Input:
Appeal No. 853 of 1966 Appeal by special leave from the order dated November 16, 1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 531 D of 1961.
M. C. Misra and M. V. Goswami.
for the appellant.
Harbans Singh, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.
The appellant Miss Sanyal has since 1942 been a tenant of a house in Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, a part of which is used for a Girls ' School and the rest 537 for residential purposes.
The respondent Gian Chand purchased the house from the owner by a sale deed dated September 19, 1956, and commenced an action in the Court of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, against the appellant for a decree in ejectment in respect of the house.
Numerous grounds were set up in the plaint in support of the claim for a decree in ejectment, but the ground that the respondent required the house bona fide for his own resi dence alone need be considered in this appeal.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit and the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi dismissed an appeal from that order holding that the house being let for purposes non residential as well as residential, a decree in ejectment could not be granted under section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
The High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) in a revision petition filed by the respondent held that on the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court a decree in ejectment limited to that portion of the house which was used for residential ' purposes by the tenant could be granted, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller "for demarcating those portions which were being used for residence" and to pass a decree in ejectment from those specified portions of the house.
Against that order the tenant has appealed to this Court.
It is necessary in the first instance to read the material pro visions of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
The expression "premises" is defined in section 2(g) of the Act as "any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes.
" Section 13 of the Act which grants protection to tenants against eviction provides insofar as it is material : "(1).
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated): Provided that nothing in this sub section shall apply to, any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied (e)that the premises let for residential purposes are, required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himeslf or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation; Explanation For the purposes of this clause, 'residential premises ' include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord used incidentally for commercial or other p urposes.
" 538 it is clear that section .13(1) imposes a ban upon the exercise of the power of the Court to decree ejectment from premises occupied by a tenant The ban is removed in certain specific cases, and, one such case is where the premises having been let for residential purposes the landlord requires the premises bona fide for occupation as a residence for himself or the members of his family and he has no other suitable accommodation.
It is plain that if the premises are not let for residential purposes, cl.
(e) has no application, nor on the express terms of the statute does the clause apply where the letting is for purposes residential and nonresidential.
In the present case the First Appellate Court held that the house was "let out for running a school and for residence".
The High Court held that where there is a composite letting, it is open to the Court to disintegrate the contract of tenancy, and if, the landlord proves his case of bona fide requirement for his own occupation to pass a decree in enjectment limited to that part which "is being used" by the tenant for residential purposes.
In so holding, in our judgment.
the High Court erred.
The jurisdiction 'of the Court may be exercised under section 13(1)(e) of the Act only when the, premises are let for residential purposes and not when the premises being let for composite purposes, are used in specific portions for purposes residential and non residential.
The contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non residential purposes, and to grant relief under section 13(1)(e) of the Act limited to the portion of the demised property which "is being used" for residential purposes.
The learned Judge purported to follow the decision of his (Court in Motilal and another vs Nanak Chand and others(1).
It was held in that case that in cases governed by the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act.
1952 "if the premises are in well defined parts and have been let out for residential and commercial purposes together, the rule as to eviction regarding the portion that has been used for residence will govern the residential portion of the same and similarly the rules of eviction regarding the commercial premises will govern the commercial portion of the same as laid down in the Act".
In the view of the Court even if there be a single letting for purposes residential and non residential, if defined portions of the premises let are used for residential and commercial purposes "it must be held that the letting out was of the commercial part of the building separately for commercial purposes and of the residential part of the building for residential purposes".
We find no warrant for that view either in the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act or in the general law of landlord and (1) 539 tenant Attention of, the learned Judge in that case was invited to a judgment of this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma vs section K. Bhardwaj and another(1), but the Court distinguished that judgment on the ground that "the facts of that case disclosed that they had no applicability to the facts of the case" in hand.
Now in Dr. Gopal Das Verma 's(1) case the premises in dispute were originally let for residential purposes, but later with the consent of the landlord a portion of the premises was used for non residential purposes.
It was held by this Court that "where premises are let for residential purposes and it is shown that they are used by the tenant incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes with the consent of the landlord, the landlord is not entitled to eject the tenant even if he proves that he needs the premises bona fide for his personal use, because the premises have by their user ceased, to be premises let for residential pur poses alone".
It was, therefore, clearly ruled that if the premises originally let for residential purposes ceased, because of the con,sent of the landlord, to be premises let for residential purposes alone, the Court had no jurisdiction to decree ejectment on the grounds specified in section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
The rule evolved by the Punjab High Court in Motilal 's case(1) is inconsistent with the judgment of this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma 's(1) case.
