Input:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 570 of 1983.
From the Judgment and order dated 27the September, 1983 of the Calcutta High Court in C.R. No. (W) of 1983 arising out of original order Tender No. 1583 of 1983.
WITH Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2671 of 1983.
From the Judgment and order dated 27th September, 1983 of the Calcutta High Court in C.R. No. (W) of 1983 arising out of original order Tender No. 1 583 of 1983.
260 Somnath Chatterjee, HK Puri, section Ghosh and VK Behl for the petitioners.
Ashok Sen, Shankar Das Banerjee, DN Das and Shri Narain, for the respondents.
KG Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General.
RN Poddar Miss Halida Khatoon for the Union of India.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
The appeal is under Article 134 (a) with leave from the Calcutta High Court and is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of that Court dated September 27, 1983.
The Special Leave Petition is under Article 136 of the Constitution and is also directed against the same decision.
Both these matters are thus connected and arise out of the incident relating to the death of two young boys of Barrackpore area near Calcutta.
This judgment of ours will dispose of both the matters.
Two letters, one by one Sampat Lal, respondent I in the criminal appeal and another by respondents l (a) to I (n), both dated June 1, 1983, were received by the learned Acting Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court.
The letter sent by Sampat Lal alleged that two young boys by names Tirthankar Das Sharma and Sanjib Chatterjee, living in Barrackpore area, were missing since the afternoon of March 2, 1983.
Information was given at the local police station late at night on the same day and wide publicity that the two boys were missing but no information about their whereabouts was received till April 5, 1983.
On that day it transpired that dead bodies of two boys had been found from the railway track near Pandua railway station and they had been disposed of by the local police without taking any steps for their identification.
Verification of the photographs maintained by the Railway Police at Bandel and the wearing apparel of the two boys kept at the police station clearly indicated that the dead bodies were of the two missing boys.
The letter alleged that the parents of the two boys had approached several authorities including the Chief Minister of the State.
Without taking any serious notice of the matter, the Chief Minister was alleged to have made a statement to the effect even before com 261 petion of the investigation that it was a case of suicide.
From the A reports published in a Bengali newspaper it appeared that the two boys had been murdered.
The letter further alleged that the local police had been threatening the parents of the deceased and other people living in the locality.
The local people were, therefore, feeling insecure and had lost confidence in the administration.
They wanted that investigation should be conducted by an independent machinery which would command confidence and be acceptable to the local people.
They also asked for adequate protection to be given to the residents of the area.
In the second letter similar allegations were made but certain details not given in the first letter were given regarding the incident C and the following relief was claimed: "Hence on behalf of residents of Barrackpore our humble prayer to the Honourable Chief Justice is that the Government should instruct some neutral organisation like C.B.I., to investigate in search of unnatural death and solve the mystery to satisfy the people of this area and the soul of State.
This is apparent from delay in investigation, its incidents and in flow of publicity that when some neutral active investigation the reason of such death or who is the murderer or what is the real mystery cannot be known definitely.
After C.B.I. Or some such organisation con ducts the investigation, we the residents of Barrackpore promise to help them with heart and soul.
Our humble submission is that you may kindly accept our requests and try to stop the police from this negligence in investigation and also stop them from submitting motivated false informations and also we submit that through neutral investigation the real mystery should be exposed to our contention.
In case the police or some persons have some kind of motivation behind this the Honourable Court may take a role to set a precedence by ordering investigation into that." (Translated from the original letter in Bengali).
On June 6, 1983, the learned Acting Chief Justice directed the letters to be treated as a writ petition and asked the same to be placed before Borooah, J.
On June 7, 1983, the matter appeared 262 before the learned judge.
Mr. Ghosh appeared on behalf of the persons who had written the letters.
Mr. Shankar Das Banerjee appeared on behalf of Ananda Bazar Patrika, a widely circulated Bengali daily from Calcutta, in two issues of which dated May 12 and May 18, 1983 detailed reports about the incident on the basis of investigation said to have been carried by a private detective agency known as 'The Secret Eye '.
Borooah, J. read the letters and the reports in the two issues of the newspaper, heard Mr. Ghosh as also Mr. Shankar Das Banerjee and observed, inter alia: "When an unnatural death occurs or a prima facie case of the commission of a cognizable offence is brought to the notice of the police authorities, it is their duty under the Code of Criminal Procedure to conduct an investigation and ascertain the cause of the death.
Reading the letters and the newspaper reports which do not appear to have been contradicted by any authoritative statement from the police authorities, I, in the interest of justice, treat the two letters as formal petition under Article 226 of the Constitution after dispensing with the necessary formalities . " He ordered that a rule should issue to the State of West Bengal and other State authorities to, show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus may not be issued directing investigation in accordance with law to be conducted over the unnatural deaths of Tirthankar Das Sharma and Sanjib Chatterjee.
He also directed cause to be shown as to why a direction may not be given for production of all the records relating to investigation conducted till then.
He further directed: "Pending disposal of this rule, I direct the Deputy Inspector General Bureau of Investigation, 13 Lindsay Street, Calcutta 16 to cause an enquiry to be made and report to this Court by the 23rd of June 1983 as to how the two boys met their death.
The police authorities of the State will extend all possible help as required by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and the Ananda Bazar Patrika will also make available to the Central Bureau the reports submitted to the newspaper by the Detective Agency.
" Borooah, J. further directed the Superintendent of Police, 24 263 Pargans, to issue necessary instructions so that the proper protection A may be given to the people of the locality of Barrackpore and threats would not be meted out to them.
He prohibited publications relating to the death of the two boys in any newspaper within the State of West Bengal.
On June 9, 1983, an oral prayer was made on behalf of the State of West Bengal for staying operation of the orders and on the following day an appeal was preferred against the order of Borooah J. and the appeal was placed before a Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Pyne and Mr. Justice section C. Sen. Grievance was made on behalf of the State of West Bengal that Borooah, J. had made his order without giving any notice to it and without finding out if the investigation conducted by the police authorities under the law was not adequate, and as to whether the manner of investigation was such that it required the Deputy Inspector General of the Central Bureau of Investigation at Calcutta to be appointed to enquire into the incident.
At the appellate stage on behalf of the State Government materials were placed before the Court in support of its contention that adequate investigation had been undertaken as would be expected in the ordinary course over an incident of the type under consideration.
Long arguments were advanced before the Division Bench and the two learned judges devoted considerable attention to the matter and wrote out two separate and lengthy E judgments Pyne, J. held that: "I respectfully agree with the observations made by the Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the above case (Bhagwant Singh vs Commissioner of Police, Delhi, ; I am also of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case it would not be proper for me to speculate as to whether the unnatural death of the two boys was caused by suicide or murder.
I am, however, very much concerned with the question whether the investigation into the cause of the unnatural death of the two boys by the appellants is being conducted fairly and properly and after taking all materials, evidence and circumstances into consideration in accordance with law.
In the instant case the Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation is not called upon to exercise any power or to investigate into any 264 matter under or any other statuts.
In view of what has been stated herein before and in the fact and circumstances of the case, I appoint Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation as the Special officer in this case.
The Special officer will make the enquiry about the correctness of the facts, allegations and inferences contained in the reports of 'Secret Eye ' dated 8th and 14th May, 1983, as well as those in the two letters of the respondents both dated 1st June, 1983, copies whereof are Annexures 'A ' and 'B ' respectively to the affidavit of Bappaditya Roy affirmed on 20th June, 1983 and in the reports published in the two issues of Ananda Bazar Patrika dated May 12 and 18, 1983.
