Input:
Appeal No. 790 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated February 10, 1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 280 of 1950.
C. B. Aggarwala, G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the appellants.
G. section Pathak and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent No. 1. 1960.
November 11.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR J.
This is an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a writ petition.
In the writ petition the respondents challenged certain orders made by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under section 3, cl.
(b) of the United Provinces , (XXVIII of 1947) requiring the respondents to pay bonus at certain rates for the years 1947 48 and 1948 49 to their workers and also payment of retaining allowances to the skilled seasonal workmen and clerical staff.
The circumstances under which the orders were made are briefly these: 333 The Indian National Sugar Mills Workers ' Federation, Lucknow, served notices on various sugar factories in Uttar Pradesh on December 15, 1949, in which they made six demands.
We need, however, mention only one of them as that alone is in controversy in this appeal.
That demand related to the bonus for the year 1948 49 and to the restoration of the reduction which had been made in the previous year 's bonus.
By that notice the Federation threatened a strike in the industry with effect from January 16, 1960, if the demands were not met by the sugar factories.
Since this situation brought into existence an industrial dispute, the Government of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of the power conferred by sections 6 and 10 of the , (XIV of 1947) appointed a Court of Inquiry and referred the dispute to it.
The notification also stated the points which were referred to the Court of Inquiry.
That notification was twice amended but nothing turns on those amendments.
A full enquiry was held by the Court of Inquiry at which the representatives of both the employers as well as the employees were represented and material was placed before the Court of Inquiry by both the sides.
The Court of Inquiry submitted its report to the Government on April 15, 1950.
On receipt of this report the Government of Uttar Pradesh published the report in the Uttar Pradesh gazette on May 8, 1950, as provided for in section 17 of the .
On July 5, 1950, the Government of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3(b) of the Uttar Pradesh , issued a notification directing the various sugar factories to pay bonus to their workmen for the year 1948 49 as well as to pay certain amounts as bonus for the year 1947 48.
A further direction was made in the notification for payment of retaining allowance to the skilled seasonal workmen and clerical staff with effect from the off season in the year 1950.
Thereupon the Indian Sugar Millers Association, which is an Association of sugar factories in India and is registered under the Trade Union Act made a petition before the High Court at Allahabad under 334 article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ against the Government of Uttar Pradesh prohibiting the Government from enforcing the notification.
The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on September 14, 1950, on the ground that the Association had no legal interest in the matter.
Thereupon various sugar mills preferred separate writ petitions before the High Court, the respondents before us being one of them.
As many as fourteen grounds were taken on their behalf in their writ petition.
We are, however, concerned with only three of them to which Mr. G. section Pathak, who appears for the respondents confined his arguments.
Before we refer to those grounds we would complete the narration of facts.
The High Court of Allahabad allowed the writ petitions, in so far as the question of payment of bonus was concerned, though Sapru, J., one of the judges constituting the Full Bench, expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the view that the order of the State Government as regards the payment of bonus was invalid.
After the decision of the High Court, the State of Uttar Pradesh applied for a certificate under article 133(1)(b) and article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
The High Court having granted the certificate, the present appeal has been brought to this Court.
In order to appreciate the points raised by Mr. G. section Pathak, it is necessary to set out the provisions of section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh .
They are as follows: " If, in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience, or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order, make provision (a) for prohibiting, subject to the provisions of the order, strikes or look outs generally, or a strike or lock out in connection with any industrial dispute; (b) for requiring employers, workmen or both to observe for such period, as may be specified in the order, such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order; 335 (c) for appointing industrial courts; (cc) for appointing committees representative both of the employer and workmen for securing amity and good relations between the employer and workmen and for settling industrial disputes by conciliation; for consultation and advice on matters relating to production, organization, welfare and efficiency; (d) for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order ; (e) for requiring any public utility service, or any subsidiary undertaking not to close or remain closed and to work or continue to work on such conditions as may be specified in the order; (f) for exercising control over any public utility service, or any subsidiary undertaking, by authorising any person (hereinafter referred to as an authorised controller) to exercise, with respect to such service, undertaking or part thereof such functions of control as may be specified in the order; and, on the making of such order the service, undertaking or part thereof such functions of control as may be specified in the order; and, on the making of such order the service, undertaking or part, as the case may be, shall so long as the order continues to be carried on in accordance with any directions given by the authorised controller in accordance with the provisions of the order and every person having any functions of management of such service, undertaking or part thereof shall comply with such directions; (g) for any incidental or supplementary matters which appear to the State Government necessary or expedient for the purposes of the order: Provided that no order made under clause (b) (i) shall require an employer to observe terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workmen than those which were applicable to them at any time within three months preceding the date of the order; (ii) shall, if an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication under clause (d), be enforced after the decision of the adjudicating authority is announced be or with the consent of, the State Government.
