Input:
minal Appeal No. 226 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 28, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 385 of 1959.
A. R. Choubay and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
April 23.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.
This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversing, on State appeal, the order of the Additional Sessions judge, Hoshangabad, acquiring the appellant, and convicting him of an offence under section 414 I. P.C. Five bales, containing woollen shawls and mufflers despatched from Kanpur by the British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur Woollen Mills Branch, Kanpur, and another bale despatched from 291 Haimanpur to Kanpur were loaded at Itarsi railway station on September 18, 1957, in Wagoa No. C.R. 325.
The lock of the wagon wag found broken open at Pandhurna Railway Station at about 1.00 a.m. on September 20, 1957.
on checking at Nagpur the aforesaid bales were found missing.
One of the bales despatched from Kanpur was found lying the next morning near the railway line between railway stations Jaulkheda and Multai.
On September 23, 1957, the house of one Gopi Nath, at Multai, was searched and certain articles, including some torn labels were recovered from that house.
The same day, the police found the appellant and a few other persons come out of Gopi Nath 's house at Betul, whose front door was locked.
Subsequently, these persons were taken to the police station, where the appellant made a statement showing readiness to point out the stolen property.
At his instance, the police recovered from different places of that house, woollen shawls, mufflers, bed sheets and certain house breaking implements.
These recoveries were made on September 23 and 24.
As a result of investigation, six persons were put on trial in the Magistrate 's Court.
Ajendra Nath, appellant, was charged under sections 120 B, 379 and 414, I.P.C. Babu Ram was charged under sections 120 B and 379 I.P.C. Ram Prasad and Gyarsi were charged under section 120 B read with section 879 I.P.C., Gopinath under section 120 B read with section 414 I.P.C. and Birendranath under section 414 I.P.C.
The learned Magistrate acquitted Birendra Nath and convicted the other accused of the offence under section 120 B read with section 379 I.P.C., except in the case of Gopinath, who was convicted of the offence under section 120 B read with section 414 I.P.C. Ajendra Nath was also convicted of the offence tinder section 414 I.P.C. 292 On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions judge, Hoshangabad, acquitted all these convicted persons.
He held that the property recovered was not proved to be stolen property and that the alleged conspiracy was not proved.
The State filed an appeal against the acquittal of Gopinath and Ajendra Nath.
The High Court dismissed the appeal against Gopinath and the appeal against Ajendra Nath for the offence of conspiracy.
It however allowed the appeal against Ajendra Nath with respect to the offence under section 414 I.P.C.
It is against this order that this appeal has been filed by Ajendra Nath, appellant.
Ajendra Nath did not question the recovery of the various articles from Gopi Nath 's house at Betul at his instance.
He did not claim the property to be his own, but stated that it was not stolen property.
The main contention for the appellant in this Court has been that these recovered article; were not proved to be stolen property.
Tile articles consisted of those said to have been sent by the British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur Woollen Mills Branch, Kanpur, and bed sheets sent by the firm of V.S.N.C. Narsingha Chettiar, which carries on business of wholesale Hand Loom Cloth at Karur.
The invoices relating to the four bales sent by ' the Kanpur Woollen Mills give the details of the shawls and mufflers the bales contained.
A very large quantity of these has been recovered.
Out of 95 shawls and 63 mufflers, as many as 80 shawls and, 43 mufflers had been recovered.
Similarly, out of 10 pairs of bed sheets stolen, 8 pairs have been recovered.
The absence of any adequate explan ation for the presence of such a large quantity of articles similar to those proved to have been despatched by the Kanpur Woollen Mills or by the Karur company, the recovery of these articles within 293 a few days of the theft, the presence of silk and paper labels of Kanpur Woollen Mills on most of the shawls and mufflers recovered and of certain manuscript writings on the labels of the bed sheets by P.W. 24 Krishnamurthi, brother of P.W. 16, Venkat Raman, who does the Karur business, have been taken into consideration by the High Court for coming to the finding that the property recovered was proved to be stolen property.
These circumstances cannot be said to be such which would not justify the finding arrived at.
The main contention for the appellant however is that it has not been definitely established from the evidence of Kunzru, P. W. 10, that the shawls, mufflers recovered were manufactured by the Kanpur Woollen Mills and were despatched in the bales which were subsequently stolen.
Kunzru 's evidence does fall short of establishing that the shawls and mufflers recovered were manufactured by the Kanpur Woollen Mills.
He has not identified the recovered shawls and mufflers as those manufactured by these mills.
In fact, he was not even shown all the shawls and mufflers recovered.
He was shown by the Police Inspector, Government Railway Police, two lois (two shawls) and two mufflers.
He got them examined by the textile expert and, on the report of the expert, gave the certificate that they appeared to be manufactured by the Woollen Mills of Kanpur.
That expert has not been examined in Court and therefore Kunzru 's statement alone fails to establish that these shawls and mufflers were manufactured by these mills.
However, it is not open to doubt that they were manufactured by these mills when most of them had sewn silk labels of these mills and quite a good number of them had even paper labels indicating that they were manufactured by these mills.
There, is no reason to suppose and in fact no such suggestion has been made that these labels had been put on these articles by some one for the purpose of 294 deception.
We therefore consider that the finding that these shawls and mufflers were the manufacture of Kanpur Woollen Mills is correct.
It was also contended for the appellant that it was not proved that these shawls and mufflers were in the bales which were despatched by the Kanpur Woollen Mills and that the gate passes and the invoices produced by Kunzru were not proved as persons who wrote them had not been examined.
Kunzru produced the originals of these documents.
He is the salesman of the Kanpur Woollen Mills.
His cross examination in no way indicates that his statement about the genuineness of the invoices and gate passes was questioned in cross examination.
There is nothing to suppose that the invoices and gate passes produced in Court did not correctly represent the articles placed inside particular bales to which specific numbers were given and that those bales were despatched from the Mills in accordance with the gate passes.
In this connection reference was made to the fact that five of the shawls recovered were of violet colour and no shawl of such a colour was mentioned in any of the invoices.
There can be a possibility of a misdescription in the invoices, There can be a possibility of the violet shawls being the property stolen in some other incident.
The fact remains that even the violet shawls are not claimed by the appellant as his own.
So, we do not consider any force in this contention for considering the finding of the High Court defective about the property recovered to be stolen property.
With respect to the identity of the bed sheets, there is the evidence of P.Ws. 16 and 24.
P.W. 16 deposed that he had supplied 10 pairs of bed sheets to a certain customer who disowned the bale.
Thereupon he asked the Station Master, Ahimanpur to return the parcel to Karur.
He recognized the various sheets to be of his firm which they had 295 despatched to Ahimanpur.
He further deposed that before despatching the goods they paste the firm labels on them.
He stated that his younger brother Krishna Murti had noted size number and pattern over these sheets in his handwriting, as he happened to be at home on vacation.
