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201 of 1952) under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
B. K. Varma.and G. C. Mathur for the petitioner.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent.
March 13.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J.
This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution in which the petitioner seeks redress for what, according to him, is a breach of his fundamental rights under articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.
It was argued at considerable length by the petitioner in person.
Then, when our judgment was nearly ready, he put in a petition asking for a rehearing and for permission to file some fresh papers.
When that was refused he came again on another,day and asked for leave to engage an agent and appear through counsel as he felt he had not been able to do justice to his case in person.
(It may be mentioned that though he had originally engaged an agent he dismissed him before the hearing when he appeared in person.) We granted his request and counsel reargued the case for him but has not carried the matter any further.
The facts are these.
657 In October,1945, the petitioner was employed by the Government of India on a five year contracting, the Directorate General of Resettlement and Employment of the Ministry of Labour.
This was after selection by the Federal Public Service Commission.
After a short period of practical training, he was posted in January, 1946, at Jabalpur as the Manager of the Sub Regional Employment Exchange and was later confirmed in this appointment.
This contract of service was due to expire in 1950.
Shortly before its expiration the Government of India made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated the 30th June, 1950, to continue him in service on the expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that letter.
Among them were the following: (3) Other conditions of service: On the termination of your contract you will be allowed to continue in your post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation and will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, unless you are a permanent Government servant.
" He was asked in the letter to intimate to the Ministry of Labour whether he was willing to continue in service on those terms and he admits that he accepted the offer and continued in service, He was not a permanent Government servant though it was contended in argument that he was, for he was on a five year contract and the work for which he was employed, namely Resettlement and Employment, was itself only of a temporary character.
Therefore, the Temporary Service Rules applied.
On those rules, ' rule 5 is material.
It runs as follows: 5 (a) The service of a temporary Government servant who is not in quasi permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant.
658 (b) The period of such notice shall be one month, unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and by the Government servant.
" Quasi permanent service is defined in the rules and it is clear that the petitioner does not come within that class.
It is also an undisputed fact that there was no agreement between the petitioner and Government regarding the period of the notice.
Therefore, according to this rule, which was a term in the petitioner 's contract of further service, his services were liable to termination at any time by ' one month 's notice in writing.
This notice was given on 25th November, 1950, and he was told that his services would terminate on the expiry of one month from 1st December, 1950.
A large field was covered in the course of the arguments, and had the matter not been re argued we would, for the petitioner 's satisfaction, have dealt with the contentions raised more fully than will be necessary now that counsel has appeared.
The petition is under article 32(1) of the Constitution and so it must be shown that a fundamental right has been infringed.
It was argued that the rights infringed are the ones conferred by articles 14 and 16(1).
Taking article 14 first, it must be shown that the ,petitioner has been discriminated against in the exercise or enjoyment of some legal right which is open to others who are similarly situated.
The rights which he says have been infringed are those confered by article 31 1.
He says he has either been dismissed or removed from service without the safeguards which that article confers.
In our opinion, article 31 1 has no application because this is neither a dismissal nor a removal from service, nor is it a reduction in rank.
It is an ordinary case of a contract being termi nated by notice under one of its clauses.
The services in India have long been afforded certain statutory guarantees and safeguards against arbitrary dismissal or reduction in rank Under 659 section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the safeguards were limited to those two cases.
Under.
the present Constitution, a third was added, namely removal from service.
In order to understand the difference between "dismissal" and "removal" from service, it will be necessary to turn to the Rule,; which governed, and with modifications still govern, the "services" in India because of article 313 of the Constitution.
Part XII of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules relating to Conduct and Discipline includes rule 49 which sets out the various penalties to which a member of the services can be subjected for indiscipline and misconduct.
They are seven in number and include censure, suspension, reduction in rank, removal from service and dismissal from service.
The Act of 1935 selected only two of these possible penalties as serious enough to merit statutory safeguards, namely reduction in rank and dismissal from service. 'The Constitution has added a third to the list.
The distinction which is drawn between the two is explained in rule 49.
There is first removal from service "which does not disqualify from future employment " and there is next dismissal from service "which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.
" Then follows an Explanation: The discharge (c) of a person engaged under contract, in accordance with the terms of his contract, does not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule.
" These terms are used in the same sense in article 3ll.
It follows that the article has no application here and so no question of discrimination arises, for the "law" whose protection the petitioner seeks has no application to him.
There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did.
He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the 660 offer which was made to him.
Having accepted, he still has open to him all the right , and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated.
He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim.
The remedy of a writ is misconceived.
Article 16(1) is equally inapplicable.
The whole matter rests in contract.
When the petitioner 's first contract (the five year one) came to an end, he was not a permanent Government servant and Government was not bound either to re employ him or to continue him in service.
On the other hand, it was open to Government to make him the offer it did of a continuation of his employment on a temporary and contractual basis.
Though the employment was continued, it was in point of fact, and in the eyes of the law, under a new and fresh contract which was quite separate and distinct from the old even though many of its terms were the same.
Article 16(1) deals with equality of opportunity in all matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
The petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of employment or of appointment.
He has been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made.
His grievance, when analysed, is not one of personal differentiation but is against an offer of temporary employment on special terms as opposed to permanent employment.
But of course the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound.
When the employment is permanent there are certain statutory guarantees but in the absence of 661 any such limitations government is, subject to the qualification mentioned above, as free to make special, contracts of, service with temporary employees, engaged in, works of a temporary nature, as any other employer.
Various matters relating to the merits of the case were referred to but we express no opinion about whether the petitioner has other rights which he can enforce in other ways.
We are dealing here with a writ under article 32 to enforce a fundamental right and the only point we decide is that no fundamental right has been infringed.
When the matter was first argued we had decided not to make any order about costs but now that the petitioner has persisted in reopening the case and calling the learned Attorney General here for a second time, we have no alternative but to dismiss the petition with costs.
Petition dismissed.
Agent for the petitioner: Bajinder Narain.

Output:
The petitioner was employed by the Government of India on a five year contract in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour.
When his contract was due to expire the Government made him a new offer to continue him in service in his post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation on the condition that he will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which provided for termination of the contract by month 's notice on either side.
He accepted the offer and continued in service, but subsequently his services were terminated after giving him one month 's notice, The petitioner applied for relief under article 32 (1) of the Constitution alleging that his funda mental rights under articles 311, 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution were infringed: Held, (i) that article 311 had no application as this was not a case of dismissal or removal from service nor a reduction in rank but only an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses, the difference between dismissal and 656 removal being that the former ordinarily disqualifies from future employment but not the latter; (ii) article 14 had no application as he had not been discriminated against and had not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim; (iii) article 16 was equally inapplicable as the petitioner was not denied equal opportunity in a matter relating to appointment or employment but had been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made.
The State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound.


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Appeal No. 560 of1966.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated September 28, 1964 of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar in Reference No. 32 of 1963.
A.C. Mitra and D.N. Gupta, for the appellant.
O.P. Sharma and V.C. Parashar, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J.
This appeal, by special leave, is against the award dated September 28, 1964 of the Industrial Tribunal, Patna.
The appellant company is an all India complex having establishments in different parts of the country.
In Bihar alone, it has two factories, one at Jamshedpur and the other at Ranchi, and has depots at Patna and other towns.
The factory at Jamshedpur is an establishment under the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act.
Certain disputes having arisen between the a_appellant company and its workmen employed in the factory at Jamshedpur, the com 553 pany and the said workmen represented by their.
union called the Indoxco Labour Union, Jamshedpur, made a joint application dated September 7, 1963 to the Government of Bihar for a reference under section 10(2) of the .
By a notification dated October 23, 1963, the Government referred five disputes to the Tribunal for adjudication.
We are concerned ' in this appeal with only two disputes arising from demands Nos3 and 5.
These demands were, No. 3.
"The payment of overtime to office staff should be 11/2 times the ordinary rate beyond their normal duty hours.
" No. 5. "Union representatives should be allowed special leave to attend to law courts for matters connected with the workers and the management, to attend to annual conventions of their federation, to attend to Executive Committee meeting of the union federation and convention of central organisation i.e., INTUC." As required by r. 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Bihar) Rules, 1961, the statement accompanying the said application signed by the District Manager on behalf of the company and the General Secretary of the said union representing the said workmen contamed inter alia the following information, namely, "( c ) Number of workmen employed in the undertaking affected 352 (d) Estimated number of workmen affected or likely to be affected by the dispute 352" It is quite dear from the said application and the statement signed by the parties, ( 1 ) that the said disputes concerned the 352 workmen employed in the company 's factory at Jamshedpur and (2) that these 352 workmen were represented by the Indoxco Labour Union.