" 336 The view taken by the High Court was that clause (b) of section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh , is prospective in operation in that thereunder it is open to the State Government to ask an employer or an employee to observe a term or a condition of employment in future and that consequently it is not competent thereunder to require an employer to pay bonus to workmen in respect of a period of employment which is already past.
The view of the High Court was challenged before us on behalf of the State.
According to the State the provisions of the aforesaid clause are wide enough to permit the making of such a direction to the employer because by doing so the State Government would only be imposing a condition of employment in future.
In answer to this contention Mr. Pathak has, as already stated, raised three points and they are as follows: (1) Clause (b) of section 3 does not operate retrospectively and must be construed as having a prospective operation only.
(2) This clause does not apply at all where an industrial dispute has arisen and that the appropriate provision under which the State Government can take action where an industrial dispute has arisen is cl.
(3) If cl.
(b) is susceptible of the interpretation that it is applicable even when an industrial dispute has arisen then it is ultra vires in as much as it would enable the State Government to discriminate between an industry and an industry or an industrial unit and another industrial unit or between a workman and a workman by referring some cases for adjudication to an industrial court under cl.
(d) and passing executive order itself in respect of others.
The provisions of cl.
(b), according to him, are violative of article 14 of the Constitution.
Further, according to him, they are also violative of the provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in as much as they confer an arbitrary power on the State Government to require an employer to pay whatever it thinks fit to an employee and thus place an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the employer to carry on his business.
337 We entirely agree with the learned judges of the Allahabad High Court that cl.
(b) of section 3 cannot be given a retrospective effect.
But we are unable to agree with them that the State Government in making a direction to the employers to pay bonus for the years in question purported to give a retrospective operation to the provisions of that clause.
The order made by the State Government in regard to bonus is to the effect that it shall be paid for the year 1947 48 to those persons who worked during that year and for the year 1948 49 to those persons who worked in that year.
This payment was directed to be made within six weeks of the making of the order.
By giving this direction the State Government did no more than attach a condition to the employment of workmen in the year 1950 51 in sugar factories affected by the order.
That is all that it has done.
Mr. Pathak contended that bonus has certain attributes of a wage and wage being a matter of contract can only be a term of employment agreed to between the employer and the employee but could not be a condition of employment which could be imposed by a statute or which could be imposed by a Government acting under a statute.
We agree that normally wage is a term of contract but it would be futile to say that it cannot be made a condition of employment.
The Minimum Wages Act provides for the fixation of a statutory minimum wage payable to a worker in respect of certain types of employments and is an instance of wage being made a condition of employment.
That apart, whether wage or bonus is a term of a contract or a condition of employment it is clear that section 3 empowers the State Government to require the employers and workmen or both to observe any term or condition of employment for a specified period.
Since the law enables the State Government to impose a term it is apparent that the legislature which enacted that law did not import into that word a con.
sensual sense.
We cannot, therefore, accept the argument that under cl.
(b) it was not open to the State Government to make the payment of bonus to 338 workmen a condition of their employment in future and thus augment their past wages.
Mr. Pathak then referred to the following observations in the judgment of Bhargava, J. s " Obviously there can be no question of requiring any one to observe for a future period terms and conditions of employment which have already remained effective and have already been carried out by those persons ".
According to Mr. Pathak the effect of the order of the Government is to add a new term or a condition with regard to employment for a period which is already over.
We would again point out that this is not the effect of the order of the Government.
The effect of that order is merely to require the employer to pay an additional sum of money to his employees as a term and condition of work in future.
Mr. Pathak, however, said that this would involve payment of bonus even to new employees, that is, those who had not participated in earning the profits in the past and that this would be contrary to the very conception of bonus.
The answer to that is that under the order of the Government such bonus is payable only to those workers who had worked during the years in question and not to new employees.
It is further to be borne in mind that in the dispute in question the employees were bargaining in their collective capacity and, therefore, the question whether the personnel forming the employees of the factories in July, 1950, when the order was made by the Government, and in the years 1947 48 and 1948 49 to which the dispute relates was the same is quite immaterial.
As has been rightly pointed out by Sapru, J., " The employees might well have taken in the industrial dispute the line that the payment of bonus in respect of the years 1947 48 and 1948 49 to the workmen employed in those years was regarded by those who were employed in future as a preliminary and essential condition for not only the settlement of the industrial dispute in progress but also for carrying on their future work in sugar factories ".
