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vil Appeals Nos. 1314 to 1318 of 1979.
Appeals by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 4.4.1979 of the Judicial Commissioner Goa, Daman & Diu in Special Civil Application (Writ Petition) Nos. 75,76, 77 of 1977, 103 and 111 of 1978.
AND Writ Petition No. 864 of 1988.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, T.V.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, S.S. Ray, Y.S. Chitaley, Joachin Dias, A.B. Nadkarni, Arun Madan, Ms. A. Subhashini, section Ganesh and R. Swamy for the Appellants/Petitioners.
Manohar section Usgaocar, F.S. Nariman, G.L. Sanghi, M.N. Phadke, R.F. Nariman, S.K. Mehta, Atul Nauda, Aman Vachher, Mrs. Nineti Sharma, S.M. Usgaocar and M.K. Dua for the Respondents.
SHARMA, J.
The civil appeals No. 1314 to 1318 of 1979 by certificate are directed against the decision of the Judi cial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu, declaring the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy (5th Amendment) Act, 1976, as unconstitutional.
The respondents are landlords in Goa.
The lands were in possession of the tenants who were cultivating the same and paying rent to the respondents.
The respondents were divested of their title in the lands by the provisions of the impugned Act which came in force in 1976 vesting the same in the tenants.
The respondents filed five writ applications in the court of the Judicial Commissioner challenging the validity of the Amendment Act.
The writ petitions were allowed by the impugned judgment.
It has been held that the Act violates Articles 14 and 19 of the Consti tution and the protection of Article 31A is not available as the scheme of the Act does not constitute agrarian reform.
It has been contended on behalf of the respondent writ petitioners that the landlords in Goa are generally small land holders and their condition is not better than that of the tenants and in that view the Act divesting the landlords of their title in the land and veting the same in the tenants suffers from the vice of illegal discrimination.
A similar Act was earlier passed by the Maharashtra Legisla ture also which has been found to be constitutionally valid.
The writ petitioners have, before the court below, success fully argued that the decision in that case is not applica ble inasmuch as the Maharashtra Act contains provisions fixing ceiling to which the other provisions are subject to, while there is no such restriction in the present Act.
The result is that although the Maharashtra Act had to be upheld as a measure of agrarian reform and thus protected by Arti cle 31A of the Constitution, the present Act cannot be so interpreted.
During the pendency of these appeals the impugned Amendment Act along with the main Act were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution and the assent of the President was received on the 26th of August, 1984.
Lakshmibai Narayan Patil, the writ petitioner in the three of the cases in the court of Judicial Commissioner (respond ent in Civil Appeals No. 1314, 1315 and 1316 of 1979) has challenged the constitutional amendment as illegal and ultra vires by filing an application under Article 32 of the Constitution which has 501 been numbered as Writ Petition No. 864 of 1988.
By the impugned Amendment Act, Chapter IIA has been included in the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Chapter III has been deleted and some consequential changes have been made in some other sections.
Chapter IIA deals with "Special rights and privileges of tenants" as indicated by the head ing.
Broadly speaking, by the provisions of section 18A of this Chapter the land belonging to a landlord not in his culti vating possession on the tiller 's day gets transferred to the tenant inpossession for a price to be paid to the land lord.
The expression 'tenant ' has been given a larger mean ing under the Act by section 4.
By the second proviso of section 4 a sub tenant cultivating any land on or after 1.7.
1962 has to be deemed to be a lawfully cultivating tenant notwithstand ing the fact that the creation of sub tenancy might have been prohibited by any law, and the tenant prior to the creation of the sub tenancy (who may be referred to as intermediary tenant) is not to be treated as a tenant.
The price of the land in question has to be determined and the payment made in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IIA.
Separate provisions have been made with respect to special cases where tenant is a minor or has been evicted by the landlord before the tiller 's day.
The provisions of section 18 J provide for the resumption and disposal of the land not purchased by the tenant by reason of purchase being ineffec tive under section 18C or section 18H or due to the failure of the tenant to take steps under section 18B within time.
A revenue officer described as Mamlatdar is vested with the power to dispose of such land in the manner provided in sub section (2) of section 18J.
Such land has to be disposed of in the order of priority, whereunder 75% of such land is to be disposed of by sale to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and thereafter the remaining land to serv ing members of the Defence Forces of the country or ex servicemen or freedom fighters who agree to cultivate the land personally.
If the land still remains undisposed of, it first goes to agricultural labourers and thereafter to landless persons.
If some of the land still remains avail able, it has to be sold to a co operative farming society.
Section 18 K puts a restriction on transfer of the land which the tenant acquires by purchase under the Chapter.
Only with the previous sanction of the Mamlatdar any trans fer whether by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment can be made.
If the land owner is himself cultivating it, there being no tenant or a deemed tenant he continues to be in possession without any curtailment of his rights.
On the other hand, in a case where the tenant 502 after getting a tenancy from the landlord inducts another person as a sub tenant who cultivates the same, the benefits of the impugned provisions go to him and not to the tenant.
The object of the Amending Act is thus clearly to vest the land in the tiller.
The right of any person to receive merely rent is taken away for a price.
The respondents who are landlords, have challenged the Amendment Act whereby Chapter IIA has been inserted in the Act on the ground of illegal discrimination.
The argument is that in absence of provisions for ceiling the impugned Act bestows undeserved benefit on the tenants at the cost of the landlords, without reference to the respective areas in their possession.
The Amendment was enforced as also the impugned judgment was delivered before the deletion of Clause (f) of Article 19(1) from the Constitution and one of the grounds which has been successfully urged before the High Court is based on Article 19(1)(f).
So far Article 31A of the Constitution is con cerned, the case of the respondents which has found favour with the court below is that the provisions of the impugned Amendment Act cannot be held to be a step by way of agrarian reforms and, therefore, cannot have the protection of the Article.
This is the main thrust of the argument of Mr. R.F. Nariman in this Court also.
He has strenuously contended that for extending the protection of Article 31A(1)(a) to any particular law it is necessary that the law contains adequate measure against concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
It is claimed that fixation of ceiling is the heart and soul of agrarian reform without which it does not survive.
It has been observed in the impugned judgment that from the transcripts of newspapers produced by the writ petitioners and the statements alleged to have been made by the late Chief Minister that there were very few big land holders in Goa, it can be assumed that the landlords in Goa are small holders of land.
Certain statements made in the affidavit filed before the Court were also referred to in this connection.
An attempt was made in this Court also to urge that there could not be many big landlords in Goa and therefore their deprivation of the lands cannot be deemed to be a step towards fair distribution.
It was contended that in many a case, a cultivating tenant in possession of lands under different landlords may be having far larger area of land than his landlords and there cannot be any justifica tion in clothing such a tenant with title to the land at the cost of his comparatively poor landlords.
The argument proceeded, that so far the holdings of the tenants are concerned.
a necessity of placing ceiling on the holdings cannot be denied in view of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State stating that further legislation for that purpose was in contemplation.
Mr. R.F. Nariman emphasized the fact that no such law has been 503 brought in force till now.
To the last part of the argument it was tightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that since the Amendment Act was struck down by the Judicial Commissioner 's Court as ultra vires, further amendment in the Act by way of introducing provisions for ceiling had to await this Court 's judgment in the present civil appeals.
Before proceeding with the main argument of Mr. R.F. Nariman and the cases relied upon by him, it may be useful to briefly refer to the nature of the right of the landlords and the tenants under the Act before the insertion of Chap ter IIA by the impugned Amendment Act.
