Input:
iminal Appeal No. 69 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 9, 1965 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 1261 of 1964 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 1235 of 1964.
R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants.
Purshottam Trikamdas and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondent.
374 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.
The 2nd petitioner Kuppuswami lodged a a complaint with Yercaud Police on October 12, 1963 alleging that the respondent, M. section P. Rajesh and other persons had formed an unlawful assembly and committed offences of house trespass, mischief and causing hurt at 10 p.m. on October 11, 1963.
The complaint was the subject matter of investigation by the police who did not present a charge sheet against respondent, M. section P. Rajesh but filed a charge sheet against 4 other persons under sections 323, 325 and 448, Indian Penal Code in C.C. No. 3097/1963 in the Court of Sub Magistrat 3, Salem.
The case was tried by the Sub Magistrate who ultimately acquitted all the accused by his judgment dated December 13, 1963.
In the course of evidence, at that trial the 1st petitioner was examined as P.W. 1 and 2nd petitioner as P.W. 2 and it is alleged by the respondent that the petitioner gave false evidence to the effect that the respondent was also among the trespassers and assailants and that he was armed with a gun which another accused took from him.
After the conclusion of the trial the respondent filed a petition in the court of the Magistrate under section 476(1), Criminal Procedure Code alleging that on October 11, 1962 he along with certain other Directors had attended a meeting of the Board of Directors of Chembra Peak Estate Ltd. from 4.30 p.m. to 5.15 p.m. at Bangalore and that he was not at Yercaud on October 11, 1963, and prayed for the prosecution of the petitioners for giving false evidence under section 193, Indian Penal Code.
The respondent produced a, copy of the Draft Minutes of the Board meeting and also cited certain witnesses in support of his case.
After considering the matter, the Sub Magistrate of Salem held that he was satisfied that the respondent could not have been present at the alleged occurrence on October 11, 1963 at Yercaud and that P.W.s 1 and 2 deliberately committed perjury and implicated Mr. Rajesh as among the assailants.
The Sub Magistrate thought that in the interest of justice the petitioners should be prosecuted under section 193, Indian Penal Code and accordingly filed a complaint against the petitioners under section 193, Indian Penal Code in the Court of District Magistrate (Judicial), Salem.
The petitioners contended, that the complaint was not maintainable in law because the trying Magistrate had not followed the procedure under section 479 A, Criminal Procedure Code and it was therefore not open to the Magistrate to take recourse to the provisions of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code.
By his order dated February 10, 1964 the District Magistrate discharged the petitioners holding that the complaint was not sustainable in view of the decision of this Court in Shafer Hussain Bholu vs State of Maharashtra(1).
Thereupon the respondent filed Criminal.
R.C. No. 1261 of 1964 in the Madras High Court against the order of the District Magistrate (Judicial), Salem.
By his 375 judgment dated December 9, 1965 Anantanarayanan, J. set aside the orders of the District Magistrate (Judicial) and directed that the case should be taken up by the District Magistrate and the trial proceeded with in accordance with law.
This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the order of the Madras High Court dated December 9, 1965 in Crl.
R.C. No. 1261 of 1964.
The question of law arising in this case is what is the true meaning and scope of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code in the context of section 479 A(1) and (6), Criminal Procedure Code with regard to a prosecution authorised by a Court in respect of an offence of prejury committed before it in the course of the trial? Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the procedure to be followed for prosecution of offenders in case of certain offences affecting the administration of justice.
Section 4/6 sets out the procedure for prosecution of offenders for offences enumerated in section 195(1)(b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
If a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is of opinion, that it is expedient in.
the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in section 195(1)(b) or (c) which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing and forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction.
Section 476 A authorises a superior Court to make a complaint where a Subordinate Court has omitted to do so in respect of offences and in the circumstances mentioned in section 476(1).
Section 476 B provides for a right of appeal against the order making or refusing to make a, complaint.
Sections, 478 and 479 deal with the procedure which may be followed in certain grave cases.
Section 479 A which was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 26 of 1955 by the first sub section (in so far as it is material) provides as follows.
"479 A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 476 to 479 inclusive, when any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the Court shall, at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of such proceeding, record a finding to that effect stating its reasons therefor and 37 6 may, if it so thinks fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard, make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court setting forth the evidence which, in the opinion of the Court, is false or fabricated and forward the same to a, Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, and may. . . . " Sub section (6) of this section enacts as follows: "(6) No proceedings shall be taken under sections 476 to 479 inclusive for the prosecution of a person for giving or fabricating false evidence, if in respect of such a person proceedings may be taken under this section.
The scheme of section 479 A is to enact a special procedure for the more expeditious and effective manner of dealing with certain cases of perjury and fabrication of false evidence by witnesses in the course of judicial proceedings.
There is, however, a necessary condition for the application of section 479 A, Criminal Procedure Code.
The condition is that the Court before it delivers its judgment or at any rate at the time of delivering the judgment must form an opinion that a particular witness or witnesses, is, or, are giving false evidence, if the court could not form any opinion about the falsity of the evidence of the witness appearing before it, then certainly the court cannot at the time of delivering its judgment, record any finding about the same.
It is manifest that a court can come to a conclusion that a witness is false only when there are materials placed before it to justify that opinion.
If no materials are placed before the court to enable the court to form an opinion that a witness is giving false evidence, then certainly it could not form that opinion.
In the present case, the respondent produced material before the trial court on December 23, 1963 after the conclusion of the trial that the petitioners had given false evidence in the case and the respondent produced the necessary documents along with an application for proceeding against the petitioners under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code.
Till those documents were produced there was no opportunity or occasion for the magistrate to form an opinion about the falsity of the evidence adduced by the petitioners.
It is, therefore, manifest that at the time when the judgment was delivered the magistrate had no material before him to form an opinion that the petitioners had given false evidence.
It is only after the respondent had made his application on December 23, 1963 and brought the necessary material to the notice of the court that the falsity of the evidence of the petitioners became apparent and the magistrate was in a position to form an opinion about the falsity of the evidence given by the petitioners.
It is, therefore, clear that section 479 A will not be applicable on the facts of this case, and if the provisions of section 479 A will not apply on the facts of this case it follows that the bar contemplated by cl.
(6) of that section will not be applicable.
The reason is that cl.
(6) can be invoked only in cases in which 377 s.479 A(1) will be applicable.
The crucial words of cl.
(6) are "if in respect of such a person proceedings may be taken under this section".
It is clear that the bar under section 479 A (6) refers not to the legal character of the offence per se but to the possibility of action under section 479 A upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
If, for instance, material is made available to the court after the judgment had been pronounced, rendering it clearly beyond doubt that a person had committed perjury during the trial and that material was simply unavailable to the Court before or at the time of judgment, it is very difficult to see how the court could have acted under section 479 A, Criminal Procedure Code at all.
It cannot be supposed that the legislature contemplated that such a case of perjury, however, gross should go unpunished in such circumstances.
It appears to us that the true interpre tation of the language of cl.
(6) of section 479 A is that it does not operate as a bar to the prosecution for perjury in a case of this description.
Take, for instance, the trial of 'A ' for the murder of 'B ' in the Sessions Court where 'C ', 'D ' and 'E ' gave evidence that they actually saw 'A ' committing the murder of 'B '.
Suppose at the conclusion of the trial and after delivery of judgment by the Sessions Court 'B ' is found alive and there is incontestable evidence to show that 'A ' was falsely charged for the murder of 'B '.