We also concur with the observations of the learned judge that by coming 339 conceded the State Government was not passing an order which will have retrospective effect but was passing an order which was to ensure that the work.
men to be employed in the year 1950 would work in a contented manner.
It must not be forgotten that the dispute was in the present, that is, it existed when the impugned order was made, though its origin was in the past.
What the order did was to resolve that dispute and this it could only do by removing its cause.
Mr. Pathak then relied upon the following observations of Bhargava, J., in L. D. Sugar Mills vs U. P. Government (1): " The expression 1 to observe for such period as may be specified, such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined ' gives an indication that clause (b) of section 3 of the U. P. , is meant for the purpose of passing orders by which the Government gives directions about what the terms and conditions of employment should be and not how a particular term and condition of employment already in existence should be acted upon.
" Bhargava, J. 's decision was, however, reversed in Ram Nath Koeri and Another vs Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills and Ors.
(2) by a division bench of the Allahabad High Court in Letters Patent Appeal brought against Bhargava, J. 's decision.
We agree with the view taken by the Appellate Bench.
In our opinion, therefore, there is nothing in cl.
(b) of section 3 of the Act which prohibited the State Government from making a direction to the sugar factories with regard to the payment of bonus for the years 1947 48 and 1948 49 in their order of July 7, 1950 and that by making such a direction the State Government was not giving a retrospective effect to the provisions of that clause.
In this connection it is relevant to remember that any direction as to payment of bonus must inevitably be based on the available surplus, and such surplus can be determined only at the end of a given year.
Therefore, what the impugned (1) A.I.R. 1954 All. 705, 714.
(2) (1956) II L. L. J. 11.
340 order purports to do is to require the employers to pay specified amounts in future, though the said ,amounts are fixed by reference to the profits made in the two preceding years.
If a direction as to payment ;of bonus can be issued under section 3(b) it cannot, therefore, be said to be retrospective.
The next argument of Mr. Pathak appears, at first sight, to be more formidable.
He points out that undoubtedly an industrial dispute had arisen, and indeed it is upon that basis that the State Government proceeded to appoint a Court of Inquiry.
Therefore, according to Mr. Pathak resort could be taken by the State Government only to the special provisions of cl.
(d) and not to the more general provisions of cl.
(b) of section 3.
In other words, where there is an industrial dispute, the appropriate thing for the Government to do is to refer it for conciliation or adjudication under the provisions of cl.
(d) and not to deal with the matter by an executive order as it has done in this case.
Mr. Pathak then refers to a further passage from the judgment of Bhargava, J., just cited which is as follows: " It appears from the language that this provision was not meant for the purpose of dealing with individual disputes arising out of the application of a term or condition of employment and no power was granted to the State Government under this provision of law, to sit as an adjudicator to decide a dispute that might have arisen relating to the working and actual application of terms and conditions of employment already in force.
The provision was for the purpose of enabling the State Government to vary the agreed terms and conditions of employment for purposes specified in a. 3 of U. P. , under the pressing necessities or expediency justifying such course of action.
" We entirely agree with Mr. Pathak that the normal way of dealing with an industrial dispute under the Act would be to have it dealt with judicially either by conciliation or by adjudication and that judicial process cannot be circumvented by resort to executive action.
The proceeding before a conciliator or an 341 adjudicator is, in a sense, a judicial proceeding because therein both the parties to the dispute would have the opportunity of being heard and of placing the relevant material before the conciliator or adjudicator.
But there may be an emergency and the Government may have to act promptly " for securing the public safety or convenience or the.
maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or maintaining employment.
" It was, therefore, necessary to arm it with additional powers for dealing with such an emergency.
Clause (b) of section 3 was apparently enacted for this purpose.
An order made thereunder would be in the nature of a tempor ary or interim order as would be clear from the words " for such period as may be specified " appearing therein and from the second proviso to section 3.
Under this proviso where an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication under cl.
(d) an order made under cl.
(b) cannot be enforced after the decision of the adjudicating authority is announced by or with the consent of the State Government.
It would, therefore, follow from this that where the Government has made an executive order, as it did in this case, under cl.
(b) of section 3, it is open to the aggrieved party to move the Government to refer the industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication under cl.
(d) of section 3.
Mr. Pathak, however, stated that under this section, the Government has a discretion whether or not to refer a dispute for conciliation or adjudication under cl.
But in our opinion where once the Government has acted under cl.
(b) on the ground that it was in the public interest to do so, it would not be open to the Government to refuse to refer the dispute under cl.
(d) for conciliation or adjudication.