The rights of a tenant were heritable and Sections 8 and 9 prohibited the termination of his tenancy and his eviction except where the himself surrendered his right to the landlord or where the landlord established one of the grounds specified in this regard.
By an Amendment in 1966.
the tenant was given, by section 13A, the first option to purchase the land in case the landlord proposed to sell it.
By Chapter III the landlord was permitted to resume the land, subject to the ceiling of an area of 2 hectares in case of paddy land and 4 hectares in other lands, on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal cultivation; but this right was also dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions.
This Chapter was to come into force only on a notification for the purpose which was never issued.
By the impugned Amendment Act this Chapter was omitted from the Act.
In effect the right of resumption contemplated by the Act never vested in the landlords before it disappeared from the statute book.
It may be stated here that the 1964 Act is not under attack and the challenge is confined to its 5th Amendment whereby Chapter IIA has been included and Chapter III deleted.
The statement of objects and reasons was placed before us wherein it has been mentioned that there was a similar legislation in force in the neighbouring State of Maharash tra.
The reference obviously is to the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)Act, 1956, mentioned in para graph 2 above, introducing similar amendments in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,1948.
In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 489, the validity of the Act was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court.
It has been contended that the Maharashtra A mending Act including provisions fixing ceiling which effec tively prevented accumulation of large areas of land in possession of the tenants; and since there is no similar safeguard in the present 5th Amendment Act, the aforesaid decision does not come to its rescue 504 and leads to the conclusion that in absence of similar provi sions the Act cannot be sustained.
The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the observation of several decisions of this Court in support of his contention that provisions regarding ceiling are essential for a statute enacted as a measure of agrarian reform and in their absence the same cannot claim pro tection of Article 31A of the Constitution.
Article 31A(1)(a) declares that no law providing for "the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinction or modification of any such rights", shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19.
The 5th Amend ment Act has received the assent of the President as re quired by the first proviso.
The expression 'estate ' is undisputedly applicable in the present case in view of the provisions of clause (2) of the said Article.
Although Article 31A(1)(a) does not by express language restrict its application to a particular nature of law, it is now well settled that the protection of the Article is limited to the laws which serve the purpose of agrarian reform, and Mr. R.F. Nariman is right in relying upon the observations at page 90IF of the judgment in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. and Others vs S.B. Kamble and Others, [1975] 3 SCR page 885.
The learned counsel has further urged that the other observa tions in this judgment support his main argument also that in absence of provisions for ceiling a statute cannot be held to be for agrarian reform.
We are unable to agree.
In that case the constitutional validity of the Act amending certain provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural (Ceiling and Holdings) Act was under challenge and it was sought to be saved inter alia with the aid of Article 3 1A.
While discussing the scope of Article 3 1A, the Court at page 902F relied upon the decision in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. and Another vs State of Tamil Nadu, ; , in the following terms: "In the case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Anr.
vs State of Tamil Nadu it was held while dealing with the provisions of Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conver sion into Ryotwari) Act that the object and general scheme of the Act was to abolish intermediaries between the state and the cultivator and to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct relationship between himself and the state.
The Act, as such, in its broad outlines was held to be a measure of agrarian reform and protected by article 31A." 505 At page 903H it was observed that in a sense agrarian reform is wider than land reform.
At page 905 the conclusion was summarised under 8 heads, and Mr. R.F. Nariman strongly relied on the last proposition stating, "(8) A provision fixing ceiling area and providing for the disposal of surplus land in accordance with the rules is a measure of agrarian reform.
" It cannot be denied that the appropriately enacted statutes having provisions for fixing ceiling of holdings do fall in the category of legislation for agrarian reform, but the proposition relied upon, does not say and cannot be inter preted as holding that it is such an essential feature of agrarian reform without which a law cannot be included in that category.
The observations at page 902F in respect of the judgment in Balmadies Plantations case, quoted earlier rather negative such an assumption.
The case of Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi (supra) has not only been distinguished in the impugned judgment but has been relied upon for supporting the writ petitioner 's argu ment.
Reliance has been placed on the observations at page 495 of the reported judgment to the effect that the object of the Maharashtra Act, which was under consideration in that case.
was to bring about such distribution of the agricultural lands as best to subserve the common good and this object was sought to be achieved by fixing ceiling on areas of holdings.
It, however, does not follow that fixing ceiling area of land which can be held by a person is a basic and essential requirement of land reform.
Since the challenge against the Maharashtra Act was being directed to the provisions fixing ceiling it became necessary to consid er and decide the effect of those provisions pointedly.
But on a careful consideration of the entire judgment, there does not remain any element of doubt that a proper statute even without including provisions regarding ceiling may be entitled to the protection of Article 31A provided it is otherwise a measure of agrarian reform.
As mentioned earli er, the Court was deciding the question of constitutional validity of the 1956 Act which amended the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act enacted in 1948.
The original 1948 Act did not contain the provisions of ceiling which were later introduced by the impugned amendment.
If the stand of the respondents be assumed to be correct, the 1948 Act could not have been in absence of the provisions of ceiling, held to be a step in agrarian reform.
But the Court at page 492 stated that: 506 "The 1948 Act had been passed by the State Legislature as a measure of agrarian reform . " With respect to the 1956 Amendment Act, it was said at page 493 that, "With a view to achieve the objective of establish ing a socialistic pattern of society in the state within the meaning of Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution, a further measure of agrarian reform was enacted by the State Legisla ture, being the impugned Act, hereinbefore referred to, which was designed to bring about such distribution of the ownership and control of agricultural lands as best to subserve the common goods thus eliminating concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment." (emphasis added) The use of the expression "further measure ' as mentioned above and the repetition of the said expression again at page 495 emphasise the fact that the original Act also was a measure of agrarian reform.
Thus the decision, instead of helping the respondents lends support to the appellants ' argument.
Mr. R.F. Nariman cited a number of other decisions dealing with the validity of provisions fixing ceiling and the Court upheld those provisions on the ground that they were measures of agrarian reform, but they do not support the reverse proposition as put forward on behalf of the respondents.
All these decisions are, therefore, clearly distinguishable and we will mention briefly some of them which were heavily relied on by Mr. Nariman.
In the case of Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. vs Must.
Mazi runnessa; , , writ petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the validity of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holding Act, 1957.
The High Court in dis missing the petitions held that the impugned Act was pro tected by Article 31A as it was a measure of agrarian re forms and imposed limits on lands to be held by persons in order to bring about its equitable distribution.
The main question which was canvassed before this Court was whether the expression "the rights in relation to an estate" in the Article could cover the impugned Act, and it was answered in the affirmative by holding that the said expression is of a very wide amplitude.
At page 729 this Court observed thus: 507 "This Article has been construed by this Court on several occasions in dealing with legislative measures of agrarian reforms.
The object of such reforms generally is to abolish the intermediaries between the State and the cultivator and to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct relationship between himself and the State." The 5th Amendment Act impugned in the cases before us satis fies this test.
Similar was the position in Purushothaman Nambudiri y.
The state of Kerala, [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 753.
The case of Fida Ali and Others vs State of Jammu and Kash mir; , , was also considering a statute pro viding a scheme for agrarian reform which included provi sions in respect of ceiling.
While upholding the Act the provisions fixing ceiling were upheld but the other observa tions in the judgment clearly indicate that the same cannot be assumed to be a condition precedent.
Personal cultivation by the holder of land was emphasised as an important aspect in the following words at page 345G: "The golden web, throughout the warp and woof of the Act, is the feature of personal cultivation of the land.