The said notification also stated "Whereas the Governor of Bihar is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended between the management of Indian Oxygen Limited .
Jamshedpur 7 and their workmen represented by Indoxco Labour Union . .
Jamshedpur, regarding the matters specified in their joint applications dated 7 9 1963 annexed hereto .
Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by sub sec.
(2 ) of section 10 of the (XIV of 1947), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to refer the said dispute . .
" The notification thus makes it clear that the disputes referred to the Tribunal were disputes set out in the said agreement and state 554 ment and were between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and their workmen represented by the Indoxco Labour Union.
It appears, however, that the union at its general meeting held on January 6, 1963, purported to amend its constitution by a resolution passed thereat by changing the name of the union to Indian Oxygen Workers Union and making the workmen of all the establishments of the appellant company in Bihar eligible for its membership.
C is the copy of a letter dated January 21, 1963 by which the Secretary of the said union informed the District Manager of the appellant company at Jamshedpur of the said purported amendment.
The Tribunal appears to be of the view that the ' constitution of thesaid Indoxco Labour Union came to be amended as from January 6, 1963 and that as the said reference was made in October 1963, i.e., after the said purported amendment, "the mention in it of the dispute as a dispute between the company and Indoxco Labour Union does not materially affect the position that the dispute raised by the union is in respect of the employees of the company wherever they may be stationed.
Consequently, the award in this case shall be effective in respect of all of them and cannot be restricted to the workmen working at Jamshedpur".
So far as the workmen 's demands Nos. 3 and 5 were concerned, the Tribunal after observing that the company 's wage scales were satisfactory, compared the rates of overtime paid by other industrial concerns in Jamshedpur and awarded 1 1/4 times the ordinary wages for overtime work exceeding 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours per week.
If the overtime exceeded 48 hours per week, 48 hours of work being the maximum provided by the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, the company would be liable to pay at double the ordinary rate of wages as provided in that Act.
Regarding demand No. 5, the union produced three letters addressed to its Secretary, ( 1 ) a letter by the General Secretary of the Tara Workers Union, (Ext.
I) dated November 30, 1963, wherein it was stated that the officials of that union were granted special leave to attend the union 's executive committee meetings, the meetings of their federation and the meetings of the I.N.T.U.C. if held at Jamshedpur; (2) a letter dated January 25, 1964 by the General Secretary of Golmuri Tinplate Workers Uni , Jamshedpur, to the effect that members of the executive committee of that union were relieved from duty with pay to attend meetings of the executive committee or any other meeting called by the union except mass meetings and the union 's delegates were also.
allowed special leave with p.ay to attend I.N.T.U.C. sessions; and (3) a letter dated December 7, 1963 by the Secretary of Telco Workers Union, Jamshedpur, to the effect that members of the executive committee of that union and office bearers were allowed to attend union 's meetings without loss of pay.
The Tribunal noted that the appellant company 555 had been allowing without loss of pay the representatives of the workmen to attend proceedings before conciliation officers and Industrial Tribunals.
This concession, it considered, was sufficient and, therefore, rejected the demand for special leave with pay to attend the law courts.
But it awarded that the union 's representatives should be given special leave to attend (1 ) meetings of its executive commit, tee, (2) meetings of the federation of the union, (3) the annual convention of that federation when held at Jamshedpur and (4) the convention of the I.N.T.U.C.
The first contention urged on behalf of the appellant company was that the Tribunal was in error in making its award operative not only to the said workmen at its Jamshedpur factory but also to workmen at its other establishments and that in doing so it acted beyond jurisdiction.
In our view, this contention must be upheld.
In the first place, the agreement by which the parties agreed to refer the said disputes for adjudication was clearly between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and the workmen employed in that factory and represented by their said union the Indoxco Labour Union.
The statement accomping that agreement clearly stated that the disputes agreed to be referred to were between the workmen of that factory and the management of that factory.
The notification referring those disputes to the Tribunal also made it Clear that the disputes referred to were those set out in the said agreement and the statement and no other dispu,tes and further that they were the disputes between the parties to that agreement.
There was no evidence before the Tribunal that similar demands were raised by workmen engaged in the appellant company 's other establishments.
Even assuming that the Indoxco Labour Union validly amended its constitution so as to extend its membership to the company 's other workmen in its other establishments, inasmuch as the disputes referred to the Tribunal were only those set out in the said agreement and the said statement, any award made by the Tribunal in respect of those disputes must necessarily be confined to the disputes referred to it, the parties to those disputes 'and the parties who had agreed to refer those disputes for adjudication.
Next, as to the claim of the Union that it had amended its constitution on January 6, 1963 and, therefore, as the workmen of the factory at Jamshedpur came henceforth to be represented by the Indian Oxygen Workers ' Union which represented also workmen employed in the appellant company 's other establishments, the reference extended to them also and the Tribunal 's award would cover them also.
We fail to see any connection between the purported amendment of the union 's constitution and 556 the reference made by the government on the basis of the said agreement and the said ' statement.
These, as aforesaid, related to the disputes between the management and the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur who alone had made the aforesaid demands and disputes arising from those demands only were agreed to be referred to and were actually referred to the Tribunal by the said notification.
There is nothing to show in that notification that other workmen of the company had raised similar demands or that there were any disputes existing or apprehended which were included in that reference.
The question next is whether the union 's constitution was duly amended on January 6, 1963 as claimed by the union and held by the Tribunal.
The constitution of the union prior to its purported amendment contained amongst other Articles, Articles 1 and 3.
These Articles read as follows: "ARTICLE NO. 1: Name and Address: 1.
This Union is a Trade Union Organisation of wage earners of the Indian Oxygen & Acetylene Co. Ltd., Jamshedpur and shall be called.
Indoxco Labour Union.
The situation of the Registered Office shall not be changed except by resolution of the General Body Meeting specially held for the purpose.
Any change of the address of the Registered Office of the Union will be communicated to the Registrar of the Trade Unions within 14 days of such change." Article XII of the said constitution deals with alteration of rules and cl.
(e) thereof provides that copies of all new rules and amendments or revisions of .rules shall be submitted to the Registrar within the prescribed period as required by section 28(3) of the .
This rule had to be incorporated in the constitution in view of the express terms of that section.
Section 6 of the provides that a trade union would not be entitled to registration under the Act unless the executive thereof is constituted in accordance, with the provisions of this Act, and the rules thereof provide amongst other things for its name and the manner in which the rules shall be amended, varied or rescinded.
Section 28(3) provides that a copy of every alteration made in the rules of a registered trade union shall be sent to the Registrar Within fifteen days of the making of the alteration.
Section 29 contains the power of the appropriate government to make regulations and sub section 2(a) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the power in sub section
(1 ) such regulations may provide inter alia for the manner in which trade unions and their rules shall be registered.
Section 30(3) lays 557 down that regulations so made shall be published in the official gazette and on such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.
In pursuance of the power to make regulations the Central Government framed Central Trade Unions Regulations, 1938, regulation 9 whereof provided that on receiving a copy of an alteration made in the rules of a trade union under section 28(3), the Registrar shall register the alteration in the register maintained for this purpose and shall notify the fact that he has done so to the secretary of the trade union.
The combined effect of secs.
6(g), 28(3), 29 and 30(3) and regulation 9 is that a registered union can alter its rules.
only in the manner provided in these provisions, that is, it has to send the amended rules to the Registrar within 15 days from the amendment and until the Registrar is satisfied that the amendments are in accordance with the rules of the union and on such satisfaction registers them in a register kept for that purpose and notifies that fact to the union 's secretary, the amendments do not become effective.
The union did not produce any evidence to show that the amendments purported to have been carried out by the said resolution dated January 6, 1963 were sent to the Registrar as provided in the aforesaid provisions, nor did it produce any communication of the Registrar notifying the fact of his having registered the said amehdments.
The only evidence it produced was its letter dated May 21, 1964 to the appellant company which indicated that the Registrar notified to the union of his having registered the said amendments on May 13, 1964.