Krishna Murti, P.W.24, admits that certain labels on the bed sheets were in his hand writing, that he wrote them under instructions of his brother and that he had not written sirnilar numbers on any other bed sheets.
He however stated subsequently that he did such type of markings casually, on occasions, and that the Sub Inspector had also got him write the size, pattern etc., on certain other blank labels of the shop as well.
The learned Additional Sessions judge did not rely on these statements and felt that the Investigating Officer might have got those markings on the labels of the recovered articles during the investigation.
The High Court thought that there was no reason for doubting the correctness of the statements of these witnesses and for suspecting that the writings on the labels were obtained during the investigation.
No question was put to P.W. 24 about the police making him write on the labels on the recovered articles.
In fact, according to the witness, labels with his writings were shown to him for purposes of recognition and he recognized those writings to be his.
The police took his writings on blank labels for purposes of comparison.
We therefore see no good reason for considering the finding of the High Court with respect to the bed sheets recovered to be stolen property to be wrong.
It was also contended that it was not open to the High Court to record a finding about the recovered property to be stolen property when the Government had not appealed against the other co accused who were acquitted on the basis of the finding that the property recovered was not proved to be stolen 296 property.
We do not see any force in this contention.
The mere fact that the learned Additional Sessions judge acquitted the other accused on the ground that the property recovered was not proved to be stolen property did not preclude the State from appealing against the acquittal of the appellant against whom there is better evidence for establishing that he was in possession of the stolen property than the evidence was against the other co accused.
The State could challenge the correctness of the findings of the learned Additional Sessions judge about the property being stolen property and, consequently, the High Court can record its own finding on that question.
Lastly, it was also urged that even if the identity of the articles recovered with the articles stolen be established, no offence under s.414 I.P.C. is made out against the appellant as the other accused have been acquitted and it is not known whom the appellant is supposed to have helped in concealing the stolen property.
Section 414 I.P.C. makes it an offence for a person to assist voluntarily in stealing or disposing of or making away with property which he knows or has reason to believe to be stolen property.
It is not necessary for a person to be convicted under s.414 I.P.C. that another person must be traced out and convicted of an offence of committing theft.
The prosecution has simply to establish that the property recovered is stolen property and that the appellant provided help in its concealment and disposal.
The circumstances of the recovery sufficiently make out that the property was deliberately divided into different packets and was separately kept.
May be that the property failing to the share of a particular thief was kept separately.
It was recovered from several different places in the same house.
These places included an iron safe and an underground cellar.
The evening before, several persons, including the appellant, were found to be coming out of the back door of the house which had its front door 297 locked.
The appellant also knew the whereabouts of the property inside the house of his maternal grandfather.
He attempted to sell a few mufflers a day before the recoveries were made.
He was seen arriving at the house, during the night, in a car with some persons and then removing property which looked like bales from the car to the house.
All these circumanstances go to support the finding that he had assisted in the concealment of the stolen property and had thus committed the offence under s,414 I.P.C. We therefore see no force in this appeal and, accordingly, dismiss it.
Appeal dismissed.

Output:
Five bales, containing woollen shawls and mufflers dispatched from Kanpur by the British India Corporation Ltd. and another bale despatched from Haimanpur to Kanpur, were loaded in wagon at Itarsi railway station.
The lock of the wagon was found broken open and on checking at nagpur the aforesaid bales were found missing.
On search, certain articles including some torn labels were recovered from the house of one Gopinath.
The same day the appellant and few other persons were found by the Police,coming out of Gopinath 's house whose front door was locked.
They were taken to the Police Station and at the instance of the appellant the police recovered woollen shawls, mufflers, bed sheets and certain house breaking implements from different places of that house.
After investigation, six persons including the appellant were put on trial before the Magistrate for several charges under sections 120 B, 379 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code and except one Birendra Nath, all were convicted.
On appeal, all the convicted persons were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, on further appeal by the State, against the acquittal of Gopinath and the appellant, the High Court allowed the appeal only against the appellant with respect to the offence under section 414 of the Indian Penal Code.
On appeal by special leave, this Court held : Held that the mere fact that the other accused persons were acquitted on the ground that the property recovered was not proved to be stolen property did not preclude the State from appealing against the acquittal of the appellant against 290 whom there is better evidence.
The State could challenge the correctness of the findings of the Additional Sessions Judge about the property being stolen property and the High Court could record its own findings on that question.
Held further, that it is not necessary for a person to be convicted under section 414 Indian Penal Code that another person must be traced out and convicted of an offence of committing theft.
The prosecution has simply to establish that the property recovered is stolen property and that the appellant provided help in its concealment and disposal.
The circum stances of the recovery in the present case sufficiently prove that the appellant had assisted in the concealment of the stolen property and had thus committed the offence under section 414 Indian Penal Code.
The appeal therefore, must be dismissed.


Input:
CTION: C.M.P. No.8076 of 1988 and I.A. Nos.
3,5,6 and 7 of 1990 In Civil Appeal No. 3519 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.1984 of the Delhi High Court in W.P. No. 1144 of 1983.
WITH Writ Petition (C) Nos.
2620 59 of 1985.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
C.S. Vaidyanathan, Ms. Smitha Singh, K.A.Raja, A.K. Srivastava, Sushma Suri, C.V.S. Rao, Ms. C.K. Sucharita and Vimal Dave for the appearing parties.
The following Order of the court was delivered: CMP No. 8076/1988: This is an application by certain doctors of the Central Health Service for clarification of the earlier orders passed by this Court in C.A. 3519/1984.
Actually, the appellants ' grievance is that even though the appeal was disposed of by the order of this court dated 9.4.
1987 and the directions given therein have been reiterated in the subsequent orders of this Court, the Union of India has not given proper effect to the directions given by this Court.
Briefly, the appellants were originally appointed after interview by selection committees but only as adhoc appoint ees in the above service.
They were appointed on various dates between 1968 and 1977.
Their grievance is that dispite their long service in the Department they were not regula rised with reference to their original dates of appointment.
The Union of India pointed out certain difficulties in giving effect to the order of this Court of April, 1987 by filing a review petition and then a clarification applica tion but these have been dismissed.
The resultant position is that all the appellants have to be regularised in Group A of the Central 112 Health Service w.e.f.
1.1.1973 or the date of their respec tive original appointments whichever is later.
We may men tion here that this date 1.1.1973 is mentioned here because the appellants have now expressed their willingness to be considered for regular appointment only from this date and not from any earlier date, this being the date on which the group B and Group A services were merged together by the Government of India on the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission.
The only difficulty experienced by the Union of India in giving effect to the directions of this Court which now subsists is that if regularisation is granted to all the appellants, doctors who have been regularly appointed in Group A after an interview by the Union Public Service Commission may get relegated to secondary positions in view of the fact that the appellants were appointed much earlier though on an adhoc basis.
