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Civil Appeal No. 663 of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dt.
9.3.77 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 84/77.
Dr. Anand Prakash, V.B. Saharaya and Miss A. Subhashini, for P the Appellants H. section Parihar, for the Respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by MADON,J.
This Appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court is preferred against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the Respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and quashing a show cause notice dated November 12,1976 issued by the First Appellant, the Chief of the Army Staff, under Rule 14 of the Army Rules.
418 The facts which have given rise to this Appeal lie in a narrow compass.
The Respondent is a permanent commissioned officer of the Indian Army holding the substantive rank of Captain and the acting rank of Major.
In November 1975, he was posted in the Army School of Mechanical Transport, Faizabad.
As a result of certain incidents which are alleged to have taken place on November 6 and 7, 1975, the Respondent was tried by a general court martial on four charges.
It is unnecessary to reproduce the charges made against the Respondent.
The charge sheet was dated January 20, 1976, and was issued by the Commandant, Ordinance Depot, Fort Allahabad.
On January 24, 1976, the Respondent was ordered to be tried by a general court martial.
The Respondent pleaded not guilty and his trial took place at Lucknow before a general court martial consisting of one Brigadier, two Majors and two Captains Both the prosecution and the Respondent led evidence.
On March 13, 1976, the court martial announced its finding subject to confirmation, the finding being "Not guilty of all the charges".
The General Officer, Commanding Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa Area, the Third Appellant, who was the confirming authority, did not confirm the verdict and by his order dated April 3, 1976, sent back the finding for revision.
The same general court martial, therefore, re assembled on April 14, 1976, and after hearing both sides and taking into consideration the observations made by the Third Appellant in his said order dated April 3, 1976, adhered to its original view and once again announced the finding that the Respondent was ' Not guilty of all the charges".
The said finding was also expressly announced as being subject to confirmation.
The Third Appellant reserved confirmation of the finding on revision by a superior authority, namely, the General Officer, Commanding in Chief, Central Command, Lucknow, the Second Appellant, and forwarded the papers to him.
By his order dated May 25, 1976, the Second Appellant did not confirm the finding on revision of the general court martial.
The charges made against The Respondent, the finding and the non confirmation thereof were promulgated as required by Rule 71 of the Army Rules.
Thereafter the Chief of the Army Staff under Rule 14 of the Army Rules issued the impugned show cause notice dated November 12, 1976.
It was stated in the said notice that the Chief of the Army Staff had carefully considered the facts of the case as also the Respondent 's defence at the trial and being satisfied that a fresh trial by a court martial for the said offences was inexpedient, he 419 was of the opinion that the Respondent 's misconduct as disclosed in the proceedings rendered his further retention in the service undesirable.
The Respondent was called upon by the said notice to submit his explanation and defence, if any, within twenty five days of the receipt of the said notice.
Along with the said notice copies of abstracts of evidence and the court martial proceedings were forwarded to the Respondent.
The Respondent thereupon filed in the High Court of Allahabad a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 84 of 1976, which, as aforesaid, was allowed.
It was the contention of the Respondent in his writ petition that under the (Act No. 46 of 1950), and the Army rules there was an initial option either to have the concerned officer tried by a court martial or to take action against him under Rule 14 and that in his case the option having been exercised to try him by a court martial, the Chief of the Army Staff was not competent to have recourse to Rule 14 after the Respondent was acquitted both at the time of the original trial and on revision.
This contention found favour with the High Court.
The High Court held that as the Respondent had in fact been tried by a court martial which both at the time of the original trial and on revision had returned a verdict of 'not guilty, it could not be said that it was inexpedient to try the Respondent by a court martial and, therefore, the impugned notice under Rule 14 was issued without any jurisdiction.
At the hearing of the said writ petition a preliminary objection was raised by the Appellants that the said writ petition was not maintainable as being premature.
The High Court held that as the impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction, it would be exposing the Respondent to jeopardy to require him to submit his reply to the said notice and to wait until his services were terminated.
The same contentions, as were raised before the High Court, were taken before us at the hearing of this Appeal.
We will first deal with the Appellants ' preliminary objection that the Respondent 's writ petition was not maintainable as being premature.
It was the Respondent 's case that the Chief of the Army Staff had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice after he had been again found not guilty by the court martial on revision.
The said notice expressly stated that the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the Respondent 's misconduct as disclosed in the proceedings rendered his further retention in service undesir 420 able and asked him to submit his explanation and defence, if any, to the charges made against him.
If the Respondent 's contention with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the said notice were correct, the Respondent was certainly exposed to the jeopardy of having his explanation and defence rejected and he being removed or dismissed from services.
Were the said notice issued without jurisdiction, the Respondent would have then suffered a grave, prejudicial injury by an act which was without jurisdiction.
Where the threat of a prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction, a person cannot be asked to wait for the injury to be caused to him before seeking the Court 's protection.
If, on the other hand, the Chief of the Army Staff had the power in law to issue the said notice, it would not be open to the Respondent to approach the court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage of notice only and in such an event his writ petition could be said to be premature.
This was, however, not a contention which could have been decided at the threshold until the court had come to a finding with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the impugned notice.
Having held that the impugned notice was issued without any jurisdiction, the High Court was right in further holding that the Respondent 's writ petition was not premature and was maintainable.
Before considering the rival contentions with respect to the validity of the impugned notice, we may mention that a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court has held in the case of Capt.
Kashmir Singh Shergill vs The Union of India and another (1) that the Chief of the Army Staff was competent to issue a show cause notice under Rule 14 even though the court martial had affirmed its verdict on revision.
The answer to the question whether the Chief of the Army Staff was competent to issue the impugned notice depends upon the relevant provisions of the and the Army Rules to which we now turn.
Chapter IV of the , which consists of Section 18 to 24, deals with the conditions of service of persons appointed under (1) Civil Writ No. 553 of 1974 decided on November 6, 1974 by Prakash Narain, J. 421 the Act.
Section 18 provides that every person subject to the Army .
Act shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
Section 19 provides that subject to the provisions of the and the rules and regulations made thereunder, the Central Government may dismiss, or remove from the service, any person subject to the .
Section 22 provides that any person subject to the may be retired, released or discharged from the service by such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under the Act.
Section 191 confers ' upon the Central Government the power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the .
Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954, provides as follows: "14.
Termination of service by the Central Government on account of misconduct (1) When it is proposed to terminate the service of an officer under Section 19 on account of misconduct, he shall be given an opportunity to show cause in the manner specified in sub rule (2) against such action: Provided that this sub rule shall not apply: (a) where the service is terminated on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction by a criminal court; or (b) where the Central Government is satisfied that for reasons to be recorded in writing, it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to give to the officer an ' opportunity of showing cause.
(2) When after considering the reports of an officer 's misconduct, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff is satisfied that the trial of the officer by court martial is inexpedient or impracticable, but is of the opinion that the further ' retention of the said officer in the service is undesirable the Chief of the Army Staff shall so inform the officer together with all reports adverse to him and he shall be called upon to submit, in writing, his explanation and defence: Provided that the Chief of the Army Staff may withhold from 422 disclosure any such report or portion thereof, in his opinion, its disclosure is not in the interest of the security of the State.