If in respect of premises originally let for residential purposes a decree in ejectment cannot be passed on the grounds mentioned in section 13(1)(e), if subsequent to the letting, with the consent of the landlord the premises are used both for residential and nonresidential purposes, the bar against the jurisdiction of the Court would be more effective when the original letting was for purposes non residential as well as residential.
It may be recalled that the condition of the applicability of section 13(1)(e) of the Act is letting of the premises for residential purposes.
In this case the letting not being solely for residential purposes, in our judgment, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order appealed from.
We may note that a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kunwar Behari vs Smt.
Vindhya Devi(1) has held in construing section 14(i)(3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958, material part whereof is substantially in the same terms as section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, that "where the building let for residence is the entire premises it is not open to the Court to further sub divide the premises and order eviction with respect to a part thereof".
In our view that judgment of the Punjab High Court was right on the fundamental ground that in the absence of a specific provision incorporated in the statute the Court has no power to break up the unity 'of the contract of letting and attribute incidents and obligations to a part of the subject matter of the contract which are not applicable to the rest.
(1) ; (3) A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 481, (2) 540 In our view the order passed by the High Court of Punjab remanding the case for determination; of the residential portion of the house occupied by the appellant and for passing a decree in ejectment in respect of that part is without jurisdiction and must be set aside.
The appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the Senior Subordinate Judge is restored.
The appellant in this appeal did not appear before the High Court to assist the Court.
In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs of this appeal.

Output:
Under section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, the jurisdiction of the court to evict a tenant, may be exercised in favour of a landlord who wants the premises bona fide for his own residence, only when the premises are let out for residential purposes, and not, when the premises being let out for composite purposes, are used for residential and non residential purposes.
The owner of a house let it out to the appellant for her residence and for running a school.
The respondent purchased the house and filed a suit for eviction of the appellant.
The suit was dismissed, but the High Court, in revision, held that a decree in ejectment limited to that portion of the house which was used for residential purposes by the tenant could be granted, and remanded the case for demarcating that portion and passing a decree.
In appeal to this Court, HELD:The order of the High Court was without jurisdiction and should be set aside.
[540A] The contract of tenancy was a single and indivisible contract, and, in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it was not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting out for residential purposes and the other for non residential purposes and to grant relief under the section in respect of that portion of the property which was being used for residential purposes.
[538E] Dr. Gopal Das Verma vs section K. Bhardwaj & Anr.
[1962] 2 S.C.R. 678, followed.
Kunwar Behari vs Smt.
Vindhya Devi, A.I.R. 1966 Punj.
approved.
Motilal and Anr.
vs Nanak Chand & Anr. (1964) Punj.
L.R. 179, overruled.


Input:
Appeal No. 145 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 16.
1959, of the Madras High Court in Case Reference No. 82 of 1956.
section K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
section Swaminathan and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent.
847 section T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the intervenor.
April 24, 1964.
The judgment Of SUBBA RAo and SIKRI In, JJ. was delivered by SIKRI J. SHAH J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
SIKRI, J. This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, against the judgment of the High Court, dated November 16, 1959, on a certificate granted by the High Court under section 66A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
The respondent, Mir Mohd. Ali, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a bus owner and transport operator at Vel lore, North Arcot District.
He had a fleet of buses, and during the year of account ending with March 31, 1950 (relevant to assessment year 1950 51) he replaced the petrol engines in two of his buses (MDJ 583 and MDJ 723) by new Diesel engines, incurring an expenditure of Rs. 18,544/in this connection.
Before the Income Tax Officer, apart from claiming normal depreciation under the first Paragraph of cl.
(vi) of section 10(2), he also claimed depreciation under the second paragraph of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
The Income Tax Officer only allowed 25 per cent depreciation under the first paragraph of cl.
The assessee appealed unsuccessfully to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on this point.
There were other points involved in the appeal but as we are not concerned with them in this appeal, they are not being mentioned.
On further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that "the assessee is not entitled to extra depreciation under section 10(2) (vi) or section 10(2)(via) because however important the engine might be for running of a motor, it is after all part of an equipment and it cannot by itself become "machinery" for the purpose of claiming extra depreciation, as envisaged in these sub sections.
We have to hold that the "installation of the new engines is only a capital addition, for the above reasons the assessee was rightly refused the extra depreciation he claims".
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on the application of the assessee, referred the following question to the High Court: "Whether extra depreciation is admissible under the provisions of section 10(2)(via) of the Income Tax Act, in respect of a diesel oil engine fitted to a motor vehicle in replacement of the existing engine.