Mr. C. B. Agarwal, who appeared for the State of Uttar Pradesh conceded, and we think rightly, that this would be so and added that in case the State Government was recalcitrant it could be forced to do its duty by the issue of a writ of mandamus by the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution.
There is a further argument of Mr. Pathak which must be noticed and that argument is that there is 342 nothing in cl.
(b) which limits its operation to an emergency and that it is, therefore, not open to us to place a construction thereon of the kind we are placing.
The opening words of section 3 themselves indicate that the provisions thereof are to be availed of in an emergency.
It is true that even a reference to an arbitrator or a conciliator could be made only if there is an emergency.
But then an emergency may be acute.
Such an emergency may necessitate the exercise of powers under cl.
(b) and a mere resort to those under cl.
(d) may be inadequate to meet this situation.
Whether to resort to one provision or other must depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the State Government upon which powers to act under section 3 have been conferred by the legislature.
No doubt, this result is arrived at by placing a particular construction on the provisions of that section but we think we are justified in doing so.
As Mr. Pathak himself suggested in the course of his arguments, we must try and construe a statute in such a way, where it is possible to so construe it, as to obviate a conflict between its various provisions and also so as to render the statute or any of its provisions constitutional.
By limiting the operation of the provisions of cl.
(b) to an emergency we do not think that we are doing violence to the language used by the legislature.
Further, assuming that the width of the language could not be limited by construction it can be said that after the coming into force of the Constitution the provisions can, by virtue of article 13, have only a limited effect as stated above and to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Constitution, they have been rendered void.
In our view, therefore, the provisions of cl.
(b) of section 3 are not in any sense alternative to those of cl.
(d) and that the former could be availed of by the State Government only in an emergency and as a temporary measure.
The right of the employer or the employee to require the dispute to be referred for conciliation or adjudication would still be there and could be exercised by them by taking appropriate steps.
Upon the construction we place on the 343 provisions of cl.
(b) of section 3 it is clear that no question of discrimination at all arises.
Similarly the fact that action was taken by the Government in an emergency in the public interest would be a complete answer to the argument that that action is violative of the pro visions of article 19(1)(g).
The restriction placed upon the employer by such an order is only a temporary one and having been placed in the public interest would fall under cl.
(6) of article 19 of, the Constitution.
Upon this view we hold that the High Court was in error in issuing a writ against the State Government quashing their order in so far as it related to payment of bonus.
The appeal is allowed and order of the High Court is set aside.
Costs of this appeal will be paid by the respondents.
Appeal allowed.

Output:
The Government of U. P. appointed a Court of enquiry under sections 6 and 10 of the United Provinces , and referred to it the present dispute.
The Court of enquiry submitted its report to the Government, whereupon the Government issued a notification in July, 1950, directing the various sugar factories to pay bonus to their workmen for the years 1948 49 as well as to pay certain amounts as bonus for the years 1947 48.
331 Court against the Government, prohibiting it from enforcing the notification.
The State Government came up in appeal, urging, that the provisions of cl.
(b) of section 3 of the United Provinces , were wide enough to permit it to issue such a direction to the employer because by doing so the State Government would be imposing a condition of employment in future.
The respondents, inter alia, contended that (1) clause (b) of section 3 of the Act does not operate retrospectively ; (2) bonus could only be a term of employment by agreement and could not be imposed by statute ; (3) where there was an industrial dispute cl.
(d) and not cl.
(b) of section 3 of the Act would apply and (4) if cl.
(b) was applicable it was ultra vires being discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution and also violative of article 19(i) of the Constitution as it confers arbitrary powers on the State Government.
Held, that (i) though cl.
(b) of section 3 of the United Provinces , could not be given a retrospective effect, yet there was nothing therein which prohibited the State Government from giving a direction with regard to the payment of bonus and by giving such a direction the State Government was not giving retrospective effect to the provisions of that clause nor did it add a new term or a condition for a period which was over, it merely required the employer to pay an additional sum of money to their employees as a term and condition of employment in future; (ii) though normally wage is a term of contract it can be made a condition of employment by statute, and it was open to the State Government under cl.
(b) of section 3 to make the payment of bonus to workmen a condition of their employment in future; (iii) where the employees bargained in their collective capacity, the fact that the personnel of the factory when the order for the payment of bonus was made by the Government and in the year to which dispute related were not the same, did not affect the power of the Government as the order would apply only to those employees who had worked during the period in question and not to new employees ; (iv) the normal way of dealing with an industrial dispute would be to have it dealt with judicially and not by resort to executive action, but cl.
(b) of section 3 empowers the Government to act promptly in case of an emergency and arms it with additional powers to deal with such an emergency in the public interest; (v) when the Government had made an executive or per under cl.