I, therefore, direct Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation to make necessary enquiry along the line aforesaid.
For the purpose of making such enquiry and report Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of investigation will be entitled to take into consideration fresh evidence, oral or documentary, materials and statements, if any, offered to him.
The report of the Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation will be submitted to the trial court within three weeks from date.
The police authorities of the State and the respondents will extend all possible help as required by.
the Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation in the matter of enquiry. " Sen, J. took note of the fact that no opportunity had been given to the State and its officers by Borooah, J. before he made the order dated June 7, 1983.
He also came to hold: "In my opinion, in a case like this, an interim order directing the CBI to make a report should not have been passed without giving a hearing to the State Government.
No case of urgency was made out at any stage.
In my opinion, an order of the magnitude of a CBI enquiry should not have been passed without giving a hearing to the State Government.
" Sen, J. took notice of the fact that allegations contained in the 265 letters had not been supported by affidavit before the learned A single judge.
He also took notice of the fact that the materials said to have been obtained on investigation by the detective agency had not been produced before the Division Bench and no affidavit of any competent person had been filed.
Only two affidavits which came before the Division Bench were one by Sampat Lal and the other from the law officer of the newspaper.
He, therefore.
concluded: "Mr. Chatterjee is right in his contention that not an iota of evidence has been brought out in the two affidavits that have been filed and also the two newspaper reports on the basis of which the interim .order was passed.
CBI enquiry into a matter which is already under investigation of the State police is a very serious step.
There must be very strong legal grounds for ordering such an enquiry." According to Sen, J. the writ petition was not maintainable on the strength of the two letters and the two newspaper reports.
Though conclusions of Sen, J. were very different from those of Pyne, J., yet he concluded by saying: "Under the order proposed to be passed, the CBI or any other agency of the Central Government has not been entrusted with the job of investigation.
It has been made clear that the DIG, CBI is being appointed the Special officer and not the CBI.
The Special officer will be at liberty to appoint his own staff for the purpose of investigation.
The costs, charges and expenses will be borne by the respondents.
There is no question of employing the men and resources of the CBI for the purpose of carrying out the investigation.
The officers of the CBI are not being entrusted with the police power or the police function in the State of West Bengal in any manner whatever.
" G "The DIG, CBI has already indicated his unwillingness to carry out the investigation as directed by the learned trial judge.
Nobody can be compelled to be a Special officer or a Receiver against his free will and volition.
The DIG, CBI is not obliged to act as a Special officer of the Court 266 and if he is still unwilling to carry out the duties of a Special officer.
he is free to decline it.
Specific provisions have been made in the order proposed.
The parties have been directed to mention the matter to the Court if the DIG, CBI declines to work as Special officer.
In that event, some other Special officer will have to be appointed.
I agree to the order that is now sought to be passed by my learned brother." The Division Bench consisting of Pyne and Sen, JJ.
granted leave to appeal to this Court and the criminal appeal has in due course been filed by the State of West Bengal.
As already pointed out, the special leave petition under Article l 36 of the Constitution at the instance of the State covers almost the same field as the criminal appeal and, therefore, it had been tagged to be heard alongwith the appeal.
It is not necessary to refer to any particular facts in regard to that special leave petition.
Though Sen, J. had indicated doubts about the maintainability of the writ petition on the basis of letters sent to the Court, Mr. Chatterjee fairly conceded before us that he would not dispute the position that it is open to a High Court to entertain grievances received through postal communication and register the same as a writ petition.
Mr. Chatterjee, however, suggested and we think that there is great force in, the submission, that when such information is laid before the Court, care and caution should be adopted to ensure that the process of the Court is not abused or misused.
The Court should be prima facie satisfied that the information laid before the Court is of such a nature that it calls for examination and this prima facie satisfaction may be derived from the credentials of the informant, namely, what is the character or standing of the informant or from the nature of the information given by him namely, whether it is vague and indefinite or contains specific allegations as a result of survey or investigation or from the gravity or seriousness of the complaint set out in the information or from any other circumstance or circumstances appearing from the communication addressed to the Court or to a judge of the Court on behalf of the Court.
Where the Court is so satisfied prima facie, the Court may not insist on the filing of an affidavit and may proceed to investigate into the allegations with a view to meting out justice to the persons on whose behalf the communication is 267 addressed.
This would be so particularly where to insist upon an A affidavit at the initial stage may lead to perpetration of injustice or may give rise to a situation where from a practical point of view the doors of justice would be closed to the poor and the disadvantaged.
We may, however, point out that where the Court is not so prima facie satisfied,the Court may before issuing notice to the opposite party, ask the lawyer appointed amicus curiae to contact the informant and file an affidavit or a regular writ petition.
These are the different procedures which have been adopted by this Court while dealing with communications complaining of violation of the rights of the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community.
Since Mr. Chatterjee, has not disputed the validity of the practice of registering of writ petitions on the basis of letters and/or information received by the Court, we arc not called upon to examine this aspect of the matter any longer.
Mr. Chatterjee appearing in support of the appeal maintained that under the Code of Criminal Procedure which lays down the statutory procedure to be followed when report of an offence is lodged with the police, the power to investigate is vested in the police.
Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( 'Code ' for short) contains provisions regarding the lodging of information with the police as also their power to investigate.
It is maintained that as soon as such information was lodged with the police, action as would be proper in the facts of the case, was taken.
According to Mr. Chatterjee, all possible steps that could be taken were taken without lapse of any time, Borooah, J. did not call upon the State to produce the papers relating to investigation and without informing himself as to what action had been taken on the report lodged with the police, proceeded to make an interim order which had far reaching effect.
According to learned counsel, the Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the investigation which under the law was vested in the police authorities had so long as there had been no breach of duty, the Court had no power to intervene particularly when the matter was still in the hands of the investigating agency.
No opportunity was given to the local police, or for the matter of that, to the State Government, to produce the records of investigation.
Thus, without informing himself of the actual stage and position of the investigation already undertaken by the local police, the learned single judge proceeded to act on certain assumption for which there was no basis or foundation.
It has been the submission of H 268 Mr. Chatterjee before us that the State Government was entitled to notice before the impugned direction on June 7, 1983, was made and the real effect of the direction being to disturb the investigation by introducing a new channel of inquiry, the rules of natural justice required that the State and the police authorities in whom vested the statutory jurisdiction to investigate should have been provided a hearing.
Mr. Chatterjee also canvassed that between 'inquiry ' and 'investigation ' there was a clear distinction under the Code and while investigation referred to the procedure of collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any other person authorised by a Magistrate in that behalf, 'inquiry ' referred to inquiry other than a trial conducted by a Magistrate or a Court.
The main distinction, therefore, was that inquiry was a magisterial process while investigation was the process of collection of evidence through the police machinery and the net effect of the impugned order of the learned single judge was actually the setting up of an investigating agency.
Though in the order there was reference to appointment of the DIG, CBI as a Special officer, what he was to carry out was referred to as an inquiry.
Continuance of investigation through two separate machineries one by the agency of the CBI and the other by the normal investigating agency of the police was bound to create confusion and prejudice the investigation into the truth of the allegations.
Mr. Ashoke Sen appeared for the respondents who had written the letters to the High Court while Mr. Shankar Das Banerjee represented the Ananda Bazar Patrika.
Learned Additional Solicitor General appeared before us on behalf of the Union Government.
Mr. Sen and Mr. Banerjee refuted the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants by Mr. Chatterjee.