The Tribunal 's conclusion, therefore, that the union 's constitution was duly amended on either January 6, or 21, 1963 or that, therefore, the/ndian Oxygen Workers Union represented the workmen of the company 's factory at Jamshedpur and that consequently it made no difference that the name of Indoxco Labour Union as representing the workmen concerned was mentioned in the said agreement and the said statement and not that of the Indian Oxygen Workers Union is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
Any award, therefore, made by the Tribunal in these circumstances can operate only in respect of the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and the Tribunal 's extension of that award to workmen in the company 's other establishments was clearly without jurisdiction.
The decisions in The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs Their Workmen(1) and Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Co. Ltd. vs Jatin ChakravortY(2) on the effect and interpretation of section 18 of the , relied on by counsel for the union are beside the point and do not assist him.
As regards the Tribunal 's finding on demand No. 3, counsel for the company raised two contentions: (1 ) that the company 's factory at Jamshedpur having been declared an establishment (1) ; (2) 558 under the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, it could be made liable to pay for overtime work at the rate provided in that Act, viz. at double the ordinary rate when a workman was asked to.
work beyond 48 hours per week as provided therein.
Therefore, the argument ran, the appellant company could not be asked to pay more than its ordinary rate of wages payable to workmen if they were asked to work beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours.
And (2) that the comparative statement (Ext.
M) of overtime rates paid by other concerns in Jamshedpur before the Tribunal showed that if the company were made to pay 11/4 times its ordinary rate of wages it would, in the light of its higher scale of wages be paying more than the other concerns.
In our judgment both these contentions are unsustainable.
Under the conditions 'of service of the company, the total hours of work per week are 39 hours.
Any workman asked to work beyond these hours would obviously be working overtime and the company in fairness would be expected to pay him compensation for such overtime work.
The Bihar Shops and Establishments Act has no relevance to this question as that Act fixes the maximum number of hours of work allowable thereunder, i.e. 48 hours a week, and provides for double the rate of ordinary wages for work done over and above 48 hours.
It is not, therefore, as if the provisions of that Act govern overtime payment payable by an employer where maximum hours of work are governed by the conditions of service prevailing in his establishment.
Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the provisions of that Act for the company 's contention that it cannot be called upon to pay for overtime work anything more than its ordinary rate of wages if the workmen do work beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours a week.
It is obvious that if the company were asked to pay at the rate equivalent to the ordinary rate of wages for work done beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours work a week, it would be paying no extra compensation at all fo.r the work done beyond the agreed hours of wo.rk.
The company would in that case be indirectly increasing the hours of work and consequently altering its conditions of service.
M., relied on by counsel, gives the overtime rate paid by six industrial concerns situate in Jamshedpur.
Out of these six concerns, four pay overtime compensation at 11/2 times the ordinary wages and dearness allowance payable by them.
If after taking into consideration the fact of the comparatively higher scale of wages prevailing in the appellant company the Tribunal fixed the rate for overtime work at 1 1/4 times the ordinary.
rate of wages, it is impossible to say that the Tribunal erred in doing so or acted unjustly.
The company 's contention, thcrefore, as regards this demand must be rejected.
559 As regards demand No. 5, counsel for the company very seriously challenged that part of the award as unjustified and contended that an obligation to grant special leave to attend the meetings of the executive committee of the union, the meetings of the federation and the conventions of the I.N.T.U.C. over and above the various types of leave available to the company 's workmen was tantamount to the company having practically to finance the administration and management of the union.
He argued that imposing such an obligation on the company cannot be justifled on the ground of social justice or promotion of trade unionism.
Counsel for the union, on the other hand, sought to support this part of the award on the ground that such a demand was justified, as the Tribunal has observed, in the interest of a proper growth ' of trade union movement and the promotion of harmony in industrial relations inasmuch as if facilities are given to the workmen to conduct the administration of the union themselves, there would be less possibility of outside elements establishing their hold on the union.
We apprehend the argument does not take into consideration certain important aspects of the demand.
As aforesaid, the appellant company has been allowing those of its workmen who are the tmion 's representatives to attend without loss of pay 'proceedings before conciliation officers and industrial tribunals.
This is fair because conciliation proceedings are likely to get thwarte if the workmen 's representatives are not there to discuss the disputes and put forward their point of view before conciliation officers and wherever possible to arrive at a settlement or compromise.
Over and above this facility, the workmen get various types of paid leave.
As the figures of such leave are not correctly 'stated in the award, we collected them from counsel on both sides.
The following table shows the types of leave enjoyed by the workmen: Factory Staff: Earned leave . 21 Festival leave . 10 Casual leave . 7 Medical leave . 15 53 Office Staff: Earned leave . 21 Festival leave . 17 Casual leave . 7 Medical leave . 15 560 General Staff: Earned leave . 15 Festival leave . 17 Casual leave . 7 Medical leave . 15 54 It is impossible to say that the leave granted by the company with full pay is not fair or even liberal.
In conceding the demand of the union the Tribunal does not appear to have considered the adverse effect on the company 's production if further absenteeism were to be allowed especially when the crying need of the country ' s economy is more and more production and employers are exhorted to streamline their management to achieve this objective and to bring down their cost in line with international cost.
In awarding this demand the Tribunal also did not specify on how many occasions the executive committee meetings of the union and other meetings would be held when the company would be obliged to give special leave with pay to the union 's representatives.
Similarly there is no knowing how many delegates the union would send to attend the conventions of the federation and the I.N.T.U.C.
The Tribunal could not in the very nature of things specify or limit the number of such meetings for such an attempt would amount to interference in the administration of the union and its autonomy.
Its order must of necessity, therefore, have to be indefinite with the result that the appellant company would not know before hand on how many occasions and to how many of its workmen would be called upon to grant special leave.
Further in case there are more than one union in the company 's establishment, the representatives of all such unions would also have to be given such leave to attend the aforesaid meetings.
A healthy growth of trade union movement undoubtedly would lead to industrial peace and harmony and consequently to higher efficiency.
But a demand of the type we have before us has to be considered from a11 aspects and its implications and results have to be properly examined.
In considering such a demand, the first question which strikes one is as to why the meetings of the executive committee of the union cannot be held outside the hours of work.
It was said that it may not be possible always do so if an emergency arises.
But emergencies are not of regular occurrence and if there be one, the representatives can certainly sacrifice one of their earned leave.
There can obviously be no difficulty in so doing.
The meetings of the federation and the annual conventions of the I.N.T.U.C. too can be attended by the union 's delegates by availing themselves of their earned leave.
561 Industrial adjudication, as observed in 1.
K. Cotton and Spinning and Weaving Mills vs Badri Mali(1) cannot and should not ignore the claims of social justice, a concept based on socio economic equality, and which endeavours to resolve conflicting claims of employers and employees by finding not a one sided but a fair and just solution.
A demand for special leave has, however, nothing to do with any disparities or inequalities social or economic.
On the other hand, too much absenteeism harms both the employers and the employees inasmuch as it saps industrial economy.
In our view, the Tribunal, on the considerations aforesaid, was not justified in obliging the appellant company to grant special leave demanded by the union.
The result is that except for the overtime rate allowed by the Tribunal which we confirm, the rest of the appeal has to be allowed and the Tribunal 's award set aside.
We hold that the award is operative in respect of the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and not the workmen of its other establishments.
The demand for special leave comprised in demand .No.
5 is disallowed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Y.P. Appeal allowed in part.

Output:
The appellant and its workmen, represented by their unio.n called the Indoxco Labour Union, Jamshedpur, made a joint application to the Government referring certain disputes to the Industrial Tribunal.
The application stated that the number of workmen employed in the undertaking affected were those employed in the company 's factory at Jamshedput, and that the same number were likely to be affected by the disputes.
The Government referred the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, and the notification also stated that the disputes were between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and their workmen represented by Indoxco Labour Union.
Two of the demands were (1) payment of overtime to office staff should be 1 1/2 times the ordinary rate .and (2) the union representatives should be allowed special leave to attend law courts for matters connected with the workers and the management, to attend the annual conventions of their federation, to attend to Executive Committee meetings of the union federation and the conventions of the central organisation i.e., INTUC.
The union at a general meeting, held prior to the reference, had passed a resolution changing the name of the union to Indian Oxygen Workers Union and making the workmen of all the establishments of the Appellant company in Bihar eligible for its membership.
By a letter the union informed the appellant company at Jamshedpur of this amendment.