In the event of the explanation of the officer being considered unsatisfactory by the Chief the Army Staff, or when so directed by the Central Government, the case shall be submitted to the Central Government with the officer 's defence and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staffs to the termination of the officer 's service in the manner specified in sub rule (4).
(3) Where, upon the conviction of an officer by a criminal court, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army staff considers that the conduct of the officer which has led to his conviction renders his further retention in service undesirable, a certified copy of the judgment of the criminal court convicting him shall be submitted to the Central Government with the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff as to the termination of the officer 's n service in the manner specified in sub rule (4).
(4) When submitting a case to the Central Government under the provisions of sub rule (2) or sub rule (3), the Chief of the Army Staff shall make his recommendation whether the officer 's service should be terminated, and if so, whether the officer should be (a) dismissed from the service; or (b) removed from the service; or (c) called upon to retire; or (d) called upon to resign.
(5) The Central Government after considering the reports and the officer 's defence, if any, or the judgment of the criminal court, as the case may be, and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff, may dismiss or remove the officer with or with out pension or call upon him to retire or resign, and on his refusing to do so, the officer may be compulsorily retired or removed from the service on pension or gratuity, if any, admissible to him.
" 423 We are not concerned in this Appeal with a case where an officer has been convicted by a criminal court or with a case where the Central Government is satisfied that it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to give to the officer an opportunity of showing cause.
A show cause notice was in fact issued to the Respondent by the Chief of the Army Staff.
Under sub rule (2) of Rule 14, the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Central B, Government or the Chief of the Army Staff to issue a show cause notice is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff after considering the reports of an officer 's misconduct that the trial OF the officer by a court martial is inexpedient or impracticable and the opinion formed that the further retention of the officer in the service is undesirable.
The contention before us was that in the circumstances of this case it cannot be said that the trial of the Respondent by a court martial was inexpedient or impracticable as in fact the Respondent had been tried by a court martial.
It was also submitted that on a true construction of Rule 14, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff has an initial option to have the officer tried by a court martial or to take action against him under Rule 14 and if it were decided that he should be tried by a court martial, then action under Rule 14 was not permissible in case of his acquittal by the court martial.
To test the correctness of these submissions, we must examine the provisions of the relating to court martial.
Section 108 provides for four kinds of courts martial, namely.
(1) general courts martial; (2) district courts martial; (3) summary general courts martial; and (4) summary courts martial.
As the Respondent was tried by a general court martial, we are not concerned here with any other type of courts martial, Under section 109, a general court martial may be convened by the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff or by any officer empowered in that behalf by warrant of the Chief of the Army Staff.
Section 113 provides that a general court martial shall consist of 424 not less than five officers, each of whom has held a commission for not less than three whole years and of whom not less than four are of a rank not below that of captain.
Section 117 provides for cases in which a court martial can be dissolved.
These cases are: (1) Where after the commencement of a trial the court martial is reduced below the minimum number of officers required by the .
In such a case the dissolution of the court martial is mandatory.
(2) If, on account of the illness of the judge advocate or of the accused before the finding, it is impossible to continue the trial.
In this case also the dissolution of the court martial is mandatory.
(3) If it appears to the officer who convened a court martial that military exigencies or the necessities of discipline render it impossible or inexpedient to continue the court martial.
In this case, the dissolution of the court martial is discretionary.
Sub section (4) of section 117 expressly provides that where a court martial is dissolved, the accused may be tried again.
Section 118 ' confers upon a general court martial the power to try any person subject to the for any offence punishable thereunder and to pass any sentence authorized thereby.
Section 121 provides as follows: "121.
Prohibition of second trial.
When any person subject to this Act has been acquitted or convicted of an offence by a court martial or by a criminal court, or has been dealt with under any of the sections 80, 83, 84 and 85, he shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence by a court martial or dealt with under the said sections.
" The Respondent was neither tried by a criminal court nor dealt with under any of the sections 80, 83, 84 and 85, most of which do not apply to an officer of his rank He was, however, tried by a general court martial which found him not guilty of any of the charges made against him.
Under section 125, where a criminal 425 court and a court martial both have jurisdiction in respect of an offence, it is in the discretion of the officer commanding the army, army crops, division or independent brigade in which the accused person is serving or such other officer as may be prescribed by the Army Rules to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted.
Under section 127, a person convicted or acquitted by a court martial may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, be tried again by a criminal court for the same offence or on the same facts.
There is, however, no provision for the trial by a court martial for the same offence or on the same facts where a person has been convicted or acquitted by a criminal court.
Sections 153, 154 and 160(1) provide as follows: "153.
Finding and sentence not valid, unless confirmed.
No finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general, court martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by this Act.
Power to confirm finding and sentence of general court martial.
The findings and sentences of general courts martial may be confirmed by the Central Government, or by any officer empowered in this behalf by warrant of the Central Government.
Revision of finding or sentence, (1) Any finding or sentence of a court martial which requires confirmation may be once revised by order of the confirming authority and on such revision, the court, if so directed by the Confirming authority, may take additional evidence.
In this connection it will also be relevant to set out the provisions of Rules 68, 69, 70 and 11 of the Army Rules.
These Rules provide as follows: `68.
Revision.
(1) Where the finding is sent back for revision under section 160, the Court shall reassemble in open court, 426 the revision order shall be read, and if the court is directed to take fresh evidence, such evidence shall also be taken in open court.
The court shall then deliberate on its finding in closed court.
(2) Where the finding is sent back for revision and the court does not adhere to its former finding, it shall revoke the finding and sentence, and record the new finding, and if such new finding involves a sentence, pass sentence afresh.
(3) Where the sentence alone is sent back for revision, the court shall not revise the finding.
(4) After the revision, the presiding officer shall date and y sign the decision of the court, and the proceedings, upon being signed by the judge advocate, if any, shall at once be transmitted for confirmation.
Review of court martial proceedings.
The proceedings of a general court martial shall be submitted by the judge advocate at the trial for review to the deputy or assistant judge advocate general of the command who shall then forward it to the confirming officer.
The proceedings of a district court martial shall be sent by the presiding officer or the judge advocate direct to the confirming officer who must, in all cases.
where the sentence is dismissal or above, seek advice of the deputy or assistant judge advocate general of the command before confirmation." "70.
Confirmation Upon receiving the proceedings of a general or district court martial, the confirming authority may confirm or refuse confirmation, or reserve confirmation for superior authority, and the confirmation, non confirmation, or reservation shall be entered in and form part of the proceedings.
" "71.
Promulgation The charge, finding, and sentence, and any recommendation to mercy shall, together with the confirmation or non confirmation of the proceedings, be 427 promulgated in such manner as the confirming authority may direct; and if no direction is given, according to the custom of the service.
Until promulgation has been effected, confirmation is not complete and the finding and sentence shall not be held to have been confirmed until they have been promulgated.
" It is pertinent to note that under Section 160 the confirming authority has the power to direct a revision of the finding of a court martial only once.