Is it to be contemplated that in such a case there is no re medy available to the Court to prosecute C, D, and E for perjury under the provisions of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, though action cannot be taken, in the circumstances of the case, under section 479 A, Criminal Procedure Code? In our opinion, such a startling consequence was not contemplated by Parliament and the bar of cl.
(6) of section 479 A was intended only to apply to cases of perjury and fabrication of false evidence in which the trying Magistrate could have acted under section 479 A(1).
In other words, the bar of cl.
(6) will not apply to a, case where perjury is detected not merely with reference to the evidence adduced at the trial but with reference to the evidence adduced in some other distinct proceeding, not then brought before the court or because there is some other material subsequently produced after the conclusion of the trial and delivery of judgment which renders the prosecution for perjury essential in the interests of justice.
Applying the principle in the present case we are of opinion that the prosecution of the petitioners under the provisions of section 476, Criminal Procedure Code by the Magistrate after the conclusion of the trial is legally valid and is not affected by the bar of cl.
(6) of section 479 A, Criminal Procedure Code.
On behalf of the appellants Mr. Thiagarajan referred to the decision of this Court in Shabir Hussein Bholu vs State of Maharashtra(1).
But the Principle of that decision does not afford any assistance to the appellants in this case.
It appears that the (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 501.
378 appellant in that care appeared as a witness in a jury trial for murder.
Before the Court he, gave a statement contradictory to the ,one he had given before the committing court.
After the conclusion of the trial and delivery of judgment the Sessions Judge passed a separate order for prosecution of the appellant for intentionally giving false evidence under section 193, Indian Penal Code.
It was held by this Court that the provisions of section 479 A had not been complied with and.
no cognizance could be taken of the offence.
Two conditions were laid down for the exercise of the powers under section 479 A, (i) the court must form an opinion that the person has committed one of the two categories of offences referred to in section 479 A, and (ii) the Court must come to the conclusion that for the eradication of the evils of perjury etc.
and in the interests of justice it is expedient that the person be prosecuted.
This opinion and conclusion must be arrived at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order in the trial , the court cannot later on resort to section 476 and make a complaint against the witnesses.
The provisions of section 479 A were held applicable to the case and the fact that the trial was with the aid of a jury did not preclude the Sessions Judge from recording the findings required by section 479 A.
While considering whether action should be taken under section 479 A it was open to the Sessions Judge to say whether the evidence tendered at the trial was true or false.
It is manifest that the material in that case was produced before the Sessions Court for coming to the conclusion that the appellant had committed perjury and so the procedure contemplated In section 479 A(1) was applicable and since the Sessions Judge did not proceed under that section, though he could have done so, the bar contemplated by cl.
(6) of section 479 A operated and no action could have been taken under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code.
The ratio of that decision is not applicable to the present case because the material facts are different.
It is necessary to add that in Shabir Hussein Bholu vs State of Maharashtra(1) this Court observed that if the Judge is unable to come to a conclusion that the statement made at the trial is false then provisions of section 479 A (1) would not be applicable.
At page 512 of the Report it was observed by this Court as follows: "But, for considering the applicability of section 479 A(1) what hag to be borne in mind is that in a jury trial it is possible for the Judge to come a conclusion that the statement made at the trial is false.
If he comes to that conclusion then, as rightly observed in Badullah 's case (A.I.R. 1961 All. 397), he has no option but to proceed under section 479 A(1`), Cr.
P.C. The question then is whether he could act under this provision if he is unable to form an opinion one way or the other as to whether the evidence tendered at the trial is false or the evidence before the committing Magistrate is false.
What would be the position in such a case? If the proceed [1963] Supp. 1. S.O.R. 501.
379 ings before the committing Magistrate must be held to be entirely separate proceedings then we agree with the Allahabad High Court that section 479 A.(1) would not apply.
" There is divergence of opinion among the various High Courts on the question of law presented for determination in this case.
In Jai Bir Singh vs Malkhan Singh and another(1), it was held by Sahai, J. that the bar of section 479 A(6) applies to all cases of perjury, viz., (1) those where the perjury or the fabrication of false evidence has been detected by the court when the judgment is pronounced, and (2) cases where the perjury or fabrication of false evidence does not come to light till after the judgment has been pronounced and it was not open to the Court to proceed under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code for prosecution in the latter class of cases.
The same view has been taken by the Punjab High Court in Parshotam Lal L. Vir Bhan vs Madan Lal Bishambar Das(2) and the Rajasthan High Court in Amolak vs State(1).
A contrary view has been expressed by the Madras High Court in C. P. Kasi Thevar vs Chinniah Konar(4) and In re. Gnanainuthu(5).
For the reasons already expressed we are of opinion that the decision of the Madras Court in C.P. Kasi Thevar vs Chinniah Konar(4) and In re. Gnanamuthu(5) represents the correct law on the point.
For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
A.I.R. 1958 All.
(2) A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 145.
(3) A.I.R. (1) A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 77.
(5) A.I.R. 1964 Mad.

Output:
At a trial, the appellants gave evidence against the respondent.
After the Conclusion of the trial the respondent filed a petition in the court of the Magistrate under section 476(1) Criminal Procedure Code, praying for the prosecution of the appellants for giving false evidence under section 193 Indian Penal Code, and adduced evidence in sup port of his contention.
The Magistrate thought that in the interest of justice the, appellants should be prosecuted and accordingly filed a complaint.
The appellants contended that the complaint was not maintainable because the trying Magistrate had not followed the procedure under section 479 A, Criminal Procedure Code and it was therefore not open to the Magistrate to take recourse to the provisions of section 476.
HELD: The prosecution of the appellants under the provisions of section 476 Criminal Procedure Code by the Magistrate after the conclusion of the trial was legally valid and wag not affected by the bar of cl.
(6) of section 479 A. Criminal Procedure Code.
[377G] The bar of cl.
(6) will not apply to a case where perjury is detected not merely with reference to the evidence adduced at the trial but with reference to the evidence adduced in some other distinct proceeding not then brought before the court or because there is some other material subsequently produced after the conclusion of the trial and delivery of judgment which renders the prosecution for perjury essential in the interests of justice.
[377 F] Shabir Hussein Bholu, vs State of Maharashtra, [1963] Supp.
I S.C.R. 501, explained and distinguished.
C.P. Kasi Thevar vs Chinniah Konar, A.I.R. 1960 'Mad. 77 and In re Gnanamuthu A.I.R. 1964 Mad.
446, approved.
Jai Bir Singh vs Malkhan Singh.
A.I.R. 1958 All.
364, Parsotam Lal Vir Bhan vs Madan Lal Bashambar Das, A.I.R. 1959 Punj.
145 and Amolak vs State.
A.I.R. 1961 Rai. 220, disapproved.


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 584 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.9.1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979.
A.B. Rohtagi and M.S. Mann for the Appellant.
Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court were delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J. I wholly agree with my learned brother Saikia, J. with regard to the reasoning and the conclusions.
He has succinctly stated the facts of the case and the relevant provisions of law and they need no reiteration.
I would add only few points which I deem relevant to be dealt with.
As regards the applicability of the limitation of six months period prescribed under Rule 18 for the exercise of the revisional power by the State Govt.
under Section 42 of the Act, assailing legality or propriety of the scheme prepared or confirmation thereof or repartition made in pursuance thereof, it could be angulated from yet another perspective.