The expression 'personal cultivation ' which runs through sections 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 is defined with care under section 2(7) in a detailed manner with a proviso and six explana tions.
From a review of the foregoing provisions it is obvious that the Act contains a clear programme of agrarian reforms intaking stock of the land in the State which is not in personal cultivation (section 3) and which though in personal cultivation is in excess of the ceiling area (section 4).
" In the ultimate paragraph of the judgment it was pointed that for framing a scheme for agrarian reforms it is not necessary or feasible to follow a set pattern in different parts of the country.
It was observed, "On the other hand, the predominant object under lying the provisions of the Act is agrarian reforms.
Agrar ian reforms naturally cannot take the same pattern through out the country.
Besides the availability of land for the purpose, limited in scope in the nature of things, the scheme has to fit in with the local conditions, variability of climate, rainfall, peculiarity of terrain, suitability and profitability of multiple crop patterns, vulnerability of floods and so 508 many other factors in formulating a scheme of agrarian reforms suitable to a particular State".
The decision, therefore, indicates that a flexible approach has to be adopted in deciding as to the nature of agrarian reform to be taken, rather than laying down a strait jacket rule for universal application.
The observations in Datta traya Govind Mahajan and Others vs State of Maharashtra and Another, ; , were also made while examining an Act fixing ceiling of holdings and in justification of the impugned provisions it was observed that the policy in this regard was initiated following the report of the Agricultur al Labour Inquiry conducted in the 1960s and in implementa tion of this policy the Act under consideration was passed.
The implication is that the fixation of ceiling was not essentially involved in agrarian reform but it had to be resorted to in the State of Maharashtra following the con clusion arrived at in the Agricultural Labour Inquiry. 13.
The learned counsel for the respondents also placed two cases wherein Article 31A was held to be inapplicable.
In K.K. Kochuni and Others vs The State of Madras and Oth ers, , the question of Article 31A did arise but in absolutely different context.
The immediate predeces sor of the petitioner K.K. Kochini was the sthanee of the properties attached to the various sthanee held by him.
On his death in 1925, the petitioner being the senior member became the sthanee and the respondents No. 2 to 17 being the junior members of the tarwad did not get any interest in the properties.
In an earlier litigation which was commenced following the passing of an Act in 1932, the petitioners ' exclusive right was established up to the Privy Council stage.
It was held that the Members of the tarwad had no interest therein.
After the title of the sthanee was thus established, the Madras Legislature passed the impugned Act in 1955, which declared that every sthanam satisfying cer tain conditions mentioned in the Act would be deemed and would always be deemed to have properties belonging to the tarwad.
The petitioner K.K. Kochuni challenged the Act as ultra vires before this Court by an application under Arti cle 32 of the Constitution.
Two other petitions were also filed, one by his wife and daughters with respect to certain other properties gifted to them and the other by his son.
In support of the constitutional validity of the Act it was argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner 's sthanam was an estate within the meaning of Article 31A and, therefore, enjoyed the protection under that Article.
The argument was that a law relating inter se the rights "of a proprietor in his estate and the junior members of his family was also covered by the wide 509 pharseology used in clause (2)(b) of Article 31A.
This Court rejected the plea, holding that: "The definition of "estate" refers to an existing law relat ing to land tenures in a particular area indicating thereby that the Article is concerned only with the land tenure described as an "estate".
The inclusive definition of the rights of such an estate also enumerates the rights vested in the proprietor and his subordinate tenure holders.
The last clause in that definition, viz., that those rights also include the rights or privileges in respect of land revenue, emphasizes the fact that the Article is concerned with land tenure.
It is, therefore, manifest that the said Article deals with a tenure called "estate" and provides for its acquisition or the extinguishment or modification of the rights of the land holders or the various subordinate ten ure holders in respect of their rights in relation to the estate.
The contrary view would enable the State to divest a proprietor of his estate and vest it in another without reference to any agrarian reform.
It would also enable the state to compel a proprietor to divide his properties, though self acquired, between himself and other members of his family or create interest therein in favour of persons other than tenants who had none before." The Court, thus held that Article 31A (1)(a) will not apply to an Act which does not contemplate or see to regulate the fights inter se between the landlords and tenants leaving all their characteristics intact.
The Court further consid ered the judgment in Sri Ram Ram Narain 's case (supra) and distinguished it on the ground that under the Bombay Act certain fights were conferred on the tenants in respect of their tenements which they did not have before.
The other case of San jeer Coke Manufacturing Company vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Another, ; , relied upon by Mr. Nariman is also of no help as the same was dealing with certain legislation in regard to mines and minerals.
The question of interpreting Article 31A (1)(a) did not arise there at all.
As has been discussed above.
the title to the land shall vest in the tiller and the landlord shall get the compensation.
Earlier also his right to resume the land for personal cultivation was considerably restricted by the provisions of the 1964 Act.
As a result of the impugned Amendment Act he has been divested of this limited right 510 for a price, and the tiller shall no more be under a threat of dispossession.
The impugned provisions must therefore be accepted as a measure of land reform.
We reject the argument of the respondents that in absence of provisions fixing ceiling on the area of land which can be held by a person a statute cannot be accepted as a measure of land reform.
The 5th Amendment Act is, therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 3 IA and it cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner declaring the Act as ultra vires is accordingly set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed.
Consequently it is not necessary to deal with the writ petition (W.P. No. 864 of 1988) filed in this Court under Article 32 challenging the inclusion of the impugned Act in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution and the same is rejected.
In the result, Civil Appeals No. 1314 1318 of 1979 are allowed, but, in the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
R.S.S. Appeals allowed Petition dismissed.

Output:
The respondents in the civil appeals and the petitioner in the writ petition were landlords in Goa, whose lands were in the possession of the cultivating tenants.
Prior to the enactment of the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy (5th Amendment) Act, 1976 the nature of the rights of the landlords and tenants were governed by the Goa.
Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964.
By Chapter III of the 1964 Act the landlord was permitted to resume his land for bona fide personal cultivation, subject to a ceiling.
Chap ter III, however, was to come into force only on a notifica tion for the purpose, which was never issued.
The impugned 5th Amendment omitted Chapter III from the 1964 Act and in its place included Chapter IIA.
By the provisions of section 18A of Chapter IIA the land belonging to a landlord not in his cultivating possession on the tiller 's day got trans ferred to the tenant in possession for a price to be paid to the landlord.
The respondents filed writ applications in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner challenging the validity of the 5th Amendment Act.
The writ petitions were allowed by the Judicial Commissioner who held that the Amendment Act vio lated Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and that the protection of Article 31A was not available as the scheme of the Amendment Act did not constitute agrarian reform.
498 During the pendency of the present appeals the impugned Amendment Act along with the main Act were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution.
The writ petition filed in this Court under Article 32 has challenged this constitu tional amendment as illegal and ultra vires.
Before this Court it was contended on behalf of the respondentslandlords that fixation of ceiling was the heart and soul of agrarian reform; that provisions regarding ceiling were essential for a statute enacted as a measure of agrarian reform and in their absence the same could not claim protection of Article 31A of the Constitution; that in the absence of provisions for ceiling the impugned Amendment Act had bestowed undeserved benefit on the tenants at the cost of the landlords, without reference to the respective areas in their possession.
In this connection it was submit ted that in many a case, a cultivating tenant in possession of lands under different landlords might be having far larger area of land than his landlords and there could not be any preference to clothing such a tenant with title to the land at the cost of his comparatively poor landlords.
Allowing the appeals and dismissing the writ petition this Court, HELD: (1) It is well settled that the protection of Article 31A is limited to the laws which serve the purpose of agrarian reform.