These regularly recruited doctors had not been heard earlier and they have now come up with intervention applications praying that any order of regular isation of the appellants should ensure that their interests are not prejudiced.
This was also the anxiety of the Union of India as expressed in the counter affidavit filed in this Court.
After heating all the counsel, we were inclined to think that while the appellants should get their rights which were declared by this Court in its earlier orders, there should at the same time be no prejudice to the doctors appointed through regular recruitment by the Union Public Service Commission.
After some discussion, counsel for the appel lants agreed to put forward certain proposals which would safeguard their interests and also at the same time not prejudice the regular appointees through the Union Public Service Commission.
The essence of the proposal made by them is that they may be treated to be a separate category with their own seniority list and entitled to promotion in ac cordance with that seniority list, the problem of conflict with the direct regular recruits being avoided by creation of an appropriate number of supernumerary posts.
The Union of India is not agreeable to accept these proposals which were set down by the appellants at our instance, in the form of an affidavit.
The proposals of the appellants have been set down in an annexure to an affidavit filed by Dr. PPC Rawani and dated 16th July, 1991.
However, after considering the matter we are of the opinion that there is no way of rendering justice to all the parties before us except by accepting these proposals in the manner to be set down below particularly because we find that while making the propos als, the appellants have also to some extent expressed the willingness to forgo certain rights that might have accrued to them in consequence of the earlier orders passed by this Court.
We are of the opinion that the proposals made are reasonable in the circumstances of the case and that they do not also in any way prejudice the rights of the regularly recruited doctors.
113 In view of this, we direct that the following proposal be implemented by the Department by way of giving effect to the order of this Court in C.A. 3519/84 dated April, 1987 and the subsequent clarificatory orders passed by this Court: The directions given are as follows: 1.
Each of the appellants will be treated as regularised in Group A of the Central Health Service from 1.1.1973 or the date of his first initial appointment in the service (though as adhoc Group B doctor), whichever is later.
In order to ensure that there is no disturbance of the seniority and the promo tional prospects of the regularly recruited doctors there will be a separate seniority list in respect of the appellants and their promotions ( 'about which directions are given below) shall be regulated by such separate 'seniority list and such promotions will only be in supernumerary posts to be created as mentioned below.
(a) Each of the appellants will be eligi ble for promotion to the post of Senior Medi cal Officer or Chief Medical Officer or fur ther promotional posts therefrom taking into account his seniority in the separate seniori ty list which is to be drawn up as indicated above.
(b) The promotion of any of the appellants to the post of Senior Medical Officer, Chief Medical Officer and further promotional post therefrom will be on par with the promotion of the regularly recruited doctor who is immedi ately junior to the concerned appellant on the basis of their respective dates of appoint ment.
In other words, if a regularly recruited doctor, on the basis of the seniority list maintained by the Department, gets a promotion as Senior Medical Officer or Chief Medical Officer or further promotion thereafter, then the appellant who was appointed immediately earlier to him will also be promoted as a Senior Medical Officer or Chief Medical Offi cer or further promotion therefrom (as the case may be) with effect from the same date.
In order that there may be no conflict or any possibilities of reversion, the post to which an appellant will be promoted (whether as Senior Medical Officer or Chief Medical Officer or on further promotion therefrom) should only be to a supernumerary post.
Such number of supernumerary posts should be creat ed by the Government as may be necessary to give effect to the above directions.
No promo tion will be given to any of the appellants in the existing vacancies which will go only to the regularly 114 appointed doctors.
The appellants hereby agree to give up all monetary claims on account of revision of scales, regularisation or promotion to which they would be entitled till 31.10.
199 1. 6.
Apart from the appellants there are certain doctors who fall in the same category but who had not filed writ petitions before the High Court.
They have filed directly writ petitions before this Court beating Nos.
2620 2659/1985 and intervention applications.
The intervention applications are allowed and rule nisi is issued in the writ petitions of which the other parties take notice.
These interveners and writ petitioner have to be granted the same relief as the appellants.
It is made clear that all these applicants and petitioners will be entitled to the same reliefs as the appellants for all purposes of seniority and promotion.
All monetary claims on account of revision of scales, regularisa tion or promotion till 31.10.1991 are given up by These applicants and petitioners as well.
We direct that, in view of the long pendency of litiga tion before this Court, the Union of India should take immediate steps to implement the above directions.
The directions should be given effect to latest by 31st March, 1992.
All the interim applications in the matter stand dis posed of in view of the fact that the main CMP itself has been disposed of.
R.P. Matters dis posed of.

Output:
In Civil Appeal No.3519 of 1984, filed by the appel lants, who were appointed as doctors on adhoc basis in the Central Health Service on various dates between 1968 and 1977, praying for regularisation of their services with reference to their original dates of appointments, this Court, by its judgment dated 9.4.1987 and subsequent orders, gave certain directions.
Since the Union of India could not implement the directions, the appellants filed the civil miscellaneous petition for clarification of the earlier orders passed by this Court in the Civil Appeal.
Certain other doctors who fall in the category of the appellants (adhoc appointees) and who had not earlier filed writ peti tion before the High Court, filed writ petitions and inter vention applications before this Court praying for the benefits as granted to the appellants.
It was contended by the Union of India that if regulari sation was granted to all the appellants and the like cate gories of doctors, the doctors regularly appointed in Group A may get relegated to secondary position in view of the fact that the appellants were appointed much earlier on adhoc basis.
The regularly recruited doctors, not heard earlier, also filed intervention applications praying that any order of regularisation of the appellants and the similarly situated doctors should ensure that their interests were not preju diced.
The appellants and the other similarly situated doctors expressed their willingness to be considered for regular appointments 110 only from 1.1.1973, this being the date on which the Group B and Group A services were merged together by the Government of India.
They also agreed to give up monetary claims on account of revision of scales, regularisation or promotion to which they would be entitled till 31.10.1991.
Disposing of the matters, this court, HELD: 1.
Each of the appellants will be treated as regularised in Group A of the Central Health Service from 1.1.1973 or the date of his first initial appointment in the service (though as an adhoc Group B doctor) whichever is later.
[p. 113 B] 2.
In order to ensure that there is no disturbance in the seniority and the promotional prospects of the regularly recruited doctors there will be a separate seniority list in respect of the appellants and their promotions shall be regulated by such separate seniority list and such promo tions will only be in supernumerary posts to be created by the Government.
[p. 113 B C] 3(a).
Each of the appellants will be eligible for promo tion to the post of Senior Medical Officer or Chief Medical Officer or further promotional posts therefrom taking into account his seniority in the separate seniority list.