(b) of section 3 on the ground that it was in the public interest to do so it was open to the aggrieved party to move the Government to refer the industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication under cl.
(b) of section 3 of the Act.
332 (vi) the provisions of cl.
(b) of section 3 are not in any sense alternative to those of cl.
(d) and the former could be availed of by the State Government only in an emergency and as a temporary measure.
The right of the employer or the employee to require the dispute to be referred for conciliation or adjudication would still be there and could be exercised by them by taking appropriate steps; (vii) clause (b) of section 3 of the Act is not violative of the provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as it permits action to be taken thereunder by the Government only in an emergency and in the public interest.
The restriction placed upon the employer is only a temporary one and having been placed in the public interest falls under cl.
(6) of article 19 of the Constitution.
Ram Nath Koeri and Anr.
vs Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills and Ors., , approved.
L. D. Mills vs U. P. Government, A.I.R. 1954 All. 705, overruled.


Input:
il Appeal No. 1062 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 25, 1962, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No. 221 of 1962.
G. section Pathak and Naunit Lal, for the appellants.
M. K. Ramamurthy, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo J.
This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Assam High Court.
Shri Ajit Kumar Sharma (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) is a teacher in the Handique Girls College (hereinafter referred to as the College) at Gauhati.
He filed a writ petition in the High Court on the following averments.
This is a private college teaching up to B.A. standard and affiliated to the Gauhati University established under the Gauhati University Act, No. 16 of 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The College is managed by a Governing Body according to the provisions of the Statute for the management of private colleges framed by the Gauhati University under section 21 (g) of the Act.
Under section 23 (h) of the Act, the Executive Council may frame Ordinances to provide for the emoluments and conditions of service of teachers of the University, including teachers in private colleges.
The University has in 'Pursuance of the powers so conferred on it framed rules for the grant of leave to teachers of private colleges which are binding on the Governing Bodies of such colleges, and had actually been adopted by the Governing Body of the College in July 1956 for its teachers.
Under these rules the Governing Body of the College cannot compel a teacher to take leave without pay.
The College receives grant in aid from the State of Assam and there are certain conditions for giving grant in aid.
These conditions do not provide for withdrawal of the grant in aid if a private college fails to put a teacher, who seeks election to a legislative or local body, on compulsory leave without pay from the date of the filing of nomination till the end of the next academic Session or till expiry of the term of the office to which the teacher is elected.
892 The respondent as already stated is a teacher in the College.
He applied for leave with pay from January 2, 1962 to March 5, 1962 in order to contest a seat for Parliament.
This leave was granted to him by the Governing Body of the College by resolution No. 1 of March 9, 1962.
The respondent stood for election and was defeated.
He thereupon applied that he be permitted to rejoin his duties from March 6, 1962 and the Governing Body permitted him to do so by its resolution No. 2 dated Match 9, 1962.
He therefore worked as such from March 6, 1962.
On March 20, 1962, the Director of Public Instruction, Assam (hereinafter referred to as the Director) wrote a letter to the Principal and Secretary of the College with reference to the letter of March 10, 1962 from the College in which apparently the Director had been informed of the leave granted to the respondent and certain other teachers in connection with elections to Parliament and Assam Legislative Assembly.
In this letter, the Director informed the College that he was unable to approve the resolution of the Governing Body permitting respondent and certain other teachers to rejoin their duties "immediately".
The letter pointed out that such permission was in contravention of r. 7 of the Rules regarding the Conduct and Discipline of the Employees of Aided Educational Institutions (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and could not therefore be approved.
The Director also added that the Rules had been framed in 1960 after due consultation with the University and the Assam College Teachers"Association.
On receipt of this letter, the Governing Body seems to have reconsidered the matter of leave to the respondent, and passed a resolution on April 4, 1962.
This letter along with another letter was considered by the Governing Body of the College, and it was resolved in view of these letters that the resolution of March 9, 1962, permitting the respondent to rejoin duties from March 6, 1962 could not be given effect to.
It was further resolved that the respondent and some other teachers be granted leave in accordance with the Rules.
This resolution of the Governing Body was conveyed to the respondent by the Principal of the College by letter dated April 5, 1962 and he was told that he had been granted compulsory leave without pay till the end of the academic session in view of his standing for election in the last general elections.
The respondent thereupon filed the writ petition in the High Court out of which the present appeal has arisen.
His contention was that the Rules to which the Director had made reference had no statutory force and that he was entitled to leave under the Rules framed by the Gauhati University, which had been accepted by the 893 College.
He also contended that the Rules not having the force of law did not affect the powers of the Governing Body of the College in the matter of its functions.