The Tribunal held that (i) the award in this case was to apply to all of the workmen and could not be restricted to the workman working at Jamshedpur; (ii) 11/2 times the ordinary wages 'for overtime work exceeding 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours per week should be paid; and if the overtime exceeded 48 hours per week, the company would be liable to pay double the ordinary rate of wages; and (iii) the appellant company had been allowing without loss of pay the representatives of the workmen to attend proceedings before conciliation officers and Industrial Tribunals, and that this concession was sufficient; therefore the Tribunal rejected the demand for special Leave with pay to attend the law courts; but held the union 's representatives were to be given special leave to attend (a) meetings of its executive committee, (b) meetings of the federation of the union, (c) the annual convention of that federation when held at Jamshedpur and (d) the convention of the INTUC.
In appeal to this Court, HELD: (i) The award was operative only in respect of the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and not the workmen of its other establishments.
[561 C D] The agreement by which the parties agreed to refer the said disputes for adjudication was between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur.
and the wo 'rkmen employed in that factory and represented by their said union, the Indoxco Labour Union.
Under the notification of the Government also 'the disputes referred to the Tribunal 551 were those set out in the said agreement.
Even assuming that the Indoxco Labour Union validly amended its constitution so as to extend its membership to the company 's other workmen in its other establishments, inasmuch as the disputes referred to.
the Tribunal were only those set out in the said agreement, any award made by the Tribunal in respect of those disputes must necessarily be confined to the disputes refered to it, the parties to those disputes and the parties who had agreed to refer those disputes for adjudication.
There is nothing to show in that notification that other workmen of the company had raised similar demands.
or that there were any disputes existing or apprehended which were included in that reference.
[555 D G] The Union did not produce any evidence to show that the amendments purported to have been carried out by the resolution were sent to the Registrar as provided in sections 6(g), 28(3), 29 and 30(3) of the Trade Union Act and regulation 9 of the Central Trade Union Regulation, nor did it produce any communication of the Registrar notifying the fact of his having registered the said amendments.
The only evidence it produced was its letter to the appellant company which indicated that the Registrar notified to the union of his having registered the said amendments.
The Tribunal 's conclusion, therefore, that the union 'section constitution, was duly amended or that the Indian Oxygen Workers Union represented the workmen of the company 's factory at Jamshedpur and that consequently it made no difference that the name of Indoxco Labour Union as representing the workmen concerned was mentioned in the said agreement and the said statement and not that of the Indian Oxygen Workers Union is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
Any award, therefore, made by the Tribunal in these circumstances can operate only in respect of the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and the Tribunal 's extension of that award to workmen in the company 's other establishments was clearly without jurisdiction.
[557 D G] The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs Their Workmen, ; a 'nd Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Co. Ltd. vs Jatin Chakravorty, , distinguished.
(ii) Under the conditions of service of the co.mpany, the total hours of work per week were 39 hours.
The Bihar Shops and Establishments Act fixes the maximum number of hours of work allowable thereunder, i.e. 48 hours a week, and provides for double the rate of ordinary wages for work done over and above 48 hours.
But no reliance can be placed on the provisions of that Act for the company 's contention that it cannot be called upon to.
pay for overtime work anything more than its ordinary rate of wages if the workmen do work beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 49 hours a week.
Any workman asked 'to work beyond 39 hours would obviously be working overtime and the company in fairness would be expected to pay him compensation for such overtime work.
If the company pays at the ordinary rate of wages for work done beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours work a week, it would be paying no extra compensation at all for the work done beyond the agreed hours of work.
The company would thus be indirectly increasing the hours of work and consequently altering its condition of service.
[558 C F] If after taking into consideration the fact of the comparatively higher scale of wages prevailing in the appellant company, the Tribunal fixed the rate for overtime work at 11/2 times the ordinary rate of wages, it is impossible to say that the Tribunal erred in doing so or acted unjustly.
(iii) The demand for special leave must be disallowed.
552 The appellant company.
has been allowing those,of its workmen who are the union 's representatives to attend without loss of pay proceedings before conciliation officers and industrial tribunals.
In conceding the demand of the union for more leave the Tribunal does not appear to have considered the adverse effect on the company 's production if furthern absenteeism were to be allowed especially when the crying need of the country 's economy is more and more production.
In awarding this demand the Tribunal also did not specify on how many ' occasions the executive committee meetings of the union and other meetings would be held when the company would be obliged to give special leave with pay to the union 's representatives.
Similarly, there is no knowing how many delegates the union would send to attend the conventions of the federation and the INTUC.
The Tribunal could not in the very nature of things specify or limit the number of such meetings for such an attempt would amount to interference in the administration of the union and its autonomy.
Its order must of necessity, therefore, have to be indefinite with the result that the appellant company would not know before hand on how many occasions and to how many of its workmen it would be called upon to grant special leave.
Further, in case there are more than one union in the company 's establishment, the representatives of all such unions would also have to be given such leave to attend the aforesaid meetings.
In considering such a demand, the question as to why the meetings of the executive committee of the union cannot be 'held outside the hours of work should be considered.
It was said that it may not be possible always to do so if an emergency arises.
But emergencies are not of regular occurrence and if there be one, the representatives can certainly sacrifice one of their earned leave.
Similarly the meetings of the federation and the annual conventions of the INTUC too can be artended by the union 's delegates by availing themselves of their earned leave.
[559 D E; 560 C H] J. K. Cotton and Spinning and Weaving Mills vs Badri Malt, [19641 3 S.C.R. 724, referred to.


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 495 of 1979.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th October, 1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1292 of 1975.
R.R. Garg, U.R. Lalit and Randhir Jain for the Appellant.
M.C. Bhandare, S.A. Shroff, S.S. Shroff and Miss C.K Sachurita for Respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BAHARUL ISLAM J.
This appeal by special leave is by the appellant, J.D. Jain.
who was a workman and whose services have been terminated by the management of the State Bank of India (hereinafter called the respondent).
230 2.
The material facts are these.
The appellant was working as a cashier in the Meerut City Branch of the State Bank of India.
On June 21, 1971, one Dishan Prakash Kansal ( 'Kansal ' for short) who had a Savings Bank account with the said branch of the State Bank came to the Bank to receive 3 his Pass Book.
On receipt of the Pass Book from the counter clerk, Kansal complained to Wadhera who was the Ledger keeper, that on February 8, 1971, he had withdrawn only Rs. 500 but a debit entry of Rs. 1,500 had been shown in the Pass Book.
Wadhera thereupon took Kansal to the the Supervisor, R.P. Gupta, before whom Kansal repeated his complaint.
Necessary documents pertaining to the said withdrawal were then examined and it was found that Kansal had given a 'letter of authority ' (which expression means, we are told, the withdrawal application form) to the appellant on February 8, 1971 authorising him to withdraw the amount from his account.
The letter of authority showed that it was for withdrawal of Rs. 1,500 though there appeared to be some interpolation suggesting that the figure of Rs. 500 had been altered to the figure of Rs. 1,500.
The matter was then brought to the notice of M. Ramzan, the Agent of the State Bank, before whom also Kansal is said to have repeated his complaint.
Eventually on September 18, 1972, a memorandum of charges was served on the appellant by the respondent stating, inter alia that in the letter of authority, the appellant altered in his own handwriting with different ink the amount of Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,500 and thus received Rs. 1,000 in excess, passing only Rs. 500 to the pass book holder, and that he subsequently, on June 24, 1971, deposited Rs 250 in the account of Kansal to liquidate a part or the amount misappropriated by him.
The appellant replied to the charges.
He denied the allegations.
Thereupon the respondent appointed one Rajendra Prasad as an Enquiry officer and a formal disciplinary enquiry was held against the appellant.
The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the respondent on February 13, 1973.
The findings of the Enquiry officer were that The appellant had fraudulently altered the amount in the letter of authority given to him by Kansal, withdrew Rs. 1,500 from Kansal 's account and paid Rs. 500 only to Kansal and misappropriated Rs. 1000.
The disciplinary authority on receipt of the report of the Enquiry officer passed the following order (material portion only): 231 "2.
Although, the charges against you are of a serious nature which would, in normal course, warrant your dismissal from the service of the Bank, yet keeping in view your past record, I am inclined to take a lenient view in the matter.
Upon consideration of the matter, I have tentatively come to the decision that your misconduct be condoned and you be merely discharged of in terms of paragraphs 521 (5) (e) of the Sastry Award read with para graph 18.28 of the Desai Award and paragraph 1.1 of the Agreement dated the 31st March 1967 entered into between the Bank and the State Bank of India Staff Federation.
Before, however, I take a final decision in the matter I would like to give you a hearing as to why the proposed punishment should not be imposed upon you.
To enable you to do so, I enclose copies of the proceedings of the enquiry and findings of the Enquiry officer.