[p. 113 D] (b).The promotion of any of the appellants to the post of Senior Medical officer, Chief Medical Officer and further promotional post therefrom will be on par with the promotion of the regularly recruited doctor who is immediately junior to the concerned appellant on the basis of their respective dates of appointment, e.g. if a regularly recruited doctor, on the basis of the seniority list maintained by the Depart ment, gets a promotion as Senior Medical Officer or Chief Medical Officer or further promotion thereafter, then the appellant who was appointed immediately earlier to him will also be promoted as a Senior Medical officer or Chief Medi cal Officer or further promotion therefrom (as the case may be) with effect from the same date.
[p. 113 D F] 4.
In order to avoid any conflict or any possibilities of reversion, the post to which an appellant will be promot ed (whether as Senior Medical Officer or Chief Medical Officer or on further promotion therefrom) should only be to a supernumerary post.
Such number of supernumerary posts should be created by the Govern 111 ment as may be necessary to give effect to the above direc tions.
No promotion will be given to any of the appellants in the existing vacancies which will go only to the regular ly appointed doctors.
[pp. 113 F H, 114 A] All the writ petitioners and interveners, falling in the category of the appellants, would also be entitled to the same reliefs as the appellants for all purposes of seniority and promotion.
[p. 114 A C]


Input:
Appeal No. 21 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 1, 1961 of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Writ No. 86 of 1960.
C. C. Kasliwal Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan and M. M. Tiwari, for the appellants.
Rameshwar Nath section N. Andley, and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Raghubar Dayal, J.
This appeal, on certificate granted by the Rajasthan High Court, raises the question of the applicability of the provisions of Chapter IV and thereby of r. 30 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1955, hereinafter called the rules, to the grants of mining leases under the provisions of Chapter V of the rules.
The facts leading to this appeal are briefly these.
The respondent obtained the mining lease for extracting sand stone from the mines in certain area from the Government of Rajasthan in 1956.
The lease was granted as a result of auction.
The period of the lease was from April 1, 1956 to July 31, 1959.
The respondent applied for extension of the period upto two years in view of the mandatory nature of the main provision of r. 30 and Simultaneously also applied for the renewal of the lease for a further period in accordance with the provisions of the proviso to r. 30.
The first prayer was refused and the State Government extended the period of the lease at first by six months and later by another two months.
The respondent thereafter filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court and prayed for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the striking down of the order of the Government renewing the lease for 8 months and directing the State of Rajasthan further to extend the lease in the first instance for two years from July 30.
1959 to bring, it unconformity with the period of lease specified in r. 30 and to renew.
after the expiry of such extended period, for a further period of 5 years under r. 30 of the rules.
The State of Rajasthan, appellant, contested the petition on the ground that the provisions of Chapter IV of the rules did not apply to the grant of mining leases by auction or tender provided for by Chapter V of the rules and that in any case the initial period short of 5 years must be deemed to have been at the desire of the respondent and that any further extension of the period of the lease under the proviso was in the discretion of the Government and consequently, the respondent could not claim to have the period of the lease extended for a period of 5 years.
The High Court held that the provisions of Chapter IV of the rules were applicable as far as possible to the grant of mining M/B(N) 3SCI 13 404 leases by auction under Chapter V. that though the State Government had to give a lease for 5 years in view of r. 30, yet the shorter period of the lease in favour of the respondent must, in the circumstances, be deemed to have been at his request and that the respondent was entitled to an extension of the lease by a further period of 5 years in accordance with the provisions of the proviso.
It therefore directed the State Government to renew the lease for a period of 5 years from the expiry of the original lease with option of further renewal, if so desired, by another period of 5 years subject to the conditions mentioned in r. 30.
It is against this order that this appeal has been filed.
Two questions are raised for the appellant in this Court.
The first is that the provisions of Chapter IV of the rules do not govern the grant of mining leases by auction under the provisions of Chapter V of the rules.
The other is that the proviso to r. 30 gives discretion to the State Government to extend the period of the lease for any period not exceeding 5 years that it is not mandatory that the State Government must extend the lease by a period of 5 years as held by the High Court.
We are of opinion that the High Court has come to a right conclusion on these two points.
Section 5 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Develop ment) Act, 1948 (Act LIII of 1948) empowered the Central Government to make rules, by notification in the official Gazette, for regulating the grant of mining leases or for prohibiting the grant of such leases in respect of any mineral in any area.
In the exercise of its power the Central Government framed the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Central rules.
Clause (ii) of r. 3 of the Central rules defined 'minor mineral ' to mean 'building stone ' etc., which admittedly included sand stone Rule 4 stated that the rules would not apply to minor minerals the extraction of which would be regulated by such rules as the State Government might prescribe.
The State of Rajasthan made the rules in 1955 in the exercise of the powers conferred by r. 4 of the Central rules.
Chapter IV of the rules deals with grant of mining leases and consists of rr.
19 to 32.
Chapter V deals with grant of mining leases and royalty collection contracts by auction or by inviting tenders or by other methods and consists of rr.
33 to 42.
Apart from the heading of Chapter IV being in general terms and so applicable to the grant of all mining leases by whatever process, a comparison of the provisions of rules in Chapter IV and those in Chapter V shows that all the incidents of a grant of a mining refuse contemplated and provided for in Chapter IV ire not provided for by Chapter V.
This leads to the irresistible conclusion that matters not provided for by rules in Chapter V with regard to mining leases will be covered by provisions relating to those matters in chapter IV, as these provisions deal with the essential incidents affecting grant of mining lease.
405 We may therefore go through the provisions of Chapter IV to have a comprehensive view of what the rules provide and to see whether all of them are such that the Legislature could have intended their not applying to leases granted under Chapter V or whether they, by their nature, can apply to leases granted under Chapter IV only.
Rule 19 deals with restrictions on grant of mining leases.
There is no corresponding rule in Chapter V.
It is inconceivable that the restrictions mentioned in r. 19 be not applicable to the grant of mining leases by auction or tender or any other method.
The matters of substance are the contents of the lease, the persons to whom the minerals about which leases can be granted and not the procedure to be followed in granting the lease.
Chapter IV deals with the grant of mining leases on applications for such a grant.
Chapter V mainly deals with grant of mining leases by auction or by inviting tenders or by other methods.
It is clear that the procedure to be followed for the grant of leases is left to the discretion of the Government though, ordinarily, in the absence if general or special orders, the procedure laid down in Chapter IV is to be followed.
Sub r.
(3) of r. 33 provides that leases by public auction or tender under sub r. (1) shall be given only in such a case as the Government may, by general or special order, direct and r. 42 gives discretion to Government to adopt any other method for leasing out minor mineral deposits in the interest of industry and development of the deposit.
The restrictions laid down by r. 19 are that no mining lease is to be granted in respect of any minor mineral notified by Government in that behalf, that no mining lease for the notified mineral will be granted to a person unless he holds a valid certificate of approval and that no mining lease shall be granted to an individual person unless he be a citizen of India except with the prior approval of Government.