Before we proceed to closely examine the submissions advanced by counsel for the parties, it is proper to clear the ground and formulate the exact points which require examination.
It is certainly not for this Court at the present stage to examine and come to a conclusion as to whether this was a case of suicide or murder.
If as a result of investigation, evidence is gathered and a trial takes place the Sessions Judge will decide that controversy and it may be that in due course such controversy may be canvassed before this Court in some form or the other.
It would, therefore, be wholly inappropriate at this stage to enter such a question.
One of the controversies which loomed large before the Division Bench 269 Of the Calcutta High Court was as to the appointment of the DIG, CBI to inquire into the matter in the absence of proper consent of the State Government.
That question has not been recanvassed before us and it has been accepted by counsel for all the parties including the Additional Solicitor General that while section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1916 ( 'Act ' for short) would require the consent of the State Government before jurisdiction under section 5 of that Act is exercised by officers of that establishment, when a direction is given by the Court in an appropriate case, consent envisaged under section 6 of the Act would not be a condition precedent to compliance with the Court 's direction.
In our considered opinion, section 6 of the Act does not apply when the Court gives a direction to the CBI to conduct an investigation and counsel for the parties rightly did not dispute this position.
In this view, the impugned order of the learned single judge and the appellate decision of the Division Bench appointing DIG, CBI to inquire into the matter would not be open to attack for want of sanction under section 6 of the Act.
Four questions appear to survive for examination: (1) Effect of violation of the Rules of Natural Justice on the order: This can be sub divided into two aspects: (i) Whether the order of the single judge is vitiated having been made in violation of rules of natural justice ? (ii) Whether that order is also bad as the learned single judge had not cared to inform himself as to the stage of investigation and if there was any lacuna therein ? (2) What exactly is the role meant to be played by the Special officer and whether the inquiry contemplated to be carried on by him would affect the investigation which was being conducted by the local police authorities? (3) Is it open to the Court to interfere with the investigation which is still proceeding and what are the circumstances in which such interference, if any, is possible, and the guidelines to be followed in such matter? 270 (4) Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the direction given by the single judge and upheld with certain modifications by the Division Bench was proper? As already point out, power vests in the police authorities of the State Government for conducting investigation into allegations relating to an offence.
However, the stand taken by the respondents was that the State Government and the police authorities had not acted properly and the investigation was not being conducted as required by law.
As appears from the order of June 7, 1983, Borooah, J. directed notice to issue to the State of West Bengal as also to the other authorities concerned to show cause against the issue of a writ.
No hearing was, however, afforded to the State Government or its officers when direction to appoint the Special officer in whom power of inquiry was to be vested, was made.
There could be no scope for appointing a special officer unless the statutory channel of investigation was found not to have functioned properly.
There was no basis at that stage to assume that the contents of the letters as also the facts stated in the columns of the newspaper had not been contradicted It was the State Government or its officers who alone could have authoritatively indicated the facts showing whether the allegations contained in the letters or the newspaper reports were true and if so, to what extent, or how the investigation was being carried on and what stage it had reached so as to enable the Court to come to a prima facie conclusion that the State Government and the police authorities were not discharging properly their statutory obligation to carry out an investigation.
But when no notice was given to the State Government and no opportunity was offered to them, it is difficult to see how an ex parte order could be made on such an assumption When we say this, we do not wish to be understood to say that in no case an ex parte order can be made by the Court If the faces stated in the letter or the writ petition are credible and there is such urgency that the ends of justice might be defeated by not making an ex parte order or giving of notice without ex parte order might lead to aggravation of oppression or exploitation or removal or elimination of evidence, the Court would certainly be justified in making an ex parte order.
But here there were no such circumstances at all and the Court could have very well issued notice to the Respondents and tried to find out whether there was 271 any necessity for directing the appointment of DIG, CBI to act as A a Special officer and requiring the police authorities of the State to extend all possible help as may be required by him.
We are of the view that Borooah, J. should have issued notice to the State Government, afforded a reasonable opportunity to it and its officers who were already in session of the investigation to make a report in regard to the action taken by them and after making an overall judicial assessment of the situation, the need for appointing a Special officer should have been considered.
The appointment of a Special officer with a direction to inquire into the commission of an offence can only be on the basis that there has not been a proper investigation.
There is a well defined hierarchical administrative set up of the police in the State of West Bengal as in all other States and to have created a new channel of inquiry or investigation is likely to create an impression that everything is not well with the statutory agency and it is likely to cast a stigma on the regular policy hierarchy.
We are inclined .
to agree with Mr. Chatterjee for the appellant that in the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping the nature of the order made in view, the direction to appoint a Special officer with powers to inquire should not have been made until the appellants had been given a hearing and the Court had the papers of investigation laid before it for being prima facie satisfied that the investigation had either not been proper or adequate.
The procedure laid down in the Code is clear and definite.
It may be that in a given case the Court on being prima facie satisfied from circumstances appearing from the record that the statutory agency has not worked in an effective way or the circumstances are such that it may reasonably be presumed or inferred that the statutory agency may not be able to discharge its function of investigation fairly and impartially might reasonably consider supplementing the procedure, but as we have already indicated, there was no adequate material on the record for the learned single G judge to be satisfied that the facts warranted appointment of a Special officer.
Borooah, J. did not describe the DIG, CBI as a Special officer.
It is in the judgment of Pyne, J. that we find reference to this term.
In his judgment Pyne, J. noted; 272 "In view of what has been stated here in before and in the facts and circumstances of the case, I appoint Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation as the Special officer in this case." (underlining is by us) Having thus appointed him as a Special officer, he proceeded to indicate that the Special officer will make an enquiry about the correctness of the facts, allegations and inferences contained in the reports of 'Secret Eye ' dated the 8th and the 14th May 1983 as well as those in the two letters of the respondents both dated 1 June, 1983, copies whereof are Annexures A ' and 'B ' respectively to the affidavit of Bappaditya Roy affirmed on 20th June, 1983, and in the reports published in the two issues of Ananda Bazar Patrika dated May 12 and 18, 1983.
Sen, J. in his separate judgment made it clear that under the order proposed to be passed, the CBI or other agency of the Central Government was not being entrusted with the job of investigation.
Investigation into the allegations had already been undertaken and the papers which have been produced before us indicate that the first information lodged with the police was a missing report dated March 21, 1983.
Even when such a report had been given contemporaneous steps were taken to trace the two missing boys.
the dead bodies were recovered from the railway track on the following day and were independently dealt with as the link between the information about missing of the two boys and the two dead bodies had not been established at that point of time.
Autopsy was conducted in due course and as the dead bodies had not been claimed by any relation, the same had been duly disposed of through the contractor for unclaimed bodies.
For the first time, on 5th and 6th April, 1983 the link was established when the relatives of the two deceased boys went two Bandel GRPS and identified the clothes kept at the police station to be those that had been worn by the missing boys, and the photographs of the dead boys placed the matter beyond dispute that the two young boys whose dead bodies had been recovered from the railway track and which had been cremated were the missing boys.
The parents of the boys met the Chief Minister on April 8, 1983.
The Chief Minister issued directions to the police for proper investigation.
273 It is stated that on April 14, 1983, the Chief Minister made a statement on the floor of the Assembly wherein he had Indicated that the incident appeared to be a case of suicide and not murder.
This statement of the Chief Minister was subjected to a lot of criticism in the columns of the newspapers as also in the body of the letters under reference.