" We may mention that another question regarding disallowance of interest had also been referred to the High Court but we are not concerned with that in the present appeal.
848 As the High Court felt that there had been an accidental slip in framing the question, it amended the question as and the amended question reads: "Whether extra depreciation is admissible under the provisions of section 10(2)(vi) and section 10(2)(via) of the Income Tax Act in respect of the diesel oil engines fitted to the motor vehicles in replacement of the existing engines".
The High Court answered this question in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee.
The Commissioner of Income Tax, on obtaining a certificate under section 66A(2) of the Income Tax Act, has filed this appeal.
Before attempting to answer the question, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act.
The relevant provisions, as in force at the relevant time, were: section 10(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely (iv)in respect of insurance against risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery, plant, furniture, stocks or stores, used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation, the amount of any premium paid; (v) in respect of current repairs to such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, the amount paid on account thereof; (vi)in respect of depreciation of such buildings, machinery, plant, or furniture being the property of the assessee, a sum equivalent, where the assets are ships other than ships ordinarily plying on inland waters, to such percentage on the original cost thereof to the assessee as may in any case or class of cases be prescribed and in any other case, to such percentage on the written down value thereof as may in any case or class of cases be prescribed; and where the buildings have been newly erected, or the machinery or plant being new has been installed, after the 31st day of March, 1945, a further sum (which shall however not be deductible in determining the written down value for the purposes of this clause) in respect of the year of erection or installation equivalent, (a) in the case of buildings the erection of which is begun and completed between the 1st day 849 of April 1946 and the 31st day of March 1952 (both dates inclusive), to fifteen per cent of the cost thereof to the assessee; (b) in the case of other buildings, to ten per cent of the cost thereof to the assessee; (c) in the case of machinery or plant, to twenty per cent of the cost thereof to the assessee: Provided that (via) in respect of depreciation of buildings newly erected, or of machinery or plant being new which has been installed, after the 31st day of March, 1948, a further sum (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) equal to the amount admissible under clause (vi) (exclusive of the extra allowance for double or multiple shift working of the machinery or plant and the initial depreciation allowance admissible under that clause for the first year of erection of the building or the installation of the machinery or plant) in the assessments for such of the five years commencing on the 1st day of April, 1949, and ending with the 31st day of March, 1954: Provided that where, in respect of such machinery or plant, the assessee establishes that the market value of similar machinery or plant on the 31st day of March, 1953, is lower than the original cost, then, subject to the provisions of clause (vi), there shall be made in the assessment for the year commencing next after that date a further allowance (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) of an amount by which the written down value of the machinery or plant as on that date (without deduction of the initial depreciation admissible in the first year) would have exceeded the corresponding written down value thereof as on the same date if the market price of the machinery or plant had been taken as the actual cost of the assessee; (vii)in respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof exceeds the amount 850 for which the building, machinery or plant, as the case may be, is actually sold or its scrap value: Provided that (5) In sub section (2) . . `plant ' includes vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment purchased for the purpose of the business, profession or vocation. ." The point at issue before us has been considered by three High Courts.
The Bombay and Andhra Pradesh High Courts have held against the assessee while in the judgment under appeal, the Madras High Court has held in favour of the assessee.
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in the case of B. Srikantiah vs Commissioner of Income Tax Andhra Pradesh(1), followed the Bombay case and expressly dissented from the Madras case.
In the judgment under appeal (reported as Mr. Mohd. Ali vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras(2), the High Court arrived at the conclusion by the following steps: (a)Machinery must be given the same meaning with reference to each of the statutory provisions, in section 10(2)(vi) and section 10(2)(via); (b) A diesel engine is machinery by the test laid down in the case of Corporation of Calcutta vs Chairman, Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality(3); (c) Machinery does not cease to be machinery merely because it has to be used in conjunction with one or more machines.
Nor does it cease to be machinery merely because it is, for instance, installed as part of a manufacturing or industrial plant; (d) The statutory provision for depreciation is in the alternative.
Whether it is plant or whether it is machinery without its being itself a plant, the assessee is entitled to claim the statutory allowance for depreciation.
The question then is: Which is the correct view? First, the history of para two of cl.
(vi) may be noticed.
The object of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1946 (VIII of 1946), which first inserted the provisions regarding extra depreciation, was to encourage the modernisation and re habilitation of industry and trade.
The Second World War (2) (3) 190. 851 had ended recently and during the long war machinery and plant had not only not been replaced or modernised but had been subjected to excessive wear and tear and needed rehabilitation.
During the War, there had also been great,,, advance in technology.
