Input:
o. 189 of 1971.
Appeal under Section 116 A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated January 8, 1971 of the Madras High Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 1970.
V. P. Raman and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant.
Jagdish Swarup, Socilitor General of India, B. D. Sharma and section P. Nayar, for the Election Commission of India.
B. Sen and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the Supreme Court Bar Association.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Beg, J.
This is an appeal under Section 116 A of the Repre sentation of People Act, 1951.
The appellant 's election, held on 11 4 1970, to the Madras Legislative Council from the Madras District Graduates ' Constituency was set aside by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court who decided all the issues except one in favour of the appellant.
The only issue decided against the appellant, which is now before us, was framed as follows : "Whether the first Respondent was not qualified to stand for election to the Graduates Constituency on all or any of the grounds set out by the petitioner in paragraph 7 to 9 of the election Petition" ? Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the election petition against the appellant are lengthy, prolix, and argumentative.
The case and the contentions of the Respondent G. Panneerselvam, the petitioner before the High Court, which were accepted by the High Court, may be summarised as follows Firstly, the whole purpose of Article 171 of the Constitution was to confer a right of "functional representation" upon persons possessing certain educational or other qualifications so that the Appellant Narayanaswami, who had only passed the High School Leaving Examination and was not a Graduate, could not be elected 175 at all to the Legislative Council from the Graduates ' Constituency; secondly, it would be absurd and destructive of the very concept of representation of especially qualified persons that an individual who does not possess the essential or basic qualification of the electors should be a representative of those who are to be represented because of this special qualification of theirs; and, thirdly, the Constitution, being an organic instrument for the governance of the land, must be interpreted in a particularly broad and liberal manner so as to give effect to the underlying principles and purposes of the system of representation sought to be set up by it and not in such a way as to defeat them.
Hence, the educational qualification of the electors should be read into the system of represen tation set up by the Constitution for Legislative, Councils as a necessary qualification of candidates in such constituencies.
Authorities are certainly not wanting which indicate that Courts should interpret in a broad and generous spirit the document which contains the fundamental law of the land or the basic principles of its Government.
Nevertheless, the rule of "plain meaning or "literal" interpretation, described in Maxwell 's Interpretation of Statutes as "the primary rule", could not be altogether abandoned today in interpreting any document.
Indeed, we find Lord Evershed, M.R., saying: "The length and detail of modern legislation, has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule".
(See : Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition p. 28).
It may be that the great mass of modem legislation, a large part of which consists of statutory rules, makes some departure from the literal rule of interpretation more easily justifiable today than it was in the past, But, the object of interpretation and of "construction" (which may be broader than "interpretation") is to discover the intention of the law makers in every case (See: Crawford on "Statutory Construction" 1940 Ed. para 157, p. 240 242).
This object can, obviously, be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions.
Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results.
This is an elementary and basic rule of interpretation as well as of construction processes which, from the point of view of principles applied, coalesce and converge towards the common purpose of both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may be reasonably possible to do this, of what is found laid down.
The provisions whose meaning is under consideration have, therefore, to he examined before applying any method of construction at all.
To these provisions we may now turn.
Article 168 of our Constitution shows that the State Legis latures in nine States in India, including Madras, were to consist of two Houses : the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative, Coun 176 cil.
Article 170 lays down that the Legislative Assembly of each State "shall consist of members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the State, in such a manner as the Parliament may by law determine".
After that, comes Article 171 which may be reproduced in toto here: "1.71(1) The total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State having such a Council shall not exceed one third of the total number of members in the Legislative Assembly of that State,: Provided that the total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State shall in no case be less than forty.
(2) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the composition of the Legislative Council of a State shall be as provided in clause (3).
(3) of the total number of members of the Legislative Council of a State (a) as nearly as may be, one third shall be elected by electorates consisting of members of municipalities, district boards and such other local authorities in the State as Parliament may by law specify; (b) as nearly as may be, one twelfth shalt be elected by electorates consisting of persons residing in the State who have been for at least three years graduates of any university in the territory of India or have been for at least three years in possession of qualifications prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament as equivalent to that of a graduate of any such university; (c) as nearly as may be.
one twelfth shall be, elected by electorates consisting of persons who have been for at least three years engaged in teaching in such educational institutions within the State, not lower in standard than that of a secondary school, as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament; (d) as nearly as may be, one third shall be elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State from amongst persons who are not members of the Assembly.
(e) the remainder shall be nominated by the Governor in accordance with the provisions of clause (5).
(4) The members to be elected under sub clauses(a), (b) and (c) of clause (3) shall be chosen in such territorial constituencies as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament,, and the elections under 177 the said sub clauses and under sub clause (d) of the said clause shall be held in accordance with the system of pro portional representation by means of the single transferable vote.
(5) The members to be nominated by the Governor under sub clause (2) of clause (3) shall consist of persons having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of such matters as the following namely: Literature, Science, article cooperative movement and social service.
" The term "electorate", used in Article 171(3) (a)(b) & (c) has neither been defined by the Constitution nor in any enactment by Parliament.
2(1)(e) of the Representation of People Act 43 of 1951, however, says : " 'elector, ' in relation to a constituency means a person whose name is entered in the electoral roll of that constituency for the time being in force and who is not subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sec.
16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950".
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term " electorate" is confined to the body of persons who elect.
It does not contain, within its ambit, the extended notion of a body of persons electing representatives "from amongst themselves".
Thus, the use of the term "electorale" in Article 171(3) of our Constitution, could not, by itself, impose a limit upon the field of choice of members of the electorate by requiring that the person to be chosen must also be a member of the electorate.
The qualifications of the electors constituting the "electorate" and of those who can represent each " electorate", contemplated by the constitution and then supplemented by Parliament, are separately set out for each house.
We may glance at the provisions relating to Legislative Assemblies first.
Section 16 of the Representation of People Act 43 of 1950 lays down the qualifications of an elector negatively by prescribing who shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll.
A disqualified person is one who : (a) is not a citizen of India; or (b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; _or (c) is for the time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any law relating to corrupt practices and other offences in connection with elections".
Section 19 lays down the two conditions for registration on the electoral roll of a constituency.
The person to be registered must not be less than 21 years of age on the qualifying date and must 178 be ordinarily resident in the constituency.
The persons so registered, whose names appear on the electoral roll, constitute the electorato for the legislative Assembly of each State.
Section 5 of the Representation of People Act, 43 of 1.951 enacts : "5.
Qualifications for membership of a Legislative Assembly: A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless (a) in the case of a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes or for the Scheduled Tribes of that State, he is a member of any of those castes or of those tribes, as the case may be, and is an elector for any Assembly consti tuency in that State; (b) in the case of a seat reserved for an autonomous district of Assam, other than a seat the constituency for which comprises the cantonment and municipality of Shillong, he is a member of a Scheduled Tribe of any autonomous district and is an elector for the Assembly constituency in which such seat or any other seat is reserved for that district; and (c) in the case of any other seat, he is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State"; Coming to the Legislative Council, we find that the qualifications for the four "electorates" are indicated by article 171(3)(a)(b)(c) & (d).
And, the qualifications of candidates for seats in a Legislative Council are given in Section 6 of the Representation of People Act 43 of 1951 which lays down: "6.
Qualifications for membership of a Legislative Council. (1) A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Council of a State to be filled by election unless he is an elector for any Assembly con stituency in that State.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Council of a State to be filled by nomination by the Governor unless he is ordinarily resident in the State".
