Input:
Appeal No. 176 of 1956 and Petition No. 165 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 15/23,1955 of the Orissa High Court, in Civil Reference No, 4 of 1954, 169 N. C. Chatterji, D. N. Mukherjee and R. Patinaik, for the appellant.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1. 1956.
November 29.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.K. DAS J.
The appellant is Shri Lalit Mohan Das, a pleader of about 25 years ' standing.
who ordinarily practiced in the Courts at Anandapur in the district of Mayur bhanj in Orissa.
The Munsif of Anandapur, one Shri L. B. N. section Deo ' drew up a proceeding under sections 13 and 14 of the , against the pleader for grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty and submitted a report to the High Court through the District Judge of Mayurbhanj on December 12, 1953.
The District Judge forwarded the report, accompanied by his opinion, to the High Court of Orissa on March 9, 1954.
The recommendation of the Munsif was that the pleader should be suspended from practice for one year.
The reference was heard by the High Court of Orissa ' and by its order dated March 15, 1955, the High Court came to the conclusion that the pleader was guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for a period of five years with.
effect from March 15,1955, Shri Lalit Mohan Das then obtained special leave from this Court to appeal against the judgment and order of the Orissa High Court dated March 15 /23, 1955.
He also filed a petition under article 32 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed the petition under article 32 and nothing more need be said about it.
We proceed now to deal with the appeal which has been brought to this Court on special leave.
The charges against the appellant were the following On July 15, 1953, the appellant was appearing on behalf of the defendant in Suit No. 81 of 1952 pending before the Munsif of Anandapur.
On that date, there were two other suits pending before the same Munsif.
There were petitions for time in all the three suits.
22 170 The Munsif wanted to take up the oldest suit for hearing, and the oldest suit being Suit No. 54 of 1952, it was taken up first and five witnesses for the plaintiff were examined.
Suit No. 81 of 1952 was postponed to August 18, 1953.
The appellant, who appeared for the defendant in that suit, was informed of the postponement.
When so informed, the appellant made a remark in open Court and within the hearing of the Munsif to this effect: " If the Peshkar is gained over, he can do everything." He then left the Court.
The Munsif was surprised at the remark made and asked the appellant to explain his conduct, by means of a letter sent the same day.
As the appellant sent no reply, the Munsif wrote again to the appellant on July 18, 1953.
To this letter the appellant sent the following reply: "Dear Sir, I am painfully constrained to receive memo after memo for some imaginary act of mine not in any way connected with my affairs for which if any explanation is at all warranted officiallv.
For your second memo I felt it desirable as a gentleman to reply.
Further I may request you to be more polite while addressing letters to lawyers.
Yours faithfully, Sd.
L. M. Das.
Pleader.
" It is obvious that the letter of the appellant was couched in very improper terms and considerably strained the relation between the Munsif and the appellant.
The appellant, it may be stated here, was at that time the President of the Anandapur Sub Divisional Bar Association which consisted of about 14 legal practitioners.
On July 21, 1953, Shri B. Raghava Rao, who was the predecessor in office of Shri Deo, came to Anandapur.
He was the guest of Shri A. V. Ranga Rao, the Sub Divisional Officer.
One Shri N. C. Mohanty, a pleader of.
Anandapur and who was related to the appellant, came to invite the two Munsifs to a luncheon on the occasion of a housewarming ceremony.
On hearing about the trouble between Shri Deo 171 and the appellant, Shri B. Raghava Rao interceded and it appears that the appellant was persuaded to come to the house of the Sub Divisional officer and to ,say that he was sorry for what had happened in court on July 15, 1953, and that he did not happean to insult Shri Deo; Shri Deo, it appears, accepted the apology and for the time being.
the trouble between the two was smoothed over.
A second incident, however, took place on September 25, 1953.
The appellant was appearing for a defendant in another suit before the Munsif It was Suit No. 101 of 1952.
This suit was fixed for hearing on September 21, 1953.
As that date was a holiday, the suit was taken up 'on September 22, 1953.
Another suit, Suit No. 86 of 1952, was also fixed for hearing on that date but Shri N. C. Mohanty, pleader for the defendants in that suit, took time on the ground of the illness of one of the defendants, which ground was supported by a medical certificate.
In Suit No. 101 of 1952 also, the defendants applied for time.
on the ground of illness of their witnesses; but there being no medical certificate in support of the allegation of illness and no witnesses having been summoned in that suit, the learned Munsif refused to grant time, and one Shri P. N. Patnaik who also represented the defendants agreed to go on with the suit.
The suit was then heard for two days, i. e., on September 22 and 23, 1953, and at the request of the defendants ' lawyers the hearing of arguments was postponed to September 25, 1953.
On that date the appellant came to Court accompanied by his junior Shri P. N. Patnaik, for the purpose of arguing the case on behalf of the defendants.
At the very outset of his arguments the appellant made the follwing remarks:The Court is unfair to me, while the Court was fair to Mr. Misra (meaning Shri Bhagabat Prasad Misra who was appearing for the plaintiffs in that suit).
The Court is accommodating and granting adjournments to Mr. Misra while it was not accommodating me.".
The Munsif took objection to these remarks but nothing untoward happened.
The appellant concluded his arguments.
172 A third incident brought matters to a climax, and this incident took place on September 29, 1953.
The appellant was appearing for the defendants in Suit No. 6 of 1951.
In that suit a preliminary point of jurisdiction and sufficiency of court fees was raised and Shri B. Raghava Rao, the predecessor in office of Shri Deo, had dealt with the point and decided it against the appellant 's client.
A Civil Revision taken to the High Court was also rejected. 'The appellant, however, again pressed the same preliminary point and on September.
29, 1953, Shri Deo passed an order dismissing the preliminary objection.
When this order was shown to the appellant, he stood up and shouted at the top of his voice I 'I on behalf of the Bar Association, Anandapur, challenge the order of the Court,.
The Court has no principle as it is passing one kind of order in one suit and another kind of order in another suit.
" The Munsif, it appears, was disgusted at the conduct of the appellant and he stood up and, left the Court room, directing the bench clerk to send a telegram to the District Judge.
, A telegram was accordingly sent to the District Judge asking him to come to Anandapur.
The District Judge asked for a detailed report which was sent on October 1, 1953.
On October 5, 1953, the Munsif drew up a proceeding against the appellant on a charge under section 13 of the referring therein to the three incidents mentioned above.
The appellant was asked to show cause by October 26, 1953.
On November 3, 1953, the appellant denied the allegations made and took up the attitude that the Munsif was not competent to hold the enquiry on the ground that the Munsif was in the position of a complainant.
The appellant gave a different version of what happened on the three dates in question.
With regard to the incident of July 15, 1953, the appellant 's plea was that some other client had come to him.
in connection with a criminal case pending in another Court and to that client the appellant had said that an enquiry should be made from the Peshkar as to the date fixed.