It is then pertinent to point out that the word 'machinery ' occurs in cls.
(iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of section 10(2).
Prima facie the same meaning must be given to the word ,machinery ' in all these clauses.
If a machine is machinery for purposes of giving an allowance in respect of insurance or for repairs or in respect of normal depreciation or for the purpose of para one of cl.
(vi), it must also be machinery for the purpose of second para of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via).
But it is said that the scheme of para two of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via) is different from that of para one of cl.
(vi) inasmuch as before it can qualify for extra depreciation, the machinery must be new and must be installed, and the rate of depreciation is provided in the Act itself.
Keeping in view this scheme, it is urged that the word 'machinery ' must be given a restricted meaning in para two of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via), and the meaning suggested is that it must be a "self contained unit capable of being put to use in the business, profession or vocation for the benefit of which it was installed".
That this is the true meaning, it is further said, is evidenced by the definition of the word 'plant ' in section 10(5).
It is argued that this definition indicates that for purposes of para two of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via), 'plant ', including a vehicle should be viewed as a unit and component parts thereof are excluded from its purview, and 'machinery ' should also be considered in the same light.
Let us now examine these contentions.
First, we do not think that there is anything in the scheme of the second para ,of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via) that throws any light on the construction of the word 'machinery ' in these clauses.
It is true that the machinery must be new and it must be installed and the rate of allowance is prescribed in the Act itself.
But the requirement that the machinery must be new does not tell us what is 'machinery '.
Assuming for the present that a diesel engine is machinery, if an assessee buys and instals a secondhand diesel engine, he will not be given the extra allowance under the second para of cl.
(vi), and the ground would be that the engine is not new and not that because it is second hand, it is not machinery.
Similarly, if it is purchased but not installed, the ground of refusal would be that it has not been installed and not that because it has not been installed it has ceased to be machinery.
Suppose a new machinery is purchased but not installed, it would not qualify for extra depreciation on the ground that it has not been 852 installed and not because it has ceased to be machinery due to its non installation.
The fact that the rate of depreciation is provided for in the Act has also no bearing on the question of the construction of the word 'machinery '.
This fact only indicates that the legislature had made up its mind as to the extent of encouragement to be given to industry and, therefore, it did not consider it necessary to delegate this to the rule making authority.
The definition of the word 'plant ' in section 10(5) equally does not throw any light on the meaning of the word 'machinery '.
The word 'plant ' is of wide import, but even so it may be argued that vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment are not 'plant ' in all businesses, pro fessions and vocations.
The legislature settled this possible controversy, but without throwing any light on the true meaning of the word 'machinery '.
What then is the test for determining whether a mechanical contrivance is machinery for the purposes of second para of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via)? The Privy Council in the case of Corporation of Calcutta vs Chairman, Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality(1) hazarded the following definition of `machinery ': "The word 'machinery ', when used in ordinary language prima facie, means some mechanical contrivances which, by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivances,.
by the combined movement and inter dependent operation of their respective parts generate power, or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result.
" They had already observed that the word 'machinery ' must mean more than a collection of ordinary tools.
The Privy Council case was not a tax case but prima facie the ordinary meaning of the word 'machinery ' and the word machinery ' is an ordinary and not a technical word must, unless there is something in the context, prevail in the Indian Income Tax Act also.
According to the above definition, a diesel engine is clearly 'machinery '.
Indeed, r. 8 of the Income Tax Rules treats aero engines separately from aircraft.
It is true that this rule cannot be used to interpret the clauses in the Act but it does show that components of an aircraft, which are machinery, can be treated separately.
(1) Cal.
190 853 Further, when the assessee purchased the diesel engines, they were not 'plant ' or part of a plant, because they had not been installed in any vehicle.
They were, according to the definition given by the Privy Council, machinery.
They, were not yet part of a plant, and, according to the Act, 20 ' per cent of the cost thereof was allowable to the assessee.
All the conditions required by the Act are satisfied.
If we look at the point of time of purchase and installation, what was purchased and installed was machinery.
The learned counsel next contended that the assessee is not entitled to extra depreciation because a diesel engine cannot be said to be installed.
He urges that the word 'installed ' is wholly inappropriate to cover the fixing of a diesel engine in a motor vehicle.
We are of the opinion that there is no force in this contention.
As observed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs Saraspur Mills Ltd.(1) the expression 'installed ' did not necessarily mean 'fixed in position ' but was also used in the sense of 'inducted or introduced ' , or to use the language of the Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras vs Sri Ram Vilas Services (Pvt) Ltd.(2), installed would certainly mean 'to place an apparatus in position for service or use '.