There is no power in the confirming authority, if it does not agree with the finding on revision, to direct a second revision of such finding.
In the absence of any such confirmation, whether of the original finding or of the finding on revision, by reason of the provisions of section l 53 the finding is not valid.
Therefore, in the case of the Respondent, the finding of the general court martial on revision not having been confirmed was not valid.
Could he, therefore, be tried again by another court martial on the same charges ? Under Section 121, a person subject to the , who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence by a court martial or by a criminal Court, is not liable to be tried again for the same offence by a court martial.
It can well be argued that by reason of the provisions of section 153 under which no finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general court martial is valid except in so far as it is confirmed as provided by the a person cannot be said to have been acquitted or convicted by a court martial until the finding of "guilty" or "not guilty" in his case has been confirmed by the confirming authority.
There is, however, no express provision in the which empowers the holding of a fresh court martial when the finding of a court martial on revision is not confirmed.
The decisions of three High Courts may be referred to in this connection.
The first decision is that of Allahabad High Court in G.B. Singh vs Union of India and Others.
(1) That was a case under the (Act No. 45 of 1950).
In that case, the officer was found guilty by a general court martial and sentenced ,.
to be dismissed from service.
The finding and sentence was referred to the confirming authority.
The confirming authority passed an order reserving the same for confirmation by superior authority and forwarded the proceedings to the Chief Of the Air Staff.
The (1) 428 Chief of the Air staff passed an order not confirming the finding or sentence awarded by the court martial.
The finding and sentence which were not confirmed by the Chief of Air Staff were promulgated after the lapse of about ten months.
A fresh general court martial was convened to retry the office.
On enquiry the officer was informed that the findings and sentence of the general court martial had not been confirmed as it was found that the proceedings were not in order and, therefore, there was no valid order convicting or acquitting the officer.
After considering the relevant provisions of the and the Air Force Rules, 1969, which are in pari materia with the corresponding provisions of the and the Army Rules, a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the effect of non confirmation was that though the finding and sentence passed by the court martial existed, they could not be put into effect unless they had been confirmed under the provisions of the , and that in such a case section 120 of the (which is in pari materia with section 121 of the ) barred a second trial by a court martial.
In Major Manohar Lal vs The Union of India and Anr.
(1) the petitioner was tried by a general court martial which found him not guilty.
The General Officer Commanding in Chief held the proceedings to be null and void on the ground that one of the members of the court martial was of the rank of Captain and was thus lower in the rank to the petitioner and no certificate had been recorded by the officer convening the court martial as required by Rule 40(2) of the Army Rules, that an officer of the rank of the petitioner was not available and he, therefore, ordered a retrial.
A learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that under the and the Army Rules, a Captain was eligible to be made a member of a general court martial and the mere fact that the convening officer did not append the certificate that an officer of the rank of the petitioner was not available did not make the constitution of the general court martial invalid or the finding given by it to be without jurisdiction or the proceedings of the trial before it to be null and void.
He further held that as the petitioner had no say in the constitution of the general court martial and had suffered the trial before it, the proceedings could not have been declared null and void on a highly technical ground.
The learned Single Judge, therefore.
came to the conclusion that the second trial of the petitioner (1) 1971(1) S.L.R. 717.
429 was without jurisdiction and the sentence imposed upon him in consequence of that trial was wholly illegal.
In J.C. 13018 Subedar Surat Singh vs The Chief Engineer Projects (Beacon).
Co. 56 A.P.O. (1).A Division Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that though every finding of a general court martial, whether of acquittal or of guilt, cannot be recorded as valid unless it is confirmed by the competent authority, the Legislature could not have reasonably intended that an officer convening a general court martial can go on dissolving such court martials and reconstituting them ad infinitum until he obtained a verdict or a finding of his own liking.
The Division Bench further held that such a position would not only be against public policy and the ancient maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa" (no man ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause) but would also reduce the provisions of the to a mockery and give an appearance of mala fides.
According to the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in such a case the proper course for the confirming authority would be to refer the case to its superior authority for confirmation.
This being the position, what then is the course open to the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff when the finding of a court martial even on revision is perverse or against the weight of evidence on record? The High Court in its judgment under appeal has also held that in such a case a fresh trial by another court martial is not permissible.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff can have resort to Rule 14 of the Army Rules.
Though it is open to the Central Government of the Chief of the Army Staff to have recourse to that Rule in the first instance without directing trial by a court martial of the concerned officer, there is no provision in the or in Rule l 4 or any of the other rules of the Army Rules which prohibits the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff from resorting in such a case to Rule 14.
Can it, however, be said that in such a case a trial by a court martial is inexpedient or impracticable? The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, defines the word "inexpedient" as meaning "not expedient; disadvantageous in the circumstances, unadvisable, impolitic".
The same dictionary defines "expedient ' inter alia as meaning "advantageous; fit, proper, or suitable to the circumstances o the case".
Webster 's Third New International Dictionary also (1) A.I.R. 1970 J. & K, 179.
430 defines the term "expedient" inter alia as meaning "characterized by suitability, practicality, and efficiency in achieving a particular end: fit, proper, or advantageous under the circumstances".
In the present case, the Chief of the Army Staff.
had, on the one hand, the finding of a general court martial which had not been confirmed and the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the further retention of the Respondent in the service was undesirable and, on the other hand, there were the above three High Court decisions and the point was not concluded by a definitive pronouncement of this Court.
In such circumstances, to order a fresh trial by a court martial could certainly be said to be both inexpedient and impracticable and the only expedient and practicable course, therefore, open to the Chief of the Army Staff would be to take action against the Respondent under Rule 14, which he did.
The action of the Chief of the Army Staff in issuing the impugned notice was, therefore, neither without jurisdiction nor unwarraned in law.
In the result, this Appeal must succeed and is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the Division Beach of the Allahabad High Court under Appeal is reversed and the order passed by it is set aside.
The writ petition filed by the Respondent in the Allahabad High Court, namely, Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 84 of 1977, is hereby dismissed.
Before parting with this Appeal, we would like to observe that the alleged incidents in respect of which the Respondent was tried before the general court martial took place nearly ten years ago.
We, therefore, feel that the Chief of the Army Staff should take into account the conduct and behaviour of the Respondent during the intervening period and if they have been in conformity with good order and military discipline and the high traditions of the Indian Army, he may consider the desirability of proceeding further in the matter.
In the circumstances of the Case, there Will be no order as to costs throughout.

Output:
The respondent, a permanent commissioned officer of the Indian Army holding the substantive rank of captain and the acting rank of major, as a result of certain incidents which are alleged to have taken place on November 5 and 6, 1975 was ordered to be tried by a general court martial.
On March 13, 1976, the court martial announced its finding subject to confirmation, the finding being "Not guilty of all the charges.
" The General Officer Commanding, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa Area, the third appellant, who was the confirming authority, did not confirm the verdict and by his order dated April 3, 1976, sent back the finding for revision.