With regard to the incident, on September 25, 1953, the plea of the appellant was^ total denial, and with regard to the last incident, the appellant said 173 that the Munsif behaved rudely and wanted to ' assault the appellant, for which the appellant appears, to have filed a petition to the Governor of Orissa on September 30, 1953, for according sanction for the prosecution of the Munsif.
It may be stated here that on October 8, 1953, a resolution was passed, numbered Resolution 6, which purported to be a resolution on behalf of the Bar Association, Anandapur.
The resolution was in these termis: "Resolved that on September 29, 1953, the Court 's (Munsif) action on the.
dais in rising from the chair, thumping on the table, shouting at the top of his voice, and using the words 'shut up ' against one honourable member (President) of this Bar Association is quite unprecedented.
, undesirable and affecting the prestige of the Bar and may cause apprehension in the mind of the litigant public to get fair justice.
" It may be stated that some other members of the Bar dissociated themselves from the a id resolution at a later date.
The proceeding against the appellant under the stated, as we have said earlier, on October 5, 1953, and the appellant filed his written statement on November 3, 1953.
On November 5, 1953, the Munsif sent the record to the District Judge in connection with the plea of the appellant that the enquiry should be made by some other judicial officer.
The District Judge, however, took the view that under the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of the the enquiry should be made by the Munsif himself and the records were accordingly sent back to the Munsif.
Thereafter, the appellant non co operated and did not appear at the enquiry though more than one communication was sent to ham The enquiry was concluded on December 11, 1953, and the Munsif submitted his report.
the High Court through the District Judge on December 12, 1953.
On December 22, 1953, the appellant filed an application to the Additional District Judge for time to move the High Court to get an order to have the matter heard by some other judicial officer.
One month 's time was 174 accordingly granted and the Additional District Judge, for some reason which is not very apparent, sent the record back to the learned Munsif In the meantime, the Additional District Judge, it appears, made an effort to settle the trouble.
On December 23, 1953, he met the members of the Bar Association and the Munsif at the inspection bungalow at Anandapur on his way to Mayurbhanj.
At a meeting held there, a copy of a draft resolution to be passed by the members of the Bar Association, Anandapur, was made over.
This draft resolution was in these terms: "This Association re rets very much that an incident relating to the bench clerk of the Civil Court.
should have led to the subsequent unhappy differences between the Bench and the members of the Bar.
As in the interest of the litigant public it is felt not desirable to allow these strained feelings to continue further, this Association unanimously resolves to withdraw Resolution No. 6 dated October 8, 1953, passed against the Court and communicate copies of the same to the addressees previously communicated.
It is further resolved to request the Court to see to the desirability of withdrawing the proceedings that had been started against the various members of the Bar and their registered clerks on their expressing regret to the Court individually in connection with those proceedings.
It is further resolved that the members of the Bar involved in the proceedings be requested to take immediate steps in this direction.
The Association hopes that the bench clerk who has to some extent been the cause for this friction between the Bench and the Bar would be replaced by a person from a different place at an earlier date.
" On January 8, 1954, the appellant appeared in the Court of the Munsif and filed a written apology and expressed his regret.
His signature wag taken on the order sheet and the order of that date reads: "Sri L. M. Das, pleader, appears and expresses his regret.
So the proceeding No. 2 of 1952 is dropped.
Intimate Additional District Judge.
" No resolution, however, was passed in the terms 175 suggested by the Additional District Judge.
On January 19, 1954, two resolution,% were passed in the following terms: "No. 1.
In view of the fact that past misunderstandings between the Munsif and members of the Bar caused by an incident relating to the bench clerk of the Civil Court, have been removed by amicable settlement of differences existing between both parties, it is unanimously resolved that resolution No. 6 dated October 8, 1953, stands withdrawn.
No. 2.
It is further resolved that the copies of the above resolution be sent to the addressees previously communicated of resolution No. 6 of October 8, 1953.
" The learned Munsif, it appears, wanted to see the minute book of the Bar Association, presumably to find out in what terms the proposed resolution was passed.
There was again trouble between the Munsif and the appellant over the production.
of the minute book.
Ultimately, the minute book was produced, and on February 2,1954, the Munsif expressed the view that the resolution passed did not fully carry out the terms of settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge.
Accordingly, the proceeding was re opened and the record was re submitted to the District fudge.
The District Judge thereupon sent the report of the Munsif to the High Court accompanied by his opinion.
The High Court dealt with the report with the result which we have already indicated.
The main contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterji, who has appeared on behalf of the appellant is this.
He has submitted that there was no valid reason for reviving the proceeding against the appellant, after the proceeding had been dropped on January 8, 1954, on the submission of an apology and expression of regret by his client; because, in substance and effect, the terms of the settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge had been complied with.
According to Mr. Chatterji an expression of regret having been made earlier than the passing of the resolutions on January 19, 1954, by the Anandapur Bar Association and the bench clerk having already been transferred from 176 Anandapur, the resolutions could not be in the same terms as were suggested by the Additional District Judge; but the two resolutions passed on January 19, 1954 coupled with the expression of individual regret made on January 8, 1954, complied in substance with the essential terms of the draft resolution which the Additional District Judge had made over on December 23, 1953.
Mr. Chatterji has contended that this view of the matter has not been properly considered by the High Court.
He has submitted that in view of the order passed by the learned Munsif himself on January 8, 1954, the proceeding against the appellant should be treated as having been dropped and concluded on that date.
Mr. Chatterji has also drawn our attention to ground No. VI in the petition for special leave dated May 9, 1955, in which the appellant said that he was " willing and prepared to submit before this Court expressions of unreserved regret and apology for his error of judament and indiscretion, if any, in the discharge of his professional duties.
" We cannot accept the contention of Mr. Chatterji that the order passed by the learned Munsif on January 8, 1954, had the effect of terminating and bringing to an end the proceeding against the appellant.
The learned Judges of the High Court rightly pointed out that the report of the Munsif dated December 12, 1953, was a report which was submitted to the High Court.
Under the provisions of section 14 of the , such a report had to be forwarded to the High Court by the District Judge accompanied by his opinion.
It was not open to.
the Additional District Judge to send back the record to the Munsif The efforts of the Additional District Judge were, indeed, well intentioned; but at that stage, after the Munsif had made his report to the High Court, the High Court alone Was competent to pass final orders in the matter.
Apart, however, from that difficulty, we are not satisfied that the terms of settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge were fully complied with in this case.
It is true, that the appellant did express his 177 regret and to that extent the settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge was carried out.
It is also true that by the resolutions passed on January 19, 1954, the earlier resolution of October 8, 1953, was cancelled, but one essential and important part of the terms of settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge was that the Association should express regret at what had happened.