These restrictions are of a general nature and salutary in effect and the Legislature, in our view, could not have made them inapplicable to the grant of mining leases under the rules in Chapter V. Rules 20 to 23 are applicable to applications for grant of mining leases.
They mention the person to whom an application is to be made, the fee which is to accompany such application, what the application should contain and how priority is to be given if there be more than one application in respect of the same land.
These rules cannot, by their nature, apply to the grant of mining leases by auction or tender or by any other method.
Rule 24 provides for the Register of Mining Leases.
Most of the particulars to be noted in this Register relate to the grant of mining leases on application but some of the particulars could be entered with respect to the mining leases granted by following the other procedure and therefore its provisions can partially apply to the mining leases granted under Chapter V. Rule 25 will also usually apply to applications only, as in the case of granting a mining lease otherwise, the Government would have ordinarily already decided 406 the area for which the lease is to be given.
Rule 26 lays down a restriction on the length and breadth of an area to be leased, but gives discretion to the Government to relax the provisions of the rule.
This rule is of general application, subject to the discretion in the Government to relax its provisions and there is no reason why it would have been made inapplicable to mining leases granted under Chapter V. Rule 27 provides that the boundaries of the area covered by a mining lease shall run vertically down below the surface towards the centre of the earth.
Such a specification of the boundaries of the area is very essential in connection with mining leases and the rule about it must apply to all mining leases granted under Chapter V. Rule 28 deals with deposit of security and applies to applicants for mining leases and not to those who are to get leases under Chapter V.
There is a specific provision for security under r. 37 (iv), in Chapter V. Rule 29 deals with transfer of mining leases and provides that a lessee with the previous sanction of the Government and subject to certain conditions could transfer his lease or any right or interest therein.
There is no corresponding rule in Chapter V.
This indicates that r. 29 will apply to the transfer of mining leases granted under Chapter V. There is no good reason why such a lessee be deprived of his right to transfer or be free from any restriction laid down in r 29.
Rule 30 deals with the period of lease and is the rule which is to be considered by us.
Rule 31 lays down the conditions subject to which the mining lease is granted.
This rule has 24 clauses dealing with various matters.
It is clear from r. 41 in Chapter V dealing with the execution of lease that the terms and conditions mentioned in r. 31 would be included in the lease executed by the lessee to whom a mining lease is ranted under Chapter V. of course, r. 41 provides that Such terms and conditions would be so modified as might be necessary by reason of the provisions of rr. 33 and 34.
Sub.r, (2) of r. 23 provides that in cases of grant of mining leases by auction or by inviting tenders the annual dead rent of the lease would be determined in the auction or by tend as the case may be and may exceed the rate give in the Second Schedule to the rules.
Rule 34 deals with payment of royalty through the contractor for royalty collection.
These provisions of rr.
33(2) and 34 would re quire modification in conditions (3) and (4) of r. 31.
It has been urged that the specific mention of r. 31 in r. 41 indicates that the other rules in Chapter IV are not applicable to the grant of mining leases under Chapter V.
We do not agree and 407 are of opinion that the specific mention of r. 31 is made in r. 41 In view of the fact that it was to apply with suitable modifications.
Rules in Chapter IV which apply as they stand do require no specific mention for their applicability to the rant of mining leases under Chapter V. Rule 32 deals with the currency of the lease and provides that the currency of the lease shall be from the date of communication to the party unless otherwise stated, that the lessee shall have no right to continue work or to accumulate stock on or after the date of termination of the lease however unless otherwise sanctioned by Government and that all accumulated stock and immovable property left in the leased out area after the date of expiry of the lease shall be deemed to be Government property.
The provisions of this rule are essential to define the currency of the mining lease granted under Chapter V and to the rights of the lessee and the State in regard to continuing the work after the date of termination of the lease or to the matter lying in the leased out area after the expiry of the lease.
There is no corresponding rule in Chapter V. Rule 32 must be deemed to apply to the leases granted under Chapter V.
It would thus appear that the provisions of rr. 19, 26, 27 29 and 32, by their nature, must apply to the leases granted under Chapter V as they are expressed in general terms and can apply to all mining leases.
If they were not intended to apply to mining leases granted under Chapter V, the legislature would have made an express provision about it and would have also made some suitable corresponding provisions for the leases granted under Chapter V. We are therefore of opinion that the contention that the rules under Chapter IV do not apply to mining leases granted under Chapter V is not sound and that the High Court rightly held that they do apply so far as applicable to mining leases granted tinder Chapter V. Rule 30 deals with the period of lease.
This rule will apply to leases granted under Chapter V both because the rules under Chapter IV apply to such leases and because there is no corresponding rule in Chapter V. Reference has been made to rr.
38 and 39 in Chapter V which deal with certain payments if the period of lease is not more than 1 year or is more than one year respectively.
The fixing of the period of the lease is an essential term of the lease, Rule 32 in Chapter IV provides when the lease is to commence.
The lease should also provide the time when it should terminate.
That can be done either by setting down the actual date or by expressing the period of the lease.
Rules 38 and 39 provide for different matters.
They apply when the period of the lease is already fixed tinder the terms of the lease and in accordance with the rules.
408 The next matter to be considered is the construction of r.30 which reads: Period of lease A mining lease may be granted for a period of 5 years unless the applicant himself desires it shorter period; Provided that the period may be extended by the Government for another period not exceeding 5 years with option to the lessee for renewal for another equivalent period in case the lessee guarantees investments in machinery equipments and the like, it least to the tune of 20 times the value of annual dead rent within 3 years from the of such extension.
The value of the machinery, equivalent and the like shall be determined by the Government.
Were the lease is so renewed, the dead rent and the surface rent shall be fixed by the Government within the limits given in the Second Schedule to these rules, and shall in no case exceed twice the original dead rent and surface rent respectively, and the royalty shall be charged at the rates in force at the time of renewal".
It is urged for the appellant that the State Government has discretion to fix the initial period of the lease as well as to fix the of the extension of the lease after the expiry of the initial period.
The High Court did not agree with this submission of the and, we think, rightly.
The word 'may ' in the main provision of the rule must mean shall ' and make the provision mandatory.
This is obvious from the last portion of the provision.
If the State Government had discretion to fix any period of the lease, the last portion of the provision would be redundant.
The Government could fix the period of the lease at any period shorter than live yea AS.
But the provision requires the fixing of the period shorter than 5 years only when the applicant desires a shorter period.
The period of the lease therefore can be shorter than five years only when the applicant desires and not when the Government desires.
Government must fix the period of the lease at 5 years in the absence of any expression of desire by the applicant for taking the lease for a shorter period.
The word 'may ' in the proviso in regard to the extension of the period by Government should also be construed as 'shall so as to make it incumbent on Government to extend the period of the lease if the lessee desires extension.
Of course no question for the extension of the lease can arise if the lessee himself does not wish to have the lease for a further period.