We are of the opinion that when an engine is fixed in a vehicle it is installed within the meaning of the expression in cls.
(vi) and (via).
Accordingly, we hold that the High Court was correct in answering the question referred to it in the affirmative.
The appeal, therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
SHAH, J. I am unable to hold that the respondent is entitled to the allowance under section 10(2)(vi) paragraph 2, in respect of the diesel engines claimed by him.
Section 10 of the Indian Income tax Act provides that tax shall be payable on the profits and gains of an assessee under the head 'profits and gain of business, profession or vocation".
By sub section
(2) in the computation of taxable pro fits certain allowances prescribed therein are permissible.
We are primarily concerned in this appeal with the initial allowance permissible under the second paragraph of cl.
(vi) of sub section
But cls.
(iv), (v), (vi), (vi)(a) and (vii) are inter related and it may be necessary briefly to refer to those provisions By cl.
(iv) allowance for premium paid in respect of insurance against risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery, plant, furniture, stocks or stores, used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation is admissible.
Under cl.
(v) an amount paid on account of any current repairs to such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture is (1), ( 2 ) 854 an admissible allowance.
Clause (vi) recognises by the first paragraph a right to normal depreciation of a percentage on the prescribed valuation of such buildings.
machinery, plant or furniture, which are the property of the assessees.
The second paragraph at the material time stood as follows: "and where the buildings have been newly erected, or the machinery or plant being new has been installed, after the 31st day of March, 1945, a further sum (which shall however not be deductible in determining the written down value for the purposes of this clause) in respect of the year of erection or installation equivalent, etc.
" Clause (vi)(a) which was inserted by Act 67 of 1949 permit ted a further depreciation allowance In respect of buildings newly erected or of machinery or plant being new which had been erected or installed after March 31, 1948, in not more than five successive assessments, for the financial years next following the previous year in which such buildings were erected, or machinery or plant installed.
Clause (vii) permitted as an allowance the difference between the written down value and the sale price or scrap value of such buildings, machinery or plant which had been sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed.
All these clauses dealt with allowances in respect of assets of the specified description and used for the purpose of business, profession or vocation.
The depreciation allow ance permitted under the first paragraph of cl.
(vi) which may be called the normal allowance is in respect of all buildings, machinery, plant and furniture of the assessee used for the purpose of his business.
By the second paragraph of cl.
(vi) an initial allowance in the year in which buildings have been newly erected or the machinery or plant being new has been installed after March 31, 1945, is allowable.
Use of the definite article "the" in the second paragraph indicates that the buildings, machinery or plant referred to in that paragraph must also be used for the purpose of the business, profession or vocation of the assessee.
However to qualify for the initial allowance under paragraph two, the buildings must be newly erected or the machinery or plant being new must have been installed, after March 31, 1945.
Two rival views are pressed upon us in support of the respective cases of the Commissioner and the assessee as to the meaning of the second paragraph.
The Commissioner contends that the buildings, machinery or plant for which the initial allowance is admissible must be a self contained unit capable of being put to use in the business, profession or vocation for the benefit of which it is erected or installed.
It is submitted that the second paragraph of cl.
(vi) was en 855 acted with the object of giving a fillip to industry which had been starved during the war years of new machinery and building activity.
But the buildings, machinery, or plant to qualify for the initial allowances were not intended to be in the nature of replacement, addition, or repair to existing units: they had to be buildings newly erected or machinery or plant being new installed.
On behalf of the assessee it was contended that the Legislature has not put any restriction of the nature suggested on behalf of the Commissioner and, therefore, any building or a part thereof newly erected or any new machinery or plant or a part thereof installed,.
qualified for the benefit of the initial allowance.
The question to be decided is one about the intention of the Legislature.
Can it be said that when to an existing building a room even a floor is added, that the additional construction is a building newly erected? In my view, that does not appear to be the intention.
Such an addition to an existing structure, becomes a part of the structure, and cannot be said to be a building newly erected.
If every alteration or addition in an existing building is covered by the second paragraph of cl.
(vi) mere repairs falling within the words of cl.
(vi) may also qualify for initial allowance.
If a mere addition to a building cannot be regarded as such an erection as is contemplated by the second paragraph of cf.
(vi), it would be difficult to hold that the machinery or plant would include part of machinery or plant.
Counsel for the assessee concedes that replacement of a petrol engine by a diesel engine in a motor transport vehi cle is not installation of plant.
The question is whether it is installation of machine.