A look at Article 171(2), set out above, indicates that the composition of the Legislative Council of a State was a matter to be also provided for by law made by Parliament.
It is evident that the constitution makers had directed their attention specifically towards the methods of election and composition of the legislature 179 of each State.
They themselves prescribed same qualifications to be possessed by members of each House of the Legislature.
Article 173 lays down : "173.
A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he (a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule; (b) is, in the case of a seat in the Legislative Assembly, not less than twenty five years of age and, in the case of a seat in the Legislative Council, not less than thirty years of age; and (c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament".
An important and very noticeable difference between, quali fications prescribed by Parliament for the membership of a Legislative Assembly by Section 5 of the Representation of People Act of 1951 and those for the membership of a Legislative Council by Section 6 of that Act is that, so far as a member of the Legislative Assembly is concerned, he or she has to be an Elector in the Constituency from which he or she stands, but a member of a Legislative Council in a State is not, similarly, required to be a member of the electorate.
All that Parliament says, in Section 6 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, is that the, person to be chosen as a member of the Legislative Council has to be "an elector for any Assembly constituency" in the State to whose legislative Council he was to be chosen.
He has to be "ordinarily resident" in the State to qualify for nomination.
No other qualifications, apart from those found in Article 173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act of 1951, are to be found laid down anywhere.
But, an additional qualification was found, by the judgment under appeal before us, to exist by resort ' ing to a presumed legislative intent and then.
practically adding it to those expressly laid down.
It may be possible to look for legislative intention in materials outside the four corners of a statute where its language is really ambiguous or conflicting.
But, where no such difficulty arises, the mere fact that the intentions of the law makers, sought to be demonstrated by what was said by some of them or by those advising them when the Constitution was on the anvil, were really different from the result which clearly follows from language used in the Legislative provisions under consideration, could not authorise the use of such an exceptional mode of construction.
"It is well accepted", said Lord Morris (See: Davies Jankins & 180 Co. vs Davies) ', "that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law".
The judgment under appeal, after discussing the manner in which Article 171 of the Constitution was framed and the different views expressed about the nature of the Second Chambers to be set up by it in our States, says : "The system of functional, which is also called occupational representation, as distinguished from territorial representation, was borrowed from the Irish Constitution and that is the underlying principle in Article 171.
The opinion of political thinkers and statement on the wisdom of such representation may not be unanimous.
Whatever be the divergent views, the accomplished fact in the Constitution is that such a representation has been given recognition and it has to be implemented.
In making the Legislative Council as a representative body, the framers of the Constitution have not made it exclusively one of elected representatives according to their occupations.
It is intended to be a hetergenous and more broad based body consisting of persons of different walks of life, some elected and some nominated, each with the experience in his own field of activity".
The learned Judge concluded; "It is with these objects that clauses (a),, (b), and (c) of Article 171(3) have been conceived so that persons in those walks of life could make their contribution to the Legislative functions of the State.
Article 1.71 in fixing the composition of the Legislative Council as a functional chamber.
has also indirectly laid down certain qualifications and also disqualifications of members to be elected thereunder".
Whatever may have been the opinions of Constitution makers or of their advisers, whose views are cited in the judgment under appeal, it is not possible to.
say, on a perusal of Article 171 of the Constitution, that the Second Chambers set up in nine States in India were meant to incorporate the principle of what is known as "functional" or "vocational" representation which has been advocated by Guild Socialist and Syndicalist Schools of political thought.
, Some of the observations quoted above, in the judgment under appeal itself, militate with the conclusions reached there.
All that we can infer from our Constitutional provisions is that additional representation or weightage was given to persons possessing special type of knowledge and experience by enabling them to elect their special representatives also for Legislative Councils.
The concept of such representation does not carry with it, as a necessary consequence, the further notion that the representative must also possess the very qualifications of those he represents.
In the case of the Graduates ' constituency, it is provided in Article 171(3)(b) that the electors must have held their degrees (1) 1967 2 W.L.R. p. 11 39 @ 11 56.
181 for at least three years before they become qualified an electors.
Thus,. in laying down the test of competence of voters of such a constituency, more possession of degrees by them was not considered sufficient.
Moreover, graduates are not an occupational or vocational group but merely a body of persons with an educational qualification.
It would, therefore, not be correct to describe the additional representation sought to be given to them as an attempt to introduce the "functional" or "vocational" principle.
On the face of it, Article 171 appears to be designed only to give a right to choose their representatives to those who have certain types of presumably valuable knowledge and education.
If the presumption of their better competence to elect a suitable representative in there, as we think that there must be, it would be for the members of such a constituency themselves to decide whether a person who stands for election from their constituency possesses the right type of knowledge, experience, and wisdom which satisfy certain standards.
It may well be that the constitution makers, acting upon such a presumption, had intentionally left the educational qualifications of a candidate for election from the graduates constituency unspecified.
A test laid down by Blackburn J. in R. vs Cleworth(1), to determine what the correct presumption, arising from an omission in a statute should be, was whether what was omitted but sought to be brought within the legislative intention was "known" to the law makers, and could, therefore, be "supposed to have been omitted intentionally".
"It makes no difference", says Craies 'in "Statute Law"(2) "that the omission on the part of the legislature was a mere oversight, and that without doubt the Act would have been drawn otherwise had the attention of the legislature been directed to the oversight at the time the Act was under discussion".
In the case before us, it could not possibly be said that the question to be dealt with was not "known" to the, legislators.
It could not even be said that qualifications of the electors/ as well as of those to be elected were not matters to which the attention of the law makers, both in the Constituent Assembly and in Parliament, was not specially directed at all or that the omission must be by mere oversight.
The provisions discussed above demonstrate amply how legislative attention was paid to the qualifications, of the electors 'as well as of the elected in every case.
Hence, the correct presumption, in such a case, would be that the omission was deliberate.
A glance at the legislative history lying behind Article 171 also enables us to reach the conclusion that the omission by the Constitution makers or by Parliament to prescribe graduation as (1) [1864] 4 BSS 927, 934 (2) Crains on Statute Law 5th En.
182 must be deliberate.
Sections 60 and 61 of the Government of India Act, 1935, deal with composition of Provincial legislatures and of the two Chambers of such legislatures.
The Upper Chambers in the Provincial Legislatures were to be composed of members retiring every third year in accordance with provisions of the Fifth Schedule to the Act.
Rule 10 of this Schedule lays down: "In a Province in which any seats are to be filled by representatives of backward areas or backward tribes, representatives of commerce, industry, mining and planting, representatives of landholders, representatives of universities or representatives of labour, persons to fill those seats. . . shall be chosen in such manner as may be prescribed".
On 30th April, 1936, the Government of India (Provincial Legislative Assemblies) Order of 1936 was issued by His Majesty in Council.
It prescribed the qualifications of persons to be chosen from the "special constituencies" set up for representation in the Legislative Councils, A glance at the provisions relating to these qualifications, including those for the University seats, indicates that it was invariably expressly provided, where it was so intended, that a necessary qualification of a candidate for a seat was that he or she should be "entitled to vote for the choice of a member to fill it".
Hence, legislative history on the subject would also indicate.
that, whenever any qualification of the candidate was intended to be imposed, this was expressly done and not left to mere implications.
We think that the view contained in the Judgment under appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding them to the relevant statutory provisions to the effect that the candidates from graduates ' constituencies of Legislative Councils must also possess the qualification of having graduated.