You may ask for a hearing or if you so prefer show cause in writing within one week of receipt by you thereof.
If you fail therein, I will conclude that you have no cause to show in this behalf.
" The appellant then submitted a representation to Shri V.B. Chadha, the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India on June 15, 1973.
Shri Chadha after perusing the representation of the appellant and hearing him in person, recommended that the proposed punishment should not be imposed upon the appellant, on the grounds that Kansal had not been examined as a witness and that there had been no written complaint against the appellant.
The respondent, however, did not accept the recommendation, and, by its memorandum of December 7, 1973, discharged the appellant from service with effect from the close of the business on December 22, 1973.
The appellant then having raised an industrial dispute, the Central Government, by its order dated January 17, 1975, referred the following issue to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Delhi for adjudication: "Is the management of State Bank of India justified in discharging from service Shri J.D. Jain, Cashier of Meerut Branch, with effect from 22nd December, 1973? If not to what relief is he entitled ?" 232 5.
Before the Tribunal, the appellant denied the charges, He inter alia, pleaded that as Kansal was not examined in the enquiry, there was no legal evidence before the inquiry officer for a finding that he was guilty.
The Tribunal framed the following two issues: "1.
Whether a proper and valid domestic enquiry was held by the Bank and its effect ? 2.
Is the management of State Bank of India justified in discharging from service Shri J.D. Jain, Cashier of Meerut Branch with effect from 22nd December, 1973 ? If not to what relief is he entitled ?" Before the Tribunal, the Management examined no witnesses but produced certain documents and relied on them.
The appellant also did not adduce any evidence.
On a perusal of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry officer, the Tribunal held that on the evidence before it, the appellant could not be held guilty as, according to it, in the absence of the evidence of Kansal, the evidence recorded was hearsay, with the result that it directed reinstatement of the appellant with full back wages from 22nd December, 1973.
The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the award of the Tribunal.
The High Court held that the charges against the appellant had been established and quashed the award of the Tribunal.
It is against this judgment of the High Court that the present appeal by special leave is directed.
Mr. R.K. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the appellant makes three submissions before us: (1) That the Tribunal exercised its powers under Section 11 A of the and the High , Court, exercising powers under Article 2261227 of the Constitution, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the award of the Tribunal; (2) The Tribunal in the perspective of the broad contours of the case rightly refused to rely on the evidence which was hearsay? Kansal not having been examined; 233 (3) Assuming the evidence could be relied on, the High Court committed error in not considering the receipt executed by Kansal showing payment of Rs. 1000 to Kansal and its judgment is vitiated.
In an application for a Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited.
It can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is perverse.
In the case before us, according to the Tribunal, as Kansal was not examined, the evidence before it was hearsay and as such on the basis thereof the appellant could not be legally found guilty.
Before the Enquiry officer, the respondent examined the following witnesses: Gupta (Witness 1), Wadhera, the Ledger Keeper (Witness 2), Mahesh Chander who was incharge of Savings Bank account on 8.2.1971 (Witness 3), M. Ramzan, Agent of the Bank (Witness 4), Sarkar (Witness 5), and Bhardwaj (Witness 6).
Bhardwaj was a leader of the employees ' union of the respondent.
He did not support the case of the respondent.
The other witnesses supported the case of the respondent.
Witnesses Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 depose that a verbal complaint was made by Kansal in their presence to the effect that he had authorised the appellant to withdraw Rs. 500 which sum was paid to him, but the entries showed that Kansal had withdrawn Rs. 1,500.
Witnesses Vadhera, Ramzan and Sarkar also deposed that the appellant had confessed before them that he had made the alterations in the figure and in words of the sum.
The Tribunal after having made detailed references to the evidence of the above witnesses in fact found, "All that this evidence thus, proves is that a complaint was made by Shri Kansal and that the workmen confessed that he had altered the debit authority.
(emphasis added).
Curiously, however, it held, "This evidence, by no means prove that the workman altered the debit authority to defraud or that he actually defrauded or that he mis.
appropriated the amount of Rs. 1,000 after paying Rs. 500 only to Mr. Kansal from the amount of Rs. 1,500 withdrawn from the bank by him as it was not direct evidence but was in the nature of 234 hearsay evidence since it was learnt through the medium of a third person and that person was not available.
" It further held, "There can be no hesitation, therefore, that the enquiry officer relied on hearsay evidence in arriving at his findings and it vitiated the enquiry.
" It went on, "All this could be enough for raising a suspicion only.
In order to be called 'proved ' it needed evidence which was not there.
" It further observed, "But the question was whether it was done without the consent or knowledge of Mr. Kansal.
There was no evidence on the record to prove it.
The only person who could speak about it was Mr. Kansal.
He did not appear before the inquiry officer, therefore, there was no direct evidence that the change that was admittedly made by the workman in the debit authority was without Mr. Kansal 's consent or knowledge or that it was designed to defraud " (emphasis added) The positive findings of the Tribunal are: (i) Kansal made the complaint as alleged by the management.
(ii) The appellant confessed that he had made the alterations charged with, as alleged by the management, (iii) By implication it has also found that Rs. 1,000 in excess of the original amount of Rs. 500 was received by the appellant as a result of the alternations.
But it has held that as Kansal was not examined, fraud and misappropriation on the part of the appellant cannot be held to be proved, as the evidence was 'hearsay '.
The learned Tribunal, it appears, was obvious of the fact that it was examining the evidence in a domestic enquiry, and not the evidence in a criminal prosecution entailing conviction and sentence.
In a case like the one before us, three kinds of proceedings against the delinquent are possible .
(i) departmental proceedings and action, (ii) original prosecution for forgery and misappropriation, (iii) civil proceedings for, recovery of the amount alleged to be misappropriated.
235 The respondent herein adopted course (i) and instituted the domestic enquiry in which the principle applied by the Tribunal is not applicable; in such an enquiry guilt need not be established beyond reasonable doubt, proof of misconduct may be sufficient.
The learned Tribunal has committed another error in holding that the finding of the domestic enquiry was based on "hearsay" evidence.
The law is well settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry.
This Court in the case of State of Haryana & Anr.
vs Rattan Singh held: "It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply.
All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.
There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility.
The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal ? The word 'hearsay ' is used in various senses.
Some times it means whatever a person is heard to say; some times it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else.
(See Stephen on Law of Evidence).
The Privy Council it the case of Subramaniam v/s.
Public Prosecutor, observed: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay.
It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of that is contained in the statement.
lt is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made.
The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made." 236 11.
In the instant case, the alleged misconduct of the appellant was that he forged documents, withdrew Rs. 1,500.
1,000 in excess of the amount he was authorised to do and misappropriated the excess amount of Rs. 1,000.
With regard to the fact whether the appellant manipulated the documents, withdrew excess amount and misappropriated it, there is, of course, no direct evidence of any eye witness except the appellant 's 'confession ' referred to above.
The evidence on which reliance has been taken by the respondent is the confession and circumstantial evidence, namely, the authority letter containing the admitted interpolations by the appellant in his own handwriting in different ink, and the addition of the digit "I" before 500.
The evidence of Kansal would have been primary and material, if the fact in issue were whether Kansal authorised the appellant to make the alterations in the authority letter.
But Kansal 's complaint was to the contrary.
For the purpose of a departmental enquiry complaint certainly not frivolous, but substantiated by circumstantial evidence, is enough.
What the respondent sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that Kansal had made a verbal complaint with regard to 1) the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant in presence of the four witnesses, namely, Wadhera, Gupta, Ramzan and Sarkar, aforesaid, against his advice.
On the complaint of Kansal, the evidence of these four witnesses is direct as the complaint is said to have been made by Kansal in their presence and hearing; it is therefore, not hearsay.
As the respondent has succeeded in proving that a come plaint was made by Kansal on the evidence of the above named four witnesses, the respondent has succeeded.
No rule of law enjoins that complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal.
The learned Tribunal has committed yet another grevious error, in failing to appreciate the confessions made by the appellant "in the presence of witnesses and to the higher officer who appeared as witness" (as found by itself) namely, Wadhera, Ramzan, Gupta and Sarkar, aforesaid.
The confessions of the appellant before the said witnesses were to the effect that he had altered the amount in figure and words in his own hand.
The award of the Tribunal, therefore, has been vitiated by misconception of the law involved in the case.
The last submission of Mr. Garg that the judgment of the High Court had been vitiated as it had not taken into consideration the receipt executed by Kansal showing payment by the appellant of Rs. 1000 to the former is destructive of the appellant 's defence.