The same general court martial, therefore, reassembled on April 14, 1976, and after hearing both sides and taking into consideration the observations made by the third appellant in his said order dated April 3, 1976, adhered to its original view and once again announced the finding subject to confirmation, that the respondent was "Not guilty of all the charges".
The third appellant reserved confirmation of the finding on revision by a superior authority, namely, the General Officer, Commanding in Chief, Central Command, Lucknow, the second appellant, and forwarded the papers to him.
By his order dated May 25, 1976, the second appellant did not confirm the finding on revision of the general court martial.
The charges made against the respondent, the finding and the nonconfirmation thereof were promulgated as required by Rule 71 of the Army Rules.
Thereafter, the Chief of the Army Staff under Rule 14 of the Army Rules 1954 issued the impugned show cause notice dated November 12, 1976 stating that the Chief of the Army Staff had carefully considered the facts of the case as also the respondent 's defence at the trial and being satisfied that a 416 fresh trial by a court martial for the said offences was inexpedient, he was of the opinion that the respondent 's misconduct as disclosed in the proceedings rendered his further retention in the service undesirable.
and called upon the respondent to submit his explanation and defence, if any, within twenty five days of the receipt of the said notice.
Along with the said notice copies of abstracts of evidence and the court martial proceedings were forwarded to the respondent.
The respondent, thereupon, filed in the High Court of Allahabad a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 84 of 1976, which was allowed by a Division Bench of the said High Court.
Hence the appeal by special leave Allowing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD: 1.
Where the threat of a prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction, a person cannot be asked to wait for the injury to be caused to him before seeking the Court 's protection.
If, on the other hand, the Chief of the Army Staff had the power in law to issue the said notice, it would not be open to the respondent to approach the court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage of notice only and in such an event his writ petition could be said to be premature.
This was, however, not a contention which could have been decided at the threshold until the court had come to a finding with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the impugned notice.
Having held that the impugned notice was issued without any jurisdiction, the High Court was right in further holding that the respondent 's writ petition was not premature and was maintainable.
[420C E] 2.
Whether the Chief of the Army Staff was competent to issue the impugned notice of show cause depends upon the relevant provisions of the and the Army Rules 1954.
Under Section 153 of the , no finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general, court martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the .
Under Section ]60 of the , the confirming authority has the power to direct a revision of the finding of a court martial only once.
There is no power in the confirming authority, if it does not agree with the finding on revision, to direct a second revision of such finding.
In the absence of any such confirmation, whether of the original finding or of the finding on revision, by reason of the provisions of Section 153 the finding is not valid.
Therefore, in the case of the respondent, the finding of the general court martial on revision not having been confirmed was not valid.
Equally, there is however, no express provision in the which empowers the holding of a fresh court martial when the finding of a court martial on revision is not confirmed.
[427C F] 3.
Though it is open to the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff to have recourse to Rule 14 of the first instance without directing trial by a court martial of the concerned officer, there is no provision in the or in Rule 14 or any of the other Rules of the Army Rules which 417 prohibits the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff from resorting in such a case to Rule 14.
[429F G] In the present case, the Chief of the Army Staff had, on the one hand, the finding of a general court martial which had not been confirmed and the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the further retention of the respondent in the service was undesirable and, on the other hand, there were three difference conflicting decisions of different High Courts on this point which point was not concluded by a definitive pronouncement of this Court.
In such circumstances, to order a fresh trial by a court martial could certainly be said to be both inexpedient and impracticable and the only expedient and practicable course, therefore, open to the Chief of the Army Staff would be to take action against the respondent under Rule 14, which he did.
The action of the Chief of the Army Staff in issuing the impugned notice was, therefore, neither without jurisdiction nor unwarranted in law.
[430B D] Capt.
Kashmir Singh Shergill vs The Union of India & Another, Civil Writ No. 553 of 1974 decided on November 6, 1974 by Prakash Narain, J., approved.
G.B. Singh vs Union of India and Others, [1973] Crl.
L.J. 485; Major Manohar Lal vs The Union of India and Anr.
, ; J.C. 13018 Subedar Surat Singh vs The Chief Engineer Projects (Beacon) C/o.56 A.P.O. AIR 1970 J. & K 179 referred to.


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Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11493 of 1989 From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1989 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 3762 of 1989.
Mrs. Indira Jaisingh, Tripurari Ray and M.N. Shroff for the Petitioner.
V.N. Ganpule and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
This Special Leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dis missing summarily Writ Petition No. 3762 of 1989 filed by the petitioner.
The petitioner passed the Higher Secondary Certificate (hereinafter referred to as "the H.S.C.") examination held in March 1989, and sought admission to a medical college in Bombay conducted by the Government or one of the Municipal Medical Colleges in the city of 3 Bombay on the footing that she belonged to the Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli.
In support of her claim she tendered certain caste certificates.
Her application was referred, in accordance with the relevant rules to the Scrutiny Commit tee.
which is an expert body for determination of caste claims, for verifying her claim to belong to the aforesaid Scheduled Tribe.
In support of her claim, the petitioner submitted several caste certificates obtained by her.
At the hearing before the Scrutiny Committee the petitioner also furnished the Secondary School Leaving Certificate of her father.
Her father was requested to furnish his Primary School Leaving Certificate or birth certificate in order to ascertain the correct caste of the petitioner but he failed to produce the same.
The Committee, therefore, conducted the necessary inquiries at the Municipal Primary School, Worli, Koliwada, Bombay where the petitioner 's father had taken his primary education.
That school by its letter dated April 29, 1989, disclosed entries made in register of the said school showing inter alia, that the caste of the petitioner 's father was recorded as "Son Koli".
These entries were made in 1945 when there was no special advantage which the Sched uled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli enjoyed over the members of the caste of Son Koli.
It was pointed out by the Committee that these entries are entitled to a very great probative value as they have been made at a time when no question of making any manipulation arose.
The certificates relied upon by the petitioner have been rejected by the Scrutiny Committee primarily because these certificates were inconsistent with the entries in the said Register of the Primary School relating to the petitioner 's father to which the Committee attached great probative value.
The reasons given by the Scrutiny Committee for the rejection cannot be said to be irrelevant or perverse.
There is no complaint that the rules of fairplay have not been observed by the scrutiny Commit tee.
It rejected the claim of the petitioner that she be longed to the Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli.
This decision was upheld by the Additional Commissioner for Tribal Devel opment, State of Maharashtra in an appeal preferred by the petitioner.
Against the decision the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court challenging the aforesaid decision and that writ petition was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of that High Court.
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner who has strongly urged that the High Court was in error in rejecting the writ petition summarily as it is done.
We find, however, that it has not been shown how the decision of the Scrutiny Committee or the Appellate decision of the Commissioner for Tribal Welfare discloses any error calling for any interfer ence in a writ petition.
The entire controversy 4 has to be appreciated in the light of the admitted fact that Mahadeo Koli is a Scheduled Tribe whereas Son Koli is a caste.
We cannot find fault with the Scrutiny Committee for placing great reliance on the entries in the register of the primary school where the petitioner 's father took his pri mary education, as at the time when these entries were made there was no reason why he should have made a wrong state ment about the caste or tribe to which he belonged.