This contravenes the rule of "Plain meaning" or "literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail.
A logical corollary of that rule is that "a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made" (See: Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn.
p. 70).
An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible (see e.g. Sri Ram Narain Medhi & Ors.
vs The State of Bombay(1), British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Captain Itbar Singh & Ors.
(2), R. G. Jacob vs Union of India(3).
Courts may deppart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity (see e.g. State 'of Madhya Pradesh vs M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. & Anr.(4).
In Hira Devi vs District Board, Shahiahanpur(5), this Court observed (1) ; (2) (3) ; (4) A.T.R. (5) A.T.R. 365.
183 "No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature.
But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act".
Cases in, which defects in statutory provisions may or may not be supplied by Courts have been indicated in well known works such as Sutherland 's "Statutory Construction" (3rd Edn.(Vol. 2) (Paragraph 4924 at pages 455 558) and in Crawford 's "Construction of statutes" (1940 Edn.).
Only one passage from the last mentioned work need be cited here: (p. 269) : "Where the statutes meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated.
In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed.
If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words.
They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would occur.
Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute".
We think that the language as well as the legislative history of Articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, enable us to presume a deliberate omission of the qualification that the representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate.
In our opinion, no absurdity results if we presume such an intention.
We cannot infer, as the learned Judge of the Madras High Court had done, from the mere fact of such an omission and opinions about a supposed scheme "functional representation" underlying Article 171 of our Constitution, that the omission was either unintentional or that it led to absurd results.
We think that, by adding a deemed to be necessary or implied qualification of a representative of the Graduates which the Constitution makers, or, in any event, the Parliament, could have easily imposed, the learned Judge had really invaded the Legislative sphere.
The defect, if.
any, in the law could be removed only by law made by Parliament.
We conclude, after considering all the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the qualifications of a candidate for election from the Graduates ' constituency of the Legislative Council of the Madras State, that the appellant possesses all the qualifications laid down for such a candidate.
184 Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment and order of the Madras High Court, and dismiss the, Respondent 's election petition.
The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout.
V.P.S. Appeal allowed.

Output:
The respondent challenged the appellant selection to the Madras Legislative, Council from the Madras District Graduates ' Constituency on the grounds, (1) that, the purpose of article 171 of the Constitution was to confer a right of functional representation upon persons possessing certain educational or other qualifications so that the appellant who was not a graduate could not be elected to the Legislative Council from the Graduates ' Constituency; (2) that, it would be absurd and destructive of the concept of representation that an individual, who did not possess the essential or basic qualification of the electors, should be their representative, and (3), that, the Constitution, being an organic instrument, must be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner so as to give effect to the underlying principles and purposes of the system of representation sought to be embodied in it.
The High Court set aside the election.
Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD: (1) (a) Graduates are not an occupational or vocational group, but merely a body of persons with particular educational qualifications.
It would, therefore, not be correct to describe the additional representation sought to be given to them in the Legislative Council as an attempt to introduce functional or vocational representation.
[181B] (b) The qualifications of the elector constituting the electorate, and of those who can represent each electorate, contemplated by the Constitution and supplemented by Parliament, are separately set out for each House.
As regards the Legislative Council, the qualifications for the four electorates are indicated in article 171 (3) (a), (b), (c) and (d).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "electorate is that it is the body of persons who elect.
It does not take in the extended notion of a body of persons electing representatives from amongst themselves.
It does not impose a requirement that the person to be chosen must also be a member of the electorate.
[177D F] (c) The qualifications of candidates for seats in the Council are given in section 6 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
While a member of the Legislative Assembly should also be an elector in the constituency from which he stands, the member of the Legislative Council is not so required to be a member of the electorate.
All that is required is that the person to be chosen as a member of the Legislative Council should be an elector for an Assembly constituency in the State to whose Legislative Council he is chosen.
[179E] (d) Whatever may have been the opinions of the Constitution makes or their advisors it is not possible to say, on a perusal of article 171, that the Second Chamber found here were meant to provide for functional 173 or vocational representation.
AR that can be inferred is that additional representation or weightage was given to persons possessing special types of knowledge and experience by enabling them to elect their special representatives.
The concept of such representation does not carry with it the further notion that, the representative must also possess the very qualifications of those he represents.
The High Court erroneously travelled outside the four corners of the statutory provisions when there was no ambiguity at all in the language, and by resorting to a presumed legislative intent, it added a qualification to those expressly laid down in the Constitution and other statutory provisions.
[1 80F] Davies Jankins & Co. vs Davies, 1967 (2) W.L.R. p. 1139 (a_) 1156, inferred to.
2(a) Article 171 is designed only to give a right to choose their representatives to those who have certain types of presumably valuable knowledge and education.
If the presumption of their better competence to elect a suitable representative is there, it would be for the members of such a constituency themselves to decide whether a person who stands for election from their constituency possesses the right type of knowledge , experience and wisdom.
The Constitution makers, acting on such a presumption, may have intentionally left the educational qualifications of candidate for election from the Graduates Constituency unspecified.
[181C] (b) It could not possibly be said that the question to be dealt with was not known to the legislators.
The provisions of law show that the qualifications of the electors as well as of those to be elected were matters to which the attention of the law makers, both in the Constituent Assem bly and in Parliament, was specifically directed.
Hence, the omission must have been deliberate.
[181G] R. vs Cleworth, (1864) 4 BSS 927 and Craies on Statute Law6th Edn.
1963 72, referred to.
(c) The legislative history of the Article also shows that the omission by the Constitution makers or by Parliament, to prescribe graduation as a qualification of the candidate from the Graduates ' constituency, was deliberate.
The provisions of the Government of India (Provincial Legislative Assemblies) Order, 1936, prescribing the qualifications of persons to be chosen from special constituencies set up for representation in the Legislative Councils under the Government of India Act, 1935, indicate that it was invariably expressly provided where it was so intended, that a necessary qualification of a candidate for a seat was that he should be entitled to vote for the choice of a member to fill it.
Such a qualification was not left to mere implication.
[181H 182E] (3) It is true that a constitution should be interpreted in a broad and generous spirit, but the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation could not altogether be abandoned.
The object of interpretation is to discover the intention of the law makers, and this object can obviously be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions.
A logical corollary of the rule of literal interpretation is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made; and an application of this rule necessarily involves that addition to, or modification of, words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible.
Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity.
[175D] Sri Ram Narain Medhi & Ors.
vs The State of Bombay, A.I.R. ; British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs
Captain 174 itbar Singh & Ors., ; R. C. Jacob vs Union of India; , ; State of Madhya Pradesh vs M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. & Anr.
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 276; Hira Devi vs District Board, Shabiahanpur, ; & 365, referred to.
From the language as well as the legislative history of articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and section 6 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it could be presumed that the omission of the qualification that the representative of graduate should also be a graduate was deliberate.
By presuming such an intention of the law makers, no absurdity results.
By adding 'deemed to be necessary ' or 'implied ' qualification of a representative of the graduates, which the Constitution makers or Parliament could easily have imposed, the Court would be invading the legislative sphere.
[183F]


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 321 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated August 4, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Referred Case No. 29 of 1957.
M. Rajagopalan and K.R. Choudhri, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
April 10.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J.
This appeal has been filed by special leave of this Court against the judgment of 4 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which the appellant who is an Advocate was held guilty of professional misconduct and had been suspended from practice for five years.