[504D] (2) It cannot be denied that the appropriately enacted statutes having provisions for fixing ceiling of holdings do fall in the category of legislation for agrarian reform, but that proposition does not say and cannot be interpreted as holding that fixing ceiling areas is a basis and essential feature of agrarian reform without which a law cannot be included in the category.
A proper statute even without including provisions regarding ceiling may be entitled to the protection of Article 31A provided it is otherwise a measure of agrarian reform.
[505C, F] Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 489; Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs S.B. Kamble & Ors., ; and Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Ant.
vs State of Tamil Nadu; , , referred to.
(3) The title to the land shall vest in the tiller and the landlord shall get the compensation.
Earlier also his right to resume the land for personal cultivation was con siderably restricted by the provisions of the 1964 Act.
As a result of the impugned 5th Amendment Act he has been 499 divested of this limited right for a price, and the tiller shall no more be under a threat of dispossession.
The im pugned provisions must therefore be accepted as a measure of land reform.
[509G H; 510A] (4) The argument of the respondents that in absence of provisions fixing ceiling on the area of land which can be held by a person a statute cannot be accepted as a measure of land reform is, accordingly, rejected.
The 5th Amendment Act is.
therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 31A and it cannot be struck down on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
[510A B] Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 489; Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. vs Must.
Mazirunnes sa; , ; Purushothaman Nambudiri vs The State of Kerala, [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 753; Fida Ali & Ors.
vs State of Jammu & Kashmir, ; ; Dattatraya Govind Mahajan vs State of Maharashtra, ; ; K.K. Kochuni vs The State of Madras, and Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr., ; , distinguished.


Input:
tion No. 320 of 1987.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) Jitender Sharma for the Petitioners.
Kepil Sibal, Ms. Tamali Das Gupta, Ms. J. Wad and Mr. R.Venkataramani (NP) for the Respondent.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN,J.
This petition has been filed by the D.T.C. Workers ' Union and some its members.
The main relief sought by them, as contained in prayer (a), reads: "Issue a Writ of Mandamus or Direction to the respondent the Delhi Transport Corporation to implement w.e.f. 1.1.86 the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission as approved by the Government of India to the Central Government employees as per the undertakings gives to its employees vide Office Order NO.PLD IX(465)/83/10589 dated 15.9.1983 and DGM(IR)/84/93 dated 7.2.1984." The petitioners as well as the respondent, the Delhi Transport Corporation, rely heavily upon the Office Order No. DGM(IR)/84/90 dated 7.2.1984 issued by the Deputy General Manager of the respondent Corporation, although they differ in their construction of what it contains.
We shall, therefore, read the whole Order; 986 ". .
Before Interim Relief was announced by the Central Government for its employees to be paid w.e.f. 1.6.83, the Wage Group constituted by the Government of India for considering the demand regarding revision of pay scales of the employees of the Delhi Transport Corporation gave its report recommending revision of pay scales of all the Class III & IV employees as an interim measure pending receipt of Fourth Pay Commission report.
Thus the revised scales themselves were in the shape of an interim relief.
As interim relief was announced by the Government for its employees almost simultaneously some unions approached the Management opposing the introduction of new scales and asking for the interim relief as at the Government rates.
It was explained to them that the revised scales have a greater in built advantage as the benefit in some cases go even over hundred rupees while interim relief for workers was fifty to seventy rupees.
However, an option was given vide circular No.
PLD IX(465)/83/10589 dated 15.9.83 to the employees of the Corporation either to avail the benefit of interim relief and retain the old pay scales or to avail the benefit of the revised pay scales.
In reference to the clarification sought by the Unions, it was made absolutely clear beyond any ambiguity to the employees that (1) there is absolutely no intention to de link the DTC from the Central Government pay structure and DA pattern arbitrarily or unilaterally; (ii) if the Fourth Pay Commission granted any further interim relief or benefit before the final report, such benefit will be available to the DTC employees; (iii) the differential in the head start now given in the pay scales will be maintained even while implementing the scales recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission and (iv) the payscales recommended by the Working Group would be enforceable for a period of four year or the receipt of report of the Commission whichever is earlier.
It has already been made amply clear that differential in "head start" given in the revised pay scales will be maintained even while implementing the scales recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission.
In fixation of pay in the scales to be recommended by the Foruth Pay Commission, the employees coming over to the revised scales of pay will be given due benefit of Central Government Interim Relief so as to ensure that they are not at any disadvantage because of having opted for the revised scales now.
For instance, if the 987 pay of an individual in the pay scale of Rs.260 400 drawing a basic pay of Rs.260 per month who had opted for interim Relief at Central Government rates is fixed at Rs.310 p.m. by adding Rs.50 as Interim Relief a Basic Pay of Rs.260 whereas the pay of an employee who has opted for corresponding revised pay scale of Rs.284 440 and is drawing Basic pay of Rs.284 p.m. will be fixed at Rs.334 p.m. by adding Rs.50 to his Basic Pay of Rs.284.
In this connection our circular NoPLD IX(465) 83 dated 20.9.93 referees.
It has been clearly shown in the above illustrations as to how the revised pay scales will be beneficial to the employees.
It is opted that the employees will not be mislead now by any such interpretation which is being placed on the Ministry of Finance 's O.M. of 28th November ,1983.
" Referring to the concept of "head start" mentioned in the Order, Mr. Jitender Sharma, appearing for the petitioners, submits that it being the intention of the Corporation to protect the interim relief granted to the employees, not withstanding the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission, the employees are entitled to the interim relief, referred to as the "head start", in addition to the pay scale recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission, In other words, according to Mr.Sharma, the employees will be entitled not only to the new pay scale recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission, but more in the shape of interim reliefs which they had enjoyed during the period of the interregnum between their original pay scale and the new payscale.
Mr. Kapil Sibal, appearing for the respondent Corporation, submits that all that the Order dated 7.2.1984 has intended to state is that the "head start" in the form of interim relief will not deprive the employees of the full benefits of either the revised interim pay scale, i.e., the scale as revised during the interregnum, or the new pay scale subsequently introduced as per the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission.
The employees had the option either to accept the additional payment in the nature of an interim relief in the sum of Rs.50 or Rs.70 as the case may be, or the revised interim pay scale which was itself in the nature of an interim relief, pending adoption of the new scale recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission.
But once the employees are placed on the scale recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission, all the reliefs which they had earlier received would merge into the new scale and they would have no entitlement to any 988 additional payment.
Any payment in addition to what the Fourth Pay Commission recommended would place the employees of the Corporation at an undue advantage in comparison to the employees of the Government in Corresponding grades.
Any such deferential treatment, counsel points out, will be discriminatory and, therefore, unsustainable.
Mr. Sharma, however, refers to the scales of pay relating to the category of conductors, tailors,compositors etc.
Their scale of pay prior to June, 1983 was Rs.260 6 290 EB 6 326 EB 8 390 10 400.
A revised interim scale was introduced on 1.6.1983.
This scale was Rs.284 8 340 10 440.
On 1.1.86, a new scale was introduced on the basis of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission.
That scale is Rs.950 20 1150 EB 25 1500.
This shows that, prior to 1.1.1986, an employee on the scale of Rs.260 400 as on 31.5.1983 had the option either to remain on that scale and draw an additional allowance or be placed on the revised interim scale of Rs.284 440 .
On 1.1.1986 all employees in the category of conductors etc., came on the scale of Rs.950 1500 whether or not, prior to that date, they had, in exercise of their option, remained on the original scale or Rs.260 400 with the additional allowances or been placed on the revised interim scale Rs.284 440.