It was sought to be contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that Scrutiny Committee has proceeded on an entirely erroneous basis as the real claim of the petitioner is that Son Kolis are a section of the Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli.
We find, however, that this contention has nowhere been raised before the Scrutiny Committee or before the Commissioner of Tribal Welfare although it does appear to have been raised in the writ petition.
It was not open to the petitioner to raise this contention for the first time in the writ petition.
Learned counsel drew our attention to the list of the Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra appearing in Para 9 of the .
Entry 29 shows that "Koli Mahadeo" is a Scheduled Tribe recognised in Maharash tra.
In the list of Backward Classes issued by the State of Maharashtra we find that Kolis are recognised as belonging to "other backward classes".
Son Kolis are shown as belong ing to other backward classes in the list of other backward classes issued by the State of Maharashtra.
These documents, however, nowhere support the claim that Son Kolis are a section of Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli.
Learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to a publication entitled "Transactions of the Bombay Geograph ical Society from 1836 to 1838" which has been printed in 1844.
In this publication, Kolis are described as a tribe but a perusal of the relevant observations show that no distinction has been drawn in this publication between castes and tribes, and hence, the statements made in the said publication do not lend any support to the claim of the petitioner.
In the result, there is no merit in the special leave petition and it is dismissed.
No orders as to costs.
N.P.V. Petition dismissed.

Output:
The petitioner sought admission to a medical college in the State of Maharashtra on the footing that she belonged to the Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli and submitted several caste certificates, including her father 's Secondary School Leaving Certificate.
The Scrutiny Committee, the expert body for determining such claims, rejected her claim on the basis of entries made in 1945 in the register of the Municipal Primary School, where her father had his primary education, which showed that the caste of the petitioner 's father was recorded as 'Son Koli '.
This decision was upheld by the Additional Commissioner for Tribal Development.
The High Court summarily dismissed the petitioner 's writ petition.
In the Special Leave Petition before this Court, on behalf of the petitioner it was contended that the High Court was in error in rejecting the Writ Petition summarily and that the Scrutiny Committee had proceeded on an entirely erroneous basis as the real basis of the petitioner 's claim was that Son Kolis were a section of the Schedule Tribe of Mahadeo Koli.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, this Court, HELD: Entry 29 of the list of Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra, appearing in Para 9 of the shows that 'Koli Mahadeo ' is a Scheduled Tribe recognised in Maharashtra.
In the list of Backward Classes issued by the State, Kolis are recognised as belonging to "other backward classes".
Son Kolis are shown as belonging to other backward classes in the list of other backward classes.
These docu ments nowhere support the claim that Son Kolis are a section of Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli.
Though Kolis are de scribed as a tribe in the publication entitled "Transactions of the Bombay Geog 2 raphical Society from 1836 to 1838", a perusal of the rele vant observations shows that no distinction has been drawn in the said publication between castes and tribes.
[2D F] Admittedly, Mahadeo Koli is a Scheduled Tribe whereas Son Koli is a caste.
The Scrutiny Committee cannot be fault ed for placing great reliance on the entries in the register of the primary school where the petitioner 's father took his primary education, as at the time when these entries were made there was no reason why he should have made a wrong statement about the caste or tribe to which he belonged.
These entries were made in 1945, when there was no special advantage which the Scheduled Tribe of Mahadeo Koli enjoyed over the members of the caste of Son Koli.
The certificates relied upon by the petitioner have been rejected by the Scrutiny Committee primarily because these certificates were inconsistent with the entries in the said register of the Primary School relating to the petitioner 's father to which the Committee attached great probative value, as it was of the view that they were made at a time when no question of making any manipulation arose.
The reasons given by the Scrutiny Committee for the rejection cannot be said to be irrelevant or perverse.
There is no complaint that the rules of fair play have not been observed by the Scrutiny Commit tee.
[4A E]


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 2216 (N) of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.3.1970 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 1960.
S.K. Jain for the Appellants.
Miss Maya Rao for the Respondents.
(Not present) 647 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J.
The present appeal on certificate raises two questions, namely (1) Whether the parties by mutual consent had agreed to appoint D.N. Gupta, Superintending Engineer and Town Planning Officer, Jaipur to ascertain the value of the disputed land as an appraiser or valuer and therefore the appraisement or valuation thereof by him in his Report (Exh.5) dated February 21, 1956 at Rs. 35,826.50p.
should be treated as an admission under s.20 of the Evidence Act, 1872, on the basis of which the plaintiff 's claim for damages had to be decreed, and (2) Whether the plaintiff being deprived of property was, on general principles, entitled to payment of interest on the amount payable to him as the value of the property taken by the State Government.
The facts bearing on the questions are briefly stated.
In accordance with the terms of the registered deed of exchange executed by the parties on July 16, 1951, the appellant withdrew a suit for specific performance of an alleged contract against the State Government being Civil Suit No. 120/50 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jaipur City whereunder the State Government agreed to give in exchange plot No. O/17 located in Scheme on resumption of his plot bearing No. C/91 in the same scheme and handed over possession to the State Government on the aforesaid plot No. C/91, but the State Government on their part did not give possession of the exchanged plot to him, in consequence whereof the appellant instituted a suit for possession of the exchanged plot and for mesne profits thereof against the State Government being Civil Suit No. 270/51 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jaipur City.
The State Government in their written statement pleaded inter alia that the suit was not maintainable since the plot which was to be given in exchange to the appellant did not belong to them, but did not disclose as to whom the said plot belonged.
The appellant therefore served interrogatories on the State Government.
In reply to the said interrogatories it was revealed in the affidavit filed by the State Government that the exchanged plot had been transferred to Thakur Harisingh of Achrol under the orders of the Home Minister, Government of India dated January 8, 1945 and that plot No. C/91 which belonged to the appellant was then in possession of the Raj Pramukh Maharaja Mansinghji of Jaipur.
The appellant accordingly impleaded Thakur Harising of Achrol as a defendant in the suit and sought 648 permission from the Central Government under s.86 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to join Maharaja Mansingji of Jaipur as a party to the suit.
Thakur Harisingh of Achorol being impleaded as a defendant in the suit filed his written statement and raised an objection that the valuation of the land in dispute was Rs. 40,000 and the Court of Civil Judge, Jaipur City had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
That objection of his was sustained and the learned Civil Judge by his order dated October 15, 1955 returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court.
It transpires that the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India addressed a letter dated January 3, 1956 to the late Shri Mohan Lal Sukhadia, the then Chief Minister of Rajasthan conveying that it was felt that the appellant had a case and should be given the exchanged plot and if that was not feasible, he should be restored to his original position and therefore could claim back possession of plot No. C/91.
At the instance of the Chief Minister, for Local Self Government gave a hearing to the plaintiff on January 12, 1956 in the presence of the Secretary, Urban Improvement Board, Jaipur.
On February 3, 1956, the Chief Minister addressed a letter to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, conveying the anxiety of the State Government to settle the claim of the appellant and intimated that the appellant had agreed to the appointment of D.N. Gupta, Town Planning Officer as the assessor who had been asked to assess the value of the land and submit his report by February 20, 1956.