In course of hearing Mr. Chatterjee produced before us the official text of the Chief Minister 's statement.
It appears that he had only said that the Investigation carried on up to that stage appeared to indicate that it was a case of a suicide.
It may not be out of place to point out that the Doctor conducting post mortem examination had opined that it could be a case of suicide.
Obviously the statement on the floor of the Legislative Assembly was on the basis of that medical report which was apparently available to the Chief Minister. 'Inquiry ' and 'investigation ' are statutory terms defined in the Code.
We were told in the course of hearing by counsel for the parties that under the West Bengal Police Manual the terms have different meanings given to them.
It is not necessary for our purpose to go into the question any further.
By whatever name the work entrusted to the Special officer be called, there can be no dispute that he was required to ascertain facts from the witnesses and documents, if any, in regard to the death of the two boys.
This process necessarily involved a fact finding inquiry by ordinarily tapping the same sources as the investigating agency was expected to contract.
This, therefore, necessarily involved a duplicate investigation.
The police had already commenced investigation into the allegations.
Under the patronage of the Ananda Bazar Patrika the private defective agency had also started investigating into the matter and as would appear from the two reports in the Ananda Bazar Patrika and the materials now placed on the records of the High Court and this Court, some investigation had definitely been carried out by the State agency.
This meant that three separate channels were put into operation almost contemporaneously.
Over the activity of the private detective agency the Court would ordinarily have no jurisdiction to exercise but in view of the fact that there were two separate channels placed in active charge of investigation to be conducted contemporaneously, confusion was bound to occur and working of the two channels at a time was 274 likely to prejudice the proper investigation making the exposing of the truth buried under mystery more difficult.
Carrying this duplicate process, in our opinion, was not likely to serve the cause of justice nor help in achieving the object for which it had been set up.
The Special officer was not to exercise the powers under section 5 of the Act and if he wanted any real assistance in the matter of investigation, it had to be carried through the police officers of the State administration.
This was likely to bring in further confusion inasmuch as the witnesses were likely to be contacted by the same police officer on more than one occasion once in the course of investigation conducted by the police and again to meet the requirements of the Special officer.
We are sure that the High Court never intended the cause of justice to be prejudiced and the serious attempt to find out the truth to be aborted.
The next aspect to be considered is whether it is open to the Court to interfere with the investigation which is still proceeding.
It has been conceded before us and rightly in our view, that investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of the Code.
Judicial opinion seems to be settled and we have several authorities of this Court where interference by the Court into police investigation has not been approved.
This question arose before a Division Bench of three judges in an appeal carried by the same State of West Bengal in the case of State of West Bengal vs section N. Basak,(1) Kapoor, J. quoted with approval the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of king Emperor vs Khwaja Nazir Ahmad,(2) where the Privy Council observed: "The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus.
In such a case as the present, however, the Court 's functions being when (1) ; (2) [1944] L.R. 71.
275 a charge is preferred before it, and not until then.
It has A sometimes been thought that section 561A (now section 482) has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted.
But this is not so, the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it , should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of that Act.
" The Court added: "With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord." on a finding that the High Court had exceeded jurisdiction in interfering with the investigation, the appeal of the State of West Bengal was allowed.
The question again arose in the case of section N. Sharma vs Bipin Kumar Tiwari & Ors.(8) on this occasion the Court was called upon to examine the scope of magisterial power.
After referring to the relevant sections, the Court concluded that: "The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case The power of the police to investigate has been made independent of any control by the Magistrate.
" Then came the case of State of Bihar vs J.A.C. Saldanha & ors.(2) In a peculiar set of fact this Court was again called upon to adjudacte upon the scope of judicial interference over investigation.
Speaking on this aspect of the matter, Desai,J. spoke for the Division Bench thus: (1) ; (2) ; 6. 276 "There is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment.
Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government.
The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the l offence and bring the offender to book.
Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence for the purpose of proving the offence.
Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end.
On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in section 173(8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to.
law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court.
There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in field or crime detection and its subsequent adjucation between the police and the Magistrate.
" The observation of the Privy Council which we have already extracted were again quoted with approval, Desai, J. adding: "This view of the Judicial Committee clearly demarcates the functions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of detection of crime and its subsequent trial and it would appear that the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not be interfered with by the judiciary." (underlining ours) This seems to have been the well accepted judicial opinion on 277 the subject.
It is appropriate at this stage to refer to a later decision of this Court which has been relied upon by the Division Bench of the High Court, being the case of Bhagwat Singh vs Commissioner of Police, Delhi.(l) That case arose out of what is now being described as the notorious bride burning incidents.
Investigation had come to an end and a conclusion of the case being one of suicide had been reached.
At this stage the Minister of State of Home Affairs in the Government of India (the case related to the Union Territory of Delhi) had taken a decision to entrust the investigation again to the C.B.I. A writ petition was filed before this Court making allegations against the police authorities with reference to the investigation.
The conclusion of the investigating agency that it was a case of suicide was challenged.
This Court clearly indicated: "It is not possible in this case, nor indeed would it be right for us to do so, to enter into the question whether Gurinder Kaur committed suicide or was murdered.
That is a matter which is properly involved in the trial of a criminal charge by a court possessing jurisdiction.
We are concerned here only with an examination of the question whether, after being informed of Gurinder Kaur 's death, the police authorities conducted themselves as law and justice required of them.
" The Court after dealing with the material placed before it, came to the conclusion: "Two inferences follow irresistibly from the material before us.
One is that the investigation by the police following the occurrence was desultory and lackadaisical, and showed want of appreciation of the emergent need to get at the truth of the case.
The other inference which disturbs us is that the entries in the police case diary (set forth in the annexure to the counter affidavit on the record) do not a appear to have been entered with the scrupulous completeness and efficiency which the law requires of such a document.
The haphazard maintenance of a document of that (1) ; 278 status not only does no credit to those responsible for maintaining it but defeats the very purpose for which it is required to be maintained.
We think it to be of the utmost importance that the entries in a police case diary should be made with promptness, in sufficient detail, mentioning all significant facts, in careful chronological order and with complete objectivity. ' The Court concluded by observing: "We have referred to some of the important features of the case.
We have done so not for the purpose of determining whether the girl was murdered or had committed suicide, but solely with the object of drawing attention to the manner in which the investigation of the case was conducted.
Disappointing as it may seem to those who have desired the institution of criminal action on the basis that a crime has been committed, we do not think that on the material before us we can go that far.
The investigation of the case was transferred from the police administration of Delhi to the Central Bureau of Investigation at the instance, we understand, of the petitioner.
We hope and trust that this investigation has been completed.
If not we would request the Central Bureau of Investigation to complete the investigation within three months from today and take such action as may be warranted by the result of the investigation.
" Nothing has been said in this decision which runs counter to the well settled proposition laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and approved on three occasions by this Court.
The investigation in the present case is still pending as we were told at the Bar.
It is quite likely that some day, and we hope and trust that there would we no further delay, the Court of competent jurisdiction would be in seisin of the matter and would be called upon to decide whether it was a case of murder or suicide.
We have, therefore, thought it proper exercise of discretion not to enter into the facts and express any opinion one way or the other so as to prejudice the trial that might take place.
It is sufficient to indicate that there is residuary jurisdiction left in the Court to give directions 279 to the investigating agency when it is satisfied that the requirements A of the law are not being complied with and investigation is not being conducted properly or with due haste and promptitude.
The Court has to be alive to the fact that the scheme of the law is that the investigation has been entrusted to the police and it is ordinarily not subjeci to the normal supervisory power of the Court.