In my view replacement of a petrol engine by a new diesel engine in a motor car cannot be said to be installation of machinery within the meaning of the relevant clause.
To be installed the machinery being new must for the purpose of the business be brought into service as a self contained unit.
If the argument of the assessee is sound, every bolt, nut, rod or flywheel which constitute a part of machinery would qualify for the initial allowance and the difference between the allowance for repairs and initial allowance may be obliterated.
Counsel for the assessee also did not, as I understood him, contend that replacement of a mere part of machinery was installation of machinery within the meaning of the second paragraph of cl.
The Legislature has not given any definition for that expression, and the expression "machinery" is otherwise somewhat difficult to define.
The Judicial Committee in Corporation of Calcutta vs Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality(1) when it was called upon to consider whether a tank supported on (1) L. R. 48 I.A. 435.
856 columns, and which could be filled by pumping from a re servoir belonging to the Corporation could be regarded as machinery within the meaning of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, observed at p. 445: "If their Lordships were obliged to run the hazard of the attempt (to define machinery) they would be inclined to say that the word 'machinery ' when used in ordinary language, prima facie means some mechanical contrivances which, by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivance, by the combined movement and inter dependent operation of their respective parts generate power, or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result.
" But we are not called upon in this case to decide whether a diesel engine is in the abstract machinery: the question is whether a diesel engine, which is used for replacing a pet rol engine, in a vehicle used by a transport operator for the purpose of his business is machinery installed within the meaning of section 10(2)(vi) paragraph 2.
Whether "machinery" is some contrivance for supplying motive power to another contrivance which directly produces an article or is a mechanical contrivance which produces or assists in the production of an article, it would be difficult to regard introduction of a mere part, which has no independent use in the business conducted by the assessee, as machinery installed for the purpose of the second paragraph of cl.
The Legislature has provided for the normal depreciation by paragraph 1 of cl.
(vi) and in respect of newly installed machinery it has provided for the initial allowance, the object being to induce industrialists to start new industries or to extend their existing industries by erecting new buildings, or installing new machinery or plant.
A diesel engine by itself may undoubtedly be used in a business other than that of a transport operator, for instance, for working a pump to draw underground water and may for that purpose be regarded as a self contained unit.
But that is not decisive of the question whether in the business of a transport operator a diesel engine used to replace a petrol engine may be regarded as machinery installed.
Machinery installed within the meaning of paragraph 2 of section 10(2)(vi) is qualified by the expression "used for the purposes of the business", and therefore unless as a self contained unit the machinery is used for the purposes of the business, initial depreciation would not be admissible in respect thereof.
That it may be capable of being used in another 857 business by the same or another assessee as a self contained unit is irrelevant in considering its admissibility for initial allowance in the business in which it is actually used.
It would be fruitless to refer to the schedule under rule 8 of the Income tax Rules for computing the allowance in res pect of the depreciation under section 10(2)(vi).
The schedule catalogues different items in respect of which depreciation is admissible at the rates prescribed.
But whether a particular item is admissible for initial allowance in the second paragraph must depend upon two factors (i) that it is in respect of the year of erection or installation that the initial allowance is permissible; and (ii) the building or the machinery is used for the purposes of the business.
If it is a predicate of admissibility to initial allowance that the machinery must be new and a self contained unit in the particular business in the carrying on of which the initial allowance is claimed, the fact that in certain conditions that machinery may be regarded as self contained for the purpose of another business in which it is used, would furnish no guide in ascertaining whether initial allowance is permissible as a deduction in the assessment of taxable income of the business in which it is actually used.
In my view the appeal should be allowed and the question referred for opinion should be answered in the negative.
ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The assessee, who was the owner of a fleet of buses, rep laced the petrol engines in two of his buses by new Diesel engines incurring an expenditure of Rs. 18,544/ in this connection, during the year of account ending with March 31, 1950.
For the relevant assessment year he claimed deprecia tion allowance under the second para of cl.
(vi) and cl.
(via) of section 10(2) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, apart from the normal depreciation under the first para of cl.
(vi) but he was allowed only 25 per cent depreciation under the first para ,of cl.
(vi) on the ground that he was not entitled to extra depreciation under section 10(2)(vi).
or section 10(2)(via) because the ,engine was only part of an equipment and could not by itself become machinery and that when an engine was fixed in a motor vehicle it could not be said to be installed within the meaning of those sub sections.
Held: (per Subba Rao and Sikri, JJ.) (i) The assessee was entitled to extra depreciation under sections 10(2)(vi).
and 10(2) (via) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, in respect of the diesel oil engine fitted to the motor vehicles in replacement of the existing engines.