It is on account of this option existing in the lessee that the word 'may ' has been used in this context.
The lessee has been given a further option to have the lease extended by another five years but such an option is to be respected only if he gives the guarantee referred to in the proviso.
If he is not prepared to give such a guarantee, he cannot exercise the option for 409 the extension of the lease and the lease must automatically expire at the end of the first extended period.
The first extension has to be for five years.
Government has no option in that regard as well.
This appears from what is provided in connection with the option of the lessee for a second extension.
The second extension, at his option, is to be for a period equivalent to the period of the first extension.
The guarantee to be given is to the effect that the lessee would invest in machinery etc.
, at least to the tune of 20 times the value of the annual dead rent within 3 years from the grant of such extension.
There is no point in, taking a gurantee to make certain investments within three years if the second extended period of the lease is of a shorter duration as it can be if Government has a discretion in granting extension for a period shorter than 5 years.
If the first extension be for less than three years the second extension cannot be for a longer period.
If that expression 'such extension ' refers to the extension on the exercise of the option of the lessee at the end of the first extension, it would be a preferable construction of the proviso to hold that the Government is bound to extend the period of the lease for five years at the expiry of the initial period of the lease and that the lessee will have the option for renewal of the lease for another five years in case be guarantees the requisite investment as mentioned in the proviso.
Another way of looking at the provision and a better way is that the expression 'such extension ' refers to the first extension which the Government grants at the expiry of the initial term of the lease.
This means that at the time of granting the first extension the lessee has to choose whether he should also ask for the option for a second extension.
The option would then be an integral part of the agreement about the first extension.
This is also indicated from the language of the proviso linking the period of extension with the option for renewal of the lease for an equivalent period If no option as such is given at the time and is not a term of the lease, the lessee may not be able to ask for a second extension at the end of the first extended period of the lease.
When he secures the exercise of such an option as a term of the lease, he has to guarantee that within the first three years of the extended period of the lease he will make the heavy investment mentioned in the proviso with the resultant confidence that he will have undisturbed lessee rights for a period of 10 years from the expiry of the initial term of the lease: Whichever construction be put, with respect to the time when the term about option is to be settled between the parties, it must follow that the period of the first extension must be five years and not less.
We are further of opinion that the High Court is right in holding that the respondent 's taking the lease for a period upto July 31, 1959 must amount to his expressing a desire for having a lease for that period.
If he did not so desire, he need not have bid and taken the lease for the period for which it was to be given by auction.
410 it has been argued for the State that the High Court granted relief to the respondent in excess of what he had prayed, inasmuch as the High Court had directed the Government to renew the respondent 's first lease for a period of 5 years with option to further renewal if so desired for another period of 5 years subject to the condition mentioned in r. 30 when the respondent had not prayed for any direction with respect to the option for a second extension of the lease.
The contention is not sound.
The relief claimed after the expiry of the period of the first lease, which, according to the respondent, was also to be extended by two years, reads: " and then, after the expiry of the period of five years the lease be renewed for a period of five years under Rule 30 ,of Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1955".
The renewal was to be under r. 30.
Rule 30 itself requires extension of the lease with option in the lessee for obtaining another extension for an equivalent period.
This option must be a term of the lease and therefore must be incorporated in the lease at the time when the first extension is granted.
The prayer therefore should be deemed to include a prayer for an extension of 5 years with the necessary option.
Even if the prayer was not so made, the High Court was competent to make the direction in accordance with the requirements of the proviso to r. 30.
The direction for renewal is, in our view.
in full accordance with what the proviso requires.
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The respondent who had as a result of auction obtained a mining lease from the appellant State, applied for extension of the lease period in view of the mandatory nature of the main provision of rule 30 and simultaneously also applied for renewal of the lease in accordance with the provisions of the proviso to rule 30.
The appellant refused the first prayer but extended the period by a few months.
The respondent thereafter, filed a writ petition in the High Court for striking down the order of the Government renewing the lease by a few months and for directing the appellant to extend the lease in the first instance for two years to bring it in conformity with the period of lease specified in rule 30 and to renew after the expiry of such extended period, for a further period of 5 years under rule 30.
The appellant contended that the provisions of Chapter IV of the rules did not apply to the grant of mining leases by auction or tender provided for by Chapter V of the rules and that in any case the initial period short of 5 years must be deemed to have been at the desire of the respondent and that any further extension of the period of lease under the proviso was in the discretion of the appellant and consequently, the respondent could not claim to have the period of the lease extended for a period of 5 years.
The High Court disagreed with the appellant 's contentions and allowed the petition.
In appeal by certificate; HELD: Matters not provided for by rules in Chapter V with regard to mining leases will be covered by provisions relating to those matters in Chapter IV, as these provisions deal with the essential Incidents affecting grant of mining leases.
[404 H] Rule 30 applies to leases granted under Chapter V both because the rules under Chapter IV apply to such leases and because there is no corresponding rule in Chapter V. [407 G H] The word "may" in the proviso in rule 30 in regard to the extension of the period by, Government should also be construed as 'shall ', so as to mike it incumbent on Government to extend the period of the lease if the lessee desires extension.
Of course no question for the extension of the lease can arise if the lessee himself does not wish to have the lease for a further period.
It is on account of this option existing in the lessees that the word 'may ' has been used in this context.
But the option given to the lessee to have the lease extended by period of another five years is to be respected only if the lessee gives the guarantee referred to in the proviso.
[408 H] The first extension must be five years and not less.
The period of lease can be shorter than five years only when the applicant desires and not when the Government desires.
[409 B] 403


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 1728 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.1982 of the Allahabad 838 High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 6324 of 1980.
R.K. Garg, M.K.D. Namboodiri and section Balakrishnan for the Appellant.
S.N. Kaicker, Pradeep Kumar Jain for the Respondents.
This tenant 's appeal by special leave arises out of a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages.
The suit was brought by the respondents who claimed that a shop owned by them had been let to the appellant, that the appellant had fallen in arrears of rent from 1 February, 1968 and had not paid the arrears, notwithstanding a notice of demand dated 8 January, 1975 served on the appellant.
The suit was decreed ex parte by the Trial Court and the decree was set aside by the first Appellate Court.
In writ Petition before the High Court, it was urged on behalf of the appel lant that the appellant had deposited the arrears of rent under sub section
(4) of section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, and that therefore the Court should have made an order relieving the appellant against his liability for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent.
The High Court noted that the suit was filed on 12 February, 1975 and as the appellant did not appear on 4 April, 1975, the day fixed in the summons, the suit proceeded ex parte and was decreed.
The High Court also noticed that upon subsequent application made by the appel lant the ex parte decree was set aside on 24 March, 1977, and on 30 May, 1977, the fresh date now fixed, the appellant made a deposit of Rs.2,912 accompanied by an application stating that the said date was the first date of hearing and he was making a deposit of the entire arrears of rent.