Resolution No. I dated January 19, 1954, was so worded as to give the impression that the misunderstanding between the Munsif and the appellant was all due to the bench clerk and that misunderstanding having been removed Resolution No. 6 dated October,$, 1953, should be withdrawn.
There is nothing in the resolution to show that the appellant was in any way at fault, a fault which he had expiated I by an expression of regret.
It may be pointed out that the earlier ,resolution, Resolution No. 6 dated October 8, 1953, had been communicated to a large number of persons and authorities and the later resolution dated January 19, 1,954, passed in the diluted form in which it was passed, could hardly undo the damage which had been made by the earlier resolution.
On merits we agree with the High Court that the appellant was undoubtedly guilty of grave professional, misconduct.
A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty, to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client.
He may even submit that a particular order is not correct land may ask for a review of that order.
At the same time, a member of the 'Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is appearing.
He must phold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do any thing to.
bring the Court itself into disrepute.
The appellant before us grossly ' overstepped the limits of proprieety when he made imputation$; of partiality and unfairiness against the Munsif in open Court.
In suggesting that the Munsif followed no principle in his orders the appellant was adding insult to injury, because the 'Munsif had merely up held an order of his predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, 23 178 which order had been upheld by the High Court in s revision.
Scandalising the Court in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service; it brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice.
From that point of view, the conduct of the appellant was highly reprehensible.
The appellant gave no evidence in support of his version of the incidents, though he had an opportunity of doingso, if he so desired.
The only point left for consideration, is the question of punishment.
On a matter of this nature, this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the order of the High Court as respects the disciplinary action to be taken against a member of the Bar who has been guilty of professional misconduct.
There are, however, two mitigating circumstances.
One is that the learned Munsif himself recommended suspension of practice for one year only.
The appellant was suspended from practice with affect, from March 15,1955.
The order of suspension has now lasted for a little more than a year and eight months.
The second mitigating circumstance is that the appellant did file la written apology and expressed regret to the learned Munsif onJanuary 8, 1954.
It is unfortunate that the appellantdid not take up a more contrite attitude in the High Court.
In this Court, the appellant tried to make out that the proceeding against him should not have been revived; he however showed his willingness to offer an apology and ex pression of regret Having regard to all the circumstances, we think that the punishment imposed errs on the side of excess.
We would accordingly reduece the period of susppusion to, two years only.
In the result, the petition, under article 32 is dismissed and the appeal is,also dismissed subject to the reduction of the period of suspension as indicated above.
In the circumstances of this case, there will be, no 'order for costs.

Output:
The appellant pleader who already had strained relation with the Munsif made certain objectionable remarks in open Court, suggesting partiality and unfairness on the part of the Munsif.
The Munsif drew up a proceeding under sections 13, 14 Of the , against the pleader and submitted a report to the High Court through the District judge.
An application to the Additional District judge was filed by the pleader, for time to move the High Court to get an order to have the matter heard by some judicial Officer other than the 168 Munsif who had made the report.
One month 's time was accordingly granted, and for some reason which is not very apparent, the Additional District judge sent the record back to the Munsif.
The Additional District judge made an effort to settle the trouble.
It was arranged that the pleader should apologise and a resolution should be passed by the members of the local Bar Association.
Accordingly, the pleader appeared in the Court of the Munsif and filed a written apology and expressed his regret, and the Munsif dropped the proceeding.
It was later found that the resolution was not passed in the terms suggested by the Additional District judge, and the terms of settlement suggested by the latter were not fully carried out.
Accordingly, the proceeding was re opened and the report was re submitted to the District judge who with his opinion forwarded the same to the High Court.
The High Court suspended the pleader for 5 years.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no valid reason for reviving the proceeding, after it had once been dropped on the submission of an apology and expression of regret.
Held, that the report under section 14 of the is a report which is submitted to the High Court.
When a report is made to the High Court by any Civil judge subordinate to the District judge, the report shall be made through the District judge and the report must be accompanied by the opinion of such judge.
Once the report has been made, it is not open to the District judge to send back the record to the Subordinate Civil judge, and no order passed by the Subordinate Civil judge can have the effect of terminating or bringing to an end the proceeding.
The High Court alone is competent to pass final orders on the report.
A member of the Bar is an officer of the Court, and though he owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client, he also owes a duty to the Court and must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court in which he is appearing.
Making amputations of partiality and unfairness against the subordinate Civil judge in open Court is scandalizing the Court in such a way as to pollute the very fount of justice ; such conduct is not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial Service.
With regard to disciplinary action against a member of the Bar, the Supreme Court would be reluctant to interfere with the order of the High Court unless there are clear mitigating circumstances.


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 871 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 13, 1959, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 294 of 1959.
S.P. Sinha and M. 1.
Khowaja, for the appellant.
S.T. Desai and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent.
This appeal arises from a suit filed by the appellants who are the representatives of residents of Nayapara Ward in particular and of the Muslim community of Raipur in general, in which they claimed an injunction restraining the respondent, Municipal Committee of Raipur, from committing acts of encroachment on their rights and the rights of 301 the Muslim community in holding Urs and other ceremonies on the plot in suit.
It appears that at Raipur, there is a piece of land called "Fazle Karim 's Bada" Khasra No. 649 measuring 4.62 acres.
Inside this Bada, there are three or four Municipal Schools.
The office of the Electric Power House is also located in one corner of the land.
Behind the School, there is a Pakka platform known as "Syed Baba 's Mazar".
Near the Electric Power House, there is a raised earth platform on which there is a flag.
This flag is called "Madar Sahib 's Jhanda".
Surrounding this land.
there is a brick wall which was made by the respondent several years past.
According to the plaint, Urs function is held every year in front of Syed Baba 's Mazar for the last several years.
On or about the 22nd October, 1956, the employees of the respondent started digging foundation at the places A, B, C and D shown on the map attached to the plaint.
These digging operations were commenced under the directions of the respondent.
because the respondent intended to construct another school building on the plot.
The appellants then served a notice on the respondent to desist from carrying on the digging operations on the ground that the property on which the said operations were being carried out, was a part of the wakf property.
When the respondent did not comply with the requisition contained in the said notice, the present suit was filed by the appellants on October 29, 1956.
This suit has been flied under O.1 r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The case of the appellants is that the plot of land in suit was old Kabrasthan known as "Chuchu 's Takia", and is a permanent inalienable wakf property.
On this plot are tombs of renowned saints like Syed Baba.
and Madar Sahib 's Jhanda.
On a part of the plot.
every year Urs and other religious functions are performed.
In fact, the land has been registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act (No. 30 of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act) as trust property; as such, the respondent can claim no right or title to the said land.
That is the basis on which the appellants claimed injunction against the respondent.
The respondent disputed this claim.