According to Mr. Sharma, the "head start" promised by the Corporation means the additional allowances or revised scales recieved by the employees during the interregnum, and such benefits have to be super imposed over the new scale of Rs.950 1500.
He further submits, insofar as none of the employees of the Corporation had opted to remain on the original scale with the additional allowances, but had come on the revised interim pay scale, all the employees brought on the new pay scales on 1.1.86 are entitled to be fitted with reference to the total emoluments drawn on the revised interim scale.
A careful reading of the Order dated 7.2.1984 shows that certain interim benefits were granted to the employees preceding the introduction of the new pay scale on the basis of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay commission.
These benefits which were either in the nature of an additional payment or a revised interim pay scale were intended to cover the period preceding the introduction of the regular pay scale which came into effect on 1.1.86.
The Order further shows that the Corporation was to carry the same pay structure and DA pattern as in the case of the Government employees in the corresponding categories.
All benefits granted by the Fourth Pay Commission in the nature of interim reliefs were also to be made available to the 989 Corporation employees.
The interim reliefs granted by the Corporation in the nature of what is imprecisely referred to as "head start" were to be maintained in implementing the scales recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission.
The figures worked out in the penultimate paragraph of the Report indicate that whether the employees were retained on the original pay scale with the additional emoluments by way of interim relief or they had, as in the instant case, opted for the revised interim scale, they should suffer no loss by reason of the option they hadexercised.
But the overriding consideration behind the Other dated 7.2.1984 is that, as in the case of all Government employees, so in the case of the Corporation employees, the new scale recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission should be fully implemented.
What ever may be the amounts actually payable in terms of the interim reliefs, the employees of the Corporation should neither be paid less nor more than the Government employees in the corresponding categories.
This means that all employees, whether retained on the original pay scale or placed on the revised interim pay scale during the period preceding 1.1.86 will be placed on the pay scale adopted as per the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission in such a way that they will be fitted exactly in positions corresponding to their positions on the earlier pay scales.
But the corresponding positions in the new pay scales will naturally carry better emoluments, so as to maintain parity with the Government employees in like categories.
In the circumstances, we have no doubt that the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission will be fully implemendted in terms thereof.
Mr. Kapil Sibal, appearing for the Corporation, assures us that it will be so done.
Mr. Sibal 's submission is recorded.
In the circumstances, no further order is required.
The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
No costs.
R.N.J. Pentition disposed of.

Output:
The D.T.C. Workers ' Union and some of its members have filed this Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution praying, as the main relief, for issue of a Writ of Mandamus or Direction to the respondent Corporation to implement w.e.f. 1.1.86 the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission as approved by the Government of India to the Central Government employees as per the undertakings given to its employees vide Office Orders No.
PLD IX (465/83/10589 dated 15.9.1983 and DGM(IR)/84/90 dated 7.2.1984.
Relying on the undertakings given in the said Office Orders it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the D.T.C. employees will be entitled not only to new pay scales as recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission to the corresponding categories in the Central Government but more in the shape of interim reliefs which they has enjoyed during the period of interregnum between their original pay scale and the new pay scales.
On behalf of the Corporation it has been submitted that all the reliefs which its employees had earlier received, be it additional payment in the nature of interim relief in the sum of Rs.50 or Rs.70 as the case may be, or the revised interim pay scale, pending adoption of the new scale recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission, would merge into the new scale and they would have no entitlement to any additional payment as any such differential treatment will be discriminatory and, therefore, unsustainable.
Disposing of the Writ Petition, this Court, HELD: The overriding consideration behind the Order dated 7.2.1984 is that, as in the case of all Government employees, so in the case of the Corporation employees, the new scales recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission should be fully implemented.
Whatever may be the amounts actually payable in terms to the interim reliefs, the 985 employees of the Corporation should neither be paid less nor more than the Government employees in the corresponding categories.[989C] All employees, whether retained on the original pay scale or placed on the revised interim pay scale during the period preceding 1.1.86, will be placed on the pay scale adopted as per the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission in such a way that will be fitted exactly in positions corresponding to their positions on the earlier pay scales.
But the corresponding positions in the new pay scale will naturally carry better emoluments, so as to maintain parity with the Government employees in like categories.
We have no doubt that the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission will be fully implemented in terms thereof.
[989D E]


Input:
Civil Appeal Nos.
3050 305 1 of 199 1.
From the Judgment and Orders dated 23.8.90 & 13.6.1990 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos.
1236/85 and 2758 of 1988.
T.S.K. lyer, Rajiv Datta and Shahid Azad for the Appellant.
M.S. Nargolkar, D.M. Nargolkar and A.T.M. Sampath for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA, J.
Special leave granted.
Since in both these appeals an identical question of law arises they are being decided by a common judgment.
Facts in a nutshell necessary for appreciating the question involved may be stated.
M/s Patel Roadways (P) Limited, the appellant in both these appeals carries on the business of a carrier and transports goods on hire.
It has its principal office at Bombay and branch offices at various other places which shall hereinafter be referred to as subordinate of fices.
M/s Prasad Trading Company, the respondent in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14660 of 1990 who is a dealer in 395 cardamom entrusted a consignment of 851) kilograms of carda mora to the appellant at its subordinate office at Bodinaya kanur in Tamil Nadu to be delivered at Delhi.
After the goods had been transported by the appellant and kept in a godown at Delhi the same got destroyed and damaged in a fire as a result whereof the consignee refused to take delivery.
The respondent instituted a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Periakulam within whose territorial jurisdiction the subordinate office of the appellant where the goods were entrusted for transport is situate for damages alleging that the fire was due to the negligence and carelessness on the part of the staff of the appellant.
M/s Tropical Agro Systems Private Limited, the respond ent 1 in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14692 of 1990 on the other hand entrusted certain packets of pesticides insured with the second respondent, M/s Oriental Insurance Company Limited to the appellant at its subordi nate office at Madras for being carried to New Delhi.
Ac cording to the respondents the goods aforesaid were deliv ered at New Delhi in a damaged condition resulting in loss to the first respondent and a suit was instituted for recov ery of the loss so sustained by the respondents in the Court of the Third Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras.
In both the suits the appellant inter alia took the plea in its defence.
that in the contract entered into between them the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute between them would be only with the courts at Bombay and consequently the courts in Madras where the two suits re ferred to above had been instituted had no jurisdiction.
This plea was repelled in both the suits by the trial court.
The order of the trial court in each of the two suits was challenged by the appellant before the High Court of Judica ture at Madras under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce dure (hereinafter referred to as the Code).
This challenge having failed in each of the civil revisions, the appellant has preferred these civil appeals.
The question which arises in both these civil appeals, therefore, is as to whether in view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties the courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the courts at Madras where the two suits were instituted was barred.
It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appel lant that apart from the courts within whose territorial jurisdiction the goods were delivered to the appellant for transport, the courts at Bombay also had jurisdiction to entertain a suit arising out of the contract between the parties in view of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code inasmuch as the principal office of the appellant was situ ate in 396 Bombay.
According to learned counsel for the appellant since courts at two places namely Madras and Bombay had jurisdic tion in the matter, the jurisdiction of the courts in Madras was ousted by the clause in the contract whereunder the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute under the contract would be only in the courts at Bombay.
Consequently the courts where the two suits were instituted had no jurisdiction to entertain them and the trial court in each of the two cases as well as the High Court erred in law in taking a contrary view.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties we find it difficult to agree with this submission.