Indisputably Section 42 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1960 incorporating after the words any order passed "(Scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made)".
Rule 18 was made in exercise of the rule making power by the subordinate legislation.
After the amendment of Section 42 was made to exercise the revisional power by the State Govt.
against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, correspondingly, no amendment to Rule 18 was made bringing within its ambit scheme prepared or con firmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
It is unnecessary to go into the question whether Rule 18 was declared to be intra vires or not.
We proceed on the footing that Rule 18 is ultra vires and applies to the exercise of the revisional power by the State Govt.
under Section 42.
The omission to amend the Rule is an indication of the legislative animation that the limitation of six months prescribed under the Rule 18 would be confined to be ap plicable only to "any order passed by any officer under the Act.
Thereby, by necessary implication the prescription of the limitation of six months for filing revision petition against the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof would stand excluded.
It is no 580 doubt true as contended for respondents that the Consolida tion Officer who has prepared the scheme or confirmed it or modified or repartition made when it is objected to by the affected party, has to consider the objections and, as a part thereof by necessary implication, has to assign reasons and the record must contain reasons.
But the legislature made a dichotomy between the orders passed and scheme pre pared or confirmation thereof or repartition affected in pursuance thereof.
He is not free to take arbitrary deci sion.
Assigning reasons are sine quo non for application of the mind though he does not appear to communicate the rea sons therefore.
But to an order passed assigning reasons in its support and communication thereof are necessary concomi tants and this was made manifest when Section 19, 20 and 21 are looked into.
As regards the exercise of the power under Section 19 and 20 the statute does not envisage passing any orders.
But when exercise of the power in Sub sec.
20 of 21, the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed limitation against those orders to the appellate forums.
This, also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised under section 42.
It is undoubted that the scheme prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof are amena ble to the revisional jurisdiction under section 42.
The State Govt. would consider the legality or propriety of the reasons or the grounds on which the scheme was initially prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
But that does not mean that it is an order made and the limitation of six months prescribed under Rule 18 would get attracted to the revision filed against the scheme prepared or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
Thus I have.
little hesitation to hold that the prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by any officer under the Act; it would not apply to the revision filed against the scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti tion made in pursuance thereof.
It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre scribed for exercise of the revisional power under Section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time.
What is a reasonable time is always a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances in each case.
When legisla ture chose not to fix a particular period of limitation by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particu lar period.
The long lapse of time may be a fact for the revisional authority to take into 581 account in the light of the facts and circumstances obtain able in an appropriate case.
No absolute or precise period of limitation could be predicated or laid.
Take for instance the facts of this case.
the previous Sarpanch is a benefici ary from the impugned order and has chosen not to take steps to have the scheme impugned by filing a revision under Section 42 of the Act.
The Gram Panchayat, being a juristic person, could not by itself except through the executive authority take.
any action against the scheme prepared by the Consolidation Officer to assail its legality or proprie ty by filing the revision.
The revision petition was filed soon after the new Sarpanch came into office.
Take another instance of a case where the officer concerned and the person benefitted, in confabulation, have made a scheme and repartition affected in pursuance thereto and kept it in dark to the knowledge of the person affected by the scheme prepared or the partition made.
Until the person affected had actual knowledge, it is not possible to become award of it.
The limitation begins to run from the date of the knowl edge of the fraud so played.
It is always open to the af fected person to come forward and say that for the first time he became aware of the scheme prepared or partition made in pursuance thereof only when his rights are sought to be interfered with or exercise of the enjoyment of the property is interdicted.
Therefore immediately within a reasonable time thereafter he is to file a revision before the State Govt.
Having had the knowledge of the impugned action if he stood by without taking any further action, it is always open to the other party to bring it to the notice of the State Govt.
of the ground or the circumstances under which the revision petitioner when he became aware of the scheme prepared or the repartition made and he deliberately chose to acquiesce to it and if the State Govt.
is satisfied of the same, unless satisfactory explanation for the delay is given, the State Govt.
may decline to interfere with the impugned action or may decline to entertain the revision petition itself.
Thus it could be seen that each case has to be angulated on its own given facts and circumstances as to the reasonable period of limitation within which the revi sional power is to be filed.
Even though more than 5 years time had elapsed from the date of the preparation of the scheme till date of the filing of the revision under Section 42, there is sufficient ground in this case for the new Sarpanch in not filing a revision within six months from the date of the original scheme and the State Govt.
is well justified in exercising the power under Section 42.
The High Court is unjustified in interfering with the order passed by the Consolidation Officer.
Accordingly, the appeal is al lowed.
No costs.
582 K.N. SAIKIA, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandi garh dated 21.9.1979 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 allowing the petition and setting aside the order of the Director, Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.
The appellant Gram Panchayat, hereinafter referred to as the 'Panchayat ', was the owner of 1200 Bighas of land in village Kanonda, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak.
A Scheme of consolidation of holdings, hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme ', of the village was confirmed on 15.1.1974 under section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act '.
The Panchayat, there fore, moved an application under section 42 of the Act on 20.9.1977 for setting aside the Scheme, objecting to the utilisation of the land of value of /2/ (two annas) and allotments made to the other rightholders for their benefit.
On 24.1.
1979 a Mushtehri Mundadi was made for information of all the villagers concerned, but the rightholders were absent and ex party proceedings were taken against them.
The Panchayat 's case was that under the said Scheme the Panchay at land was consolidated, repartitioned and allotted to persons who did not have any right to hold the land.
Be sides, the land of Dharat containing two wells and a big house being religious place of worship was also partitioned under the Scheme and consequently the Panchayat has been reduced to a landless person, financially weakened and rendered incapable of rendering service in the village.
After hearing the parties the Director in his order dated 8.2.
1979 observed that it was evident from the perus al of the record that the Scheme of Consolidation of the village was confirmed on 15.1.
1974 whereas the application had been filed on 20.9.
1977 and as such the application had been filed too late.
After the expiry of six months period the application was time barred.
However, he said in his order: "In this case only to benefit some land own ers, the land of the value of two annas has been allotted due to which the deserving persons have been left over and they have not been given even Abadi plots.
Apart from this the Panchayat had no other land to cultivate, due to which the Panchayat is unable to devel op the agricultural schemes and in these circumstances of the matter I condone the delay in filing the present application.
" 583 He accordingly set aside the Scheme and remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer under section 21(2) of the Act with some directions.
Against that order the respondents moved the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 urging, inter alia, that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had condoned the delay without there being any ground for the same and that, in doing so, he had acted illegally and with material irregu larity.
The High Court held that from the observations of the Director it was evident that the delay was condoned on extraneous considerations as no reason whatsoever was given by the applicant in the application filed before him under section 42 of the Act as to why it was filed after the period of limitation.
In that view of the matter, holding that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had acted illegally and with material irregularity in condoning the delay, the High Court by the impugned order dated 21.9.79 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.
Mr. A.B. Rohtagi, the learned counsel for the appel lant, submits that the High Court erred in setting aside the Director of Consolidation 's order applying to the confirma tion of the Scheme the period of limitation of six months as prescribed in Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consoli dation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949, herein after referred to as 'the Rules ', inasmuch as that rule speaks only of orders and not of confirmation of the Scheme; and that a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jullundar, , taking the view that the bar of limitation under Rule 18 does not apply to those petitions under section 42 in which the legality or validity of a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is challenged has overruled AIR 1982 Punjab and Har yana 148 and that Full Bench decision has since been followed in Mr. Rohtagi further submits that on merits also there was ample justification for the Director to have taken the view it did inasmuch as Panchayat lands were taken into consolidation and repartitioned and allotted to persons who had no right to obtain the land thereby impoverishing the Panchayat and rendering it incapa ble of giving any help to the villagers.