We are inclined, on the facts of the case as placed before us, to take the view that the materials placed before the Court did not justify an exception to be made to the rule indicated by this Court and the appointment of a Special officer was not called for at this stage.
What then should be the nature of the order to be made in the case, is the next aspect for consideration.
On the conclusion which we have indicated above, the appeal has to be allowed and the order of appointment of the Special officer has to be set aside.
Certain observations to our mind are appropriate and called for regarding further conduct of the investigation by the police authorities.
We must indicate also that the investigation carried out has not been quite satisfactory.
As already pointed out, the Chief Minister had very appropriately ordered that a thorough and careful investigation should be made into the unfortunate death of Tirthankar and Sanjeeb.
Papers were produced before us at time of hearing which indicated.
that pursuant to the orders of the Chief Minister, the Home Secretary had addressed letters to the top police officers conveying the serious concern of the Chief Minister as also his direction that a thorough and proper investigation should be taken up.
From the materials placed before us, we have a feeling that in the conduct of investigation the police authorities have been more concerned with trying to establish that the reports furnished by Secret Eye as appearing in the issues of the Ananda Bazar Patrika were not based on correct materials and that proper conclusions had not been drawn rather than into carrying on an intensive investigation in an objective manner.
It further appears that as the police authorities during their investigation could not find any clue to establish the kidnapping of the two boys, they formed a tentative opinion that the two boys had committed suicide.
This was based mere upon suspicion than upon any clue obtained during investigation.
Once having formed that opinion, it appears 280 from the materials produced before us that they laboured to justify the same.
The facts and circumstances leave an impression in our mind that the investigation was channelised for collecting materials to support that view only.
It is indeed unfortunate that in spite of the missing report of the two boys having been properly lodged with the appropriate police authorities and the fact that the two boys were missing have been sufficiently publicised as ordinarily done, the bodies of the two boys were allowed to be cremated even before an attempt for identification had been made.
There is some material in the records of investigation indicating that two railway tickets from Barrackpore to Pandua had been found in possession of the two dead boys and for non seizure of those two tickets the Assistant Sub Inspector incharge had actually been suspended.
It is indeed difficult to understand why the Assistant Sub Inspector should not have seized the two tickets if they were found on the dead bodies of the two boys, even if he felt it was a case of suicide.
Assuming that this fact of recovery of two tickets from the dead bodies of the two young boys was true, a clue was available than that two boys had travelled from Barrackpore and when this link through the railway tickets was available, it is incomprehensive why the police officers failed to contact the police authorities at Barrack pore.
If that had been done, there would have been a possibility of the link being established.
particularly when the missing report was available and the investigation of the case could have taken a different turn.
It is necessary that the investigating agency must disabuse its mind of the tentative conclusion that death was suicide.
Our saying so does not mean that after a proper investigation they may not reach the same conclusion.
All that we intend to point out is that conclusion should not have been the basis upon which the a investigation should have proceeded.
Nor had the stage come to draw that conclusion without further investigation.
There are aspects which militate against the theory of suicide.
Normally one would not commit suide unless there are strong and compelling reasons for it.
Thus, ordinarily there has to be a very pressing motive behind every case of suicide.
Sufficient material to prima facie establish the existence of such a motive has not yet been 281 brought on the record of investigation.
Both the deceased boys were teenagers.
Tirthankar has been pictured as a bright boy good at his studies and appeared to be responsive in nature took active interest in various fields of life appropriate for his age.
The picture of Tirthankar as a disappointed and frustrated lover is again not supported by much evidence.
The reactions of human mind have no set.
form and it may be that Tirthankar was an unusual boy full of sentiments and could have acted in an unusual manner.
But that cannot be a conclusion drawn either on suspicion or on materials which do not readily fit into that theory.
Even if the view of the investigating agency in regard to Tirthankar 's motive is accepted, there does not appear to be any motive at all so far as his associate is concerned, except that as a loyal friend he was prepared to act the way Tirthankar went.
For Sanjeeb to have chosen to commit suicide the material collected till now seems to be very weak.
There have been rare instances where loyalty has known no limitations but there is no justify material to credit Sanjeeb as possessing such a rare quality.
If suicide had to be committed it did not require the two boys to travel to such a distance and die at an unknown place on the railway track.
The place where the dead bodies were found was not indeed very lonely and the apprehension of being detected before the attempt to commit suicide would be successful could not be eliminated.
The two boys were sufficiently grown up to be credited with logical behaviour.
There has been a lot of criticism and explanation advanced before us relating to the mode of travelling to reach Pandua.
Some railway tickets were sold for Pandua and there is conclusion as to whether the sale related to two or 2 tickets.
The material relating to the time of sale is also not very clear.
If proper investigation is made and further attention is devoted, it is quite likely that more material would come to light on the basis of which one or the other of the competing explanations for the death can find credibility and the investigation can then proceed in the right direction.
There is another aspect to which we must immediately turn.
Affidavits and other materials were placed before us regarding the investigation both by the private agency, namely, Secret Eye, and the statutory channel.
The language used by the top police offers 282 in the official reports is indeed unfortunate.
They have expressed themselves not only in intemperate and improper language but have even gone to the extent of being abusive in their approach.
The language used in the reply of Shri Debabrat Dhar, Director of Secret Eye to the report is equally bad.
The investigation conducted by the private agency as also official channel was intended to find out the truth.
While both these agencies were or were required to devote their entire attention in unearthing the truth, they should not have got themselves entangled in a battle of words.
We indicate our strong disapproval of the attitude adopted by both.
Public mind appears to have been greatly shaken and agitated on account of the mysterious death of the two boys.
This is an event over which the people of the State are justifiably concerned.
They do reasonably expect the police authorities to concentrate their full attention and by using the expertise at their command to unearth the mystery and proceed on the basis of the truth discovered by them.
It is, therefore, necessary that greater candour should be exhibited and the investigating agency should with an open mind, collect all the material available and then only eliminate that which has to be discarded and retain the rest to be used for their 15 purpose.
We are alive to the position that there are occasions when death remains a mystery in spite of the best of efforts.
But we hope and trust that with an honest attempt and sincere efforts made, the truth would be found out and the police authorities of the State would be in a position to give a creditable account of themselves.
We do not think there is any necessity to take away the investigation from the hands of the State police machinery which is the statutory agency.
We would, however, suggest that the Director General of Police, West Bengal, will appoint a competent supervisory officer from the higher ranks of the State police with expertise in investigation to supervise the investigation in the present case.
The police authorities will, we hope, avail of any credible/material collected by Secret Eye, if such material is made available to the police authorities.
We hope and trust that a determined effort would be made by the State Government and its Police authorities to get at the truth and in the event of this case appearing 283 to be a case of murder, the murderer would be proceeded against the A dealt with according to law.
We are sure that the police authorities would take it as a matter of challenge, rise to the occasion and by their performance, justify their stand in these proceedings that they were competent to investigate and there was no necessity of the CBI being called in, as was done by the High Court.
In view of what we have decided, no orders are necessary in the connected special leave petition.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

Output:
The respondents addressed two letters to the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court regarding mysterious death of two young boys living in Barrackpore area near Calcutta alleging, inter alia, that the local police was not conducting the investigation into the unnatural death of the two boys fairly and properly and was trying to make it a case of suicide and requested the High Court to order a thorough investigation into the incident by an independent machinery which would command confidence and be acceptable to the local police.
