Customs or Chief Customs authority and from which no appeal lies, to reverse or modify such decision or order.
The outline of the various provisions above made shows that successive remedies are provided to an aggrieved person from whom articles have been seized and confiscated and the Act is a complete Code in itself affording redress and relief in case of illegal or unjustified orders.
The genesis of section 178 A may now be considered.
The Central Government had appointed a commission known as the Taxation Enquiry Commission which by its report recommended the adoption of the principles underlying section 178 A in order to minimize smuggling.
In Vol.
II of their report, Chapter VII deals with administrative problems in regard to customs and Excise duties.
At pp.
320 and 321 the Committee recommends the amendment of the , firstly to make smuggling a criminal offence and secondly empowering Customs officers to search premises etc.
and the third recommendation is the one with which we are concerned.
It is in the following terms: "To transfer the onus of proof in respect of offences relating to smuggling to the person in whose possession any dutiable, restricted or prohibited goods are found.
" It is to implement this recommendation that section 178 A has been enacted.
Section 178 A applies to diamonds and other precious stones and there has been no dispute about 1119 the application of this provision to the present case.
On the facts mentioned above it is clear that the seizure has been under the Act in the reasonable belief of the Customs authorities that they are smuggled goods and, therefore, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods has been cast by this section on the persons from whose possession the goods are seized.
No doubt the content and import of the section are very wide.
It applies not only to the actual smuggler from whose possession the goods are seized but also to those who came into possession of the goods after having purchased the same after the same has passed through many hands or agencies.
For example, if the Customs authorities have a reasonable belief that certain goods in the possession of an innocent party are smuggled goods and the same is seized under the provisions of this Act, then the person from whose possession the goods were seized, however innocent he may be, has to prove that the goods are not smuggled articles.
This is no doubt a very heavy and onerous duty cast on an innocent possessor who, for aught one knows, may have bona fide paid adequate consideration for the purchase of the articles without knowing that the same has been smuggled.
The only pre requisite for the application of the section is the subjectivity of the Customs officer in having a reasonable belief that the goods are smuggled.
A careful examination of the contents of the somewhat lengthy petition under article 32 of the Constitution does not show how the impugned section offends article 14, and no distinct and separate ground is taken about its unconstitutionality, but Mr. Chatterjee argues that the burden of proof enunciated therein is opposed to fundamental principles of natural justice, as it gives an unrestricted arbitrary and naked power to the customs authorities without laying down any standard or norm to be followed for exercising powers under the section.
What is urged is that whereas under the ordinary law the burden of proof in matters like this is on the party who sets up a particular case, under the section that process is inverted and the 1120 burden is cast on the possessor of the article to show that it was imported into India with a proper bill of entry and after paying the proper custom duty due.
As stated already, it is a heavy burden to be laid upon the shoulders of an innocent purchaser who might have come into possession after the article has changed many hands and this, it is alleged, invokes discrimination between him and other litigants and deprives him of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.
A large number of cases have been cited at the Bar in support of the respective contentions of the parties.
The true nature, scope and effect of article 14 of the Constitution have been explained by different constitutional Benches of this Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury vs The Union of India and Others(1), The State of Bombay and Another vs F. N. Balsara(2), The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar(3), Kathi Raning Rawat vs The State of Saurashtra(4), Lachmandas Kewalram Ahua and another vs The State of Bombay (5), Syed Qasim Razvi vs The State of Hyderabad and Others(6) , Habeeb Mohammad vs The State of Hyderabad(6) and V. M.
Syed Mohammed and Company vs The State of Andhra(7), but it will not be necessary for us to enter upon a lengthy discussion of the matter or to refer to passages in those judgments, for the principles underlying the provisions of the Article have been summarised by a Full Bench of this Court in Budhan Chaudhury and Others vs The State of Bihar(9) in the following terms: "It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
In order, however, to pass the test of per omissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that (1) ; , (2) ; (3) ; (4) ; (5) ; (6) (7) ; (8) ; (9) ; at p. 1048 1049.
1121 are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like.
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.
It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.
" The principle thus enunciated has been adopted and applied by this Court in Purshottam Govindji Halai vs Shri B. M. Desai (1) and in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar vs M. Venkitachalam Potti and another (2).
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioner has referred us to several decisions of the Supreme Court of America, such as William N. McFerland vs American Sugar Refining Co. (3), W. D. Manley vs State of Georgia (4) and Tot vs United States(5).
It appears to us that these decisions really turn upon the due process clause of the American Federal Constitution and cannot help in the construction of the equal protection clause of our Constitution.
The contentions urged by Mr. Chatterjee as to the unconstitutionality of section 178 A of the , will, therefore, have to be tested in the light of the principles laid down by this Court in Budhan Chowdhury 's case (supra).
A cursory perusal of section 178 A will at once disclose the well defined classification of goods based on an intelligible differentia.
It applies only to certain goods described in sub section
(2) which are or can be easily smuggled.
The, section applies only to those goods of the specified kind which have been seized under the Act and in the reasonable belief that they are (1) , 898 899.
(2) [1955] 2 S C.R. 1996, 1229.
(3) ; ; (4) (1929) 279 U.S.I; ; (5) ; 144 1122 smuggled goods.
It is only those goods which answer the threefold description that come under the operation of the section.
The object of the Act is to prevent smuggling.
The differentia on the basis.
of which the goods have been classified and the presumption raised by the section obviously have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
The presumption only attaches to goods of the description mentioned in the section and it directly furthers the object of the Act, namely, the prevention of smuggling, and that being the position the impugned section is clearly within the principle enunciated above, not hit by article 14.
The impugned section cannot be struck down on the infirmity either of discrimination or illegal classification.
Confining as it does to certain classes of goods seized by the customs authorities on the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, there is only a presumption which can be rebutted.
In these circumstances, there can be no doubt whatever that section 178 A does not offend article 14 of the Constitution and this petition is, therefore, to be dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.

Output:
Section 178 A of the Sea Customs Act which places the burden of proving that any of the goods mentioned in the section and reasonably believed to be smuggled are not really so on the person from whose possession they are seized, is not discriminative in character and does not violate equal protection of law guaranteed by article 14 Of the Constitution.
Budhan Chaudhury and Others vs The State of Bihar, (1955) I S.C.R. 1045, applied.
Purshottam Govindji Halai vs Shri B. M. Desai, and A. Thangal Kunju, Musaliar vs M. Venkitachalam Potti and another (1955) 2 S.C.R. ii96, referred to.
1111 William N. McFeyland vs American Sugar Refining Co., ; , W. D. Manley vs State of Georgia, (1929) 279 U.S. I and Tot vs United States, , held inapplicable.
Consequently, in a case where the Collector of Customs on the failure of a person, from whose possession certain diamond pieces were seized, to prove that they were not smuggled goods but were legally imported into India, confiscated the diamonds under sections 167(8) and 167(39) Of the Sea Customs Act, no violation of the fundamental right conferred by article 14, Of the Constitution occurred.