Mr. Harbans Lal, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Full Bench decision that the limitation under rule 18 does not cover an order confirming a scheme is not tenable inasmuch as confirmation of a scheme is only by an order as contemplated under rule 18, and an applica tion challenging that order of confirmation has, there 584 fore, to be made within six months thereof; and that even assuming that there was no bar of limitation, an application had to be made within a reasonable time which, according to learned counsel, would be 'about two years '; and that by any standard the appellant 's application under section 42 was belated and could not have been allowed.
Lastly, counsel submits that there were three earlier applications dismissed by the Director under section 42 of the Act, including one by the Panchayat itself, and the Director had no power to review his own order.
The questions to be decided therefore are, whether for the purpose of limitation under rule 18 of the Rules confir mation of a scheme would be an order as envisaged in the rule; if it was not an order, whether the Director was justified in setting aside the scheme and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer; and whether the Direc tor 's order was one of review of his earlier order and as such beyond his jurisdiction.
To decide the first question we may conveniently refer to the provisions of the Act and rule 18 of the Rules.
Section 42 of the Act empowers the State Government to call for proceedings under the Act.
It says: "42.
Power of State Government to call for proceedings:The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repar tition made by any officer under this Act, call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that no order or scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed with out giving the parties interested notice ' to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.
" From a perusal of this section there arises no doubt that under it the State Government may for the stated purpose call for proceedings wherein any order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act.
Under the proviso the State 585 Government shall not vary or reverse any order or scheme or repartition without giving the interested parties opportuni ty of being heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.
There is therefore no doubt that this section envisages proceedings wherein order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made.
These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under this section.
Rule 18 deals with limitation for application under section 42, and it reads: "18.
Limitation for application under section 42: An application under section 42 shall be made within six months of the date of the order against which it is filed: Provided that in computing the period of limitation, the time spent in ob taining certified copies of the orders and the grounds of appeal, if any, filed under sub section (3) or sub section(4) of section 21, required to accompany the application shall be excluded: Provided further, that an applica tion may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore if the appli cant satisfies the authority competent to take action under section 42 that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
" From a perusal of this rule there arises no doubt that for applying this rule the application has to be one under section 42 of the Act and it has to be against an order and under the first proviso a certified copy of the order is required to accompany the application and in computing the period of limitation of six months, the time spent in ob taining the certified copy is to be excluded.
While the Division Bench comprising P.C. Jain and Tewa tia, JJ of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the instant case applied the period of limitation to the confirmation of the scheme and in that view of the matter set aside the Director 's order, the Full Bench comprising P.C. Jain, Acting C.J., Tewatia and Tiwana, JJ.
held: "A bare perusal of rule 18 of the Rules would show that .it provides limitation only for petitions filed against orders 586 passed.
There is no reference in the Rules to a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made.
The fact that in section 42 of the Act the words 'scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made ' have been added as a result of amendment, cannot justify the conclusion that in Rule 18 of the Rules these words have also to be read.
" We respectfully agree with this view.
Rule 18 has to be interpreted as we find it and the words of the rule are simple, precise and unambiguous and no more is necessary than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary sense.
Two different meanings cannot be given to the same word 'order ' namely, that in section 42 it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made; while in rule 18 it would include them.
The Full Bench therefore rightly held that rule 18 of the Rules does not apply to those proceedings in which the legality or validity of the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is chal lenged.
The Full Bench rightly approved the decision in Haqiqat Singh vs Addl.
Director, Consolidation of Holdings, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204, wherein it was held that a reading of section 42 as well as the scheme of the Act unmistakably pointed out that the statute made a clear distinction between order passed by an officer under the Act and the performance of duties by the authorities under the Act in the matter of preparation and confirmation of scheme of consolidation and re partition made in pursuance thereof.
So it could not possibly be held that preparation or confir mation of a scheme and the repartition carried would fail within the scope of 'order ' as used in rule 18 of the rules.
The rule did not come into play when a petitioner challenged either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confirmation of the repartition made in pursuance there of.
The amendment made this position clear.
In a subsequent decision reported in Joginder Singh and Ors.
vs The Director, Consolidation of Holdings, decided on August 8, 1988, where the direct hold ers had not challenged any order of the consolidation au thorities but had attacked the validity of the scheme and the repartition, it was rightly held that the bar of limita tion of six months in rule 18 of the Rules was not attracted to the facts of that case.
Mr. Harbans Lal submits that the above decisions require reconsideration.
We do not agreed.
We have perused the provisions of the Act and rule 18.
The Act provides for the compulsory consolidation of, and for prevention of fragmen tation of, agricultural holdings in the 587 State of Punjab and for the assignment or reservation of land for common purposes of the village.
It appears that prior to the Act there were two methods of consolidation in vogue in the Province, one through the Revenue Department and the other through the Cooperative Department but the progress of consolidation was very slow and lengthy and the Act sought to remedy those defects.
Section 19 of the Act provides for publication of draft scheme and on such publi cation any person likely to be affected by such scheme, shall, within 30 days of such publication, communicate in writing to the Consolidation Officer any objections relating to the scheme.
The Consolidation Officer, shall, after considering the objections, if any received, submit the scheme with such amendment as he considers necessary togeth er with his remarks on the objections to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation).
Thus, in this section we do not find any provisions for any order being passed.
Section 20 deals with confirmation of the scheme.
Under sub section(2) thereof if any objections are received to the draft scheme published under sub section (1) of section 19 and also if no written or oral objections to the draft scheme are received under subsection (3) of that section by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) he shall confirm that scheme.
Under sub section (3) if any objections are received to the draft scheme published under sub section (1) of section 19 or if any written or oral objections are received by the Settle ment Officer (Consolidation) before the confirmation of the draft scheme by him the Settlement Officer(Consolidation) may after taking the objections into consideration together with the remarks thereon of the Consolidation Officer and also after considering the written or oral objections either confirm the scheme with or without modifications, or refuse to confirm it.
In case of such refusal the Settlement Offi cer (Consolidation) shall return the draft scheme, with such directions as may be necessary to the Consolidation Officer, for reconsideration and resubmission .
Under sub section (4) upon the consideration of the scheme under sub section (2) or (3) the scheme as confirmed shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned.
Thus, this section also does not envisage passing of any order with reference to any person affected by the scheme.
It may be true, as Mr. Harbans Lal submits, that the confirmation may be done in the form of an order.
However, the word 'order ' has not been used by the legislature in this sec tion.
Section 21 deals with repartition.
Under sub section (1) of this section, the Consolidation Officer shall, after obtaining the advice of the land owners of the estate or estates concerned, carry out repartition in accordance with the scheme of consolidation of holdings 588 confirmed under section 20 and the boundaries of the hold ings as demarcated shall be shown on the Shajra which shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned.
There is no provision of passing of any 'order ' under this sub section.
Under subsection (2) any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written objec tion within 15 days of the publication before the Consolida tion Officer who shall after hearing the objectors pass such orders as he considers proper confirming or modifying the repartition.