The facts relating to the misconduct charged were briefly these: The three respondents before us and one other Kagga Veeraiah were plaintiffs m O.S. 432 of 1951 on the file of District Munsiff, Guntur in which a claim was made for possession of certain lands.
The appellant was the Advocate for these plaintiffs.
The suit was dismissed by the Trail Court and an appeal was filed therefrom to the Subordinate Judge, Guntur and pending the disposal of the appeal there was a direction by the Court that the crops standing on the suit land be sold and the proceeds deposited into Court.
In pursuance of this order a sum of about Rs. 1,600/ was deposited into Court on December 19, 1951.
The appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed by the Subordinate Judge.
The ' unsuccessful defendants preferred a second appeal to the High Court, but meanwhile the plaintiffs made an application for withdrawing the amount deposited in Court.
By virtue of interim orders passed by the Court they were granted liberty, to withdraw the sum pending disposal of the second appeal in the High.
Court filed by the defendants on furnishing security of immovable property.
The security was furnished and.
the withdrawal was ordered.
A cheque petition E.A. 250 of 1952 was accordingly filed which was allowed and thereafter a cheque was issued in favour of the Advocate the appellant before us for Rs. 1,452/4/ , this being the sum remaining to the credit of the plaintiffs after deduction of poundage etc.
It was admitted that this cheque was cashed by the appellant on April 23, 1953.
The appellant did not dispute that.
he cashed this cheque on behalf of his clients or that the latter were entitled to be paid this sum and the charge of professional misconduct against the 5 appellant was that the Advocate had not made this payment in spite of demands but that on the other hand he falsely claimed to have paid them this sum.
To resume the narrative of the matters leading to these proceedings, the second appeal before the High Court was disposed of in August, 1955 and by the judgment of that Court the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff 's suit dismissed.
The plaintiffs had therefore to refund the sum to the defendants in the suit.
On February 8, 1956 the plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for the sum complaining that the cheque had been cashed by him but that its proceeds had not been paid over.
On April 14, 1956 the appellant replied to this notice claiming to have paid over the sum to them on their passing a receipt and stating.that the receipt happened to be in the bundle of case papers which had been returned to them.
But even before the receipt of this reply the three respondents before us filed a complaint under sections 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act alleging the non payment of the money and charging the Advocate with professional misconduct in respect of it, and praying for an enquiry into his conduct.
The appellant was an Advocate and hence the complaint was treated as one under section 10 (2) of the .
The explanation of the Advocate was called for.
and thereafter the District.
Judge, Guntur was directed.
to hold an inquiry into the allegations of professional misconduct against the appellant and forward his report to the High Court.
An elaborate inquiry was thereafter held by the learned District Judge who, after considering the .evidence, submitted a report recording his conclusion that the appellant 's case was not unbelievable" and that on that ground he was entitled to the benefit of doubt.
The matter then came up before the High Court for consideration on this report.
Some point 6 appears to have been made before the Court that certain material witnesses had not been examined.
Agreeing with the submission they directed the District Judge to summon and examine them and this was accordingly done, their evidence was recorded and submitted to the High Court.
The matter was thereafter heard by a Bench of 3 Judges and the learned Judges being of the opinion that the charge against the appellant viz., that he did not pay over the amount of 'the cheque to his clients was clearly made out, held him guilty of professional misconduct and imposed the punishment of suspension from practice, as stated earlier.
The appellant then applied and obtained leave of this court special leave under article 136 to challenge the correctness of these findings and that is how the matter is before us.
Before proceeding further we desire to indicate the nature of the jurisdiction of this Court in such matters and in broad outline the principles which it would observe in dealing with them.
The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in cases of professional misconduct is neither civil nor criminal as these expressions are used in articles 133 and 134 of the Constitution.
In one aspect it is a jurisdiction over an officer of the Court and the Advocate owes a duty to the Court apart from his duty to his clients.
In another aspect it is a statutory power and we would add a duty vested in the Court under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act to ensure that the highest standards of professional rectitude are maintained, so that the Bar can render its expert service to the public in general and the litigants in particular and thus discharge its main function of co operating with the judiciary in the administrance of justice according to law.
This task which is at once delicate and responsible the statute vest in the High Court and therefore the primary responsibility of ensuring it rests with it, 7 This Court is in consequence most reluctant to interfere with the orders of High Courts in this field, save in exceptional cases when any question of principle is involved or where this Court is persuaded that any violation of the principles of natural justice has taken place or that otherwise there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Where however none of these factors, are present, it is not the practice of this Court to permit the canvassing of the evidence on the record either for reappraising it or to determine whether it should be accepted or not.
The findings of the High Court therefore on questions of fact are not open before us and this Court would only consider whether on the facts found, the charge of professional misconduct is established.
Learned Counsel for the appellant urged before us several grounds in support of the appeal but we consider that none of them merits serious attention.
It was first submitted that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for inquiry and report and that this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against the appellant.
Our attention was drawn to the terms of section 10 (2) of the reading: "10.
(2) Upon receipt of a complaint made to it by any Court or by the Bar Council, or by any other person that any such Advocate has been guilty of misconduct, the High Court shall, if it does not summarily reject the complaint, refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar Council, or, after consultation with the Bar Council, to the Court of a District Judge (hereinafter referred to as a District Court) and may of its own motion so refer any case in which it has otherwise reason to believe that any such advocate has been so guilty." and the argument was that the matter could not have been remitted for inquiry to a District Judge 8 unless the.
statutory pre condition of consultation.
with the Bar Council had taken place.
It is not necessary to consider in this case whether this provision for consultation is mandatory or not but we shall assume that it is so.
There was however no hint of this objection to the validity of the proceedings up to the stage of the appeal in this Court.
The question whether there has or has not been a consultation is one of fact and if this point had been raised in the High Court we would have information as to whether there had been such consultation or not, and if not why there was none.
Even when the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness under article 133 (1)(c) this objection was not suggested as a ground upon which the validity of the proceedings would be impugned.
In these circumstances we are not disposed to entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact.
The fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under section 10 (2)to the District Judge there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had previously been consulted is not decisive on the point.
There would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it would before the party who challenges such regularity to plead and prove his case.
It was next contended that the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court.
We consider this objection frivolous in the extreme.
It was argued by the appellant before the High Court that there was dissimilarity between the several signatures of the three respondents found in the petition sent by them and that to be found in the plaint etc., of O.S. 432 of 1951 and that this was some proof that it was not the respondents who were 9 really responsible for the petition but that someone inimically disposed towards the appellant.
The learned Judges of the High Court rejected this submission in these words: "For one thing, we are unable to find any such dissimilarity.
Even so, that has not much of a bearing on the question whether the respondent (appellant) had discharged the burden viz., of proving that he had made the payment to the petitioners.
This argument would have had some force if the petitioners had not given evidence against the respondent.
Further, no such suggestion was put to any of the plaintiffs.
" This is on the question of the dissimilarity of the signatures on which rests the argument that the respondents were not the complainants.
Coming next to the point about the verification of the complaint the matter stands thus: The three complainants (the respondents before us) originally filed a petition on March ?6, 1956 before the District Judge but this did not bear the attestation of a gazetted officer or other authority as required by the rules.
This defect was made good by a fresh petition which they filed before the District Judge on April 16, 1956.
After the petition was signed by the three petitioners they added a verification in these terms: "We do hereby state that the facts stated above are true to the best of our knowledge, information and belief," and then they signed again.