He therefore requested the Government of India to defer its decision in fairness to the State Government for a couple of months as it was felt that it might be possible to settle the matter without any unreasonable delay.
The aforesaid assessor D.N. Gupta by his report (Exh. 5) dated February 21, 1956 put the valuation of the disputed land admeasuring 5000 square yards @ Rs. 7 per square yard amounting to Rs. 35,000 and to this he added Rs. 826.50p.
as the cost of construction of a boundary wall i.e. Rs. 35,826,50p.
in all.
There ensued a correspondence between the State Government and the appellant as regards the payment of compensation.
It was felt by the State Government that the assessor had wrongly taken into consideration parta rates or the Municipal Committee, Jaipur which could not form any legal basis for assessing the value of the disputed land which admittedly was situated outside the walled city of Jaipur, nor could he have taken into consideration the rates for the sale of 649 plots of commercial site at a distance from the disputed land.
The State Government accordingly declined to pay Rs. 35,826.50p.
The suit out of which the present appeal arises was instituted by the appellant on February 4, 1957, as plaintiff, for recovery of Rs. 47,741.50p.
i.e. Rs. 35,826.50p.
as value of the disputed land in 1951 and Rs. 11,915 as interest at 6% per annum by way of damages.
The State Government contested the plaintiff 's claim and pleaded inter alia that the State Government had never agreed that the assessment or valuation made by D.N. Gupta of the disputed land was to be final and binding on them; that there was an error of principle in the assessment or valuation made by him based as it was on the parta rates of the Municipal Committee, Jaipur which admittedly was not applicable to the disputed land which was situate outside the walled city of Jaipur or the rate for the sale of plots of commercial site situate at a distance there from, and that since there was no sale of land in C Scheme in the vicinity of the exchanged plot, the correct value thereof had to be assessed on the basis of the C Scheme rates and therefore the real market value of the disputed land admeasuring 5000 square yards on the basis of the full rate in Scheme of the Urban Improvement Board at Rs. 3.50p.
per square yard must work out to Rs. 17,000 and nothing more.
The learned Senior Civil Judge as well as the High Court have however decreed the plaintiff 's claim in part for a sum of Rs. 17,500 with interest thereon @ 6% per annum from February 4, 1957, the date of institution of the suit, till realization on the ground that the State Government was not bound by the assessment made by D.N. Gupta based on parta rates of the Municipal Committee, Jaipur which were not applicable to lands situate outside the walled city of Jaipur and could not form any legal basis for valuation of the disputed land and therefore the State Government was not bound to pay Rs. 35,826.50p.
as determined by him.
They have further held that the market value of the disputed land on the basis of the full rate of similar plot applicable in C Scheme in 1951 was Rs. 3.50p.
per square yard and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of Rs. 17,500 as the value thereof.
The learned Subordinate Judge held that on the admission of the plaintiff himself as PW 6, and his two witnesses Parmanand, Secretary Urban Improvement Board, PW 3 and Shah Alamuddin, Deputy Minister, PW 5 it was clear that D.N. Gupta had been appointed merely to assess the value of the disputed land and that it was never agreed that whatever appraisement or valuation he may make would be binding on both the parties, nor did the 650 Deputy Minister make any commitment on behalf of the State Government that whatever assessment D.N. Gupta would make would be binding on the State Government and that therefore the appraisement or valuation made by D.N. Gupta in his report (Exh.5) dated February 21, 1956 could not be treated as an 'admission of liability ' under s.20 of the Evidence Act on the part of the State Government.
He further held that the correct value on the basis of the notification issued by the Urban Improvement Board clearly showed that the parta rate of the Municipal Committee, Jaipur was not applicable to the disputed land which was situate outside the old walled city of Jaipur and that the correct value thereof could be assessed on the basis of C Scheme rates and therefore the value of the disputed land Rs. 17,500.
The learned Judge however held that the plaintiff was entitled to receive damages by way of interest @ 6% per annum.
On appeal the High Court held that the plaintiff had to prove that the State Government had agreed to be bound by the assessment made by D.N. Gupta before s.20 of the Evidence Act could be attracted and that there was no evidence that the State Government had ever agreed to be bound by the said assessment.
As regards, the letter addressed by the Chief Minister to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India dated February 3, 1956, the High Court observed that the Chief Minister was not examined as a witness and when admittedly he was not present when the talk between the Deputy Minister for Local Self Government and the plaintiff took place, the latter would not necessarily lead to the inference that the State Government agreed to abide by the assessment made by D.N. Gupta.
It accordingly affirmed the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the appraisement or valuation made by D.N. Gupta was not binding on the State Government and further that the disputed land was much inferior than land included in C Scheme and therefore the amount of Rs. 17,500 awarded by the learned Subordinate Judge was quite adequate.
Following the decision of this Court in Satinder Singh vs Amrao Singh it held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest thereon at 6% per annum.
The main question raised is whether the report of the assessor (Exh. 5) was information ' within the meaning of s.20 of the Evidence 651 Act and therefore considered to be an admission of the parties as to appraisement or valuation of the disputed land at Rs. 35,826.50p.
and such an admission must operate as estoppel.
Admissions may operate as estoppel and they do so where parties had agreed to abide by them.
The word 'information ' occurring in s.20 is not to be understood in the sense that the parties desired to know something which none of them had any knowledge of.
Where there is a dispute as regards a certain question and the Court is in need of information regarding the truth on that point, any statement which the referee may make is nevertheless information within the purview of s.20.
The contention on behalf of the State Government on the word 'information ' occurring in this section is that the parties did not stand in need of obtaining any information from D.N. Gupta and that at any rate the State Government never agreed to abide by the valuation made by him and therefore they were not bound by the same inasmuch as the valuation made by him was not conclusive as to the value of the subject matter as between the parties.
S.20 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "20.
Admissions by persons expressly referred to by party to suit Statements made by persons to whom a party to the suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions.
" Illustration The question is whether a horse sold by A to B is sound.
A says to B "Go and ask C, C knows all about it.
" C 'S statement is an admission.
S.20 is the second exception to the general rule laid down in s.18.
It deals with one class of vicarious admission i.e. admissions of persons other than the party.
Where a party refers to a third person for some information or an opinion on a matter in dispute, the statements made by the third person are receivable as admissions against the person referring.
The reason is that when a party refers to another person for a statement of his views, the party approves of his utterance in anticipation and adopts that as his own.
The principle is the same as that of reference to arbitration.
A position analogous to that of agency is created by the reference.
652 The reference may be by express words or by conduct, but in any case there must be a clear intention to refer, and such admissions are generally conclusive.
As Ellenbrough, L.C.J. said in Williams vs Innes from which the illustration is taken: "If a man refers another upon any particular business to a third person he is bound by what this third person says or does concerning it as much as if that had been said or done by himself.