It was urged in the written statement filed by the respondent that the land was never and could never be wakf property.
There was no tomb on the land.
There are only two so called tombs.
but they have no significance.
The Urs is of very recent origin and it is allowed to be held with the licence of the respondent.
The plot originally, belonged to private persons and had been acquired by the Government in land acquisition proceedings in 1910 11.
The respondent got the said land from the Government in 1922.
In 1932 33.
the Deputy Commissioner fixed rent of the land which is being paid by the respondent eversince.
On this land, the respondent has constructed some schools, and a part of the land which is lying vacant is allowed to be used by the people of the neighbourhood for traffic.
The respondent thus has full right to 302 construct on its own plot of land.
The representative character of the appellants was disputed by the respondent and their right to file the present suit was challenged.
On these pleadings, several.
issues were framed by the learned trial Judge.
They covered the title of appellants, the title of the respondent, and the right of the appellants to file the suit.
The issue with which we are concerned in the present appeal related to the registration of the plot in the register kept under the relevant provisions of the Act and its effect.
The appellants ' contention was that the said registration was conclusive against the respondent and in favour of the appellants ' claim.
This contention was rejected by the trial Judge, with the result that the appellants ' suit was dismissed.
With the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge on the other issues we are not concerned in the present appeal.
The matter then went in appeal.
and the appellate Court confirmed the conclusions recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal.
The appellants challenged the correctness of the said appellate decree by preferring a second appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
but the second appeal also failed.
and that has brought the appellants to this Court by special leave.
Thus. it would be noticed that the appellants have failed on the merits of their claim in all the courts below.
and the technical point raised by them that the registration of the plot under the relevant provisions of the Act concluded the matter.
has also been rejected.
It is this last point which has been urged before us by Mr. Sinha on behalf of the appellants.
Before we deal with this point.
however, it would be relevant to mention how the property came to be entered in the register kept under the relevant provisions of the Act.
The record shows that the Masjid Nayapara.
Raipur had been entered in the register as a public trust on June 25.
1954 in Case No. 23XXXiii/7 of 1952 53.
certain properties were entered in the said register in respect of this trust.
In 1956.
Abdul Karim.
Mutawali Masjid Naypara Raipur applied to the SubDivisional Officer.
Raipur alleging that the property now in suit also belonged to the public trust and should be included amongst its properties.
On this application, public notice was issued calling upon persons interested in the property to show cause why it should not be added to the properties of the wakf.
No objection was.
however.
received and on October 23.
the Sub Divisional Officer reported that the poperty be shown against the trust.
The said report was sanctioned by the Registrar.
Public Trusts on April 22.
That is how the property came to be registered as belonging to the public trust.
and it is on this entry that the whole argument of the appellants is based.
In considering the validity of the contention raised by Mr. Sinha before us.
it is necessary to examine broadly the scheme 303 of the Act and the material provisions on which Mr. Sinha relies.
The Act was passed in 1951 to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
Section 2(4) of the Act defines a "public trust", and section 2(8) defines a "wakf". 'Working trustee ' is defined by section 2(9).
Section 3(1) provides that the Deputy Commissioner shall be the Registrar of public trusts in respect of every public trust; and section 3(2) imposes on the Registrar the obligation to maintain a register of public trusts, and such other books and registers and in such form as may be prescribed.
Section 4(1) deals with the registration of public trusts and in requires that within three months from the date on which the said section comes into force in any area or from the date on which a public trust is created, whichever is later, the working trustee of every public trust shall apply to the Registrar having jurisdiction for the registration of the public trust.
Section 4(3) lays down the particulars which have to be stated by the application which is required to be made under section 4(1).
All these particulars are in relation to the nature of the trust, its properties, the mode of succession to the office of the trustees, and other allied matters.
Section 4(4) empowers the Registrar to decide the merits of the application, while section 4(5) provides for an appeal against his decision which is required to be filed within 30 days of the order.
Mr. Sinha relies on a specific provision contained in section 4(5) which says that subject to the decision in such appeal.
the order of the Registrar under sub section (4) shall be final.
Section 4(6) requires the signing and verification of the application in the manner laid down in the code of Civil Procedure for signing and verifying plaints.
That takes us to section 5 which deals with the enquiry to be held by the Registrar on the application made before him under section 4(1).
Eight points are set down under section 5(1) which the Registrar has to consider.
Section 5(2) lays down that the Registrar shall give in the prescribed manner public notice of the inquiry proposed to be made under sub section (1) and invite all persons interested in the public trust under inquiry to prefer objections, if any, in respect of such trust.
Under section 6, the Registrar has to make his findings on the point specified by section 5(1); and under section 7, the Registrar causes entries to be made in the Register in accordance with his findings.
Section 7(2) naturally lays down that the entries made under section 7(1) shall be final and conclusive.
Section 8(1) allows a civil suit to be filed against the findings of the Registrar within six months from the date of the publication of the notice under section 7(2); such a suit can be filed by a working trustee or a person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property.
Section 9 permits applications to be made for change in the entries recorded in the register.
It will be recalled that the application which was made in 1956 by Abdul Karim was under the provisions of section 9(1).
If an application is made for change in 304 the entries as, far instance, for adding to the list of properties belonging to the trust, a proceeding has to be taken for making the said change and this is prescribed by section 9(2).
Section 9(3) makes the provisions of section 8 applicable to any finding under section 9 as they would apply to a finding under section 6.
These provisions are contained in Chapter II of the Act.
Chapter III deals with the management of trust property; Ch.
IV with the problem of audit; Ch.
V with control; and Ch.
VI contains miscellaneous provisions, including section 35 which confers the rule making power on the State Government.
That, broadly stated, is the nature of the scheme of the Act and the material provisions which fall to be considered in the present appeal.
Mr. Sinha relies on the fact that under section 4(5) of the Act, the decision of the Registrar is made final, subject to the appellate decision, if any; and he also refers to the right of instituting a suit reserved by section 8.
His argument is that if any person who claims interest in the property which is alleged to be trust property fails to satisfy the Registrar about his claim, he can file a suit under section 8(1).
Section 8(1) allows a suit to be filed, subject to the conditions prescribed by it, and the right to file such a suit is given to a working trustee, or a person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property.
The respondent is interested in the property in suit which is found to be trust property, and since it did not avail itself of the right to file a suit within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar must be held to be final and conclusive against its claim.
If finality does not attach to such an order even after six months have expired within the meaning of section 8(1), then the provision contained in section 4(5) will serve no purpose whatever.
That is the manner in which Mr. Sinha has presented his case before us.
We are not impressed by this argument.
In testing the validity of this argument, we must bear in mind the important fact that the Act is concerned with the registration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the enquiry which its relevant provisions contemplate is an enquiry into the question as to whether the trust in question is public or private.