For the sake of convenience Section 20 of the Code except the illustrations is reproduced hereunder: "20.
Other suits to be instituted where de fendants reside or cause of action arises: Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction : (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the de fendants who do not reside, or carry on busi ness, or personally work for gain, as afore said, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
Explanation: A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." In Hakam Singh vs M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., [1971] 3 SCR Page 314 it was held that "corporation" referred to in Section 20 397 meant not only a statutory corporation but also a company registered under the Indian Companies Act.
It was also held that it is not open to the parties by agreement to confer jurisdiction on any court which it did not otherwise possess under the Code.
But where two courts have jurisdiction under the Code to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy nor does such an agreement contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.
In that case also there was a clause in the agreement being clause No. 13 which provided that notwithstanding the place where the work under the contract was to be executed the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into between the parties at Bombay and the court in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon.
The trial court had held that the entire cause of action had arisen at Varanasi and the parties could not by agreement confer jurisdiction on the courts at Bombay which they did not otherwise pos sess.
In a civil revision filed by the respondent the Alla habad High Court held that the courts at Bombay had also jurisdiction and in view of clause 13 of the agreement the jurisdiction of the courts at Varanasi stood ousted.
It is in the appeal against the said judgment of the High Court that the propositions of law referred to above were laid down by this Court.
It was held that since the respondent had its head office at Bombay the courts at Bombay also had 'jurisdiction by virtue of Section 20 of the Code read with its Explanation and in view of clause 13 of the agreement between the parties the courts in Bombay alone had jurisdic tion in the matter.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
This view was reiterated by this Court in Globe Transport Corporation vs Triveni Engineering Works and Another, [1983] 4 SCC Page 707.
Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant on these two decisions and if it can be held that the courts at Bombay also had jurisdiction in the two suits referred to above the judgments appealed against will have to be set aside on the basis of these decisions.
The ques tion, however, is as to whether in any of these two suits the courts at Bombay also had jurisdiction apart from the courts within whose jurisdiction the goods were entrusted to the appellant for purposes of transport.
Having given our anxious consideration to the matter we are of the opinion that the courts at Bombay in these two cases did not at all have jurisdiction and consequently the agreement between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at Bombay is of no avail.
Clauses(a) and (b) of Section 20 inter alia refer to a court within 398 the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant inter alia "carries on business".
Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdic tion the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
It has not been urged before us on behalf of the appellant that the cause of action wholly or in part arose in Bombay.
Conse quently clause (c) is not attracted to the facts of these cases.
What has been urged with the aid of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code is that since the appellant has its principal office in Bombay it shall be deemed to carry on business at Bombay and consequently the courts at Bombay will also have jurisdiction.
On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code we find an apparent fallacy in the aforesaid argument.
The Explanation is in two parts, one before the word "or" occurring between the words "office in India" and the words "in respect of" and the other thereafter.
The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a corporation which term, as seen above, would include even a company such as the appellant in the instant case.
The first part of the Explanation applies only to such a corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place.
In that event the courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at that place, it will "be deemed to carry on business" at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation.
The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a princi pal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place.
The words "at such place" occurring at the end of the Explanation and the word "or" referred to above which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the ease falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the Court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone shall have jurisdic tion "in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office".
Here we may point out that the view which we take finds support from a circumstance which, in our opinion, is rele vant.
Section 20 of the Code before its amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2976 had two Expla nations being Explanations I and II.
By the Amendment Act Explanation I was omitted and Explanation II was renumbered as the present Explanation.
Explanation I so omitted read as hereunder: "Explanation I: Where a person has a permanent dwelling 399 at one place and also temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such tempo rary residence." This Explanation dealt with the case of place of resi dence of the defendant and provided with regard to a person having a permanent dwelling at one place and also temporary at another place that such person shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence.
The lan guage used in Explanation II on the other hand which is the present Explanation was entirely different.
Had the inten tion been that if a corporation had its principal office at one place and a subordinate office at another place and the cause of action arose at the place where it had its subordi nate office it shall be deemed to be carrying on business at both places the language used in Explanation II would have been identical to that of Explanation I which was dealing with a case of a person having a permanent dwelling at one place and also temporary residence at another place.
The marked difference in the language of the two Explanations clearly supports the view which we have taken with regard to the interpretation of the present Explanation to Section 20 of the Code which was Explanation II earlier as indicated above.
We would also like to add that the interpretation sought to be placed by the appellant on the provision in question renders the explanation totally redundant.
If the intention of the legislature was, as is said on their behalf, that a suit against a corporation could be instituted either at the place of its sole or principal office (whether or not the corporation carries on business at that place) or at any other place where the cause of action arises, the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) together with the first .part of the explanation would have completely achieved the purpose.
Indeed the effect would have been wider.
The suit could have been instituted at the place of the principal office because of the situation of such office (whether or not any actual business was carried on there).
Alternatively, a suit could have been instituted at the place where the cause of action arose under clause (c) (irrespective of whether the corpora tion had a subordinate office in such place or not).
This was, Therefore, not the purpose of the explanation.
The explanation is really an explanation to clause (a).
It is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to where the corporation can be said to carry on business.
T 'his, it is clarified, will be the place where the principal office is ituated (whether or not any business actually is carried on there) or the place where a business 400 is carried on giving rise to a cause of action (even though the principal office of the corporation is not located there) so long as there is a subordinate office of the corporation situated at such place.
The linking together of the place where the cause of action arises with the place where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the filing of a suit and not the principal place of business.
If the intention was that the location of the sole or principal office as well as the location of the subordinate office (within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to be deemed to be places where the corporation is deemed to be carrying on business, the disjunctive "or" will not be there.
Instead, the second part of the explanation would have read "and in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also at such place".
As far as we can see the interpretation which we have placed on this section does not create any practical or undue difficulties or disadvantage either to the plaintiff or a defendant corporation.
It is true that, normally, under clauses (a) to (c), the plaintiff has a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business of the corporation and can file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises.
If a corporation desires to be protected from being dragged into litigation at some place merely because a casue of action arises there it can save itself from such a situation by an exclusion clause as has been done in the present case.
The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place.
It would be a great hardship if, in spite of the corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place where the corporation has its principal place.
That place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the corporation has an office at such place, it will also be under no disadvantage.
Thus the Explanation provides an alternative locus for the corporation 's place of busi ness, not an additional one.
There may be only one extra ordinary situation in which this interpretation may cause an apparent anomaly.
This is where the plaintiff has also his/its place of business at the same place as the 401 corporation but the cause of action has arisen at some other place.
The above interpretation would preclude him from filing a suit in that place of business common to both parties and compel him to go to a court having jurisdiction over the place where the cause of action has arisen.
But this is not really a hardship because such plaintiff must have had some nexus or connection with the place since some part of the cause of action had arisen there; if he can have dealings with the corporation at such a place giving rise to the cause of action, there is no reason why he should find it disadvantageous or difficult to file a suit at such place.
Equally, the corporation, having a subordinate office at the place, will suffer no disadvantage.
In this view of the matter since in the instant two cases clause (c) is not attracted to confer jurisdiction on courts at Bombay and the appellant has admittedly its subor dinate offices at the respective places where the goods in these two cases were delivered to it for purpose of trans port the courts at Bombay had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suits filed by the respondents and the parties could not confer jurisdiction on the courts at Bombay by an agreement.
Accordingly no exception can be taken to the findings in this behalf recorded by the trial court and the High Court in these two cases.
In the result, we find no merit in any of these two appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the cir cumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.