Thus this sub section envisages passing of orders on the objections after hearing the objectors.
Sub section (3) provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer under sub section (2) may within one month of that order file an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) who shall after hearing the appellant pass such order as he considers proper.
This sub section also clearly envisages passing of an order on appeal by an aggrieved person as above.
Subsection (4) provides that any person aggrieved by the order of Settle ment Officer (Consolidation) under sub section (3) whether made before or after the commencement of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962 may within 60 days of that order appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolida tion and under sub section (5) any appeal against an order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) pending under sub section (4) immediately before the commencement of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Frag mentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962, either before the State or any officer to whom the powers of the State Government in this behalf have been delegated, shall be decided by the Assistant Director of Consolidation.
Thus, the above sub sections clearly envisage passing of orders by the respective authorities.
We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule 18 of the Rules.
It would be clear that though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a pro ceeding where an order was passed.
There is the maxim ex pressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
When certain persons or things are specified in a law an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred.
When mention has been made only of 'Orders ', the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are 589 excluded.
Again, Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretation.
The best interpretation is made from the context.
As we have seen, while section 19 and 20 did not envisage passing of any order section 21 envisaged passing of orders.
Section 42 deals with applications against or ders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition.
Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference excludes 'preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition '.
We have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench deci sion in Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings (supra).
Mr. Harbans Lal 's submission that even if no limitation was prescribed the application of the Panchayat before the Director was inordinately delayed is not tenable.
According to the learned counsel the period of two years would be reasonable period.
We are unable to agree.
In matters like Consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to reasonable period after which an appli cation could be made under section 42 of the Act.
The legis lature itself did not do so.
In the instant case the Pan chayat filed the application on 20th September, 1977 before the Director of Consolidation under section 42 of the Act praying for the revocation of the Scheme and for directions for fresh valuation to be ordered and repartition effected through appropriate authorities stating that the Sarpanch was not given any Nishan Dehi or demarcation on the spot nor was issued any passbook, and the petition was not filed earlier because the new Sarpanch came to know all these only a month ago and so the petition was claimed to be in time.
The original Sarpanch was a beneficiary out of the Panchayat land and he took no steps and the present Sarpanch took charge only a few months ago.
There were lot of complaints about valuation and allotments to rightholders.
Under the above circumstances when the Director himself considered it fit for granting the prayer, it cannot be said that the application was unreasonably delayed.
The next submission of Mr. Harbans Lal is equally un tenable.
It is true that in Harbhajan Singh vs Karam Singh and Anr., ; , it has been held that there is no provision in the Act granting express power of Review to the State Government with regard to an order made under section 42 of the Act and in the absence of any such power the Director, Consolidation of Holdings could not have reviewed his previous order dismissing an application of the Panchay at 590 under section 42 of the Act, and if so done, the review order of the Director would be ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
In the instant case it has not been shown to us that the Panchayat earlier moved any application under section 42 on the same subject matter and the instant order of the Director amounted to a review of his own order.
There is no material to hold that the instant order of the Direc tor is an order of review of his earlier order; and Mr. Rohtagi clearly denied that it was so.
In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the im pugned order of the High Court and restore that of the Director, Consolidation.
We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

Output:
The appellant Panchayat owned 1200 Bighas of land in Village Kanonda Distt.
Rohtak in Haryana.
A Scheme of con solidation of Holdings under Section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 was confirmed on 15.1.1974, as a result whereof the Panchayat 's land was consolidated, repartitioned and allot ted to persons, allegedly having no right to hold the same with the result, the Panchayat was reduced as a landless person, and financially weak.
The Panchayat, therefore, on 20.9.1977 moved an application under section 42 of the Act objecting to the utilization of the Land of the value of /2/ (Two annas) and the allotments made to other right holders.
After hearing the parties, the Director of Consolidation of Holdings by his order dated 8.2.79 set aside the scheme and remanded the case to the consolidation officer with some directions.
The Director took the view that even though the application had been made much beyond the period of limita tion of six months contemplated under Rule 18, yet in view of the fact that the Panchayat had no other land to culti vate due to which the Panchayat was unable to develop the agricultural Schemes, condoned the delay and allowed the application as aforesaid.
Against the said orders the Re spondents moved the High Court by means of a Writ Petition urging inter alia that the Director had condoned the delay without there being any ground for the same and thus had acted illegally.
The High Court held that the Director condoned the delay on extraneous considerations and accord ingly quashed the impugned 577 order of 8.2.79 passed by the Director.
Hence the Panchayat has filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (Per K.N. Saikia & M. Fathima Beevi, JJ.) Section 42 of the Act envisages proceedings wherein order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made.
These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under this section.
[585B] Applying Rule 18, the application has to be one under section 42 of the Act, and it has to be against an order and under the first proviso, a certified copy of the order is required to accompany the application and in computing the period of limitation of six months, the time spent in ob taining the certified copy is to be excluded.
[585F].
Rule 18 has to be interpreted as it is found, and the words of the rule are simple, precise and unambiguous and no more is necessary than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary sense.
Two different meanings cannot be given to the same word "order" namely, that, in section 42 it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti tion made, while in Rule 18, it would include them.
[586B C] The Rule did not come into play when a petitioner chal lenged either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confirmation or the repartition made in pursuance thereof.
The amendment made this position clear.
[586E] Though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a proceeding where an order was passed.
There is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
When mention has been made only of "orders", the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are excluded.
[588F G] In matters like consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter, the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will 578 not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to the reasonable period after which an application could be made under section 42 of the Act.
The Legislature itself did not do so.
[589C D] In the instant case, it has not been shown that the Panchayat earlier moved an application under section 42 on the same subject matter.
There is no material to hold that the instant order of the Director is an order of review of his earlier order.
[590A] (Per K. Ramaswamy, J.) As regards the exercise of the power under sections 19 & 20, the statute does not envisage passing any orders.
But when exercising the power, the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed limi tation against those orders to the appellate forums.
This also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised under section 42.
[580C D] The prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by an officer under the Act, it would not apply to the revision filed against the scheme prepared on confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
[580F] It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre scribed for exercise of the revisional power under section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time.
[580G] What is reasonable time is always a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[580G] When legislature chose not to fix a particular period of limitation, by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particular period.
:While exercising power under Sec tion 42, the revisional authority may take into account the long lapse of time as a factor in the light of the facts and circumstances obtainable in an appropriate, case.
No abso lute or precise period of limitation could be predicted or laid.
[580H] Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jullundar, AIR 1984 Punjab & Haryana 216, ap proved.
Haqiqat Singh vs Addl.
Director, Consolidation of Hold ings, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204; Joginder Singh & Ors.
vs The Director, 579 Consolidation of Holdings, and Harbha jan Singh vs Karam Singh & Anr., ; , referred to.


Input:
ivil Appeal No. 2794 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.1985 of the Calcutta High Court in E.M.A.T. No. 19 of 1983.
Appellant in person.
G.B. Pai, P.R. Seetharaman and Ms. Deepa Chhabra for the Respondents.
477 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court affirming on appeal the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court declaring that the reference made by the Government of West Bengal in the dispute raised by the appellant is incompetent and invalid.
The appellant is a working journalist employed by the respondents, Messrs. Bennett Coleman and Company Limited.
The registered office of the company is at Bombay and its press is located in Calcutta.