In 237 Our opinion, this payment on the contrary, proves the respondent 's case and destroys the appellant 's defence which was that he had withdrawn Rs. 1,500 as advised by Kansal and paid the full amount to Kansal.
In our opinion the High Court was fully in its jurisdiction in quashing the award of the Tribunal.
This appeal has no merit and is dismissed.
We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The Appellant was working as a Cashier in a Bank.
A depositor who had a Savings Bank Account with the Bank came to the Bank to receive his Pass Book.
On receipt of his Pass Book from the Counter Clerk he complained to the ledger keeper that, on a certain date he had withdrawn only Rs. 500 but a debit entry of Rs, 1,500 had been shown in the Pass Book.
The Ledger keeper took the depositor to the Supervisor and The Agent and his complaint was recorded.
When the documents pertaining to the withdrawal were examined it was found that the depositor had given a letter of authority to the appellant authorising withdrawal from his account.
The letter of authority showed that it was for withdrawal of Rs. 1500 though there appeared to be some interpolation suggesting that the figure of Rs. 500 had been altered lo the figure of Rs. 1500.
A memorandum of charge was served on the appellant by the Management respondent No. I and a disciplinary enquiry was held.
The Enquiry Officer submitted his report and his findings were that the appellant had fraudulently altered the amount in the letter of authority given by the depositor, withdrew Rs. 1500 from the depositor 's account and paid Rs. 500 only to the depositor and 228 misappropriated Rs. 1500.
In pursuance of the enquiry the appellant was discharged from service.
The appellant having raised an industrial dispute the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
Before the Tribunal the appellant denied the charges and pleaded that as the depositor was not examined in the disciplinary enquiry there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry officer for finding that he was guilty.
Before the Tribunal the Management examined no witnesses but produced documents and relied on them.
The Tribunal held that on the evidence before it the appellant could not be held guilty as in the absence of the evidence of the depositor, the evidence recorded was 'hearsay ' and directed reinstatement to the appellant with full back wages.
The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 and 227 which held that the charge against the appellant had been established and quashed the award of the Tribunal.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) that the Tribunal exercised its powers under Section 11 A of the and the High Court exercising powers under Article 226/227 had no jurisdiction to interfere with the award; (2) the Tribunal rightly refused to rely on the evidence which was hearsay; the depositor not having been examined, and (3) the High Court committed an error in not considering the receipt executed by the depositor showing payment of Rs. 1000 to the depositor.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: The award of the Tribunal is vitiated by misconception of the law involved.
It erred in holding that as Kansal (depositor) was not examined, fraud and misappropriation on the part of appellant cannot be held to be proved and in failing to appreciate the confession made by the appellant to the higher officer that he had altered the amount in figures and words in his own hand.
[236 G] 1.
In an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 for quashing the award of an Industrial Tribunal the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited.
It can quash the award when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is perverse.
[233 B] In the instant case, three kinds of proceedings against the delinquent were possible: (i) departmental proceedings and action, (ii) Criminal prosecution for the alleged misappropriation of the amount, and (iii) civil proceedings for recovery of the amount alleged to be misappropriated.
The respondent adopted the first course and instituted the domestic enquiry.
In such an enquiry guilt need not be established beyond reasonable doubt; proof of misconduct may be sufficient.
[234 G 235 A] State of Haryana & Anr.
vs Rattan Singh , referred to 229 2.
The word 'hearsay ' is used in various senses.
Sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else.
[235 E] In the instant case, the Tribunal after having made a detailed reference to the evidence of the witnesses found that a complaint was made by Kansal and that the appellant confessed that he had altered the debit authority, but held That as Kansal was not examined, this was not direct evidence but was of the nature of 'hearsay ' evidence, with regard to the fact whether the appellant manipulated the documents, withdrew the excess amount and misappropriated it, there is no direct evidence of any of the witnesses except the appellant 's confession.
The evidence on which reliance has been taken by the respondent is the confession and circumstantial evidence.
The evidence of Kansal would have been primary and material.
if the fact in issue were whether Kansal authorised the appellant to make the alterations in the authority letter.
But Kansal 's complaint was to the contrary.
No rule of law enjoins that a complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal.
For the purpose of a departmental enquiry, complaint substantiated by circumstantial evidence is enough.
What the respondent sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that Kansal had made a verbal complaint with regard to the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant.
On the factum of complaint of Kansal the evidence of these four witnessess is direct as the complaint is said to have been made by Kansal in their presence and hearing.
It is not therefore 'hearsay '.
The respondent has succeeded in proving that a complaint was made by Kansal on the evidence of these four witnesses.
[236 A E] Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956]1 W.L.R. 965, referred to 3.
The receipt executed by Kansal showing payment by the appellant of Rs. 1000 to the former is destructive of the appellant 's defence and on the contrary proves the respondent 's case.
[236 H 237A]


Input:
No. 1685 1691 of 1979 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Soli J. Sorabjee and K.C. Dua for the Petitioners.
V. Parthasarthy, Girish Chandra and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Order of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR,,J. The question raised in this Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as regards the determination of the market value of the goods manufactured by the petitioner company for the purposes of computation of the excise duty leviable on the same.
The petitioners (manufacturers) are manufacturing electrical goods under a contract with another company known as the Bajaj Electricals Ltd. (here after referred to as buyers).
The agreement between the parties provides for the buyers having the right to reject the 84 goods if the goods are not in accordance with the buyers ' specifications or do not come up to the stipulated standard of quality.
After the manufactured goods are tested, ap proved and accepted, by the buyers the manufacturers apply the label of the brand name of the buyers (in this case 'Bajaj ') on the manufactured goods.
The petitioners contend that the market value of the goods manufactured by the petitioners should be assessed at the price at which the goods are agreed to be sold under the agreement between the manufacturers and the buyers.
On the other hand the respond ent contents that the excise duty must be levied on the basis of the market value fetched by the sale of these goods by the buyers to their wholesalers.
The goods manufactured by the Petitioner Company, which are accepted by the buyers and to which the brand name label 'Bajaj ' is applied are sold by the manufacturers to the buyers at the stipulated price and to none else.
They are not at all sold in the open market by the manufacturers.
The right to sell these goods with the brand name is solely and exclusively that of the buyers having regard to the fact that they alone are the owners of the brand name 'Bajaj '.
The price fetched by the goods manufactured by the petitioner company is the price of the electrical goods 'sans ' the brand name.
And that should be the market value for the purposes of assessing the excise duty payable by the petitioner company which manufactures the excisable goods.
The enhancement in the value of the goods by reasons of the application of the brand name is because of the augmentation attributable to the value of the goodwill of the brand name which does not belong to the manufacturers and which added market value does not accrue to the petitioner company or go into its coffers.
It accrues to the buyers to whom the brand name belongs and to whom to fruits of the goodwill belong.
Excise duty is payable on the market value fetched by the goods, in the wholesale market at the factory gate manufactured by the manufacturers.
It cannot be assessed on the basis of the market value obtained by the buyers who also add to the value of the manufactured goods the value of their own property in the goodwill of the 'brand name ' The Petitioners are therefore right and the respondents wrong.
This point is covered by earlier deci sions of this Court, namely, (1) Union of India vs Cibatul Ltd., , (2) Joint Secretary to the Government of India vs Food specialities Ltd., and (3) Civil Appeal No. 1496 of 1977 disposed of by a Bench of three Judges of this Court by its judgment dated 3rd April, 1986.
The petition must therefore be al lowed.
The respondents shall levy excise duty on the basis of the price charged by the manufacturers to the buyers namely M/s. Bajaj Electricals Ltd. A word of caution is however called for.
Our decision must be understood correct ly not misunderstood conveniently.
We, there 85 fore, clarify that our pronouncement will not enable a manufacturer who manufactures and sells his goods under his own brand name or under a brand name which he has acquired a right to use.
In such a case the sale price fetched by sales effected by him under such brand name in wholesale will be the basis for computation of excise duty payable.
by him So also nothing said herein will come to the rescue of a brand name owner who himself is the manufacturer of goods or to sales effected in favour of 'related ' persons as defined by the Act.
The Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944.
The Bank guarantee, if any, furnished by the petitioners in the context of the present Writ Petition will stand discharged.
No Other point has been argued.
The petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.
There will be no order as to costs.
Writ Petitions Nos.
1686 1691 of 1979 raise the same point in the context of other brand names.