Consequently the second resolution of the Governing Body dated March 9, 1962 was proper and correct and the respondent was properly allowed to rejoin duty after the expiry of his leave on March 6, 1962.
The Director had no authority to interfere with the second resolution of the Governing Body dated March 9, 1962 and that resolutions of this character passed by a Governing Body did not require the approval of the Director and would have effect by themselves.
It was further contended that as the leave rules which.
govern the College did not give power to the Governing Body to put a teacher on compulsory leave without pay against his will and consent, the resolution of the Governing Body dated April 4, 1962 by which the respondent was put on compulsory leave without pay was of no effect and in any case the Governing Body should not have acted on the illegal direction of the Director.
Finally it was urged that the Governing Body acted as it did on a threat contained in the letter from the Additional Director dated March 19, 1962, in which it was said that the education department would not provide funds for salaries and allowances for any employee who had gone on leave in connection with elections in contravention of r. 7 of the Rules, and therefore the action of the Governing Body was bad and in any case the Director had no right to threaten the Governing Body in this way.
The respondent therefore prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari / prohibition / mandamus declaring r. 7 of the Rules as having no legal force and also as having no binding character on the Governing Body or the respondent.
He further prayed that the resolution of the Governing Body dated April 4, 1962 be declared ultra vires, void and in effective in law, and the Director should be directed not to withhold the grant in aid to be given to the College on the failure of the Governing Body to put the respondent on compulsory leave without pay.
Before we consider the reply of the State, we would like to give the genesis of the Rules.
It appears that in February 1959 the State of Assam decided to grant additional grant in aid to private colleges to implement the recommendations of the University Grants Commission regarding scales of pay and other, emoluments to the teacher of such colleges.
Apparently these scales of pay and other emoluments were advantageous to the teachers and meant an improvement on their pay and other emoluments which they were getting from before.
It was further decided that such, 894 grant in aid should be given to private colleges on condition that the college authorities agreed to abide by certain rules regulating the conditions of service of their employees.
Accordingly it was decided to frame rules in consultation with the University and the Assam College Teachers ' Association.
Further the views of the Governing Bodies of all private colleges were also invited on the draft rules.
Among them, the Governing Body of the College was also consulted and it resolved on August 6, 1960 that it agreed with the proposed rules contemplated by the Government to be framed as communicated to it.
The Government also ascertained the views of the Gauhati University and the Assam College Teachers ' Association and eventually the Rules were notified by notification dated March 9, 1961, published on March 29, 1961.
Rule 7 of the Rules, which is material for our purposes is in these terms: "An employee desiring to seek election to the Legislative Body or to hold office with any political Organisation or local bodies shall be on compulsory leave without pay from the date of the filing of his nomination till the end of the next academic session or till the termination of the term of office to which he may be elected as the case may be.
Such employee however shall not be allowed to retain lien on his post for a period exceeding five years.
" The Rules therefore were framed in consultation with University and the Assam College Teachers ' Association, which presumably represents the teachers of all private colleges.
The Governing Body of the College was also consulted and it accepted the Rules to be promulgated.
In this Governing Body the members of the teaching staff of the College are well represented and it was after the concurrence of the University, the College Teachers ' Association and the Governing Body of the College in particular in which the teachers of the College were well represented that the Rules were notified.
The case of the appellants was that considering the manner in which the Rules were framed they were binding on the College as well as on the teachers of the College and it was thereafter that the Government gave the revised grants to the College.
It seems further that the case of the appellants was that the Rules had statutory force in view of the amendment of the Act by Assam Act 11 of 1961 by which a proviso was added to section 21 (g) of the Act whereby the Government was given power to make the 895 necessary rules in consultation with the University in respect of government colleges and government aided colleges.
There were certain other objections by the appellants, to which it is unnecessary to refer.
The Governing Body of the College was also made a party to, the writ petition and submitted a written statement.
It supported the stand taken by the State, and in particular pointed out that the Governing Body in which the teaching staff of the College was ten represented had accepted the Rules before they were notified.
In consequence the Government had been giving grant in aid to the College in accordance with the recommendations of the University Grants Commission by which the pay scales etc.
, of the teachers had been improved and the teachers had been receiving the pay and dearness allowance under this grant in aid.
No representation was ever made by any member of the teaching staff when the Rules were under consideration and were notified that he would not be bound by the Rules.
The teachers including the respondent having accepted the pay and dearness allowance under the scheme of the grant in aid given by the State on terms and conditions laid down in the Rules, the respondent was estopped from challenging the Rules which were in the interest of the College and education in general.