The enquiry permitted by the said provisions does not take within its sweep questions as to whether the property belongs to a private individual and is not the subject matter of any trust at all.
It cannot be ignored that the Registrar who, no doubt, is given the powers of a civil court under section 28 of the Act, holds a kind of summary enquiry and the points which can fall within his jurisdiction are indicated by clauses (i) to (x) of section 4(3).
Therefore, prima facie.
it appears unreasonable to suggest that contested questions of title, such as those which have arisen in the present case, can be said to fall within the enquiry which the Registrar is authorised to hold under section 5 of the Act.
Besides, it is significant that the only persons who are required to file their objections in response to a notice issued by the 305 Registrar on receiving an application made under section 4(1), are persons interested in the public trust not persons who dispute the existence of the trust or who challenge the allegation that any property belongs to the said trust.
It is only persons interested in the public trust, such as beneficiaries or others who claim a right to manage the trust, who can file objections, and it is objections of this character proceeding from persons belonging to this limited class that fall to be considered by the Registrar.
It cannot be said that the respondent falls within this class; and so, it would be idle to contend that it was the duty of the respondent to have filed objections under section 3(2).
It is true, section 8(1) permits a suit to be filed by a person having interest in the public trust or any preperty found to be trust property.
The interest to which this section refers must be read in the light of section 5(2)to be the interest of a beneficiary or the interest of a person who claims the right to maintain the trust or any other interest of a similar character.
It is not the interest which is adverse to the trust set up by a party who does not claim any relation with the trust at all.
That is why we think the finality on which Mr. Sinha 's argument is based cannot avail him against the respondent inasmuch the respondent was not a party to the proceedings and could not have filed any objections in the said proceedings.
Then again, the right to file a suit to which section 8(1) refers is given to persons who are aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar.
Having regard to the fact that the proceedings before the Registrar are in the nature of proceedings before a civil court, it would be illogical to hold that the respondent who was not a party to the proceedings can be said to be aggrieved by the findings of the Registrar.
The normal judicial concept of a person aggrieved by any order necessarily postulates that the said person must be a party to the proceedings in which the order was passed and by which he feels aggrieved.
It is unnecessary to emphasise that it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that though a person is not a party to the proceedings and cannot participate in them by way of filing objections, he would still be bound to file a suit within the period prescribed by section 8(1) if the property in which he claims an exclusive title is held by the Registrar to belong to a public trust.
Similarly, the right to prefer an appeal against the Registrar 's order prescribed by section 4(5) necessarily implies that the person must be a party to the proceedings before the Registrar; otherwise how would he know about the order? Like section 8(1), section 4(5) also seems to be confined in its operation to persons who are before the Registrar, or who could have appeared before the Registrar under section 5(2).
The whole scheme is clear, the Registrar enquires into the question as to whether a trust is private or public, 306 and deals with the points specifically enumerated by section 4(3).
Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the fact that the property now in suit was added to the list of properties belonging to the wakf, cannot affect the respondent 's title to it.
On the merits, all the courts below have rejected the appellants ' case and have upheld the pleas raised by the respondent in defence.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The first appellant, who was the Mutawalli of a public trust, filed a representative suit for an injunction restraining the respondent from committing acts of encroachment on the suit property, on the ground that the property was that of the trust and had been so registered by the Registrar of Public Trusts, under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951.
The suit was dismissed by the trial court and also on appeal.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court the appellants contended that, since the respondent did not avail itself of the ,right to file a suit within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar must be held to be final and conclusive against the respondent.
HELD: The fact that the property in suit was added to the list of the properties belonging to the trust, could not affect the respondent 's title to it.
[306 A B] The enquiry which the Act contemplates is an enquiry into the question as to whether a trust is public or private and does not take within its sweep questions as to whether a property belongs to a private individual and is not the subject matter of any trust at all.
The only persons who are required to file their objections in proceedings before the Registrar are persons interested in the public trust not persons who dispute the existence of the trust or who challenge the allegation that any property belongs to the said trust.
Inasmuch as the respondent was not a party to the proceedings and could not have filed any objections in the proceedings the respondent was not bound to file an appeal under section 4(5) of the Act or a suit under section 8(1), challenging order of the Registrar.
Therefore, the finality given to the finding of the Registrar could not be availed of by the appellant as against the respondent.
[304 G; 305 A B, D E]


Input:
N: Special Leave Peti tion (Criminal) No. 216/1977.
(From the Judgment and Order dated 28 9 1973 of the Judicial Commissioner, Court, Goa Daman and Diu in Crl.
Appeal No. 17/72).
S.J.S. Fernandez, amicus curiae, for the petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. A death sentence, with all its dreadful scenario swinging desperately out of the last breath of mortal life, is an excrutiating hour for the judges called upon to lend signature to tiffs macabre stroke of the execu tioner 's rope.
Even so, judges must enforce the laws, whatever they be, and decide according to the best of their lights, but the laws, are not always just and the lights are not always luminous.
Nor, again, are judicial methods always adequate to secure justice.
We are bound by the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, by the, very oath of our office.
Section 354(3) of the new Code gives the convicting judge, on a murder charge, a discretion to choose between capital sentence and life term.
It is true that in the present Code, the unmistakable shift in legislative emphasis is on life imprisonment for murder as the rule and capital sentence an exception, to be resorted to for reasons to be stated (Edige Annamma, , AIR).
Even so, the discretion is limited and courts can never afford to forget Benjamin ' Cardozo 's wise guidance: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.
He is not to innovate at pleasure.
He is not a knight errant roam ing at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.
He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.
He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence.
He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by sys tem, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life.
Wide enough in all conscience is the field of dis cretion that remains." (Cardoze: The Nature of the Judicial Proc ess: Wale University Press ( 1921 ) ).
We have heard counsel on the merits and.perused the paper book with some care and see no ground to disturb the conviction.
The question of 'sentence ' projects sharply before us and what we.
have stated above turns our focus on cicumstances justifying the graver sentence.
The learned Sessions Judge has given valid reasons as to why he is imposing the death sentence.
The guidelines laid down by this Court, in its precedents which bind us, tell us that if the offence has been perpetrated with attendant aggravating circumstances, if the perpetrator discloses an extremely depraved state of mind and diabolical trickery in committing the homicide, accompanied by brutal dealing with the cadaver, the court can hardly help in the present state of the law, avoiding infliction of the death penalty.
When discretion has been exercised by the trial Court and it is difficult to fault that 773 court on any ground, statutory or precedential, an appellate review and even referral action become too narrow to demol ish the discretionary exercise of power by the inferior court.
So viewed, it is clear that the learned Judicial Commissioner has acted rightly in affirming the death sentence.
We are unable to, grant leave on, this score either.
Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the affirma tion by the Judicial Commissioner 's court of Goa, Diu and Daman, of the Death sentence is illegal.