These three signatures, they made before the District Judge who attested their signatures on the same day and when for .
warding this complaint to the High Court on 10 April 18, 1956 the learned District Judge stated these facts and added: "The petitioners appeared before me on April 16, 1956.
I got them sign the petition in my presence and I attested the same.
" It is thus clear that they made three signatures in token of their signing the petition, the verification and a further affirmation before the District Judge who attested the same.
Learned Counsel did not suggest before us that the District Judge was in error about the identity of the parties who appeared before him and affixed the signatures in three places in the complaint before him.
It is because of these circumstances that we have stated that this objection was most frivolous.
It is only necessary to add that seeing that the High Court is competent to initiate these proceedings suo motu under section 10 (2) the point raised is wholly without substance.
The next submission of learned Counsel was that as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation of money belonging to the clients, the learned Judges of the High Court should have left the complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have proceeded to deal with him under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
In support of this submission learned Counsel referred us in particular to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Chandi Charan Mitter, a Pleader, In re (1), and Emperor vs satish Chandra Singha (2).
We do not consider that the case before us furnishes an occasion for any exhaustive review of the decisions upon the subject or formulating finally the principles which govern the exercise of the discretion by a Court to which a complaint is made under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act whether it should (1) (1920) I.L.R.47 Cal.
C2) Cal, 721.
11 proceed under it or leave the complainant to launch a prosecution against the advocate and await the result of such criminal proceedings.
We consider it sufficient to state this.
The object of a proceeding in respect of professional misconduct differs totally from the object of a proceeding in a criminal court.
Proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and similar statutes arc taken in order to.ensure that the highest standards of professional conduct arc maintained at the bar.
These proceedings, though in a sense penal, arc solely designed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure that a person does not continue in practice who by his conduct has shown that he is unfit so to do.
It is not a jurisdiction which is exercised in aid of the Criminal law for the only question for the court to consider is whether the practitioner has so misconducted himself as no longer to be permitted to continue a member of an honourable and responsible profession.
The object of Criminal proceedings, on the other hand, is to enforce the law of the land and to secure the punishment of an offender.
No doubt, if a criminal prosecution is initiated in respect of the subject matter of the complaint and the charge is held proved the conviction might be a ground for a later proceeding under the Bar Councils Act.
No doubt, also, if the practitioner is acquitted or discharged by a criminal court on the merits, the facts would not be reinvestigated for the purpose of rounding a charge of professional misconduct on those very facts.
The object of the two proceedings being thus different, it is not any rule of law but merely a matter .of discretion depending on the facts of each case as to whether the Court would straightaway proceed to enquire into the allegation of professional misconduct or leave it to the complainant to prosecute the practitioner and await the result of such a proceeding.
It was not suggested by Counsel for the appellant that it was incompetent for or 12 beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, 'to proceed with an enquiry in a case where the misconduct charged against the advocate or practitioner amounted to an offence under the ordinary criminal law.
Neither of the cases relied on lay down any such proposition and is not of much assistance to the appellant in the present case.
It is sufficient to extract the head note to the report of the decision in Chandi Charan Mitter (x), indicate that it bears no analogy to the case now on hand.
The relevant portion of the head note reads: "Where the misconduct alleged has no direct connection with the conduct of the pleader in his practical and immediate relation to the court, ordinarily, there should be a trial and conviction for criminal misconduct before disbarment will be Ordered.
" The charge against the practitioner in that case related to a matter which had nothing to do with his relationship to his clients, or the court, and in the circumstances it was held that the direction would be properly exercised if the initiation of professional misconduct proceedings awaited the result of the prosecution.
It is obvious that the case before us is far different.
Emperor vs Satish Chandra Singha (2), was also a similar case.
The charge against the practitioner was of forging court records by interpolating some words in an original plaint.
In the case now before us, however, the misconduct charged is intimately connected with and arises out of the duty which the Advocate owed to client.
This distinction between misconduct which is intimately connected with the duties which the practitioner owes to his clients and cases where it is not so connected as bearing upon the exercise of the Court 's discretion to proceed or not to proceed straightaway with an inquiry into the advocate 's professional misconduct was emphasised by Lord (1) Cal, 1115, (2) (1927)I.L. R. , 13 Abinger in stephans (1), which dealt with case of professional misconduct against an attorney in England.
The learned Judge said: "If the attorney has been guilty of something indictable in itself but not arising out of the cause (in which he is engaged professionally) the Court would not inquire into that with a view to striking him off the roll but would leave the party aggrieved to his remedy by a criminal prosecution.
" There is thus a clear distinction between cases where the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner 's duty to his client and other cases where it is not so.
In the former class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with the charge as a piece of professional misconduct without driving the complainant to seek his remedy in a Criminal Court.
So far as the facts of the present case are concerned the appellant got his client 's money in his hands in the course of the proceedings of a suit in which he was engaged and the charge against him was that he failed to repay the money.
In the circumstances we consider that the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under the provision of section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
The next complaint of the learned Counsel was that there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant was conducted.
This was said to consist in the fact that some evidence on behalf, of the complainants (the respondents before us)was permitted to be led after the appellant had examined himself and it was urged that thereby the complainants had been afforded opportunity of filling up any lacuna in their case.
We consider that there is no substance in this objection.
No complaint that the appellant was 14 prejudiced by the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the matter of the order in which the evidence was adduced, was made either before the District Judge who conducted the inquiry or before the High Court when the report of the District Judge was considered.
We have ourselves examined the record and find that there is no basis for any suggestion that any ' prejudice had, occurred by reason of the order in which the witnesses were examined.
It was then suggested that one of the plaintiffs Kagga Veeraiah had himself admitted in his evidence before the District Judge that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the learned Judges of the High Court were clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to his clients.
A few facts have to be mentioned to appreciate this contention as well as the answer to it.
As stated earlier, there were four plaintiffs in the suit O.S. 432 of 1951 and plaintiffs.
1 to 3 are the complainants now respondents 1 to 3 before us.
The fourth plaintiff was one Kagga Veeraiah.
It was the case of the appellant that this money , was paid to all the four plaintiffs i.e., was paid to the plaintiffs when all the four of them were present.
It was the case of the complainants that Kagga Veeraiah the 4th plaintiff died in 1957.
It was m these circumstances that the appellant alleged that Kagga Veeraiah was alive and a man claiming to be Kagga Veeraiah was produced before the District Judge who examined him as court witness No. 7.
The man who was examined did depose that the money was paid to the plaintiffs in his presence and, no doubt, if that statement along with the identity of the deponent was accepted the appellant 's defence would have been made out.
The case of the complainants, however, was that the man examined as court witness No. 7 was an impersonator.
To prove the; death of the 15 real Kagga Veeraiah an extract from the death certificate was produced in court by the complainants.
The attention of court witness No. 7 was drawn to the fact that in another proceeding (0. section 732 of 1955) to which Kagga Veeraiah was a party a memo was filed into Court stating that he was dead.
The witness 's explanation for this was that as he was not available the memo to that effect was filed.
The witness was severely cross examined about his identity and in particular, questioned about the details of the parties and other details regarding the subject matter of O.S. 432 of 1951 and his answers were most unsatisfactory, to say the least.
The Learned Judges of the High Court considered all this evidence and recorded two alternative findings :(1) that the person examined as C.W. 7 was not Kagga Veeraiah but was an impersonator seemed to accord with the probabilities, and (2) that even if C.W. 7 be in truth Kagga Veeraiah as he claimed, they would not accept his evidence as there was not 'even a modicum of truth in his deposition ' and they would unhesitatingly reject it.