The sales office of the compa ny is situated in Calcutta.
On 1 November, 1961 the appel lant was appointed a staff correspondent in the Calcutta office of the company.
The letter of appointment dated 9 November, 1961 was issued by the company from its registered office at Bombay.
Subsequently, the appellant was promoted to the post of Industrial Correspondent, Pune and was trans ferred from Calcutta to Pune from 16 February, 1976.
Upon transfer to Pune the appellant received his remuneration and allowances from the Pune office of the company, and he was under the direct control and supervision of the registered office of the company situated in Bombay.
While the appellant was in Calcutta and before his transfer on promotion to Pune the appellant applied to the Labour Department, Government of West Bengal on 29 April, 1975 under sub section
(1) of section 17 of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages relating to the period April, 1968 to February, 1973 from the employer company.
On 14 May, 1975 the Government of West Bengal initiated conciliation proceedings.
The employer company participated in the conciliation proceedings and a joint conciliation meeting was held before the Conciliation Officer, Calcutta.
The appellant was transferred to Pune while the report of the conciliation proceedings was still awaited.
On 16 November, 1976 the Conciliation Officer reported failure of the conciliation proceedings and recom mended that the dispute be referred to the Labour Court under sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act.
Accordingly, the Government of West Bengal made a reference on 23 August, 1977 to the First Labour Court, West Bengal for the adjudi cation of the dispute between the parties.
An objection was raised by the employer company before the First Labour Court that the reference was incompetent as the Government of West Bengal had 478 no power to make the reference.
On 11 July, 1980 the First Labour Court rejected the objection.
The order was chal lenged by the employer company by a writ petition filed in the High Court.
By his judgment and order dated 5 August, 1982, the learned Single Judge held that the reference was incompetent.
That view was affirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court in appeal.
And now this appeal by special leave.
The question whether the Government of West Bengal was empowered to make a reference of the dispute between the appellant and the employer company must be determined by the provisions of the Act in their application to the facts of this case.
Section 17 of the Act makes provision for the recovery of money due to a newspaper employee from his employer.
Sub section
(1) requires that an application by the newspaper employee complaining that an amount due to him has remained unpaid by the employer should be made to the State Government, and provides that if the State Government is satisfied that any amount is so due it is empowered to issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, and there upon the Collector must proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
Which is the State Government to which such application lies is indicated by Rule 36 of the Rules made under the Act.
Rule 36 provides that an application under section 17 of the Act shall be made to the Government of the State where the Central Office or the Branch Office of the newspaper establishment in which the newspaper employee is employed is situated.
It is the loca tion of the Central Office or the Branch Office in which the newspaper employee is employed which determines which State Government it will be.
The Rule works in favour of the convenience of the newspaper employees.
Sub sections (2) and (3) of section 17 provide: "(2) If any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to a newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may, on its own motion or upon application made to it, refer the question to any Labour Court constituted by it under the ( 14 of 1947) or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State and the said Act or law shall have effect in relation to the Labour Court as if the question so referred were a matter referred to the Labour Court for adjudication under that Act or law.
479 (3) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the State Government which made the reference and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided in sub section (1).
" When all the provisions of section 17 are considered together it is apparent that they constitute a single scheme.
In simple terms the scheme is this.
A newspaper employee, who claims that an amount due to him has not been paid by his employer, can apply to the State Government for recovery of the amount.
If no dispute arises as to the amount due the Collector will recover the amount from the employer and pay it over to the newspaper employee.
If a question arises as to the amount due, it is a question which arises on the application made by the newspaper employee, and the applica tion having been made before the appropriate State Govern ment it is that State Government which will call for an adjudication of the dispute by referring the question to a Labour Court.
When the Labour Court has decided the ques tion, it will forward its decision to the State Government which made the reference, and thereafter the State Govern ment will direct that recovery proceedings shall be taken.
In other words the State Government before whom the applica tion for recovery is made is the State Government which will refer the question as to the amount due to a Labour Court, and the Labour Court upon reaching its decision will forward the decision to the State Government, which will then direct recovery of the amount.
Turning to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the application under sub section
(1) of section 17 was made on 29 April, 1975 when the appellant was employed at the Cal cutta Branch of the employer company.
He made the applica tion to the Labour Department of the Government of West Bengal for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages.
When the question arose as to the amount due to the appellant, the Government of West Bengal made the reference for adjudi cation to the First Labour Court, West Bengal.
Upon the construction of sub section
(2) of section 17 which has found favour with us, it is beyond dispute, we think, that the Government of West Bengal is competent to make the reference.
In our opinion the High Court erred in holding that the reference was without jurisdiction and that it was the State of Maha rashtra which was competent to make the reference.
The application for recovery was rightly made by the appellant before the Government of West Bengal because he was then employed by the Branch Office of the employer company, Calcutta.
Once we hold that the application was rightly made before the Government of West 480 Bengal, the further conclusion must necessarily follow that it was the Government of West Bengal which possessed the power to refer the question for adjudication.
It seems to us that the High Court omitted to appreciate the inter rela tionship between the different provisions of section 17 and the fact that if the proceeding under sub section
(1) of section 17 was commenced rightly before a State Government it was that State Government alone which should make a reference to a Labour Court for adjudication.
A number of cases have been placed before us, but we do not consider it necessary to refer to them having regard to the view taken by us upon a plain analysis o.f the statutory provisions.
We may note that the fundamental question before us is whether the Government of West Bengal was competent to make the reference.
We do not consider it appropriate to decide any other questions arising upon the reference since the reference must, pursuant to this judgment, be considered to be pending still and those questions can be raised there.
Our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the employer company to an award of the Labour Court of West Bengal where, it is said, the question covered by the im pugned reference has already been concluded on its merits.
That is a submission which is open to the employer company during the proceedings before the Labour Court upon the impugned reference.
We are concerned with a limited point and we need go no further.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order dated 18 January, 1985 of the Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and order dated 5 October, 1982 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the employer company is dis missed.
The Labour Court will now proceed to dispose of the reference expeditiously.
The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal and of the entire proceedings before the High Court.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

Output:
The appellant, a working journalist who was appointed on November, 1961 as a Staff Correspondent in the Calcutta Office of the respondent company while working as such at Calcutta, applied on 29 April, 1975 to the Government of West Bengal under sub section
(1) of section 17 of the Working Jour nalists and Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages relating to the period April 1968 to February 1973.
While the conciliation proceedings were on, he was promoted and transferred to Pune on 16 February, 1976.
The Conciliation Officer reported the fail ure of the proceedings before him on 16 November, 1976 and the Government of West Bengal made a reference under sub section
(2) of section 17 of the Act to the First Labour Court, West Bengal on 23 August, 1977 for the adjudication of the dis pute between the parties.
The preliminary objection raised by the respondent company that the Government of West Bengal was not competent to make the reference was rejected by the Labour Court.
The respondent company 's writ petition chal lenging 'the order of the Labour Court was allowed by a Single Judge whose decision was affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court.
Allowing the appeal by special leave and dismissing the writ petition of the respondent company, this Court.
HELD: (i) Sub section
(1) ors.
17 of the Act requires that an application by the newspaper employee complaining that an amount due to him has remained unpaid by the employer should be made to the State Government.