These petitions will also stand disposed of in terms of this order with the same direction regarding computation of levy and discharge of guarantee bonds and with no order as to costs.
M.L.A. Petition al lowed.

Output:
The petitinner company in W.P. No. 1685 of 1979 is manufacturing electrical goods for M/s. Bajaj Electricals Limited, the buyers.
As per agreement the goods are not at all sold .in the open market by the petitioner company.
After the manufactured goods are accepted by the buyers, the petitioner company applies the label of the brand name of the buyers, namely, 'BajaJ ' on the manufactured goods.
The right to sell these goods with the aforesaid brand name is solely and exclusively that of the buyers having regard to the fact that they alone are owners of the brand name.
Counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition con tended that the market value of the goods manufactured by the petitioner should be assessed at the price at which the goods are agreed to be sold under the agreement between the manufacturer and the buyers.
On the other hand, it was argued by counsel in behalf of the respondent Union of India that the excise duty must be levied an the basis of market value fetched by the sale of these goods by the buyers to their wholesalers.
Similar question of law arose in the other writ petitions.
Allowing the writ petitions, this Cart, HELD: 1.1.
Excise duty is payable on the market value ' fetched by the goods, in the wholesale market at the factory gate manufactured by the manufacturers.
It cannot he as sessed on the hams of the market value obtained by the buyers who also add to the value of the manufactured goods the value of their own property in the goodwill of the 'Brand name '.
[84F] 1.2.
Where a manufacturer who manufacture and sells his goods under his own brand name or under a bland name which he has acquired in use, the sale price fetched by sales effected by him under 83 such bland name in wholesale, will be the basis for computa tion of excise duty payable by him.
So also nothing said herein will come to the rescue of a brand name owner who himself is the manufacturer of goods or to sales effected favour of 'related ' persons as defined by the Central Ex cises and Salt Act, 1944.
[85A B] Union of India vs Cibatul Ltd., , Joint Secretary to the Government of India vs Food Speciali ties Ltd., 'and M/s. R.O. Industries vs Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1496 of 1977 decided on 3.4.86, relied upon.
In the instant case, the price fetched by the goods manufactured by the petitioner company is the price Of*the electrical goods sans the brand name.
And that should be the market value for the purposes of assessing the excise duty payable by the petitioner company which manufactures the excisable goods.
The enhancement in the value the goods by reason of the application of the brand name is because of the augmentation attributable to the value of the goodwill of the brand name which does not belong to the manufacturer and which added market value does not accrue to the peti tioner company or go into its coffers.
It accrues to the buyers to whom the brand name belongs and to whom the fruits of the goodwill belong.
[89D E]


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 1487 of 1984.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21st August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc, Writ Petition No. 9820 of 1981 Harbans Singh for the appellant.
Abdul Kader and G.S. Narayanan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J.
This is an appeal by Special Leave directed against an order of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants claiming refund of a sum of Rs. 22681.88 from the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund under Section 6, sub section (1) of the (hereinafter referred to as the Equalisation Fund Act).
The facts of the case are few and may be briefly stated as follows: The appellants carry on business of manufacture of syrups, squashes, jams and jellies, preservation of vegetables and other food products.
One of the essential raw materials for these products manufactured by the appellants is sugar.
There was at the material time Sugar Control Order 1966 issued under section 3 of the , clause 4 of which provided that no purchaser shall sell or agree to sell or otherwise dispose of sugar or deliver or agree to deliver sugar or remove any sugar from the bonded godown of the factory in which it is stored, except under and in 209 accordance with the directions issued in writing by the Central Government or the Chief Director.
Pursuant to this Order the Central Government introduced the policy of partial decontrol of sugar in August, 1967 and under this policy, the Central Government adopted a scheme of acquiring levy sugar from the factory.
The price of levy sugar acquired by the Central Govt.
was fixed every year in accordance with the principles set out in Section 3 (3c) of the and during the period in question the price of levy sugar was determined under the sugar (Price Determination) Order 1972.
This order was however challenged by factories manufacturing sugar and an interim order was passed by the High Court of Allahabad permitting them to charge a price higher than that fixed under the order, on condition that they furnished bank guarantee for the difference in price in favour of the Registrar of the High Court.
Now, different prices were fixed under the sugar (Price Determination) order, 1972 for different zones and so far as the East U.P. Zone was concerned, the price fixed was Rs. 175 per quintal exclusive of excise duty, sales tax etc.
with the result that the price inclusive of these taxes and duties amounted to Rs. 190 per quintal.
The appellants purchased from K.M. Sugar Mills Limited, Motinagar, Faizabad a certain quantity of sugar under a release order issued by the Central Government under the Levy Sugar Supply (Control) order 1972 and they lifted an aggregate quantity of 400 quintals of sugar on 12 8 1972 and 16 8 1972.
Now, under the sugar (Price Determination) order, 1972 K.M. Sugar Mills Limited were not entitled to recover from the appellants price at a rate exceeding Rs. 190 per quintal but by virtue of the stay order granted by the High Court of Allahabad they recovered from the appellants price at the rate of Rs. 234.89 per quintal and the total excess amount charged by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited from the appellants thus came to Rs 22681.88 for which bank guarantee was given by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited in favour of the Registrar of the High Court.
The writ petition filed by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited against the Sugar (Price Determination) Order, 1972 along with other similar writ petitions filed by other manufacturers of sugar was however, ultimately dismissed by the Allahbad High Court in November, 1974 with the result that the Registrar of the High Court became entitled to encash the bank guarantee given by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited and a sun of Rs. 22,681.88 was accordingly recovered by the Registrar under the bank guarantee.
Since the excess amount recovered by the various manufactu 210 rers of sugar, including K.M. Sugar Mills Limited really belonged to the consumers to whom sugar had been sold by these manufacturers, Parliament enacted with effect from 1 4 1976 for the purpose of ensuring that the excess amount so recovered should not remain in the hands of manufacturers of sugar so as to unjustly enrich them but should be paid to the consumers of sugar from whom it had been unlawfully recovered by the manufacturers.
Section 3(1) of the Equalisation Fund Act established a Fund known as the Levy Sugar Price Equlisation Fund.
Sub Section (2) of Section 3 provided that there shall be credited to the Fund amounts representing all excess realisations made by the manufacturers, irrespective of whether such realisations were made before or after the commencement of the Equalisation Fund Act.
Pursuant to this provision, the Registrar of the High Court deposited a sum of Rs. 22681.88 to the Credit of the Fund.
Section 6 of the Equalisation Fund Act then proceeded to enact that where any amount of excess realisation is credited to the Fund, the buyer of Levy sugar from whom such excess realisation was made by the manufacturer shall be entitled to the refund of such excess realisation from the Fund.
This Section is material for the purpose of determination of the controversy arising in the present appeal and we would, therefore, reproduce it as follows: (1) Where any amount is credited to the Fund a refund shall be made from the Fund to the buyer of Levy Sugar from whom any excess realisation was made by the producer or dealer, Provided that no buyer shall be entitled to claim as refund under this sub section if he (a) being the wholesale dealer, had passed on the incidence of such excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar to the retail dealer by whom the price of such sugar was paid or (b) being a retail dealer, had passed on the incidence of such excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar to the consumer by whom the price of such sugar was paid.
" Since a sum of Rs. 22681.88 represented excess realisation 211 made by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited from the appellants and this amount was credited to the Fund by the Registrar of the High Court, the appellants filed an application in form IV making a claim for refund of this amount from the Fund.
This application was filed by the appellants, on 30th April, 1979, admittedly within the prescribed period of six months.
The Central Government, however, rejected the claim made by the appellants on the ground that they had not been able to establish fully and clearly that the incidence of higher sugar price was not passed on by them to the consumers of the end products.
The appellants thereupon preferred a Writ Petition in the High Court but the High Court also rejected the Writ Petition on the same ground, namely, that according to the finding recorded by the Central Government the appellants had not been able to establish fully and clearly that the incidence of higher sugar price was not passed on to the consumers of the end products and since this was a finding of fact base on evaluation of the material and evidence produced by the appellants before the competent authority, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of the Central Government.
The appellants thereupon preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.
The main point of controversy between the parties centres round the true interpretation of section 6 Sub section (1) of the Equalisation Fund Act.
This provision lays down as a condition precedent to its applicability that the excess realisation made by the manufacturer of sugar should have been credited to the Fund.
Now, the application made by the appellants in from IV stated in so many terms that the amount in question had been deposited by the Registrar of the High Court in terms of the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Rules, 1972, through the Chief Pay & Accounts Officer, Govt.