According to.
him section 377 of the old code (which govern the instant case), is a missile which will bit down the confirmation by the Judicial Commissioner.
The said section reads: "377.
In every case so submitted the confirmation of the sentence, or any new sentence or order passed by the High Court, shall, when such Court consists of two or more Judges, be made, passed and signed by at least two of them." This section means, as we understand it, that when the High Court concerned consists of two or more judges, the confirmation or other sentence shall be signed by at least two of them.
This provision obviously applies only to situations where the court, at the time of the confirmation of the death sentence.
, consists of two or more judges.
It is true that section 4 (1) (i) in relation to a Union Territory brings within the definition of the 'High Court ' the highest court of criminal appeal for that area viz. the Judicial Commissioner 's court.
It therefore follows that if, at the time the case for confirmation of the death sentence is being heard, the Judicial Commission er 's court consists of more than one judge, at least two judges must attest the confirmation.
In the present case it is common ground that when the case was heard and judg ment pronounced there was.
only one Judicial Commissioner, although the sanctioned strength was two.
So long as one Judicial Commissioner alone functioned in the court, section 377 was not attracted.
The necessary inference is that in the present case there is nothing illegal in a Single (i.e. the only) Judicial Commissioner deciding the refer ence.
We are aware that the insistence of the Code on two judges hearing the matter of such gravity as a death sentence involves is because of the law 's grave concern that human life shall not be judicially deprived unless at least two minds at almost the highest level are.
applied.
Even so, exceptional situations may arise where two judges are not available in a High Court and, in that narrow contingency, the Code permits what has now happened.
We cannot fault the judgment on this ground either.
Counsel for the petitioner contends that the Criminal Procedure Code is a general statute but the Goa, Daman and Diu (Judicial Commissioners Court) Regulation, 1963 is a special law which prevails against the general.
On that footing he argues that under Regulation, 8 (1) the Court of the Judicial Commissioner shall have only such jurisdiction as is exercisable in respect of Goa, Daman and Diu by the Tribunal de Relacao.
According to him, the said Tribunal did not have the powers of confirmation of death sentence, and, 774 therefore, the judicial Commissioner cannot exercise such power.
He also argues that under the said provision the Judicial Commissioner ' is the highest Court of Appeal and Revision but not of Reference and for that reason cannot exercise the powers under section 377 of the old Crimi nal Procedure Code.
We see no force in these twin submis sions.
A Code is complete and that marks the distinction between a Code and an ordinary enactment.
The Criminal Procedure Code, by that canon, is serf contained and com plete.
It defines a High Court which takes in a Judicial Commissioner 's Court.
(Section 4(1)(i).
We need not and indeed may not travel beyond the Code into the territory of the Regulation.
Even otherwise, there is nothing in Regulation 8 ( 1 ) which helps the petitioner.
It pro vides that the Judicial Commissioner shall be the highest criminal 'Court, Appeal and Revision ' used in that provision are words of the widest import and cover all proceedings which are not original proceedings but are by way of judicial review for a higher level.
Referral jurisdiction, under section 377, is skin to appeal and revision and we think that Regulation 8(1) does not disentitle the Judicial Commissioner from exercising power under section 377 of the Code: nor are we inclined to accept the submission that on the speculative assumption that the Tribunal de Relacao did not have the power to confirm death sentences, and, there fore, the Judicial Commissioner, acting as the High Court under the Code, cannot enjoy such power.
Regulation 8(1) does not limit the jurisdiction of the.
Judicial Commission er in the sense counsel wants us to accept.
We therefore hold that the Judicial Commissioner 's confirmation of the death sentence is not without jurisdiction.
Undeterred by the fact that the murder is gruesome counsel has pleaded that at least on the question of sen tence leave should be granted because his client is a young man and the sentence of death has been haunting him agonis ingly for around six years.
May be that such a long spell of torment may be one circumstance in giving the lesser sen tence.
Even s0, we have to be guided by the rulings of this Court which have not gone to the extent of holding that based on this circumstance alone, without other supplement ing factors or in the face of surrounding beastly circum stances of the crime, judicial clemency can attenuate the sentence.
Possibly, Presidential power is wider but judicial power is embanked.
We refuse special leave and dismiss the petition.
Petition dismissed.

Output:
The petitioner was convicted for the offence of murder under section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced to death by the Trial Court.
The Judicial Commissioner, Goa confirmed the death sentence in the referred trial under section 374 of the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Dismissing the special leave petition to appeal, the Court.
HELD: (1) Discretion to choose between the capital sentence and life term under section 354(3) of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure is limited.
If the offence has been perpetrated with attendant aggravating circumstances, if the perpetrator discloses an extremely depraved state of mind and diaboli cal trickery in committing the homicide, accompanied by brutal dealing with the cadaver, infliction of death penalty cannot be avoided.
Special leave under article 136.
of the Constitution cannot be granted when it is difficult to fault the court on any ground, statutory or precedential.
[772 G H, 773 A] Ediga Annamma; , , referred to.
(2) Section 377 of 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure applies only to situations where the court at the time of the con firmation of the death sentence consists of two or more Judges.
Section 4(1)(i) of the Code of Criminal proce dure, in relation to a Union Territory, brings within the definition of "High Court", the highest court of criminal appeal for that area, namely, the Judicial Commissioner 's Court.
If, at the time the case for confirmation of death sentence is being heard, the Judicial Commissioner 's Court consists of more than one Judge, at least two Judges must attest the confirmation.
So long as one Judicial Commis sioner alone functions in the Court, section 377 was not attracted.
In the present case there is nothing illegal in a single (i.e.the only) Judicial Commissioner deciding the reference.
[773 D F] (3) Referral jurisdiction under section 377 is akin to appeal and revision.
Regulation 8(1) of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Judicial Commissioner 's Court) Regulation 1963 does not disentitle the Judicial Commissioner from exercising power section 377, Cr.
In the instant case, the Judicial Commis sioner 's confirmation of death sentence is not without jurisdiction.
[774 C D] (4) Judicial clemency cannot attenuate the sentence of death on the sole circumstance that the accused was a young man and the sentence of death been haunting him for long without other supplement factors or in the face of surround ing beastly circumstances of the crime.
Possibly, Presiden tial power wider but judicial power is embanked.
[774 E F] 10 707SCI/77 772


Input:
vil Appeal Nos.
23 19 2320 of 1981.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.3.1980 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 4959 and 4960 of 1975.
236 Soli J, Sorabjee, Harish N. Salve, section Ganesh, Mahapa tra, P.S. Shroff and Mrs. P.S. Shroff for the Appellant.
N.A. Palkhiwala, Gauri Shanker, S.C. Manchanda, J.B. Dadachanji, Mrs. A.K. Verma, D.N. Mishra, M.S. Harau, Ram Chandran, Mrs. J. Ramachandran Ms. A. Subhashini and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellant against the refusal of the first respondent to rectify an assess ment order and pass consequential directions.