Which is the State Govern ment to which such application lies is 476 indicated by r: 36 of the Rules made under the Act and that rule provides that an application under section 17 of the Act shall be made to the Government of the State where the central office or the branch office of the newspaper estab lishment in which the newspaper employee is employed is situated.
It is the location of the central office or the branch office in which the newspaper employee is employed which determines which State Government it will be.
The rule works in favour of the convenience of the newspaper employ ee.
[478C E] (ii) Sub section
(2) of section 17 provides that if any question arises as to the amount due under the Act to a newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may refer the question to any Labour Court, constituted by it under the or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State.
If a question arises as to the amount due, it is a question which arises on the appli cation made by the newspaper employee, and the application having been made before the appropriate State Government, it is that State Government which will call for an adjudication of the dispute by referring the question to a Labour Court.
The State Government before whom the application for recov ery is made is the.
State Government which will refer the question as to the amount due to a Labour Court.
[478F G; 479C D] In this case, the appellant was employed at the Calcutta branch of the respondent company.
He made the application to the Labour Department of the Government of West Bengal for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages.
When the ques tion arose as to the amount due to the appellant, the Gov ernment of West Bengal made the reference for adjudication to the First Labour Court, West Bengal.
Upon the construc tion of sub section
(2) of section 17 as indicated at (ii) above, it is beyond dispute that the Government of West Bengal is competent to make the reference.
The High Court erred in holding that the reference was without jurisdiction and that it was the State of Maharashtra which was competent to make the reference.
[479E G]


Input:
tition (Civil) No. 1129 of 1977 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
R. Sharma and Dalveer Bhandari for the Petitioner.
B.Datta Additional Solicitor General, Ms. A.Subhashini, A.K. Goel, T.V.S.N. Chari, R.K. Jain, Dr. N.M. Ghatate, D.N. Mishra and H.S. Parihar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
In this writ petition the petitioner, Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co. Ltd., hereinafter referred to as 'the Company ', has challenged the taking over of the management of its two textile mills under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1972 (for short 'Take over Act ') and also the constitutional validity of the Take over Act and the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 (for short 'the Nationalisation Act ').
It appears that the Company had falled on evil days resulting in initiation of liquidation proceedings against the Company and the 940 appointment of a provisional liquidator.
The mills of the Company were closed sometime in May, 1972.
On the application by the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the Punjab & Haryana High Court directed the Board of Directors of the Company to hand over possession of the two mills to the Corporation to which the Company was indebted for a huge sum of money.
The Corporation was also directed by the High Court to lease out the mills, and it appears that Padmashree Textile Industries Ltd. was granted the lease of the mills, that is to say, the textile undertakings of the Company.
At this stage, it may be mentioned that the lessee, the said Padmashree Textile Industries Ltd., also filed a writ petition before this Court, inter alia, challenging the Take over Act and the Nationalisation Act.
That writ petition has since been disposed of by this Court upon settlement between the parties.
Section 4(1) of the Take over Act provides that on or before the appointed day, the management of the sick textile undertakings specified in the First Schedule shall vest in the Central Government.
Under Section 2(a) "appointed day" means 31st day of October, 1972.
Section 2(d) defines "sick textile undertaking" as follows: "section 2(d).
"sick textile undertaking" means the textile undertaking which falls within one or more of the following categories, namely: (i) which is owned by a textile company which is being wound up, whether voluntarily or by or under the supervision of any Court, or in respect of which a provisional liquidator has been appointed by a Court, (ii) which had remained closed for a period of not less than three months immediately before the appointed day and the closure of which is prejudicial to the textile industry, and the condition of the undertaking is such that it may, with reasonable inputs, be re started in the interests of the general public, (iii) which has been leased to Government or any other person or the management of which has been taken over by Government or any other person under any leave or licence granted by any Receiver or Liquidator by or under the orders of, or with the approval of, any Court, 941 (iv) the management of which was authorised by the Central Government, by a notified order made under section 18A, or in pursuance of an order made by the High Court under section 18FA, of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, to be taken over by a person or body of persons, but such management could not be taken over by such person or body of persons, before the appointed day, (v) the management of which ought to be [according to the report made after investigation by any person or body of persons appointed after the 1st day of January, 1970, under section 15 or section 15A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951] taken over under section 18A of that Act, but in relation to which no notified order authorising any person or body of persons to take over the management of such undertaking was made before the appointed day, (vi) in respect of which an investigation was caused to be made, before the appointed day, by the Central Government under section 15 or section 15A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and the report of such investigation was not received by the Central Government before the appointed day; and includes any textile undertaking which is deemed, under sub section (2) of section 4, to be a sick textile undertaking;" In view of sub clause (i) of section 2(d), as a provisional liquidator was appointed in respect of the textile undertakings of the Company, they were sick textile undertakings.
Moreover, the sick textile undertakings of the Company have been specified in the First Schedule to the Take over Act and by virtue of section 4(1) of the Take over Act, the undertakings of the Company have vested in the Central Government as sick textile undertakings.
It is vehemently urged by Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, that before actually taking possession of the undertakings of the Company, the Company should have been given an opportunity of being heard.
It is submitted that if such an 942 opportunity had been given, the Company could have shown that its undertakings were not sick undertakings.
Counsel submits that the intention of the Legislature to give such an opportunity of being heard is apparent from the provisions of clauses (iv), (v) and (vi) of section 2(d) of the Take over Act which relate to the taking over of manage ment of an undertaking under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.
In support of this contention, the learned Counsel has placed reliance upon three decisions of this Court in A. K. Kraipak & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, , Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621, and Smt.
Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain, In our opinion, none of the above decisions is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
In the First Schedule to the Take over Act, the undertakings of the Company have been specified as sick textile undertakings.
In other words, the Legislature has itself decided the undertakings of the Company to be sick textile undertakings.
Indeed, in the First Schedule all the sick textile undertakings have been specified.
Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature has not left it to the Executive to decide whether a particular textile undertaking is a sick textile undertaking or not.
If under the Take over Act the question whether a textile undertaking is a sick textile undertaking or not had been directed to be decided by the executive authorities, the owner of such undertaking could claim an opportunity of being heard.
But when an undertaking has been specified in the First Schedule to the Take over Act as a sick textile undertaking, the question of giving an opportunity to the owner of the undertaking does not at all arise.
We are unable to accept the contention of the petitioners that sub clauses (iv), (v) and (vi) of section 2(d) indicate that principles of natural justice should be complied with.
The provisions of these sub clauses are some of the categories under any one of which the undertaking may fall and, in that case, it will be a sick textile undertaking.
There is, therefore, no substance in the contention made on behalf of the petitioners that the Company should have been given an opportunity of being heard before the management of its undertakings was taken over as sick textile undertakings.
It is next urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Legislature having itself decided the question whether an under taking is a sick textile undertaking or not without giving any opportunity to the owner of such undertaking to make a representation, has damaged the basic structure of the Constitution of India, namely, 943 separation of power between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Our attention has been drawn to the observations made by Sikri, CJ, in Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala, [1973] 2 Supp.
SCR 1, and that of Mathew, J, in Smt.
lndira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain, at page 503 to the effect, inter alia, that separation of powers among the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, is one of the basic structures of the Constitution.
It is, accordingly, submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the doctrine of separation of powers implies that the Legislature should define civil or criminal wrong or a default and create an independent machinery, judicial or quasi judicial, to determine the liability of the status of an individual.