" There is nothing on record to show that the State Government ever agreed to abide by the valuation made by the assessor D.N. Gupta; on the contrary, the Secretary (Local Self Government) by his letter dated June 30, 1951 had conveyed to the appellant sanction for allotment of the exchanged plot admeasuring 5000 square yards on condition that the terms of allotment would be the same as in the case of the previous allotment, meaning thereby that the plaintiff would have to pay as per the rates fixed by the Government for the sale of plots in C Scheme.
The testimony of Shah Alimuddin, Deputy Minister for Local Self Government clearly shows that he gave a hearing to the appellant and had deputed D.N. Gupta, Town Planning Officer to assess the valuation of the disputed land but he did not make any commitment on behalf of the, State Government that whatever assessment was made by him would be binding on the Government.
This hearing was given by the Minister on January 12, 1956 at the instance of the Chief Minister at which Parmanand, the then Secretary, Urban Improvement Board was also present.
As a result of this, D.N. Gupta was appointed to determine the market value of the disputed land by letter of the Secretary to the State Government, Local Self Government Department dated February 4, 1956 which was in these terms: From The Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan.
653 To Shri D.N. Gupta through the Chief Engineer.
B&R., P.W.D., Rajasthan, Jaipur.
No. F.1 (K) (56) LSG/59 dated Jaipur the February 4, 1956.
Sub: Allotment of land to Shri Heera Chand Kothari.
With reference to the above, I am directed to forward herewith a full history of the case and to say that the case was heard by the Deputy Minister for Local Self Government on 12.1.56.
Shri Heera Chand Kothari and the Secretary, Urban Improvement Board, Jaipur, were present.
Shri Kothari has agreed to accept the compensation of 5000 sq.
of land and to appoint you as assessor.
I am, therefore, to request you kindly to assess the value of land (5000 sq. yds.) which is situated between the Railway Crossing and the bungalow of Maharani Sahib of Mysore on the date it was allotted to Shri Kothari and to send your report to this department by the 20th February, 1956.
Sd/ Secretary to the Government As already stated, the assessor, D.N. Gupta submitted his report (Exh.5) dated February 21, 1956 wherein he valued the land @ Rs.7 per square yard, that is, at Rs. 35,000 and added the cost of construction of the boundary wall at Rs. 826.50p.
totalling Rs. 35,826.50p.
The State Government not being satisfied at the exorbitant value so determined were not prepared to accept the valuation made by the assessor D.N. Gupta.
Accordingly, the Secretary (Local Self Government) by his letter dated March 14, 1956 asked him to explain the basis of valuation adopted by him.
In reply thereto, D.N. Gupta by his letter dated March 19, 1956 disclosed that he had assessed the value of the disputed land, at the least possible price, taking the value of lands spread over between the years 1948 and 1955 and that he had adopted the parta rates of the Municipal Committee, Jaipur for determining the value of the disputed land.
While we feel that the High Court was not right in excluding from its consideration the Chief Minister 's letter dated February 654 3, 1956 on the ground of want of proof, the document by itself does not substantiate the plaintiff 's claim that the parties had by mutual consent agreed to appoint D.N. Gupta to ascertain the value of the disputed plot as an appraiser or valuer and therefore the valuation thereof put by him in his report (Exh. 5) dated February 21, 1956 at Rs. 35,826.50p.
being based on an erroneous principle should be treated as 'information ' within the terms of section 20 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and therefore an admission which must operate as estoppel against the State Government.
The High Court was therefore justified in upholding the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge that the report of D.N. Gupta dated February 21, 1956 making an appraisement or valuation at Rs. 35,826.50p.
could not be treated as an admission under section 20 of the Evidence Act on the basis of which the plaintiff 's claim for damages had to be decreed.
Nevertheless, this Court as well as the High Court and the learned Subordinate Judge had ample power to restitute the plaintiff by granting him compensation for the value of property of which he had been deprived in the year 1951.
As already stated, the value of the exchanged plot had to be determined in accordance with the terms of the letter dated June 30, 1951 addressed by the Secretary, (Local Self Government) to the appellant by which he conveyed the sanction of the State Government for allotment of the exchanged plot admeasuring 5,000 square yards on an application made by him to the Urban Improvement Board.
The grant was subject to the condition that 'the terms of the allotment would be the same as in the case of the previous allotment ' i.e. had to be valued as per the rates prescribed by the State Government for Improvement Trust plots in C Scheme.
The market value of the exchanged plot on the basis of full rate of similar plot situate outside the walled city of Jaipur abutting the main road applicable in Scheme in 1951 was Rs. 3.50 per square yard and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to recover Rs. 17,500 upon that basis.
Admittedly, the State Government had not fixed any parta rates for land situate outside the walled city of Jaipur.
The testimony of Shiv Ram Jain, Secretary, Urban Improvement Board, Jaipur (DW 2) shows that the Maharani of Mysore was allotted a plot in the near vicinity of plot No. C/91 in C Scheme not as a concessional but on normal rate at Rs. 10,000 per acre.
If that were to be the basis the appellant would be entitled to compensation at a much lesser rate.
The matter however does not end there.
The transaction of 655 exchange which fell through in 1951 was entered into before the formation of the State of Rajasthan.
At that time, Jaipur was not the capital of the State, and there was no trend in rise of prices of land.
Once it was known that Jaipur would be the capital, the value of land particularly in an exclusive area near and around the palatial bungalow of the Maharani of Mysore (which later became Raj Bhawan) which was extremely scarce, had naturally shot up.
The land in dispute was situate near the railway station and which, according to the High Court, was lesser in value than land in C Scheme.
Taking all these factors into consideration we think it just and proper to award the appellant a sum of Rs. 25,000 as compensation towards the value of the exchanged plot and to award him a reasonable rate of interest to offset the spiral rise of value of land in the city of Jaipur.
We are clearly of the view that the plaintiff having been deprived of the property was entitled to a reasonable rate of interest on the amount found to be due to him.
In somewhat similar circumstances the Court speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. in Satinder Singh 's case, relied upon the speech of Viscount Cave, LC in Swift & Co. vs Board of Trade and observed: "Stated broadly the act of taking possession of immovable property generally implies an agreement to pay interest on the value of the property and it is on this principle that a claim for interest is made against the State.
This question has been considered on several occasions and the general principle on which the contention is raised by the claimants has been upheld.
In Swift & Co. vs Board of Trade (supra) it has been held by the House of Lords that 'on a contract for the sale and purchase of land it is the practice of the Court of Chancery to require the purchaser to pay interest on his purchase money from the date when he took, or might safely have taken, possession of the land. ' This principle has been recognized ever since the decision in Birch vs Joy ; In his speech, Viscount Cave, LC added that "this practice rests upon the view that the act of taking possession is an implied agreement to pay interest", and he points out that the said rule has been extended to cases of compulsory purchase under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845.
In this connec 656 tion is drawn between acquisition or sales of land and requisition of goods by the State.
In regard to cases falling under the latter category this rule would not apply.
" We are in respectful agreement with these observations.
It was further held in Amrao Singh 's case that the Court had ample power under proviso to section 1 of the Interest Act, 1839 to award interest on equitable grounds.