Shri Anantharamakrishnan, a reputed industrialist in Tamil Nadu, died in the state in Madras on 18 April, 1964.
He left behind his widow, Valli, his two sons, Sivasailam and Krish namoorthy and two daughters, Kalyani and Seetha.
Some time after his death, Sivasailam, as an accountable person ren dered the estate duty account.
All the heirs, other than Sri Sivasailam, who were also accountable persons wrote to the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty on 15 December, 1964 that as accountable persons they agreed to abide by the accounts , rendered by Sri Sivasailam and any explanation furnished by him with regard to the Estate Duty case would be binding on them.
Messrs. Amalgamations Private Ltd. (shortly referred to as 'Amalgamations ') is a company which holds shares in most of the companies including Simpson and Company Ltd. (shortly referred to as 'Simpson ') of the group.
By letter dated 27 April, 1965 Amalgamations informed the assessing authority that the deceased had transferred property in the form of shares in Simpson to it and that the deceased had controlling interest in that company at the time of his death.
On 13 September, 1965 the assessing authority wrote to Amalgamations that the deceased had transferred 80,377 shares of Simpson, and therefore Amalga mations was a controlled company within the meaning of section 17 of the Estate Duty Act.
By virtue of section 19(1) of the Estate Duty Act the controlled company had to be regarded as one of the persons accountable for the estate of the deceased.
Amalgamations was required to submit an account of the estate.
Amalgamations filed a return before the Assistant Controller.
No objection was raised by the heirs of the deceased or by Amalgama 237 tions to the latter being treated as an accountable person.
After due enquiry the assessment of Estate Duty was completed on 27 January, 1970 and the duty payable by the estate was determined at Rs. 1,67,74,697.58, of which provi sional duty had been paid in the amount of Rs.65,50,452.73 leaving a balance of Rs.1,02,24,244.85.
The assessment order was addressed to Amalgamations as well as Sri Sivasailam as accountable persons.
The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty proceeded on the basis that Amalgamations was a "controlled company" and the deceased had control over its affairs, and therefore valuation of the shares held by the deceased in the company had to be made in the manner laid down in Rule 15 framed by the Board under section 30(1)(e) of the Estate Duty Act.
The principal value of the assets was determined at Rs.2,12,29,998 and the duty was computed at Rs. 1,67,74,697.58.
There was no appeal against the assessment by any of the accountable persons.
Kalyani Sundaram, one of the daughters of the deceased and the appellant before us, became entitled to the death of Anantharamakrishnan to a fifth share in his estate under the Hindu Succession Act.
Her husband, K.S. Sundaram, as her agent constituted by power of attorney, wrote on 11 June, 1974 to the Assistant Controller seeking certain clarifica tions regarding the assessment.
The Assistant Controller replied on 25 June, 1974 referring to the specific agreement of the accountable persons to abide by the accounts rendered by Sri Sivasailam and to be bound by any explanation given by him.
The Assistant Controller referred to the fact that all subsequent proceedings had been completed after discus sion with Sri Sivasailam and Amalgamations and as the as sessment had now become final it was not possible to enter into any discussion concerning it.
On 2 January, 1975 the appellant 's husband as agent filed an application under section 61 of the Estate Duty Act contending that the assessment order was vitiated by several errors inasmuch as Rule 15 prescribed only the method of valuation of the shares and debentures of the controlled company and the Rule was an appendage to sections 36 & 37 of the Act, that unless property was transferred without considera tion by the deceased to Amalgamations and some benefit accrued to the deceased from the company section 17(1) of the Act would not be attracted, that the decision to treat Amalgama tions as an accountable person because of the transfer of shares rested on the transfer of shares made by the de ceased, that on a number of aspects of the case the assess ment order did not show any detail, and therefore a rectifi cation 238 order should be made indicating the exact amount included under section 17(1) of the Act as the property passing on the death of the deceased.
He required this information, he said, to enable him to work out the amount which his princi pal had to pay to Amalgamations by way of reimbursement of the duty.
If the apportionment of the duty had been effected by the order itself, he said, the need for rectification would not have arisen.
Section 61 empowers the Controller "to rectify any mistake apparent from the record" at any time within five years from the date of the order passed by him.
On 25 Janu ary, 1975 the Assistant Controller passed an Order declaring that he was unable to discover any mistake which called for rectification in the assessment order and therefore he declined to act under section 61 of the Act.
This order was challenged by the writ petitions out of which the present appeals arise.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions.
Sethuraman, J. held that there was no apparent error, and therefore no reason for invoking section 61 of the Act and Balasubramanyan, J. in a concurring judgment, held likewise and also dealt with other aspects of the case.
BOth learned Judges were of the view that the proceeding reflected a private dispute between the appellant and other members of the family, and that the forum and remedy selected by the appellant were not appro priate for that purpose.
The fundamental question in these appeals is whether the appellant is right in invoking section 61 of the Act.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the heirs of the deceased on whom the estate devolves are liable to pay estate duty attributable to the property which falls to their respective shares and that if an accountable person pays any part of the estate duty in respect of any property not passing to him he is entitled to reimbursement by the person entitled to such property.
This, says learned coun sel, has no application in respect of the duty payable by virtue of section 17 of the Act, which provides that the slice of the assets of a controlled company shall be deemed to pass on the death of the deceased for the purposes of estate duty and the slice will be included in the property passing on his death if the deceased made a transfer of that property to the controlled company and benefit accrued to the de ceased in the three years ending his death.
The slice of the assets of the controlled company does not come to any heir; therefore no heir is called upon to pay the amount of estate duty attributable to the inclusion of that slice 239 in the chargeable estate.
By section 19 the controlled company itself is liable to pay the corresponding amount of estate duty.
In the present case, however, learned counsel urges, no slice of the assets of Amalgamations has been included in the estate of the deceased by the assessing authority as property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased and therefore the demand issued to the controlled company con stitutes a mistake apparent from the record.
The application of Rule 15 is also contested and this, according to learned counsel, is a clear mistake committed by the Controller.
It is urged that there is a mistake apparent from the record in the directions requiring Amalgamations to pay the entire amount of estate duty.
It seems to us that all the heirs other than Sivasailam had agreed that as accountable persons they would abide by the accounts rendered by Sivasailam, and any information furnished by him with regard to the estate duty matter would be binding on them.
The appellant cannot be heard now to dispute the quantum of liability and the basis on which the liability was computed.
Nor is it open to her to contend that it is not Amalgamations which is liable to pay the duty, but the duty is payable by the heirs of the deceased.
The assessment has become final and no appeal against it has been attempted.
It was for the benefit of the heirs that there was general agreement to have the assessment made on Amalgamations and indeed when the assessment was completed and finalised, no objection was taken.