Further, the Legislature itself cannot give a judgment and, in any case, if such a judgment is given by the Legislature, it must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
The above submissions of the petitioners, in our opinion, are misconceived.
There can be no doubt that in respect of each sick textile undertaking, a Take over Act and a Nationalisation Act could be passed and, in that case, a large number of enactments would come into existence to the inconvenience of all concerned.
In order to avoid such cumbersome course and for the sake of convenience, the Legislature has mentioned in the First Schedule in both the Take over Act and the Nationalisation Act the names of all sick textile undertakings in the country.
By including certain textile undertakings as sick textile E undertakings in the First Schedule to the Take over Act, the Legislature has not made any judicial or quasi judicial determination, nor has the Legislature given any judgment, as contended on behalf of the petitioners, although such inclusion is sometimes loosely expressed as 'legislative judgment '.
In section 2(d), the Legislature has laid down the criteria for a sick undertaking.
The sick textile undertakings have been specified in the First Schedule on the basis of the tests laid down in section 2(d).
In including the sick textile undertakings in the First Schedule, the Legislature has not acted arbitrarily, for, it has also laid down the criteria or tests for such inclusion.
If any undertaking which has been so specified in the First Schedule does not satisfy the tests under section 2(d) of the Take over Act, the owner of it is entitled to t challenge such inclusion or take over in a court of law, although such challenge has to be founded on a strong ground.
Thus, there is no finality or conclusiveness in the legislative determination of an under taking as a sick textile undertaking.
Such determination is neither judicial nor quasi judicial.
Therefore, the question of damaging or altering the basic structure of the Constitution, namely, separation of 944 powers among the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, does not at all arise.
So also the question of the validity of the constitutional amendments by which the Take over Act and the Nationalisation Act have been included in the Ninth Schedule on the ground that by such amendments the basic structure of the Constitution is damaged, as contended on behalf of the petitioners, does not arise.
The contentions are misconceived and are rejected.
As a last resort, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the Nationalisation Act on the ground of inadequacy of compensation.
The Company had two undertakings, namely, Panipat Woollen Mills and Kharar Textile Mills.
In the third column of the First Schedule to the Nationalisation Act, a sum of Rs. 6,40,000 has been specified for the Panipat Woollen Mills and a sum of Rs. 12,89,000 has been specified for the Kharar Textile Mills by way of compensation for the acquisition of these two undertakings.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the amounts of compensation, which have been specified for the acquisition of these two undertakings, are inadequate.
We are afraid, as on the date the Nationalisation Act had come into force, Article 31 of the Constitution was not repealed, the validity of the Nationalisation Act cannot be challenged on the ground of inadequacy of compensation.
In Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition Nos.
356 361 of 1977, decided on September 9, 1986, it has been already held by us that the Nationalisation Act gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the ownership and control of the material resources of the community which are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, as contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution.
In the circumstances, the Nationalisation Act falls within the provision of Article 31C of the Constitution before it was amended by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976.
Even assuming that the Nationalisation Act violates the provision of Article 31, no challenge to its validity can be made on that ground.
Apart from that, we are of the view that the compensation that has been awarded to the Company is neither inadequate nor illusory as contended on behalf of the petitioners.
It is not in dispute that the paid up share capital of the Company was Rs.60 lakhs and it paid dividend up to 1965.
Thereafter, the Company did not pay any dividend from 1965 to 1970.
It will not be unreasonable to presume that in specifying the compensation, the Legislature has taken these facts into consideration.
There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the compensation specified in First Schedule to the Nationalisation Act in respect of the undertakings of 945 the Company is illusory.
The contention is rejected.
No other point has been urged on behalf of the petitioners.
For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed and the rule nisi is discharged.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
M.L.A. Petition dismissed.

Output:
A provisional liquidator was appointed in respect of two textile undertakings of the petitioner company since they had gone into huge loss and had to be closed sometime in May 1972.
As the textile undertakings of the petitioner company were 'sick textile undertakings ' within the meaning of sub clause (i) of section 2(d) of the Sick Textiles Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act 1972 (for short, Take over Act) and have also been specified in the First Schedule to the Take over Act, they vested in the Central Government as 'sick textile undertakings ' by virtue of section 4(1) of the Take over Act.
The petitioner company challenged before the Supreme Court the taking over of the management of the aforesaid two textile mills under the Take over Act and also the constitutional validity of the Take over Act and the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act 1974 on the grounds (a) that the Company should have been given an opportunity of being heard before the management of its undertakings was taken over as 'sick textiles undertakings ' and if such an opportunity had been given, the company could have shown that its undertakings were not sick undertakings; (b) that the legislature, having itself decided the question whether an undertaking is sick textile undertaking or not without giving any opportunity to the owner of such undertaking to make a representation, has damaged the basic structure of the Constitution 938 namely separation of power between the legislature, the executive and the judicially; and (c) that the Nationalisa tion Act is consititutionally invalid on the ground of inadequacy of compensation.
Dismissing the petition, ^ HELD 1.1 In the First Schedule to the Take over Act, the undertakings of the company have been specified as sick textile undertakings.
In other words, the Legislature has itself decided the undertakings of the Company to be sick textile undertakings.
Indeed, in the First Schedule all the sick textile undertakings have been specified.
Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature has not left it to the Executive to decide whether a particular textile undertaking is a sick textile undertaking or not.
If under the Take over Act the question whether a textile undertaking is a sick textile undertaking or not had been directed to be decided by the executive authorities, the owner of such undertaking could claim an opportunity of being heard.
But when an undertaking has been specified in the First Schedule to the Take over Act as a sick textile undertaking, the question of giving an opportunity to the owner of the undertaking does not at all arise.
[942C F] 1.2 In including the sick textile undertakings in the First Schedule, the Legislature has not acted arbitrarily, for it has also laid down the criteria or tests for such inclusion.
If any undertaking which has been so specified in the First Schedule does not satisfy the tests under section 2(d) of the Take over Act, the owner of it is entitled to challenge such inclusion or take over in a court of law, although such challenge has to be founded on a strong ground.
Thus, there is no finality or conclusiveness in the legislative determination of an undertaking as a sick textile undertaking.
Such determination is neither judicial nor quasi judicial.
Therefore, the question of damaging or altering the basic structure of the Constitution namely, separation of powers among the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, does not at all arise.
So also the question of the validity of the constitutional amendments by which the Take over Act and the Nationalisation Act have been included in the Ninth Schedule on the ground that by such amendments the basic structure of the Constitution is damaged, as contended on behalf of the petitioners, does not arise.
[943F H; 944A B] 2.
The Nationalisation Act gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the ownership and control of the material resources of the community which are so distributed as best to subserve the common 939 good, as contained in article 39(b) of the Constitution.
It falls within the provision of article 31C of the Constitution before it was amended by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976.
Even assuming that the Nationalisation Act violates the provision of article 31, no challenge to its validity can be made on that ground.
[944E G] Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition Nos.
356 361 of 1977, decided on September 9, 1986, relied upon.
In the instant case, the compensation that has been awarded to the Company is neither inadequate nor illusory.
It is not in dispute that the paid up share capital of the Company was Rs.60 lakhs and it paid dividend from 1965 to 1970.
It will not be unreasonable to presume that in specifying the compensation, the Legislature has taken these facts into consideration.
There is, therefore no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the compensation specified in First Schedule to the Nationalisation Act in respect of the undertakings of the Company is illusory.
[944G H; 945A]