A single Judge of the High Court, before whom the letters were placed, treated the two letters as a formal petition and, without giving notice directed issue of a rule to the State of West Bengal and other authorities to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus may not be issued directing investigation in accordance with law to be conducted over the unnatural death of the two boys.
In the meanwhile the Judge also appointed Deputy Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation to make as inquiry and report to the High Court as to how 257 the two boys met their death.
The appellants preferred an appeal against the said order before the Division Bench which also confirmed the order of the Single Judge with the modification that the DIG, CBI will act as a special officer.
Hence this appeal.
The appellants contended (i) that the order of the Single Judge was vitiated having been made in violation of rules of natural justice; (ii) that the order was also bad as the learned Single Judge had not cared to inform himself as to the stage of investigation and if there was any lacuna therein and he proceeded to act on certain assumptions for which there was no basis or foundation, (iii) that since there had been no breach of duty, the court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the investigation which, under the law, was vested in the police authorities and therefore the directions given by the Single Judge and upheld with certain modifications by the Division Bench were not proper.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
It is clear from the order passed by the Learned Single Judge that no bearing was afforded to the State Government or its officers when direction to appoint the special officer in whom power of inquiry was to be vested was made.
There was no basis at that stage to assume that the contents of the letters as also the facts stated in the columns of the newspaper had not been contradicted.
It was the State Government or its officers who alone could have authoritatively indicated the facts showing whether the allegations contained in the letters or the newspaper report were true and if so to what extent or how the investigation was being carried on and what stage it had reached so as to enable the court to come to a prima facie authorities were not discharging properly their statutory obligation to carry out an investigation But when no notice was given to the State Government and no opportunity was offered to them, it is difficult to see how an ex parte order could be made on such an assumption.
If the facts stated in the letter or the writ petition are credible and there is such urgency that the ends of justice might be defeated by not making an ex parte order or giving of notice without ex parte order might lead to aggrevation of oppression or exploitation or removal or elimination of evidence, the court would certainly be justified in making an ex parte order.
But in the instant case, there were no such circumstances at all and the court could have very well issued notice to the respondents and tried to find out whether there wag any necessity directing the appointment of DIG, CBI to act as a Special officer and requiring the police authorities of the State to extend all possible help as may be required by him.
[270C H: 271A] (2) The appointment of a Special officer with a direction to enquire into the commission of an offence can only be on the basis that there has not been a proper investigation.
There is a well defined hierarchical administrative set up of the police in the State of West Benga1 as in all other States and lo have created 3 new channel of inquiry or investigation is likely to create an impression that everything is not well with the statutory agency 258 and it is likely to cast a stigma on the regular police hierarchy.
In the facts and circumstances of the instant case and the nature of the order made in view, the direction to appoint a Special officer with powers to inquire should not have been made until the appellants has been given a hearing and the court had the papers of investigation laid before it for being prima facie satisfied that the investigation had either not been proper or adequate.
[271C E] (3) Under the Code of Criminal Procedure which lays down the procedure to be followed when report of an offence is lodged with the police, the power to investigate is vested in the police.
The procedure laid down in the Code is clear and definite.
Investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of the Code.
Judicial opinion seems to be settled and there are several authorities of the Supreme Court where interference by the Court into police investigation has not been approved.
There is however.
residuary jurisdiction left in the court to give directions to the investigating agency when it is satisfied that the requirements of the law are not being complied with and investigation is not being conducted properly or with due haste and promptitude.
The court has to be alive to the fact that the scheme of the law is that the investigation has been entrusted to the police and it is ordinarily not subject to the normal supervisory power of the court.
But in the instant case, the material placed before the court did not justify an exception to be made to the rule indicated by the Supreme Court and the appointment of a Special officer was not called for at this state.
[262D; 270B; 278H; 279A C] State of West Bengal vs S.N. Basak S.N. Sharma vs Bipin Kumar Tiwari & Ors.[1970] 3 S.C.R 946.
State of Bihar v J. A. C. Saldanha & Ors.
[1980] 2 S.C R. 16 followed.
kings Emperor vs Khwaja Nazir Ahmed [1944] L.R. 71 referred to.
Bhagwant Singh vs Commissioner of Police, Delhi ; held not applicable.
(4) 'Inquiry ' and 'investigation ' are statutory terms defined in the Code.
In the instant case whatever name the work entrusted to the Special officer be called, there can be no dispute that he was required to ascertain facts from the witnesses and documents, if any, in regard to the death of the two boys.
This process necessarily involved a fact finding inquiry by ordinarily tapping the same sources as the investigating agency was expected to contact.
This, therefore, necessarily involved a duplicate investigation.
In view of the fact that there were two separate channels Placed in active charge of investigation to be conducted contemporaneously, confusion was bound to occur and working of the two channels at a time was likely to prejudice the proper investigation making the exposing of the truth buried under mystery more difficult.
Carrying this duplicate process was not likely to serve the cause of justice nor help in achieving the object for which it had been set up.
The Special officer was not to exercise the power under s.5 of the , and if be wanted any real 259 assistance in the matter of investigation, it had to be carried through the police officers of the State Administration.
This was likely to bring in futher confusion in as much as the witnesses were likely to be contacted by the same police office on more than one occasion once in the course of investigation conducted by the police and again to meet the requirements of the Special officer.
We are sure that the High Court never intended the cause of justice to be prejudiced and the serious attempt to find out the truth to be aborted.
[273D F; H; 274A C] (5) While section 6 of the would require the consent of the Slate Government before jurisdiction under s.5 of that Act is exercised by officer of that establishment, when a direction is given by the court in an appropriate case, consent envisaged under s.6 of the Act would not be a condition precedent to compliance with the court 's direction Section 6 of the Act does not apply when the court C gives a direction to the C.B.I. to conduct an investigation.
In this view, the impugned order of the learned single judge and the appellate decision of the Division Bench appointing DIG, CBI to inquire into the matter would not be open to attack for want of sanction under s.6 of the Act.
[269B D] (6) ln the instant case, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of appointment of the Special officer and observed that the investigation carried out has not been quite satisfactory.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no necessity to take away the investigation from the hands of the State Police machinery which is the statutory agency.
The court pointed out that though there are occasions when death remains a mystery in spite of the best of efforts, it hopes that with an honest attempt and since efforts made, the truth would be found out and the police authorities of the State would be in a position to give a creditable account of themselves.
The court also suggested that the Director General of Police, West Bengal, will appoint a competent supervisory officer from the higher ranks of the State police with expertise in investigation to supervise the investigation in the present case.
[279D; 282E H]


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 13, 1954, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (Calcutta Bench) in Appeal No. Cal 87 of 1953.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India, J. B. Dadachanji, section N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellants.
P. K. Chatterjee, for the respondents.
November 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J.
This appeal with special leave arises out of an application made by the appellant to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar under section 33 of the (hereinafter referred to as " 'the Act"), seeking permission to discharge the respondents from its employ.
873 The respondents were in the employ of the appellant and were staying in a two storeyed house in the city of Patna which had been rented by the appellant for housing its workmen.
On November 20, 1952, an occurrence took place in the said house wherein the respondents were involved.
Written reports of the said occurrence were sent on November 21, 1952, to the appellant 's Chief Engineer and the respondents were placed under suspension the same day.
An industrial dispute was then pending between the parties i.e., the appellant and its workmen before the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, and the appellant therefore made an application to the said Tribunal under section 33 of the Act for permission to dismiss the respondents on the ground of misconduct as per cl.