The appellant acqui esced wholly and completely in the assessment to estate duty being made on Amalgamations.
No separate assessment was made on the appellant nor on the other heirs.
The assessment was completed in 1970 and the entire estate duty has now been paid up.
It was only after the entire estate duty was paid that the appellant filed the application for rectification on 2 January, 1975.
It was contended by learned counsel for the private respondents that the appellant enjoyed no locus standi in order to maintain the application under section 61 and these appeals thereafter, but we do not propose to enter into this question.
Further, it appears that this litigation is woven around a private dispute among the family members.
That is hardly any justification for invoking section 61 of the Act.
We have carefully perused the reasons given individually by the two learned Judges of the High Court and we are in complete agreement with them that there is no mistake appar ent on the record.
240 In support of the contention that there was a mistake apparent on the record, learned counsel has referred us to Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed Ishaque and Others, ; , 1123; Hind Trading Company vs Union of India & Anr., ; ; M.K. Venkatachalam, Income Tax Officer and Another vs Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.; , , 149 50 and Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras vs Mr. P. Firm, Muar, 15,822 but having regard to the facts of the case before us we do not find anything in those cases which can be of assistance to the appellant.
Learned counsel for the appellant states that having regard to the terms of the order granting special leave to appeal the appellant is justified in requesting the court to consider the issues on the merits.
We are unable to spell out such intent of the Court from the terms of the order granting special leave to appeal.
We do not think that the observations of the Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh; , , 180 affect the position before us.
The real question is whether the assessment was justi fied on Amalgamations or should it have been taken against the heirs of the deceased.
In our opinion, that question stands concluded now and upon all the facts and circum stances of the case we do not think it permissible for the appellant to have recourse to section 61 of the Act in order to re open the case.
The appeals are dismissed, there is no order as to costs.
Y.L. Appeals dis missed.

Output:
Shri Anantharamakrishnan, a reputed industrialist died in Madras on April 18, 1964 intestate leaving behind his widow, Valli, two sons, Sivasailam and Krishnamoorthy and two daughters, Kalyani and Seetha.
Some time thereafter, his son Sivasailam, being an accountable person rendered the Estate Duty account.
All other heirs i.e. his mother, broth er and sisters, who were also accountable persons, being the heirs of the deceased wrote to the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty that as accountable persons they agreed to abide by the accounts rendered by Sivasailam and whatever explana tion is furnished by him would be binding on them.
M/s. Amalgamations Private Ltd. is a company which held shares in most of the companies including Simpson and Compa ny Ltd. in which company the deceased Anantharamakrishnan too held shares.
By a letter of April 27, 1965, Amalgama tions informed the assessing authority that the deceased had transferred property to it in the form of shares and that at the time of his death, he had controlling interest in the Company.
On September 13, 1965, the Assessing Authority wrote to Amalgamations that the deceased having transferred 80,377 shares of Simpson, as such Amalgamations was a con trolled company within the meaning of section 17 of the Estate Duty Act and thus the said company had to be regarded as one of the accountable persons in respect of the estate of the deceased.
Amalgamations was therefore required to submit an account of the estate.
Accordingly Amalgamations flied a return and no objection thereto was taken by any of the heirs.
Treating Amalgamations as a controlled company and in view of the fact that the deceased had control over its affairs, the assessing authority valued the shares as per the provisions of Rule 15 of the Rule framed by 234 the Board under Section 30(1)(e) of the Act.
The principal value of the shares was determined of Rs.2,12,29,998 and the duty was computed at Rs.1,67,74,697.58, out of which provi sional duty in the sum of Rs.65,50,542.73 had been paid.
The assessment order was addressed both to Amalgamations as also to Shri Sivasailam as accountable persons.
No appeal was preferred against the said assessment by the accountable persons.
K.S. Sundaram husband of the appellant as her agent and constituted power of attorney, on June 11, 1974 wrote to the Assistant Controller seeking certain clarifications.
The Assistant Controller referring to the agreement between the heirs of the deceased Anantharamakrishnan that they were bound by the accounts rendered or explanation given by Sivasailam, replied that, since all subsequent proceedings had been completed after discussion with Sivasailam and Amalgamations, the assessment had become final and that it was not possible to enter into any further discussion.
On 2nd January, 1975, appellant 's husband as agent filed an application under Sec.
61 of the Estate Duty Act, and it was contended by him that the assessment order was vitiated by several errors inasmuch as Rule 15 only prescribed the method of valuation of shares and debentures of the con trolled company and the rule was appendage to Sections 36 & 37 of the Act.
It was urged that the assessment order did not show any details and therefore a rectification order should be made indicating the exact amount included under Section 17(1) of the Act as the property passing on the death of the deceased.
He stated that he required this information to know the precise amount which his principal had to pay to Amalgamations, as the assessment order did not, in terms, indicate apportionment of the duty, for which reason rectification was required.
On January 25, 1975, the Assistant Controller declared by an order that he was unable to find any mistake in the assessment order which called for any rectification and therefore he declined to act under Sec.
61 of the Act.
Order passed by the Assistant Controller was challenged in the High Court by means of Writ Petitions.
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that there was no error apparent on the record and therefore there was no reason for invoking Sec.
61 of the Act.
The High Court took the view that proceedings reflected a private dispute between the appellant and other members of the family.
Hence this appeal by the appellant.
235 Dismissing the appeal the Court, HELD: All the heirs other than Sivasailam had agreed that as accountable persons they would abide by the accounts rendered by Sivasailam and any information furnished by him with regard to the estate duty matter would be binding on them.
The appellant cannot be heard now to dispute the quantum of liability and the basis on which the liability was computed.
Nor is it open to her to contend that it is not Amalgamations which is liable to pay the duty, but the duty is payable by the heirs of the deceased.
The assessment had become final and no appeal against it had been attempt ed.
[239C D] The appellant acquiesced wholly and completely in the assessment to estate duty being made on Amalgamations.
[239E] The assessment was completed in 1970 and the entire estate duty has now been paid up.
It was only after the entire estate duty was paid that the appellant filed the application for rectification on January 2, 1975.
[239E F] The question whether the assessment was justified on Amalgamations or should it have been taken against the heirs of the deceased stands concluded now and upon all the facts and circumstances of the case it was not permissible for the appellant to have recourse to Sec.
61 of the Act in order to re open the case, as there was no mistake apparent on the record.
[240D E] That this litigation was woven around a private dispute among the family members.
[239G] Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed Ishaque and Others, ; , 1123; Hind Trading Company vs Union of India & Anr., ; ; M.K. Venkatachalam, Income tax Officer and Another vs Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., ; , 149 50; Commissioner of Income tax, Madras vs Mr. P. Firm Muar, ; ,822 and Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh, ; , 180, referred to.