(ii)The definition of "machinery" given by the Privy Council in the case of Corporation of Calcutta vs Chairman, Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality (1922) L.R. 48 I.A. 435, is applicable, and according to that definition a diesel engine is clearly "machinery".
And when an engine is fixed in a vehicle it is installed within the meaning of the expression in cls.
(vi) and (via).
Per Shah, J. (dissenting) Replacement of a petrol engine by a new diesel engine in a motor car cannot be said to be installation of machinery.
To be installed, the machinery must for the purpose of the business be brought into service as a self contained unit, and it would be difficult to regard the introduction of a mere part, which has no independent use in the business conducted by the assesses, as machinery installed for the purpose of the second para of cl.
(vi) of section 10 (2).


Input:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1984.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 29th November, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 6601 of 1983 P. Ram Reddy, G. Narasimhlu for the Appellant.
A. Subba Rao for the Respondent.
The following Judgments were delivered VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The main question involved in this appeal by Special Leave is whether on the coming into force of section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code ') an adolescent offender who is sentenced to imprisonment for life on being convicted of an offence for which death is also one of the punishments prescribed by law and who later on is by an order made by the State Government directed to be sent to a Borstal School under section 10 A of the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') is liable to be kept in a Borstal School or in a prison at least for a period of fourteen years.
733 The respondent Vallabhapuram Ravi was born or April 28, 1960.
Unfortunately owing to an incident which took place when he was still in his teens, he was convicted of an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life on April 29, 1980 in the Sessions Case No. 51 of 1980 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Guntur in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
On September 12, 1980 the State Government of Andhra Pradesh on being satisfied that it would be to the advantage of the respondent if he was transferred to a Borstal School made an order under section 10 A of the Act in G.O. Rt.
No. 2394 Home (Prisons B) Department dated September 12, 1980 directing that he should be detained in a Borstal School to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence till he attained the age of 23 years.
Accordingly he was transferred to the Borstal School at Visakhapatnam on October 14, 1980.
The respondent was classified as a Special Star Grade Inmate which was the highest classification on the basis of industrious and good conduct under section 19 C of the Act.
Since he was not released on his attaining 23 years of age on April 28, 1983 in accordance with the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Bondili Jagannath Singh vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh he sent a letter to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh requesting it to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the State Government to release him.
The High Court treated the letter as a writ petition and after hearing the State Government passed an order on November 29,1983 in Writ Petition No. 6601 of 1983 directing the States Government to release the respondent.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the State Government has filed this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Owing to the persistent efforts of public spirited persons like Sir Evelyn Ruggles Brise (1857 1937) and the agitation which was carried on by leading members of the community two public enquiries were instituted in England in the year 1894 into the administration of prisons.
The enquiries revealed that in England annually about 20,000 young criminals belonging to the age group of 16 to 21 were being admitted into prison by the end of the last century and that it was necessary to find a remedy to prevent the inflow of such large number of youngmen into the prisons lest they should turn out to be professional criminals in later years on account of the pernicious 734 influence the prison life and the close association with other adult prisoners would have on them.
This led to the passing of two laws by the British Parliament, namely, the Prevention of Crime (Borstal) Act, 1908 and the Children Act, 1908.
These laws were followed by the Criminal Justice Acts of 1948,1961 and 1972 and the Children and Young Persons Act, 1969 and each of them made detailed provisions for dealing with young or adolescent offenders.
The principle underlying these laws was that if children or adolescents found to be guilty of offences by criminal courts were in lieu of ordinary sentence of imprisonment kept in a special form of detention in a place other than a prison, of which the purpose was to develop mentally, physically and morally all inmates by giving them necessary training, there was every likelihood of such persons being reformed and accepted by society as persons who had no inclination to commit crimes in the future.
It was generally felt that every offender upto a certain age "May be regarded as a potentially good citizen; that his lapse into crime may be due either to physical degeneracy or had social environment; that it is the duty of the State at least to try to effect a cure, and not to class the offender offhand and without experiment with the adult professional criminal" (See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1962 Edn., Vol.
III at page 923).
This system of treatment of juvenile or adolescent offenders came to be called the 'Borstal System ' after the village of Borstal in Kent (England) where the early experiments on boys between the ages of 16 and 21 were carried out in an old convict prison before the passing of the above mentioned Acts of 1908.
The Borstal System subsequently became popular in all the Commonwealth countries and was introduced through laws passed for the purpose of achieving its object.
One such law is the Act which was enacted in the year 1925.
Its object was to make provision for the establishment and regulation of Borstal Schools for detention and training of adolescent offenders.