The appellant first stated that he was not obliged to deposit the entire arrears of rent as they were barred by time.
However, the appellant prayed for amendment of his plead ings.
On 29 September, 1977, the appellant sought to deposit the time barred arrears also and got the tender passed for that purpose.
In pursuance of the tender the amount was deposited on 1 October, 1977.
The amendment application was allowed, but when the matter came before the learned First Additional District Judge, he took the view that the appel lant had failed to comply with the conditions of sub section
(4) of section 20 of the Act.
He held that 30 August, 1977 was 839 the date of first hearing in the suit within the meaning of sub section
(4) of section 20.
He recorded that the parties did not dispute that the time barred arrears claimed by the respond ents were also required to be deposited under sub section
(4) of section 20.
As the time barred arrears had been deposited by the appellant on 1 October, 1977 only, the High Court took the view that the entire arrears of rent had not been deposited on or before the date of first hearing.
The High Court declined to go into the further question whether the depos its made by the appellant on 1 October, 1977 ought to relate back to 29 September, 1977.
In the result the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we see no reason to take a different view from that adopted by the High Court.
The High Court was plainly right in holding that 30 August, 1977 was the date of first hearing in the suit.
As the suit was in the nature of a small cause suit, and as the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act did not contemplate the fixation of any date for settlement of issues, it must be taken that 30 August, 1977 was the date of first hearing in the suit, and inasmuch as the entire amount due as ar rears of rent had not been deposited within time, the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition.
Accordingly the appeal is dismissed but there As no order as to costs.
H.L.C. Appeal dis missed.

Output:
Respondent owners ' suit for recovery of arrears of rent was decreed ex parte when the appellant tenant failed to appear in the suit; however, on a subsequent application made by him the decree was set aside on 24.3.1977.
The appellant made a deposit of Rs.2,912 on 30.5.1977 stating that the said date was the first date of hearing in the suit.
The appellant, who had first stated that he was not obliged to deposit the entire arrears as they were barred by time, later on prayed for amendment of his pleadings and sought to deposit the time barred arrears on 29.9.1977, but the deposit was actually made on 1.10.1977.
The Court al lowed the prayer for amendment but the Additional District Judge held that the appellant was liable to be evicted from the premises since he had failed to deposit the entire arrears on or before 30.8.1977 which was the date of first hearing in the suit in terms of section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
The appellant 's writ petition challenging the afore said finding was dismissed by the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, HELD: As the suit was in the nature of a small cause suit, and as the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act did not contemplate the fixation of any date for settlement of issues, it must be taken that 30.8.1977 was the date of first hearing in the suit, and inasmuch as the entire amount due as arrears of rent had not been deposited within time, the High Court was right in dismissing the Writ Petition.
[839D]


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 1004 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.1987 of the High Court of Calcutta in Civil Order No. 2506 of 1987.
509 S.N. Kacker, N. Choudhary and Rathin Das for the Appellant.
A.P. Chatterjee, Deepak Mitra and G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J.
The jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, Calcutta to entertain a suit being T.S. No. 520 of 1983 filed by the respondent No. 1 is under challenge in the present appeal, on the ground that the correct value of the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
The plaintiff respondent No. 1 has alleged that he is a partner of a partnership business along with his brothers defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
Originally it was a proprietary business belonging to Abdul Samad, father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and was later converted into a partnership firm by a regular deed.
During his life time the business was under the control of Abdul Samad, but on his death the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have effectively taken charge of the business and excluded the plaintiff.
A suggestion to re constitute and partnership made and repeated by the plaintiff has been ignored.
In reply to the plaintiff 's letter seeking information the defendant No. 2 petitioner has stated in his letter to the plaintiff that he (the plaintiff) has no interest in the firm.
In paragraph 11 of the plaint it is stated that he has on enquiry discovered that the defendants nos.
1 and 2 have been falsely representing before the Income Tax department, inter alia, that a new deed of partnership had been executed on 15.1.1979 to be effective from 1.1.1979 in which the plaintiff has no interest.
The Income Tax Officer passed an order on 26th December 1981 on the basis of the false allegations made by the defendants.
The plaintiff has challenged the aforementioned partnership deed of 1979.
In paragraph 16 of the plaint the amount of profit from the business has been described as "huge".
In the prayer portion of the plaint the plaintiff prayed for declaring the partnership deed of 1979 as illegal and void and for passing a decree for dissolution of the partnership firm and for accounts.
The valuation of the suit was put as Rs.150 being the sum of Rs.50 for declaration, Rs. 50 for rendition of accounts and another sum of Rs. 50 for profit to the share of the plaintiff arising out of the business.
Court fee was accordingly paid.
The defendants No. 1 and 2, besides denying the plaint allegations made by the plaintiff, challenged the valuation given by the plaintiff as grossly undervalued and arbitrary.
The issues relating to the correct valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to enter 510 tain the suit were taken up as preliminary issues and were decided in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendants challenged the order by a civil revision application before the Calcutta High Court which was dismised.
The defendant No. 2 has now come to this Court against the High Court 's order.
Special leave is granted.
Mr. Kacker, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that it is manifest that relief to the tune of lacs of rupees has been claimed by the plaintiff in the suit.
He said that the plaintiff has laid claim to a sum of Rs.1,26,796.72 besides another sum of over Rs.84,000 as his share in the profit for a particular period by reference to the proceeding of the Income Tax department mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint, and it is, therefore, preposterous on his part to suggest in paragraph 19 of the plaint that it could be tentatively valued at Rs.50 only.
According to the defence case which is challenged as incorrect by the plaintiff, the plaintiff requested for and was allowed a larger share 'in the well established and reputed business of auctioneer known as "Russell Exchange" and its assets and goodwill as well as the amount lying in the Habib Bank, Karachi Branch, solely and absolutely '.
The "Russell Exchange" building is a very valuable property near Park Street in the city of Calcutta.
A copy of the Profit and Loss Account for the calendar year 1979 attached by the plaintiff to the additional affidavit filed on his behalf before this Court mentions figures in lacs.
Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent No. 1, has argued that the suit is governed for the purpose of court fees by section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, and the plaintiff has the absolute right to put on the plaint any value he wishes to and the court has no jurisdiction to examine the matter.
In other words, it is the sweet will of the plaintiff to choose any figure he likes and thus decide finally the court which shall have jurisdiction to entertain the suit without reference to the subject matter of the litigation, the nature and extent of the relief claimed or any other factor.
He has relied upon the decision of this Court in Smt.
Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, , and Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, ; Reference was also made to Krishnaji Hari vs Gopal Narayan, AIR 1936 Bombay 166 and Ishwarappa vs Dhanji, AIR 1932 Bombay 111.
Mr. Chatterjee claimed that the different High Courts in the country have consistently confirmed this right of the plaintiff and he has not discovered any decision to the contrary.