Of India, Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation, Department of Food, New Delhi.
This statement was not at any time disputed on behalf of the Central Government either in the order made by the Central Government rejecting the claim of the appellants or in the proceedings before the High Court.
It is indisputable that a sum of Rs. 22681.88 representing the excess realisation made from the appellants by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited was credited to the Fund by the Registrar of the High Court.
And in any event, this must be 212 presumed to have been done because the Equalisation Fund Act having been enacted for this purpose, the Registrar of the High Court would naturally be expected to carry out his obligation under the statute by depositing the amount of excess realisation recovered by him under the bank guarantee given by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited.
There can, therefore, be no doubt that in terms of Section 6, Sub section (1) the appellants were entitled to claim refund of the sum of Rs. 22681.88 from the Fund.
The only question is whether the proviso to section 6, Sub section (1) precluded the appellants from claiming refund of that amount.
The proviso on its plain terms applied only where the party claiming refund of the amount of excess realisation is a wholesale or a retail dealer who has passed on the incidence of the excess over the controlled price of levy sugar to the retail dealer or to the consumer, as the case may be.
The proviso obviously cannot apply to a case where a claim for refund has been made by a consumer of sugar from whom excess realisation has been made by the manufacturer of sugar.
The appellants were admittedly consumers of sugar and not dealers in sugar and since they were not dealers in sugar, there could be no question of any incidence of excess being passed by them to the retail dealer or to the consumer.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar must have been passed on by the appellants to the consumer when they sold the manufactured products to them, because the higher price paid by them for the sugar purchased from K.M. Sugar Mills Limited must have been taken into account by them in fixing the price of the manufactured products.
This may be so or may not be so.
It is not necessary for us to examine this question because it is irrelevant on the terms of the proviso to Section 6, Sub section (1).
That proviso deals with a situation where a wholesale or retail dealer passes on the incidence of excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar to a retail dealer or consumer, who purchases such sugar.
It contemplates a case where a dealer whether whole sale or retail sells sugar to a retail dealer or consumer as the case may be and not where a person sells a manufactured product containing sugar as one of its ingredients, we have, therefore, no doubt that the proviso to Section 6, Sub section (1) was not attracted in the case of the appellants and, consequently, the appellants were entitled to claim refund of the sum of the Rs. 22681.88 from the sum of Fund.
213 We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and issue a Writ directing the respondent to pay to the appellants a sum of Rs. 22681.88 together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from today until payment.
The respondent will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellants.
H.S.K. Appeal allowed.

Output:
Section 3 (1) of the established a fund known as the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund.
Sub sec.
(2) of section 3 provided that there shall be credited to the Fund amounts representing all excess realisations made by the manufacturers.
Section 6 (1) provided that where any amount of excess realisation was credited to the fund, the buyer of levy sugar from whom such excess realisation as made by the manufacturers shall be entitled to the refund of such excess realisation from the Fund.
There was a proviso to section 6 (1) which inter alia precluded buyers of levy sugar to claim refund of excess realisation in certain cases.
The appellants, who carried on the business of manufacture of syrups, squashes, jams and jellies, preservation of vegetables and other food products and from whom excess realisation was made and credited to the Fund, applied for refund of such realisation.
The Central Government rejected the appellants ' application for refund on the ground that they had not been able to establish fully and clearly that the incidence of higher sugar price was not passed on by them to the consumers of the end products.
The appellants preferred a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court on the same ground.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: The proviso on its plain terms applies only where the party claiming refund of the amount of excess realisation is a wholesale or a retail dealer who has passed on the incidence of the excess over the controlled price of levy sugar to the retail dealer or to the consumer, as the case may be.
The proviso obviously cannot apply to a case where a claim for refund has been made, by a consumer of sugar from whom excess realisation has been made by the manufacturer of sugar.
[106C D] In the instant case the appellants were admittedly consumers of sugar 208 and not dealers in sugar and since they were not dealers in sugar, there could be no question of any incidence of excess being passed on by them to the retail dealer or to the consumer.
[106D] The proviso to section 6 (1) contemplates a case where a dealer whether wholesale or retail sells sugar to a retail dealer or consumer as the case may be and not where a person sells a manufactured product containing sugar as one of its ingredients.
[106G] In the instant case the appellants sold manufactured product containing sugar as one of its ingredient.
Therefore, the proviso to section 6 (1) was not attracted and the appellants were entitled to claim refund of the excess realisation from the Fund.
[106H]


Input:
minal Appeal No. 568 of 1976.
(From the Order dt. 2 4 1975 of the Punjab and Haryana High, Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Original No. 15/Crl.11975).
Mohan Behari Lal for the Appellant.
Hardev Singh, Sunada Bhandare and Mohini for the Respondents Nos.
1 2. 511 section M. Kacker, Sol.
Genl. & R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J.
This is an appeal filed by the alleged contemner under section 19(1) of the (hereinafter called the Act), from the order dated 2nd April, 1975 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana directing the issue of notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for committing con tempt of the High Court.
The Notice was issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 17 of the Act, to show cause against the appellant 's alleged liability to be punished under section 15.
A preliminary objection was raised by the, Learned Solicitor General,, on behalf of the respondents that no appeal lies to this Court under section 19 of the Act from an order issuing notice as nothing yet has been decided by the High Court.
Mr. Mohan Behari Lai, learned counsel for the appellant combated this argument and submitted that an appeal does lie to this Court as a matter of right under section 19.
In our opinion, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the, respondents is well founded and must be accepted as correct.
section 19(1) says .lm15
An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt (a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court : Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
" It would appear from a plain reading of the section that an appeal shall lie to this Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
No appeal can lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceeding for contempt: The proceeding is initiated under section 17 by issuance of a notice.
Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court.
It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court.
The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved.
Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance, of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question.
This Court, 512 for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the; person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High Court or not.
The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be.
even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemner asking the, High Court to drop the, proceeding.
It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the: typo of orders which may be appealable to this Court under section 19.
A final order, surely, will be appealable.
Our attention was drawn by Mr. Mohan Behari Lai, to section 20 of the Act which provides "No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
" He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the High Court will be, without jurisdiction if it is in violation of section 20.
It may be so.
If the alleged contemner in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the.
ground of its being barred under section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the, proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court.
We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermittent stage in the proceeding may be, appealable under section 19.
In our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right tinder section 19.
in a given case special leave may be granted under article 136 of the Constitution from an order initiating the proceeding.
But that is entirely a different matter.
What we are deciding in, this case is that the present appeal filed under section 19 (1) of the Act does not lie and is incompetent.
We find some support to, the view expressed by us above from the decision of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra vs Orissa High Court,(1) where it has been held that no appeal lies to this Court under section 19 of the Act from an order rejecting the prayer of the alleged contemner for bearing the case piecemeal.
Mr. Lai placed reliance on the observations of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra vs Justice Gatikrushna Mishra (2).
What has been decided therein is this : that on a reference made by the Advocate General if the Court declines to take cognisance and to initiate proceeding for contempt, the order is not an order initiating contempt proceeding.
Surely, it is not appealable under section 19.
But there are no observations by this Court nor on the facts of that case there can be any,.
to show that an appeal would lie to, this Court from an order of the High Court merely initiating the proceeding by issuance of a notice.
We, may repeat that it may be, a different matter if the order does decide (1) A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1206.
(2) ; (at pp.
531 32).
513 some disputes raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the proceeding on one ground or the other.
But unless and until there is some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it by the parties, affecting their right, the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed as being not maintainable.
P H. P. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The High Court passed an order directing issue of notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt .of the High Court.
The notice was issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 17 of the .
The appellant filed an appeal against the said order under section 19(1) of the Act in this Court.
The counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that no appeal under section 19(1) is maintainable against the order in question.
Dismissing the appeal the Court, HELD : (1) An appeal lies to this Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a Bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
However, an appeal cannot lie from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceeding for contempt.
The proceeding is initiated under section 17 by issuance of a notice.
Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court.
It could not be the intention of the Legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court.
The order or the decision must be such that.
it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved.
Mere initiation of a proceeding does not decide any question.
[511 F H] 2.
if the alleged contemner in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceedings on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceedings is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under section 19 It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable under section 19.
[512 B C] Baradakanta Mishra vs Orissa, High Court, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1206, relied on.
Baradakanta Mishra vs Justice Gatikrushna Mishra ; , 53132, distinguished.