The submission, however, of learned Counsel was that there was before the High Court the thumb impression of this witness to his deposition before the District Judge as C.W. 7 and the thumb impression of the 4th plaintiff in O.S. 432 of 1951 and that on a comparison of these two the court should have accepted the identity of C.W. 7 as Kagga Veeraiah the 4th plaintiff.
It is really not necessary to pursue this matter or the details of the evidence relating to it because there is no ground at all for interfering with the appreciation by the learned Judges of the High Court of the credibility of this witness 's deposition apart altogether from the question as to whether Kagga Veeraiah was dead and if he was not, whether C.W. 7 was Kagga Veeraiah.
The admissions that this witness made and the ignorance that he displayed about the proceedings in the suit stamped him as a witness of untruth and the learned Judges correctly characterised his evidence 16 as devoid of "even a modicum of truth.
" The appellant cannot therefore rely on any admission on the part of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having received the sum which was admittedly in his hands.
Lastly, it was urged that the order directing the suspension of the appellant for a period of five years was too severe and that we should reduce the period of suspension even on the basis that the charge against the appellant be held to be established.
We can only express surprise that Counsel should have made bold to make this submission.
The appellant had got into his hands a considerable sum of money belonging to his clients and, on the finding of the High Court, had failed to, pay it back when demanded.
Not content with this he had put forward a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain his defence by suborning witnesses.
In the circumstances, even, if the learned Judges of the High Court had struck off the name of the appellant from the roll of advocates we would have considered it a proper punishment having regard to the gravity of the offence.
The order now under appeal therefore errs, if at all, on the side of leniency and there is no justification for the request made on behalf of the appellant.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.

Output:
The respondents and one other Kagga Veeraiah, were plaintiffs in a suit for possession of certain lands and the appellant was their Advocate.
Tim suit was dismissed and an appeal was preferred therefrom to the Subordinate Judge.
Pending the disposal of the appeal, the court directed the sale proceeds of the standing crops on the suit land to be deposited into court, and a sum of Rs. 1,600/ was so deposited.
The plaintiff 's appeal was allowed and the defendants preferred a second appeal to the High Court.
Pending disposal of the second appeal, plaintiff 's application for withdrawing the amount was allowed by the court on furnishing security of immovable property.
A cheque petition was filed which was allowed and thereafter a cheque for Rs. 1,452/4/ was issued in favour of the appellant.
The appellant an Advocate admitted that he had received and.
had cashed the cheque on behalf of his clients who were entitled to be paid this sum.
The second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the plaintiff 's suit was dismissed, as a result of which the plaintiffs had to refund the sum of the defendants in the suit.
The plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for the proceeds of the cheque that had been cashed by him and not paid over to them.
The appellant in reply claimed to have paid over the sum to them on their passing a receipt which happened to be in the bundle.
of case papers returned to 2 them.
The respondents filed a complaint under as. 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act.
The explanation of the Advocate was called for and the District Judge was directed to hold an enquiry and forward his report to the High Court.
His report was that the appellant 's case was not unbelievable and he was entitled to the benefit of doubt.
The matter was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court, who held him guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him for five years from practice.
In this Court the appellant contended, (1) that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against the appellant.
(2) That the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court.
(3) That as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation of moneys belonging to the clients, the High Court should have left the complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have proceeded to deal with him under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
(4) That there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant was conducted.
(5) That one of the plaintiffs Kagga Veeraiah had himself admitted in his evidence that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the High Court was clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to his clients.
Held (1) that the fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, to the District Judge, there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had previously been consulted, is not decisive on the point.
There would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it would be for.
the party who challenges such regularity to plead and prove his case.
Since, this objection was not raised in the High Court, even when the appellant applied for a certificate, this Court will not entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact.
(2) The complaint petition had been signed by the respondents and properly verified and even otherwise since the High Court was competent to initiate these proceedings suo motu under section 10(2) of the Act, the point raised is wholly without substance.
(3) There is a clear distinction between cases where the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner 's duty to 3 his client and other cases where it is not so.
In the former Class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with the charge as a piece of professional misconduct without driving the complainant to seek his remedy in a criminal court.
80 far as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned, it must be held, that the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under the provisions of section 10 of the Bar Councils Act.
Chandi Charan Mitter a Pleader, In re.
1115 and Emperor vs satish Chandra Singha, Cal. 721, distinguished.
Stephens vs Hills, ; , referred to.
(4) No complaint, that the appellant was prejudiced by the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the matter of the order in which the evidence was adduced, was made either before the District Judge or before the High Court and there is nothing on the record to suggest that any prejudice had occurred to the appellant.
(5) The evidence of Kagga Veeraiah was correctly characterised by the High Court as devoid of truth and the appellant, therefore, cannot rely on any admission of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having received the sum.
Having regard to the gravity of the offence, there is no justification for reducing the period of suspension.
The appeal therefore, must be dismissed.


Input:
ition No. 4676 of 1978, (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) M.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner.
N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
'Equal pay for equal work ' is not a mere demagogic slogan.
It is a constitutional goal capable of attainment through constitutional remedies by the enforcement of constitutional rights.
So the petitioner claims; so the petitioner asserts.
Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims, as a Directive Principle, the Constitutional goal of 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women '.
Articles 14 and 19 guarantee respectively the fundamental rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment and article 32 provides the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.
So the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under article 32 and has asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the same as they have given others like him.
True, he is the merest microbe in the mighty organism of the State, a little clog in a giant wheel.
But, the glory of our Constitution is that it enables him to a directly approach the highest Court in the land for redress.
It is a matter of no little pride and satisfaction to us that he has done so.
Hitherto the equality clauses of the Constitution, as other articles of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were most often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and advancement and for a 'fair and satisfactory ' distribution of the buttered leaves amongst themselves.
Now, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a consequence, and the forward looking posture of this Court, the underprivileged also are clamouring for their rights and are seeking intervention of the Court with touching faith and confidence in the Court.
The judges of the Court have a duty to redeem their constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller than to the guest of the five star hotel.
301 The petitioner is a Driver Constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration and he demands that his scale of pay should atleast be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration.
The scale of pay of a Driver Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs. 210 270 in the case of non matriculates and Rs. 225 308 in the case of matriculates.
The scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260 400.
The scale of pay of drivers in the non Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 326.E B 8 350.
The scale of pay of drivers in the Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 290 EB 6 326 8 366 EB 8 8 8 390 10 400.
The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260 350.
The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs. 330 480.
The case of the petitioner is that he discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claims that he discharges more onerous duties than the others.
He complains that there is no reason whatsoever to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver Constables merely because he and his ilk happen to be described as constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to the Police Force.
It appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the claims of all drivers as a common category under the head "the pay scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads.
After considering the qualifications etc.
possessed by drivers the Commission proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles, drivers employed in organisations with large fleet of vehicles, drivers of staff cars etc.
The pay scales were professed to be fixed with reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the arduousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non availability of adequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations.
The Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of the scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable drivers on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel.
The grievance of the petitioner is that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay Commission failed to consider the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations which prevailed in the case of drivers in other departments and which should have, therefore, prevailed in the case of driver constables also.
302 The drivers constables were not only required to possess heavy transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as driver constables in the police force.
Their duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities no less heavy than the duties and responsibilities of drivers in other departments.
Their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was constant exposure to security risks.