17(b)(viii) of the appellant 's Standing Orders.
On November 27, 1952, the respondents also made an application before the said Tribunal under section 33A of the Act inter alia on the ground that their suspension by the appellant as aforesaid was a breach of section 33 of the Act.
On December 6, 1952, the appellant made an application before the said Tribunal stating that on a reconsideration of the facts of the case of the respondents the original prayer for permission to dismiss the the respondents was not being pressed, and for the ends of justice it would be sufficient if the appellant was granted permission to discharge the respondents under cl.
14(a) of the Standing Orders instead of the original prayer for dismissal under cl.
17(b)(viii) thereof.
This application was resisted by the respondents.
The Industrial Tribunal, however, entertained the same and after hearing the parties duly made its award on May 14, 1953, dismissing the respondents ' application under section 33A of the Act and granting the appellant permission to discharge the respondents from its employ with effect from the date of the order on payment to the respondents of one month 's pay in lieu of notice within 15 days therefrom.
The respondents carried an appeal against the said order of the Industrial Tribunal granting the appellant 's application under section 33 of the Act before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta.
A 874 preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the appellant before the Labour Appellate Tribunal that no substantial question of law was involved and as such the appeal was not maintainable.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal was of the opinion that the appellant had alleged misconduct against the respondents and could not be allowed to adopt the expedient of terminating their services by giving notice for the requisite period or payment of salary in lieu of notice and that the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, ought not to have entertained the application for amendment of the prayer of the original application in which the appellant wanted to dismiss the respondents for misconduct.
This according to the Labour Appellate Tribunal was a substantial question of law and it therefore entertained the appeal.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal thereafter considered whether the appel lant had made out a case under cl.
17(b)(viii) of the Standing Orders and came to the conclusion that the respondents had not been guilty of any misconduct within the meaning of that clause and that therefore the order made by the Industrial Tribunal granting permission to the appellant to terminate the services of the respondents was liable to be set aside.
In so far, however, as after obtaining the permission from the Industrial Tribunal the appellant had given notice of discharge to the respondents, the Labour Appellate Tribunal expressed its inability to give the respondents any substantial relief either in the shape of reinstatement or compensation.
The appellant has come up in appeal before us against this order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
Shri H. N. Sanyal, appearing for the appellant, has urged in the fore front the contention that no appeal from the order of the Industrial Tribunal lay to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
He contended that the said order was not a "decision" within the meaning of that expression in section 7 and even assuming that it was so, the appeal neither involved any substantial question of law nor was it a decision in respect of any of the matters specified in sub section (1)(b) 875 of that section.
The answer of Shri P. K. Chatterjee on behalf of the respondents was that the action of the appellant in the matter of the termination of the services of the respondents was punitive in character, that the discharge of the respondents for which permission was sought by the appellant was a punitive discharge, that such discharge was by reason of the alleged misconduct of the respondents falling within cl.
17(b)(viii) of the Standing Orders and not within cl.
14(a) thereof and that the substantial question of law which arose in the appeal was whether the appellant could be allowed to adopt the expedient of terminating the services of the respondents, without going through the procedure of submitting a charge sheet to the respondents and holding a proper enquiry in the matter of those charges, by merely giving notice for the requisite period or payment of salary in lieu of notice and thus resorting to el.
14(a) of the Standing Orders instead of cl.
17(b)(viii) of the same.
The other answer made by Shri P. K. Chatterjee was that having regard to the definition of the term "retrenchment" to be found in section 2(oo) of the Act the discharge of the respondents by the appellant really amounted to retrenchment and retrenchment being one of the matters specified in sub section
(1)(b) of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the respondents had a right of appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
It is necessary, therefore, to appreciate what was sought to be done by the appellant when it made the application before the Industrial Tribunal on December 6, 1952.
This application has been described by the Labour Appellate Tribunal as an application for amendment of the original application which had been filed by the appellant on November 21, 1952, for permission to dismiss the respondents from its employ as per el.
17(b)(viii) of the Standing Orders.
It must be noted, however, that what the appellant purported to do by its application of December 6, 1952, was, in effect, to substitute another application asking for permission to discharge the respondents from its 111 876 employ under el.
14(a) of the Standing Orders, thus abandoning the relief which it had prayed for in the original application.
The application dated December 6, 1952, was thus, in substance, a new application made by the appellant to the Industrial Tribunal, no doubt relying upon the facts and circumstances which were set out in the original application but asking for the permission of the Industrial Tribunal to discharge the respondents from its employ under cl.
14(a) of the Standing Orders instead of dismissing them from its employ under el.
17(b)(viii) thereof.
We do not see how it was not competent to the Industrial Tribunal to allow the appellant to do so.
If the appellant bad been actuated by any oblique motives and wanted to evade the consequences of its not having held a proper enquiry, after submitting a charge sheet to the respondents one could have understood the criticism made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in regard to the same.
The Industrial Tribunal, however, expressly recorded the finding that the application for leave to discharge the respondents from its employ was bona fide and what the appellant did by making the application dated December 6, 1952, was actuated by an honest motive of exercising its right to discharge the respondents under el.
14(a) of the Standing Orders instead of visiting upon the respondents the penalty of dismissing them from its employ under el.
17(b)(viii) thereof.
The discharge of the respondents was a discharge simpliciter in exercise of the rights of the employer under el.
14(a) of the Standing Orders and was not a punitive discharge under el.
17(b)(viii) thereof and if it was merely a discharge simpliciter, then, no objection could be taken to the same and the appellant would be well within its rights to do so, provided, however, that it was not arbitrary or apricious but was bona fide.
The only question relevant to be considered by the Industrial Tribunal would be that in taking the step which it did the appellant was not guilty of any unfair labour practice or victimization.
If the Industrial Tribunal did not come to a conclusion adverse to the appellant on these counts, it would have no jurisdiction to refuse, 877 'the permission asked for by the appellant.
Once the Industrial Tribunal was of opinion that the application dated December 6, 1952, and the discharge of the respondents for which .
the permission of the Industrial Tribunal was sought were in the honest exercise of the appellant 's rights, no question of law, much less a substantial question of law could arise in the appeal filed by the respondents against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal was clearly in error when it entertained the appeal.
In view of the above finding, we do not propose to deal with the contention that the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal under section 33 of the Act is not a "decision" within the meaning of that term in section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
The argument that the discharge of the respondents though patently it was a discharge simpliciter was, in substance, retrenchment within the meaning of the definition contained in section 2(oo) of the Act is equally untenable, for the simple reason that the term "retrenchment" was for the first time defined in the manner in which it has been done by an Ordinance promulgated in October 1953 which was followed by Act 43 of 1953 which was published in the Gazette of India on December 23, 1953.
The Industrial Tribunal made its order granting the permission under section 33 of the Act on May 14, 1953, so that, this definition of the term "retrenchment" could not apply to the facts of the present case.
If, therefore, at the relevant period the discharge simpliciter could not be deemed to be retrenchment of the respondents by the appellant, the decision of the Industrial Tribunal could not be said to be one in respect of any of the matters specified in sub section
(1)(b) of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
In that view also no appeal could lie from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
It must be observed that neither of these two points was taken by the respondents either in the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour 878 Appellate Tribunal nor was either of them mentioned in the statement of case filed by the respondents in this Court.
They were taken for the first time in the arguments advanced before us by Shri P. K. Chatterjee.
We have, however, dealt with the same because we thought that we should not deprive tile respondents of the benefit of any argument which could possibly be advanced in their favour.