511 5.
We are afraid, the interpretation put by the learned counsel on the decisions of this Court is not correct and cannot be accepted.
None of the two cited judgments relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee helps him.
It is true that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after taking all the accounts and he may, therefore, put a tentative valuation upon the suit, but he is not permitted to choose an unreasonable and arbitrary figure for that purpose.
At page 392 of the judgment in Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, (supra) this Court while taking note of the plaintiff 's right to give a tentative valuation on the suit, observed: "The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately under value the relief." In Smt.
Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, , the view was reiterated thus at page 70: ". .
The plaintiff however, has not been given the absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on such relief and where the plaintiff manifestly and deliberately under estimates the relief the court is entitled to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff and to revise the same if it is patently arbitrary or unreasonable . ." 6.
So far as the opinion of the High Courts is concerned, it is not uniform.
The argument, "that the plaintiff can give an arbitrary valuation in the plaint, and that the court is bound to accept that" made on behalf of the plaintiff before the Allahabad High Court in Aizaz Ahmad vs Nazirul Hasan, AIR 1935 Allahabad 849, was rejected, after observing that there was some authority for the extreme view as urged in two Calcutta decisions but later a different view was taken by the said Court as also by the Allahabad Court.
In Attar Singh vs Manohar Singh, ILR (1947) Nagpur 933, the plaintiff non applicant before the High Court filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts valuing at Rs.150 as has been done in the case before us.
The defendant 's objection to the valuation was rejected by the trial court "on the ground that the court was powerless to challenge the valuation put by the plaintiff on the relief claimed in the suit.
" The Full Bench decision in Mata Ram vs Daulat, ILR (1938) Nagpur 588 (F.B.) was attempted to be distinguished on the basis that it was a case covered by section 7(iv)(c).
of the Court Fees Act and not by section 7(iv)(f).
The 512 High Court while repelling the argument pointed out that the principle underlying both the clauses (c) and (f) of section 7(iv) is substantially the same and the Full Bench decision governed the case.
Accordingly it was held that when the valuation put by the plaintiff appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable the court may reject it and leave the plaintiff to correct the valuation or have the suit rejected.
Similar was the view of the Patna High Court in suits covered by section 7(iv)(c) in Salahuddinhyder vs Dhanoolal, [1945] ILR XXIV Patna 334, and Shama Pershad Shahi vs Sheopershad Singh XLI, I.C. 95 (Patna).
In Gouri Lal and others vs Raja Babu, AIR 1929 Patna 626, the respondent filed a suit praying for accounts from appellant No. 1.
Rejecting his claim to put any valuation under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act the High Court observed that when a plaintiff is required to place the valuation on his claim he must state a valuation which need only be approximately correct but qualified it by saying that, "it must not be arbitrary or manifestly inadequate.
It is true that in a suit for accounts the correct amount payable by one party to the other can be ascertained only when the accounts are examined and it is not possible to give an accurate valuation of the claim at the inception of the suit.
The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed to give his own tentative valuation.
Ordinarily the Court shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chosen, but the plaintiff cannot act arbitrarily in this matter.
If a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount to not exercising his right in this regard.
In such a case it is not only open to the Court but its duty to reject such a valuation.
The cases of some of the High Courts which have taken a different view must be held to be incorrectly decided.
The learned counsel for the parties have placed before us the materials on the record at considerable length and we do not have any hesitation in holding that the valuation put by the plaintiff (respondent before us) on the plaint is arbitrary and unacceptable.
We, however, do not propose to examine the matter further and remit this question to be reconsidered by the trial court.
While examining the issue it will be open to the trial court to take into consideration the statement in the plaint that the plaintiff has been ousted from the partnership business.
If the court comes to the conclusion that the tentative valuation of the suit would be beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, it shall pass an appropriate order under Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs payable by the plaintiff respondent.
G.N. Appeal allowed.

Output:
The father and brothers of Respondent No. 1 were running a proprietary business, which was later converted into a partnership firm by a regular deed.
On the death of the father, the two brothers had effectively taken control of the business and excluded Respondent No. 1.
The suggestion to reconstitute the partnership made repeatedly by Respondent No. 1 had been ignored.
The two brothers represented before the Income Tax Officer that a new deed of partnership had been executed on 15.1.1979 to be effective from 1.1.1979 in which Respondent No. 1 had no interest and on that basis the Income Tax Officer passed an order.
In the suit filed by Respondent No. 1, he challenged the partnership deed as being illegal and void and prayed for a decree for dissolution of the partnership firm and for accounts.
Valuation of the suit was put as Rs.150 i.e., Rs.50 each for declaration, rendition of accounts, and for profit to the share of the plaintiff.
Court fee was paid accordingly.
The defendants in the suit denied the allegations made in the plaint and also challenged the valuation as being grossly undervalued and arbitrary.
The issue relating to the correct valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was decided in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendants challenged the order by a Civil Revision Application which was dismissed by the High Court.
This appeal by special leave is against the High Court 's order.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that while relief to the tune of lakhs of rupees had been claimed, the plaint had been tentatively valued for Rs.50 only, which is preposterous.
The contention of Respondent No. 1 was that a Plaintiff has the absolute right to put on the plaint any 508 value he wishes and the court has no jurisdiction to examine the matter.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
It is true that in a suit for accounts the correct amount payable by one party to the other can be ascertained only when the accounts are examined and it is not possible to give an accurate valuation of the claim at the inception of the suit.
The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed to give his own tentative valuation.
Ordinarily the Court shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chosen, but the plaintiff cannot act arbitrarily in this matter.
If a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount to not exercising his right in this regard.
In such a case it is not only open to the Court but its duty to reject such a valuation.
[512D E] 2.
In the instant case the valuation put by the plaintiff on the plaint is arbitrary and unacceptable.
However, the question is remitted to the trial court for reconsideration.
It is open to the trial court to take into consideration the statement in the plaint that the plaintiff has been ousted from the partnership business.
If the court comes to the conclusion that the tentative valuation of the suit would be beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, it shall pass an appropriate order under Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
[512F G] Smt.
Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, ; Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, ; , relied on.
Aizaz Ahmad vs Nazirul Hasan, AIR 1935 Allahabad 849; Attar Singh vs Manohar Singh, ILR (1947) Nagpur 933; Mata Ram vs Daulat ILR (1938) Nagpur 588 (F.B.); Salahuddinhyder vs Dhanoolal, [1945] ILR XXIV Patna 334; Shama Pershad Sahi vs Sheopershad Singh XLI I.C. 95 (Patna); Gouri Lal and others vs Raja Babu, AIR 929 Patna 626, approved.
Krishnaji Hari vs Gopal Narayan.
AIR 1936 Bombay 166 and Ishwarappa vs Dhanji, AIR 1932 Bombay 111, overruled.