The petitioner and other driver constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Pay Commission and that their scales of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments.
As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the present application has been filed for the issue of a Writ under Art, 32 of the Constitution.
Among the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it was suggested that the petitioner was no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi Police Force.
The hollowness of this submission is exposed by a reference to the facts relating to the individual petitioner.
The petitioner who was an ex gunner (driver) in the artiliary corps of the Indian Army and who was experienced in the driving, operation and maintenance of jeeps, trucks and heavy armoured vehicles was allowed to retire from the Army on compassionate grounds.
He held an Army driving licence as also a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence.
After he was discharged from the Army his nominal roll was forwarded by the Director General Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi.
The question of his employment as a driver in the Delhi Police Force was considered and he was informed that a test of proficiency in driving would be held.
He was required to produce his Civil Heavy transport driving licence at the time of the test.
It is of interest to note that the subject of the communication sent by the Delhi Police establishment to the petitioner was "Employment of ex servicemen in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Const)".
He appeared at the test.
By a communication dated March 29, 1968, he was informed by the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi that his name had been "approved for enlistment as driver in the Delhi Police".
Thereafter a certificate in the prescribed form was issued to him vesting him with the powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer.
It is clear and it cannot be seriously disputed that the petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi 303 Police Force.
He was designated as constable, because, for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force, he had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force.
The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.
The main defence taken by the respondents is, in the words of the deponent of the counter affidavit, as follows : "It is submitted that there can be no comparison between the different departments of the Government of India for the purpose of fixation of pay scale.
A pay scale has been fixed upon consideration of various factors.
The pay scales of the drivers of the Delhi Police has been fixed after duly considering all the circumstances.
The drivers in the other departments are not similarly situated as the petitioner and there is no question of any hostile discrimination.
It is, however, denied that the drivers have been treated as a separate class.
It is also denied that the designation of the petitioner is N. T. Driver (Constable) ' The counter affidavit does not explain how the case of the drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them.
Apparently in the view of the respondents, the circumstance that persons belong to different departments of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstance to justify different scales of pay irrespective of their identity of their powers duties and responsibilities.
We cannot accept this view.
If this view is to be stretched to its logical conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in the Government of India may vary from department to department notwithstanding that their powers duties and responsibilities are identical.
We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments.
Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, 304 duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.
Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee vs Union of India, Makhan Singh vs Union of India & Ors.
where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs Union of India describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with article 14.
We shall presently point out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.
Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service.
It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade.
The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay.
The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting article 14 if sought to be applied to them.
It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work ' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right.
But it certainly is a Constitutional goal.
article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women ' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes.
Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation.
article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under 305 the State.
These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some thing to everyone.
To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get.
To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay.
Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched.
Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them.
The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic.
Again the word 'Socialist ' must mean something.
Even if it does not mean 'To each according to his need ', it must atleast mean 'equal pay for equal work '.
The principle of 'equal pay for equal work ' is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g, Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour.
Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code.
Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western labour codes too.
Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements.
In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265).
The preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value ' as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled".
Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and article 39(d) we are of the view that the principle 'Equal pay for Equal work ' is deducible from those Article and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based 306 on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing the different scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government.
If anything, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileges of a police officer ', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous.
In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous.
What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ? There is none.
The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon.
We have shown that the answer is unsound.
The clarification is irrational.
We, therefore, allow the Writ Petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the drivers constables of the Delhi Police Force atleast on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force.
The scale of pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.
S.R. Petition allowed.

Output:
The petitioner is a driver constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration.
The scale of pay in the Delhi Police Force is for non matriculate drivers Rs. 210 270 and for matriculate drivers 225 308.
The scale of pay of a driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260 400.
The scale of pay of driver in the non secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 326 EB 8 350, while that of Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 290 EB 6 326 8 366 EB 8 8 8 390 10 400.
The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260 300 while the drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs. 330 480.
The petitioner and other driver constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Third Pay Commission and that their pay scales should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments.
As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with success, the present application has been filed by the petitioner for the issue of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Allowing the petition, the Court ^ HELD: 1:1.
The petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi Police Force.
After his discharge from the army question of his employment as a driver in Delhi Police Force was considered, he was asked to appear for a test of proficiency in driving, directed to produce a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence, selected thereafter as a driver in Delhi Police Force under the category "Employment of Ex serviceman in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Constable).
" He was designated as Constable, because for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force he had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force.
The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.
[302 H, 303 A C] 1:2.
The petitioner and other drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government.
If anything, by reason of their investiture with the "power, functions and privileges of a police Officer", their duties and responsibilities are more arduous.
The clarification that the drivers of the 299 Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon is irrational.
[306 A, B, C, D] 2:1.
No doubt, equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert bodies and not for the courts, but where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments.
Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.
[303 G H, 304 A] 3:1.
The principle "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.
There can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade.
The higher qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay.
The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them.
[304 C E] 3:2.
It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right.
But it certainly is a Constitutional goal.
Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men aud women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy.
"Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" means equal pay for equal work for every one and as between the sexes.
Directive Principles have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation.
Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone.
To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get.
To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay.
Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them.
The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic.
Again the word 'Socialist ' must mean something.
Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need ', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work '.
[304 E H, 305 A D] 3:3.
From a construction of Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), it is clear that the principle "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal 300 scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.
[305 G H, 306 A] Kishori Lal Mohan Lal Bakshi vs Union of India, A.I.R. , distinguished.


Input:
Appeal No. 17 19 or 67.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 23, 1961 of e Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Regular Second appeal No. 43 D of 1956.
N. N. Keswani, for the appellant.
V. A. Seyid Muhammad and section P. Nayar, for the respondent.
According to the allegations in the plaint the appellant was appointed by the Governor General in July 1942 as Supervisor, Army Ordnance Corps which, according to him, was a civil post under the Crown in India.
In the months of September and October, 1950 the appellant was served with chargesheets by the Ordnance Officer, Administration, Shakurbasti, Delhi State, where he was posted at that time calling upon him to submit his defence to the charges of making serious false allegations against his superior officer Maj. H. section Dhillon.
The appellant asked for grant of time for submitting his defence and be also demanded copies of certain documents etc to prove his case.
On May 26, 1951 while this inquiry was pending he was served with an order by the Ordnance Officer, Administration, Shakur basti, Delhi which was as follows "Under instructions received from Army Head quarters you are hereby given one month 's notice of discharge with immediate effect, services being no longer required.
Your services will be terminated on 25th June, 1951".
The appellant challenged the legality of the above order principally on the ground that it had been passed by an officer who was subordinate to the authority who appointed him and that no inquiry "as required by Fundamental Rules and under the provisions of the Constitution of India" had been held in the matter of allegations against him and that no adequate opportunity had been afforded to him of defending himself or of show 910 ing cause against the action proposed to be taken.
He all raised the question of the order being vitiated by mala fid In the written statement filed by the Union of India it was stat that the appellant had been appointed as a Labour Supervisor he Extra Temporary Establishment by the COO/Ordnan Officer Incharge, Ammunition Depot, Kasubegu under t authority of Financial Regulations, India, Part 1, Volume and not by the Governor General.
It was pleaded, inter all that it was decided by the Government of India vide Army Headquarter 's letter dated May, 25, 1951 to terminate the services by serving one month 's notice.
Consequently a notice of discharge from the service was given to him by the Ordnance Officer, Administration, who was competent to serve the notice on him under the authority of the Army Order No. 1202/1943 read in conjunction with 'Financial Regulations referred to before.