In all the facts and circumstances of the case, the reasonable rate of interest would be 6% per annum on the compensation amount of Rs. 25,000 from August 13, 1951, the date of dispossession till August 31, 1959, the date of judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, and thereafter at 9% per annum thereon till realization.
It more or less works out to Rs. 95,000 which is a multiple of 20 times the actual investment of the appellant in purchasing plot No. C/91 in C Scheme in the city of Jaipur.
The result therefore is that the appeal partly succeeds and is allowed with costs.
The judgment and decree of the High Court and those of the learned Subordinate Judge are modified by decreeing the plaintiff 's claim for compensation at Rs. 25,000 with interest as indicated above.
The appellant will be entitled to recover and be liable to pay costs in proportion to success and failure.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

Output:
Pursuant to a registered deed of exchange dated July 16, 1951 executed between the parties, the appellant withdrew a suit for specific performance of an alleged contract against the State Government under which the Government were to resume his plot No. C/91 in 'C ' Scheme allotted to him by Improvement Trust, Jaipur for a sum of Rs 5000 in 1951 and give in exchange another plot in the same scheme on the same terms.
Under the terms of the deed, the State Government agreed to give in exchange plot No. O/17 in 'C ' Scheme to the appellant on resumption of his plot bearing no C/91.
In terms thereof, the appellant handed over possession of his plot No. C/91 to the State Government but the State Government on their part did not give possession of the exchanged plot to him.
Thereupon, the appellant brought a suit for possession of the exchanged plot and for mesne profits thereof.
It was revealed in answer to the interrogatories served by the appellant that the exchanged plot had already been transferred by the State Government to Thakur Hari Singh of Achrol under the orders of the Home Minister, Government of India dated January 8,1945 and that plot No. C/91 which belonged to the appellant was then in possession of the Raj Pramukh Maharaja of Jaipur.
The appellant accordingly impleaded Thakur Harisingh of Achrol as a party to the suit and sought permission from the Central Government under section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to join Maharaja Mansinghji of Jaipur as a party to the suit.
The objection raised by Thakur Harisingh of Achrol as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was sustained and the Civil Judge, Jaipur City returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court.
It transpired during the pendency of the aforesaid suit that the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India had addressed a letter dated January 3, 1956 to the then Chief Minister of Rajasthan conveying that it was felt that the appellant had a case and should be given the exchanged plot and if that was not feasible he should be restored back in possession of plot No. C/91.
In response to the same, the Chief Minister addressed a letter dated February 3, 1956 to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs conveying the anxiety of the State Government to settle the claim of the appellant and intimated that the appellant had agreed to the appointment of the Town Planning Officer, Jaipur as the assess or who had been asked to assess the 645 value of the land and submit his report, with a request that the Government of India should defer its decision in fairness to the State Government for a couple of months as it was felt that it might be possible to settle the claim without any unreasonable delay.
The Town Planning Officer by his report (Exh. 5) dated February 21, 1956 put the valuation of the disputed land in 1951 admeasuring 5,000 square yards at Rs. 7 per square yard at 35,000 and to this he added Rs. 826.50p as the cost of construction of a boundary wall i.e. Rs. 35,826 50p.
in all.
[651 G H, 652 A] The State Government declined to pay the compensation.
The appellant instituted the present suit for recovery of Rs. 47,741.50p.
as damages i.e. Rs. 35,826.50p.
to wards the value of disputed land and Rs. 11,915 as compensation.
The Civil Judge held that on the admission of the plaintiff as P W. 6 and his witnesses Secretary, Urban Improvement Board.
P.W. 3 and the Deputy Minister it was clear that the Town Planning Officer was appointed merely to assess the value of the disputed land and that it was never agreed that whatever appraisement or valuation that he may make would be binding on both the parties, nor did the Deputy Minister make any commitment that such assessment would be binding on the State Government and that therefore the appraisement or valuation could not be treated as an 'admission of liability ' under section 20 of the Evidence Act, 1872 on the part of the State Government.
It was further held that the correct value on the basis of the notification issued by the Urban Improvement Board clearly showed that the part rate of the Municipal Committee was not applicable to the disputed land which was situated outside the walled city.
The suit was decreed in part for Rs. 17,000 with damages by way of interest at 6%.
On appeal, the High Court held, that the plaintiff had to prove that the State Government had agreed to be bound by the assessment made by the Town Planning Officer, before s.20 of the Act, 1872 could be attracted and that there was no evidence that the State Government had ever agreed to be bound by the said assessment and that reliance cannot be placed upon the letter dated February 3, 1956 of the Chief Minister, as the Chief Minister was not examined as a witness.
It upheld the finding of the Trial Court that the appraisement or valuation made by the Town Planning Officer was not binding on the State Government, and that the disputed land was of an inferior type and affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
Allowing the Appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
Admissions may operate as estoppel and they do so where parties had agreed to abide by them.
The word 'information ' occurring in section 20 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is not to be understood in the sense that the parties desired to know something which none of them had knowledge of.
Where there is a dispute as regards a certain question and the Court in need of information regarding the truth on that point, any statement which the referee may make is nevertheless information ' within the purview of section 20.
section 20 is the second exception to the General rule laid down in section 18.
It deals with one class of 646 vicarious admissions, that is, admissions of persons other than the party.
Where a party refers to a third person for some information or an opinion on a matter in dispute, the statements made by the third person are receivable as admissions against the person referring.
The reason is that when a party refers to another person for a statement of his views, the party approves of his utterance in anticipation and adopts that as his own.
The principle is the same as that of reference to arbitration.
The reference may be by express words or by conduct, but in any case there must be a clear admission to refer and such admissions are generally conclusive.
[651 A B; G H; 652 A] 2.
The High Court was not right in excluding from its consideration the Chief Minister 's letter dated February 3, 1956 on the ground of want of proof.
The document by itself does not substantiate the plaintiff 's claim that the parties had by mutual consent agreed to appoint the Town Planning Officer to ascertain the value of the disputed plot as an appraiser or valuer.
[653 H; 654A] 3.
The High Court was justified in upholding the judgment of the Subordinate Judge that the report of the Town Planning Officer making an appraisement or valuation at Rs. 35,826.50p could not be treated as an admission under section 20 of the Evidence Act, on the basis of which the plaintiffs ' claim for damages had to be decreed.
[654 B C] 4.
This Court as well as the High Court and the Subordinate Court had ample power to restitute the plaintiff by granting him compensation for the value of the property of which he had been deprived in the years 1951.
Taking all factors into consideration it is just and proper to award the appellant a sum of Rs. 25,000 as compensation towards the value of the exchanged plot.
The plaintiff having been deprived of the property he was entitled, a reasonable rate of interest on the amount is necessary.
The Court has ample power under proviso to section I of the Interest Act 1839 to award interest on equitable grounds.
The reasonable rate of interest would be 6% per annum on the compensation amount of Rs. 25,000 from August 13, 1951, the date of dispossession till August 31, 1959, the date of judgment of the Subordinate Judge and thereafter at 9% per annum thereon till realization.
[654 D; 655 C; 656 BC] Satinder Singh vs Amrao Singh ; ; referred to.