The Governing Body in particular was bound by the Rules having accepted them and the resolution of April 4, 1962, was not passed on.
account of any threat by the Director.
The main question that was argued before the High Court was whether the Rules in question had statutory force.
Alternatively, it was argued that even if the Rules had no statutory force and were mere executive instructions for the purpose of grant in aid, the High Court should not issue a writ against the State or the Director interfering with such administrative instructions issued by the Director.
It was further urged that if the Rules were mere executive instructions which had been accepted by the Governing Body of the College in which the teachers of the College were well represented, they would be in the nature of contractual obligations which could not be enforced by the issue of a writ under article 226.
The High Court first considered the question whether the Rules had statutory force and came to the conclusion that they could not be said to be issued under the proviso to section 21(g) of the Act on which reliance was placed and therefore did not have any statutory force.
But the High Court further held that even if the Rules had no statutory force it was open to it to issue a mandamus under article 226 to the Director, who is a public authority, to refrain from, giving effect to the Rules which had no statutory force.
It 896 therefore made a direction to the Director not to give effect to his letter of March 20, 1962.
Further it was urged before the High Court that the Governing Body of the College was not a statutory body and therefore no writ or direction could issue to it and the remedy of the respondent was to go to the civil court to enforce his right (if any).
The High Court however held that the words of article 226 were wide enough and did not confine its power to the issue of writs, directions or orders in the nature of mandamus; they gave power to issue directions, orders or writs which the Court considered proper in the circumstances of each case and such direction could be issued for any purpose.
The High Court therefore held that as the Governing Body had not applied its independent mind to the question of leave, it could issue a direction to it also.
The High Court however did not decide whether the Governing Body was a statutory body or not, and in the result directed the Governing Body also not to give effect to the letter of the Director dated March 20, 1962.
Thereupon there was a prayer to the High Court on behalf of the State and the Director for leave to appeal to this Court, which was refused.
Then the State and the Director applied to this Court for special leave which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
It may be mentioned that the Governing Body of the College has been made a respondent in the appeal before us.
The main question which falls for decision in this appeal is whether the High Court is right in issuing a writ of mandamus to the State through the Director directing it not to give effect to the letter of March 20, 1962.
It has not been contended on behalf of the appellants that the Rules have statutory force and :the arguments before us have been made on the basis that the Rules have no statutory force and are mere executive instructions given by the Government to private colleges as a condition for the implementation of pay scales etc., recommended by the University Grants Commission for private colleges, these scales being apparently higher than those existing from before.
It seems to us that the High Court was in error in granting a writ of mandamus against the State through the Director once it found that the Rules bad no statutory force and were mere administrative instructions for the purpose of giving grant in aid to private colleges.
What grants the State should make to private educational institutions and upon what terms are matters for the State to decide.
Conditions of these grants may be prescribed by statutory rules; there is 'however no law to prevent the State from prescribing the conditions 897 of such grants by mere executive instructions which have not the force of statutory rules.
In the present case the Rules have been framed in order to give revised grants to private colleges to enable them to give higher scales of pay etc., to their teachers in accordance with the recommendation of the University Grants Commission.
The Rules have been held by the High Court to have no statutory force, and that is not disputed before us.
In these circumstances it is clear that the Rules are mere executive instructions containing conditions on which grants would be made to private colleges to implement the recommendations of the University Grants Commission as to pay scales etc., of teachers of private colleges.
Where such conditions of grant in aid are laid down by mere executive instructions, it is open to a private college to accept those instructions or not to accept them.
If it decides not to accept the instructions it will naturally not get the granted which is contingent on its accepting the conditions contained in the instructions.
On the other hand, if the college accepts the conditions contained in the instructions, it receives the grant in aid.
If however having accepted the instructions containing the conditions and terms, the college does not carry out the instructions, the Government will naturally have the right to withhold the grant inaid.
That is however a matter between the Government and the private college concerned.
Such conditions and instructions as to grant in aid confer no right on the teachers of the private colleges and they cannot ask that either a particular instruction or condition should be enforced or should not be enforced.
It is only for the Governing Body of the College to decide whether to carry out any direction contained in mere administrative instructions laying down conditions for grant in aid.
Further it is open to the Governing Body not to carry out any such instruction which is not based on rules having statutory force, and it will then be naturally open to the State to consider what grant to make.
But if the Governing Body chooses to carry out the instruction, it could hardly be said that the instruction was being carried out under any threat.
It is certainly not open to a teacher to insist that the Governing Body should not carry out the instruction.
The rules for the purpose of grant in aid being as in this case merely executive instructions confer no right of any kind on teachers and they cannot apply to the High Court for a mandamus asking for the enforcement or nonenforcement of the rules, even if indirectly there may be some effect on them because of the grant in aid being withheld in whole or in part.