The sole material issue which was framed was whether the order dated May 26, 1951 removing the appellant from service was illegal, wrong, void, ultra vires and inoperative.
The trial judge held that article 311 of the Constitution was applicable to the case of the appellant and that his removal had not been ordered by the appointing authority.
The suit was decreed.
respondent preferred an appeal which was decided by the Additional District Judge, Delhi.
It :Was held by him that article 311 was not applicable to the appellant as he held a post connected with defence.
According to the learned judge the appellant 's services were terminated under Rule 5 of the Civilians in Defence (Temporary Services) Rules, 1949, hereinafter called the 'Rules '.
It was found that the order terminating the services had been passed by the proper authority.
The appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed.
The appellant appealed to the High Court which was dismissed.
His appeal was heard along with certain other appeals in which similar points were involved.
It was found that the salary of the appellant was paid out of the estimates of the Mnistry of Defence and he was intimately connected with the defence of the country not as a combatant but as a person holding a post the object of which was exclusively to serve the Military Department.
In the opinion of the High ' Court Articles 309 and 310 were applicable to the case of the appellant but Article 311 was inapplicable.
On the question whether the services of the appellant were terminated without complying with the rules the High Court expressed the view that the breach of such rules did not give the aggrieved party a right to go to the court Reliance in that connection was placed on the decision of the Privy Council in R. Venkatarao vs 911 Secretary of State(1) and certain other cases in which that decision was followed.
In the case of the appellant the only other point which appears to have appear to have been argued on his behalf and which was decided by the High Court related to the allegation of mala fides.
The decision went against him on that, point.
The question whether the case of the appellant was governed by article 311 of the Constitution stands concluded by two decisions of this court.
In Jagatrai Mahinchand Ajwani vs Union of India(2) it was held that an Engineer in the Military Service who was drawing these salary from the Defence Estimates could not claim the protection of article 311(2) of the Constitution.
In that case also the appellant was found to have held a post connected with Defence as in the present case.
This decision was followed in section P. Bell vs Union of India (3).
Both these decisions fully cover the case of the appellant so far as the applicability of article 3 1 1 is concerned.
Learned counsel for the appellant sought to argue that since the appellant was admittedly governed by the rules which framed under section 241(2) 'of the Government of India Act 1935 he was entitled to the protection of section 240 of that Act.
Chapter I of Part 10 of that Act related to the Defence Services.
According to sections 239, 235, 236 and 237 were applicable to persons who not being members of His Majest 's Forces held or had held posts in India connected with the equipment or administration of those forces or otherwise connected with Defence as they applied in relation to persons who were or had been members of those forces.
Section 240, to the extent it is material was in the following terms: "240(1) Except as expressly provided by this Act, every person who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, or holds any civil post under the Crown in India, holds office during His Majesty 's pleasure.
(2) No such ' person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(3) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reason able opportunity or showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him : (1) A.I.R. (1937) P.C. 31.
(3) C, A 1918 of 1966 dt.
8 3 68.
14 L1100sup.
CI/72 (2) C. A. 1185 of 1965 dt. 6 2 67.
912 Provided. . .
Section 241 provided for recruitment and conditions of service.
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that since his conditions of service were governed by the rules which were framed under the above section, s.240 was clearly applicable and his services could not have been terminated in terms of subs.
(2) of that section by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed nor could he be dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.
At no stage of the proceedings in the courts below the appellant relied on section 240 of the Government of India Act and rightly so because the order of his discharge or termination of service was made after the Constitution had come into force.
It was apparently for that reason.
that protection was sought from Art 311 and not section 240 of the Government of India Act 1935.
We see no reason or justification in the present case for determining whether a person holding a civilian post which is connected with the defence and for which he is paid salary and emoluments from the Defence Estimates would be governed by the provisions of section 240 of the Government of India Act if the provisions of that Act were not applicable to the case of such a servant.
The next question is whether rule 5 of the Rules was applique able and whether the appellant could claim the benefit of that rule.
It provided, inter alia, that the service of a temporary government servant who is not in quasi permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the", government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the government servant.
The view of the High Court that the rules were not justifiable cannot be sustained as the decision of the Privy Council in Venkatarao 's case (supra) and the other cases following that view have not been accepted as laying down the law correctly by this court.
It has been held that the breach of a statutory rule in relation to the conditions of service would entitle the government servant to have recourse to the court for redress; vide The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs Ajodhya Prasad(1) and State of Mysore vs M. R. Bellary(1).
Now Exhibit P. 3 which is a letter dated May 26, 1951 and which was produced by the appellant himself shows that one months notice of discharge was given by the ordnance Officer, Administration, under instructions received from the Army Headquarters.
A copy of another letter Exht.
P 2 dated May 27, 1951 was produced according to which it had been decided by the Government (1) [1951] 2 S.C.R.671.
(2) [1964] 7 S.C.R.471.
913 of India that the services of the appellant be terminated by giving him one month 's notice.
It is true that the origin of that letter was not produced although it had been summoned by the appellant It is at least clear that the.
Ordnance Officer, Administration, had served the notice of discharge under instructions from the Army Headquarters.
In this view of the matter there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the order of discharge had not been made by the appointing authority.
At any rate before the High Court there was no challenge to the finding of the learned District Judge on the point and a question of fact cannot be allowed to be reopened at this stage.
The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to reopen the finding on the question of mala fides and also invoked the rule of natural Justice in so far as the appellant had not been afforded any opportunity of showing cause against his discharge or termination of services.
In the appeal before this Court the finding on the point of mala fides must be accepted as final and the appellant cannot be allowed to reagitate that matter.
As regards the applicability of the rule of natural justice it has not been shown to us how under the general law of master and servant, in the absence of any protection conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution such a rule can be invoked.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed but in view of the cir cumstances we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The appellant was appointed in 1942 as Labour Supervisor, Army Ordnance Corps.
In 1951, pending inquiry into certain charges against him his service was terminated by giving him one month 's notice under rule 5 of the Civilians in Defence Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949.
He challenged the legality of the order of termination on the grounds that it had been passed by an officer subordinate to the authority who appointed him and that no adequate opportunity had been afforded to him of defending himself.
He also alleged that the Order was vitiated by mala fides.
In the appellant 's appeal against the dismissal of his suit the High Court held that Article 311 of the Constitution was inapplicable, that breach of the Rules did not give an aggrieved party a right to go to the Court and that the Order was not vitiated by mala fides.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court.
HELD : The appellant, holding a post connected with Defence cannot claim the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution.
Jugatrai Mahinchand Ajwani vs Union of India C.A. 1185 of 1965 dt. 6 2 67 and section P. Bahl vs Union of India C.A. 1918 of 1966 dt. 8 3 68: followed.
(ii)The view of the High Court that the rules are not justifiable cannot be sustained.
Breach of statutory rules in relation to conditions ,of service would entitle the aggrieved government servant to have recourse to the court for redress.
R. Venkataro vs Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 31, The State ,of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs Ajodhya Prasad, and State of Mysore vs M. H. Bellary, ; , referred to.
In the present case the order of discharge has been passed by the ,appointing authority as required by rule 5.
(iii)In the appeal before this Court the finding on the point of mala fides must be accepted as final and the appellant cannot be allowed to re agitate that matters.
(iv)As regards the applicability of the rule of natural justice it has not been shown how under the general law of master and servant, in the absence of any protection conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution such a rule can be invoked.