Output:
The appellant in both the appeals carried on the busi ness of a carrier and transported goods on hire.
It had its principal office at Bombay and branch offices at various other places.
The respondent in the first appeal a dealer in cardamom entrusted a consignment of cardamom to the appellant at its branch office at Bodinayakanur in Tamilnadu to be delivered at Delhi.
After the goods had been transported by the appel lant and kept in a godown at Delhi the same got destroyed and damaged in a fire as a result whereof the consignee refused to take delivery.
The respondent instituted a suit in the sub court within whose territorial jurisdiction the branch office of the appellant was situated for damages alleging that the fire was due to the negligence and care lessness on the part of the staff of the appellant.
Respondent No. 4 in the second appeal entrusted certain packets of pesticides insured with the second respondent Insurance Company to the appellant at its branch office at Madras for being carried to Delhi.
The respondent alleged that the goods were delivered at New Delhi in a damaged condition resulting in loss and a suit was instituted for recovery of the loss in the City Civil Court at Madras.
In both the aforesaid civil suits the appellant pleaded in defence that in the contract entered into between them, the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute between them would be only with the courts at Bom bay, and consequently the courts in Madras ' where the two suits had been instituted had no jurisdiction.
This plea was repelled by the Trial Court in each of the suits.
The aforesaid orders were challenged by the appellant in the High 392 Court under Section 115 C.P.C. and having failed, the appel lant appealed to this Court.
In the appeal, it was contended on behalf of the appel lant that since the courts at two places namely Madras and Bombay had jurisdiction in the matter, the jurisdiction of the courts in Madras was ousted by the clause in the con tract whereunder the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute under the contract would be only in the courts at Bombay.
On the question: whether in view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties the courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the courts at Madras where the two suits were instituted was barred.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
The courts at Bombay in these two cases did not at all have jurisdiction and consequently the agreement between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at Bombay is of no avail.
[401D] 2.
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 refer to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant "carries on business".
Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
[397H 398A] 3.
Section 20 of the Code before its amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 had two Expla nations being Explanation I and II.
By the Amendment Act Explanation I was omitted and Explanation II was renumbered as the present Explanation.
[398G] 4.
The Explanation is in two parts, one before the word "or" occurring between the wOrds "office in India" and the words "in respect of" and the other thereafter.
The Explana tion applies to a defendant which is a corporation which term, would include even a company such as the appellant in the instant case.
The first part of the Explanation applies only to such a corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place.
In that event the courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inas much as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at that place, it will "be deemed to carry on business" at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation.
[398C F] 393 5.
The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place.
The words "at such place" occurring at the end of the Explanation and the word "or" referred to above which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case fails within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose juris diction it has a subordinate office which alone shall have jurisdiction "in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office".
[398E F] 6.
The Explanation is really an explanation to clause (a).
It is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to where the corporation can be said to carry on business.
This, it is clarified, will be the place where the principal office is situated (whether or not any business actually is carried on there) or the place where a business is carried on giving rise to a cause of action (even though the principal office of the corporation is not located there) so long as there is a subordinate office of the corporation situated at such place.
The linking together of the place where the cause of action arises with the place where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the filing of a suit and not the principal place of business.
[399G 400B] 7.
If the intention was that the location of the sole or principal office as well as the location of the subordinate office (within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to be deemed to be places where the corporation is deemed to be carrying or business, the disjunctive "or" will not he there.
Instead, the second part of the explanation would have read "and, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also at such place ' '.
[400C] 8.
The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place.
It would be a great hard ship if, in spite of the corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place where the corporation has its principal place.
That place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the corpo ration 394 has an office at such place, it will also be under no disad vantage.
Thus the Explanation provides an alternative locus for the corporation 's place of business, not an additional one.
[400F G] 9.
In the instant two cases since clause (c) is not attract ed to confer jurisdiction on courts at Bombay and the appel lant has admittedly its subordinate offices at the respec tive places where the goods in these two cases were deliv ered to it for purposes of transport, the courts at Bombay had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suits filed by the respondents and the parties could not confer jurisdic tion on the courts at Bombay by an agreement.
Accordingly, no exception can be taken to the findings in this behalf recorded by the trial court and the High Court.
[401C D] Hakam Singh vs M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., [1971] 3 SCR page 314, referred to.


Input:
ivil Appeal Nos.
992997 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.
1988 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos.
12572 of 1984.
6512/85, 12574/84, 17966/180.
12152,84 and 12159 of 1984.
K.K. Venugopal, S.N. Misra, Rajinder Sachhar, Soli J. Sorabjee, V.M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, O.P. Rana, Govind Muk hoti, P.C. Kapur, B.P. Sahu, P.N. Misra, Krishna Pd., B.P. Singh, A.K. Goel.
J.M. Khanna, Ms. Shafali Khanna, section Mar kandeya, Ashok Sharma, G.S. Gift Rao, Mrs. C. Markandeya, W.A. Nomani, G. Seshagiri, S.K. Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul Nanda, N.D. Tyagi, Raju Ramachandran, D. Pillai, Raja Ram Agarwal, Sanjay Parekh, S.N. Mira and A.K. Goel for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
We have heard counsel for the par ties at considerable length but piece meal spread over a number of days.
Special Leave granted 205 Five cooperative societies with membership of Government servants mostly of ' the lower strata filed six separate writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court challenging the Notification under section 4(1) and section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894) on several grounds.
The principal contentions before the High Court were two fold: (1) the cooperative societies consisting Of the low paid Government servants having acquired the land for the purpose of providing residential accommodation to their members, the Ghaziabad Development Authority constituted by the State of Uttar Pradesh for the same purpose should not have been permitted to acquire the said land to their prejudice; and (2) there was no justification for depriving the petitioners of their right to representation under section 5A of the Acquisition Act in the facts and circumstances of the case.
The High Court by a common judgment dated 30th August, 1988, dismissed the writ petitions by negativing the several contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners.
It may be pointed out that on behalf of the Neelam Sahakari Awas Samiti Ltd. two writ petitions were filed while each of the other four societies had filed one writ petition.
That is how six Special Leave Petitions were filed before this Court and have now been converted into appeals on grant of leave.
Ghaziabad, within the State of Uttar Pradesh, virtually bordering Delhi is located at a distance of 28 kilometers from the New Delhi Railway Station in the trans Jamuna area.
It has of late become, apart from being a Railway junction,.
an industrial area as also an agglomeration sufficiently developed to call it a township.
A Master Plan has been drawn up for the area and some portions have been developed while the lands of the five cooperative societies have not yet been improved on account of the pendency of this group of cases.
In course of the hearing of these appeals we were satis fied about the genuineness of the grievance advanced on behalf of the members through their respective cooperative societies and took the view that the members of the coopera tive societies should not be denied residential accommoda tion for which they had taken effective steps before the acquisition for the Development authority was notified.
We took into consideration the total number of members as also the number of eligible members; the total area which the members had acquired and entrusted to the cooperative socie ties for construction; the capacity of the members to pay for the construction now charged by the Development authori ty; the need of planned development of the area.
; and all other relevant facts and circumstances placed by all the parties before 206 us and formed the opinion that it would be sufficient to meet the requirement of members of these societies if each one of them was provided with a plot limited to an area of 80 square yards.
Total members entitled to allotment are 1739.
Whether it should be individual plots or double storeyed construction should be permitted was seriously debated before us but we have come to the ultimate conclusion that instead of single storey construction double storey constructions would be convenient and economical.