We are, therefore, of opinion that no appeal lay from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order made by the Industrial Tribunal granting the appellant permission to discharge the respondents under section 33 of the Act and that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is liable to be set aside.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and restore the order made by the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, on date May 14, 1953.
The appellant will be entitled to its costs of this appeal from the respondents.
Appeal allowed.

Output:
The appellant made an application before the Industrial Tri bunal under section 33 Of the , for permission to dismiss the respondents, its employees, on the ground of misconduct under cl.
17 (b) (viii) of the appellant 's Standing 872 Orders, but subsequently, on a reconsideration of the facts, made another application praying instead for permission to discharge the respondents under cl.
14(a) of the Standing Orders.
The Industrial Tribunal found that the second application was bona fide made by the appellant with the honest motive of exercising its right to discharge the respondents instead of visiting upon them the penalty of dismissing them, and granted the appellant permission on payment to the respondents of one month 's pay in lieu of notice.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal, on appeal, was of the opinion that having once alleged misconduct against the respondents the appellant could not be allowed to adopt the expedient of terminating their services by giving notice for the requisite period, by means of a fresh application, and after considering whether the appellant had made out a case under cl.
I7(b)(viii) of the Standing Orders, came to the conclusion that the respondents had not been guilty of any misconduct, and held that the Industrial Tribunal erred in granting the permission to discharge the respondents.
On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, that in an application under section 33 of the Industrial: Disputes Act, 1947, the relevant consideration was whether the employer was guilty of any unfair labour practice or victimisation, and unless the Tribunal came to a conclusion adverse to the applicant it would have no jurisdiction to refuse the permission asked for to discharge the employee.
Accordingly, in view of the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that the application was bona fide, no question of law arose out of its order, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in entertaining the appeal.


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 3255 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.1985 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 2137 of 1979.
V.A. Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnapaxkhi for the Appellant.
S.K. Dholakia, A.S. Bhasme and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Respondents.
For the Respondent No. 4 in person (not present).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J.
Notice for final disposal of the case was served on the respondents.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Special leave is granted.
This case is dependent on the correct meaning and scope of Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).
A certain area in village Bazargaon, District Nagpur was reserved for Nistar purposes (that is, for grazing of cattle etc.).
The respond ent No. 4 applied for grant of a mining lease in regard to the said area which was allowed.
The appellant, who is a local resident, challenged the allotment on the ground that the procedure for settlement as laid down in Rule 59 read with Rule 58 was not followed before the grant.
Rule 58 deals with availability of areas for re grant of a mining lease and requires an entry to that effect to be made in a 832 register referred to in Rule 21(2) of the Rules, and a notification to be published in the official gazette at least 30 days in advance.
The purpose obviously is to enable the members of general public to apply for the proposed lease.
Rule 59 directs the procedure in Rule 58 to be fol lowed in the cases mentioned thereunder in the following terms: "59.
Availability of certain areas for grant to be notified In the case of any land which is otherwise available for the grant of a prospecting licence or a mining lease but in respect of which the State Government has refused to grant a prospecting licence or a mining lease on the ground that the land should be reserved for any purpose, the State Government shall, as soon as such land becomes again available for the grant of a prospecting licence or mining lease, grant the licence or lease after following the procedure laid down in rule 58.
" The appellant contends that as the prescribed procedure had not been followed, the grant in favour of the respondent No. 4 is illegal and fit to be set aside. ' 4.
Admittedly the disputed area was reserved for Nistar purposes and when an application for grant of mining lease was earlier made by a third party it was rejected on the ground that it was so~ reserved.
Further, there is no dis pute that before the impugned grant was made in favour of the respondent No. 4 the procedure prescribed by Rule 58 was not followed, and no opportunity was given to any other person before entertaining the request of the respondent No. 4.
The question in this background is whether Rule 59 is attracted to the case.
The appellant 's application under Article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed by the Bombay High Court on the ground that Rule 59 was confined to cases where earlier reservation was made for mining purposes.
The stand of the respondents that the expression "reserved for any purpose" in rule 59 does not cover a case where the area was reserved for Nistar purposes or for any purpose other than that of mining was accepted.
Earlier the expression "reserved for any purpose" was followed by the words "other than prospecting or mining for minerals", which were omitted by an amendment in 1963.
Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel for the respondents, appearing in support of the 833 impugned judgment, has contended that as a result of this amendment the expression must now be confined to cases of prospecting or mining for minerals and all other cases where the earlier reservation was for agricultural, industrial or any other purpose must be excluded from the scope of the rule.
We are not pursuaded to accept the suggested interpre tation.
Earlier the only category which was excluded from the application of Rule 59 was prospecting or mining leases and the effect of the amendment is that by omitting this exception, prospecting and mining leases are also placed in the same position as the other cases.
We do not see any reason as to why by including in the rule prospecting and mining leases, the other cases to which it applied earlier would get excluded.
The result of the amendment is to extend the rule and not to curtail its area of operation.
The words "any purpose" is of wide connotation and there is no reason to restrict its meaning.
We do not see any ground for limiting the scope of the rule so as to deprive the members of general public to approach the State with competitive terms.
It is clearly in the public interest to notify the proposal to grant a mining lease, so that the best deserving person may have a chance to be considered.
The State and its authorities will, in that case, have the choice of selecting the most suitable person by following the just and equitable criteria laid down by the Rules.
If, on the other hand, the rule is con strued as suggested by the respondents, a resourceful appli cant can succeed in striking an un deserved bargain to the prejudice of the public interest.
We are, therefore, of the view that Rule 59 covered the present case and the grant in favour of the respondent No. 4 was illegally made in violation of Rule 58.
According ly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the decision to grant the mining lease in question to the respondent No. 4 is quashed.
The State Government may now issue a notification and take other steps in accordance with law before proceeding further.
There will be no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

Output:
Rule 58 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, which deals with availability of areas for regrant of a mining lease, requires a notification to be published in the offi cal gazette at least 30 days in advance.
Rule 59 directs the procedure laid down in Rule 58 to be followed in the case of any land in respect of which the State Government had re fused to grant a prospecting licence or a mining lease on the ground that it was required to be reserved for any purpose.
The expression "reserved for any purpose" was earlier followed by the words "other than prospecting or mining for minerals", which was omitted by an amendment in 1963.
An application for grant of mining lease in respect of the disputed area had been rejected earlier on the ground that it was reserved for some other purpose.
Subsequently, however, a mining lease in regard to the said area was granted in favour of respondent No. 4.
The appellant chal lenged the allotment on the ground that the procedure for settlement as laid down in Rule 59 read with Rule 58 was not followed before the grant.
The High Court dismissed that application on the ground that Rule 59 was confirmed to cases where earlier reservation was made for mining pur poses.
Allowing the appeal, HELD: 1.
The grant of mining lease in favour of respond ent No. 4 was illegally made in violation of Rule 58 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
[833E F] 2.1 Rule 59 covered the instant case.
Earlier the only category which was excluded from the application of this Rule was prospecting 831 or mining leases.
The effect of the 1963 amendment is that by omitting the words "other than prospecting or mining for minerals", prospecting and mining leases have also been placed in the same position as the other cases.
The other cases to which the Rule applied earlier have not thus been excluded.
[833E B] 2.2 It is clearly in the public interest to notify the proposal to grant a mining lease.
The State and its authori ties will, in that case, have the choice of selecting the most suitable person by following the just and equitable criteria laid down by the Rules.
[833D]