Such mere administrative instructions even though called rules are only a matter between the Governing Body and the State 898 through the Director and cannot in our opinion form the basis of a petition for writ under article 226 by a teacher.
We may in this connection refer to Messrs. Raman and Raman vs The State of Madras(1) where this Court had to consider certain orders and directions issued under section 43A of the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948.
The question arose whether the orders issued under section 43A had the status of law or not.
This Court held that such orders did not have the status of law regulating the rights of parties and must partake of the character of administrative orders.
It was further held that there could be no right arising out of mere executive instructions, muchness a vested right, and if such instructions were changed pending any appeal, there would be no change in the law pending the appeal so as to effect any vested right of a party.
That decision in our opinion governs the present case also, for it has been found by the High Court, and it is not disputed before us, that the Rules are mere administrative instructions and have not the force of law as statutory rules.
They therefore confer no right on the teachers of private colleges which would entitle them to maintain a writ petition under article 226 for the enforcement or non enforcement.
of any provision of the Rules.
The Rules being mere administrative instructions are matters between private colleges and the Government in the matter of grant in aid to such colleges, and no teacher of a college has any right under the Rules to ask either for their enforcement or for their non enforcement.
We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was in error when it granted a writ against the State through the Director, by which the Director was asked not to give effect to its letter dated March 20, 1962, against the Governing Body of the College.
Then we come to the question whether a writ could have been issued against the Governing Body of the College.
We find however that there is no appeal by the College against the order of the High Court issuing a writ against it.
In these circumstances we do not think that we can interfere with the order of the High Court insofar as it is against the Governing Body of the College.
At the same time we should like to make it clear that we should not be taken to have approved of the order of the High Court against the Governing Body of the College in circumstances like the pre sent and that matter may have to be considered in a case where it properly arises.
Before we leave this case we should like to add that it was stated on behalf of the State before us that even if the decision went in (1) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 227.
899 favour of the State, it would not enforce r. 7 insofar as the respondent is concerned, as the State was concerned merely with the clarification of the law on the subject.
In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court granting a writ against the State through the Director.
The State of Assam has agreed to pay counsel engaged amicus curiae for respondent, Ajit Kumar Sharma.
We therefore pass no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.

Output:
The respondent was a teacher in a private college affiliated to the Gauhati University in Assam.
The college was receiving grants in aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules.
One of the rules, r. 7, provided that if a teacher stood for election to the Legislature, he should be on compulsory leave without pay from the date of filing of nomination till the end of the next academic session or, till the termination of the term of the office to which he may be elected.
The respondent applied for leave for three months and contested for a. seat in Parliament but was defeated.
So, he applied for permission to rejoin, and the Governing Body granted him the permission.
The Director of Public Instruction, however, pointed out that such permission was in contravention of the aforesaid rule, and therefore, the Governing Body informed the respondent that he had been granted compulsory leave without pay till the end of the academic session.
The respondent thereupon filed a petition in the High Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate direction on the grounds that : (i) the rule had no legal force, (ii) the rule did not bind the Governing Body or the respondent and (iii) the order of the Governing Body putting him on compulsory leave was ineffective.
He also prayed that the State should be directed not to withhold the grant inlaid to the college if the Governing Body did not impose compulsory leave on him.
The Governing Body was also made a party to the petition.
The High Court held that the rules had no statutory force, and issued a direction to the Director, as a public authority, to refrain from giving effect to.
such rules.
The High Court also issued a similar direction to the Governing Body, on the ground that it had not applied its independent mind to the question of respondent 's leave.
The State appealed to the Supreme Court, but did not dispute that the Rules were only administrative instructions.
HELD: The order of the High Court issuing a writ to the State through its Director should be set aside.
[899 B] The rules being mere administrative instructions have not the force of law as statutory rules.
They therefore confer no right on the teachers of private colleges which would entitle them to maintain a writ petition under article 226, for the enforcement or non enforcement of any provision of the rules.
They being mere administrative instructions, are matters between private colleges and the Government in the matter of grants in aid to such colleges, and no teacher of any college has any right under the rules to ask either for their enforcement or non enforcement.
It is open to the Governing Body not to carry out any such instructions and it will then be open to the State to consider what grant to make.
But if the Governing Body chooses to carry out the instructions it could not be said that the instruction was carried out under any threat; and, it is not oven to a teacher 891 to insist that the Governing Body should not carry out the instruction.
[897 B H] Messrs Raman and Raman vs The State of Madras, [1959] Supp.2.
S.C.R. 227, referred to,