The interest of the members represented by their respective cooperative societies and the nature of the housing complex contemplated by the Devel opment authority have to be kept in view and the ultimate decision, keeping the interest of both, has to be taken.
Counsel for the Development authority had canvassed before us that instead of confining construction of flats to two storeys, the normal pattern of five or six storeys could be adopted.
High rise construction for the poor section of the society would not be convenient in old age many would have movement problem; many of the necessities for living would be difficult to secure.
We have, therefore, decided that the construction must be confined to two storeys only and the members of their respective societies shall make their own adjustment of the ground floor and 1st floor allotments.
About 20 acres of land would be necessary if the double storey construction with an area of 80 square yards is adopted.
Society wise particulars are provided below: section No. Name of cooperative Total members Area society entitled to in acres allotment 1.
Sarkari Karamchari Evam 230 2.54 Mitregan Sahakari Awas Samiti Ltd. 2.
Kendriya Karamchari Evam 523 5.77 Mitregan Sahakari Awas Samiti Ltd. 3.
Ghaziabad Shiromani 298 3.29 Sahakari Awas Samiti Ltd. 4.
Neelain Sahakari Awas 245 2.70 Samiti Ltd. 207 5.
Asha Pushpa Vihar Sahakari 443 4.87 Awas Samiti Ltd. 1739 19.17 Members entitled 1739 Total area 19.17 acres (rounded to 20 acres) This area of 20 acres is inclusive of land for laying of the roads and other requirements contemplated under the development scheme.
For convenience and adjustment we are of the view that two more acres of land be made available to the five cooperative societies to be shared by amicable adjustment by them.
Thus from the acquisition Notification 22 acres of land shall stand deleted and shall be released in accordance with the extent indicated for each of the five cooperative societies.
The identification of the land to be so released shall be made within four weeks from the date of pronouncement of the order by mutual arrangement.
We direct that when the land shall be so identified, the order of release from acquisition by appropriate description of the land shall be made; sketch maps showing the identified land shall also be signed by parties to avoid future litigation and made over to each of the societies.
We commend that all the five cooperative societies may form themselves into a federation for the purpose of ensur ing appropriate development of the area and sharing either in common or by division the 2.83 acres of extra land which is directed to be released from acquisition.
It has been agreed that development charges for sewer age, electricity, road connections and the like shall be provided by the Development authority @ Rs. 100 per square yards and internal development shall be done by the socie ties themselves.
In raising the construction, the bye laws and regulations of the Development authority shall be strictly followed.
We hope and trust that the Development authority shall extend its cooperation in every manner to the societies to effectuate the directions made by us.
We look forward to the fulfillment of the dreams of each of the members of the society in the matter of having a residential accommodation.
208 As soon as the lands are identified and sketch maps are delivered as directed above the interim orders made by this Court shall stand dissolved.
The appeals are disposed of without any order for costs.
P.S.S. Appeals allowed.

Output:
The appellant cooperative societies consisting of 1739 low paid Government servants had acquired certain land in Ghaziabad for the purpose of providing residential accommo dation to their members.
Subsequently, the said land was notified for acquisition under sections 4(1) and 7(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the Ghaziabad Development Authori ty.
Representations made by the appellants under section 5A of the Act were rejected.
In the writ petitions, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, it was contended for the appellant societies that the Development Authority constituted by the State for the same purpose should not have been permitted to acquire the said land to their prejudice, and that there was no justification for depriving them of their right to represen tation under section 5A of the Act.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions.
Allowing the appeals by special leave, the Court, HELD: 1.
The members of the appellant societies should not be denied residential accommodation for which they had taken effective steps before the acquisition for the Ghazia bad Development Authority was notified.
[205G] 2.1 Keeping in view the number of eligible members, the total area which they had acquired and entrusted to the societies for construction, the capacity of the members to pay for the construction now charged by the Development Authority, the need for planned development of the area and all other relevant facts, it would be sufficient if each one of them was provided with an area of 80 sq. yards.
[205G H; 206A] 204 2.2 High rise construction for the poor sections of the society would not be convenient.
If the double storey con struction with an area of 80 sq.
yards is adopted about 20 acres of land, inclusive of land for laying of the roads and other requirements contemplated under the development scheme, would be necessary.
For convenience and adjustment two more acres of land shall be made available to the socie ties to be shared by amicable adjustment by them.
Thus, from the acquisition notification 22 acres of land shall stand deleted and shall be released inaccordance with the extent indicated for each of the societies.
The identification of the land to be so released shall be made within four weeks from the date of pronouncement of the order by mutual ar rangements.
The order of release bearing appropriate de scription to follow and sketch maps to be signed by the parties.
[206D; 207C E] 3.
The development charges for sewerage, electricity, road connections and the like shall be provided to the Development Authority at the rate of Rs.100 per sq. yard and internal development shall be done by the societies them selves.
In raising the construction, the bye laws and regu lations of the Development Authority shall be strictly followed, (207G)


Input:
: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 489 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9 11 1978 of the Kerala High Court in Crl.
R.P. No. 260/77.
K. T. Harendra Nath and T. T. Kunhikannan for the Petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. The Petitioner has pressed before us certain points of law which have not been urged before the High Court and so we are unable to examine the tenability of those points.
For this reason, petition must be dismissed.
Counsel drew our attention to the fact that although the episode, which is the subject matter of the prosecution under section 16 (1A) (i) read with section 7(i) and section 2(1A) of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act, took place allegedly in 1972.
There was inexplicable, inordinate delay in trial.
The case was tried in 1977 which, according to counsel, prejudiced the petitioner considerably.
We are aghast at the traumatic impact on criminal justice inflicted by delayed trials when human memory becomes faded and vivid testimony is withheld.
The present case is an instance in point.
We feel strongly that the trial courts in the country should ensure that, in the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution, food adulteration cases, 5 which involve imprisonment, are tried expeditiously so that neither the prosecution nor the accused is prejudiced by unusual procrastination.
We express the hope that the High Court concerned will issue peremptory directions to trial Judges demanding expeditious disposal of such cases.
In the present case, prosecution evidence, as regards taking of samples, is perhaps not as good as it would have been had the trial been prompt.
We do not want forensic martyrdoms for prosecutions in food adulteration cases, thanks to tarred trials blamable on the judicial process.
The State Government has a duty to sanction the required courts in obedience to the mandate of Article 21 which implies judicial justice without undue delay.
Maybe, there is some grievance for the petitioner that he was disabled in defending himself properly, hampered by the lapse of five years, but unfortunately the point was not pressed before the High Court; and, we do not think it proper to investigate the substantiality of the prejudice.
As for the sentence, true that, in this case, it is not shown that the petitioner is a big merchant.
Perhaps he was a petty dealer and counsel represents that the trade has been wound up.
It is also submitted that the petitioner has served about three months out of the six months of imprisonment.
Having regard to the totality of circumstances, it is open to the petitioner to move the State Government to remit the remaining portion of the sentence, if so advised, and it would be for the Government to consider at all whether it should exercise its power of remission and its impact on society.
N.K.A. Petition dismissed.

Output:
HELD : The trial courts in the country should ensure that in the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution, food adulteration cases which involve imprisonment are tried expeditiously so that neither the prosecution nor the accused is prejudiced by unusual judicial procrastination.
The High Court concerned should issue peremptory directions to the trial judges demanding expeditious disposal of cases.
The State Government has a duty to sanction the required courts in obedience to the mandate of Article 21 which implies judicial justice without undue delay.
[4H, 5A B] It would be for the State Government in the instant case to consider at all whether it should exercise its power of remission and its impact on the society.
[5D E]