The relevant provisions of the Act i.e. sections 2 (1) and (2), 8 and 10 A are extracted below for ready reference: "2.
In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: 1. "Adolescent offender" means any person who has been convicted of any offence punishable with imprisonment or who having been ordered to give security under 735 section 106 or 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has failed to do so and who at the time of such conviction or failure to give security is not less than 16 nor more than 21 years of age; 2. "Borstal School" is a corrective institution wherein adolescent offenders, whilst detained in pursuance of this Act, are given such industrial training and other instruction and are subject to such disciplinary and moral influences as will conduce to their reformation and the prevention of crime:. . " "8.
Power of Court to pass sentences of detention in Borstal School.
Where it appears to a Court having jurisdiction under this Act that an adolescent offender should, by reason of his criminal habits or tendencies, or association with persons of bad character be subject to detention for such term and under such instruction and discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation and the repression of crime, it shall be lawful for the Court, in lieu of passing a sentence of imprisonment, to pass sentence of detention in a Borstal School for a term which shall not be less than two years and shall not exceed five years but in no case extending beyond the date on which the adolescent offender will, in the opinion of the Court attain the age of twenty three years; Provided that, before passing such sentence, the Court shall consider any report of representation which may be made to it including any report or representation made by the probation officer of the area in which the offender permanently resided at the time when he committed the offence as to the suitability of the case for treatment in a Borstal School and shall be satisfied that the character, state of health and mental condition of the offender and other circumstances of the case are such that the offender is likely to profit by such instruction and discipline as aforesaid." "10 A. Power of State Government to transfer offenders sentenced to transportation to Borstal Schools.
The State Government may, if satisfied that any offender who has 736 been sentenced to transportation either before or after the passing of madras Borstal Schools (Amendment) Act, 1939, and who at the time of conviction was not less than 16 nor more than 21 years of age, might with advantage be detained in a Borstal School, direct that such offender shall be transferred to a Borstal School there to serve the whole or any part of the unexpired residue of his sentence.
The provisions of this Act shall apply to such offender as if he had been originally sentenced to detention in a Borstal School.
An order may be made under this section notwithstanding that the sentence of transportation has been subsequently commuted into a sentence of imprisonment." Any person who is not less than 16 years nor more than 21 years of age on the date of his conviction of an offence punishable with imprisonment or who having been ordered to give security under section 106 or section 117 of the Code fails to furnish such security is considered an adolescent offender under the Act.
When such an offender is convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment it is the duty of the court convicting him to consider whether having regard to his criminal habits or tendencies or association with persons of bad character he should be detained for such period and under such instruction and discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation and repression of crime.
If the Court considers that it is desirable to do so it may in substitution of the sentence of imprisonment pass a sentence of detention in a Borstal School for a term which shall not be less than two years and shall not exceed five years.
In no case he can be detained in a Borstal School beyond the age of twenty three years.
This outer limit of 23 years of age was introduced by an amendment made by the Madras Borstal Schools (Amendment) Act, 1936 (Madras Act XIX of 1936).
Before passing such order of detention the court should satisfy itself about matters set out in the proviso to section 8 of the Act including any report made by the Probation officer of the area concerned.
It is seen that the sentence of detention is passed in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment which may have been passed.
Hence the detention ordered under the above provision is not imprisonment and the Borstal School where the adolescent offender is detained is not a prison.
737 This is also the view taken by Beaumont, C.J. in Emperor vs Lakshman Shivram which was a case arising under the Bombay Borstal Schools Act, 1929.
Merely because section 5 of the Act has made the and Prisoners Act, 1900 applicable to a Borstal School regarding matters not otherwise provided for does not make it a prison or its inmates prisoners.
The period of detention has no relationship to the sentence of imprisonment that could have been imposed under law.
It is based on the opinion of the court as to what is conducive to the reformation of the person detained and the repression of the crime and in no case it can exceed five years or can be beyond the date on which the person attains 23 years of age.
Section 10 A of the Act which was introduced by the Madras Borstal Schools (Amendment) Act, 1939 (Madras Act XIII of 1939) provides that the State Government, if satisfied that any offender who has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and who at the time of conviction was not less then 16 years of age nor more than 21 years of age might, with advantage be detained in a Borstal Schools, direct that such offender shall be transferred to a Borstal School, there to serve the whole or any part of the unexpired period of sentence.
The second sentence in section 10 A of the Act is a deeming provision.
It provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply to such offender as if he had been originally sentenced to detention in a Borstal School.
In view of this clause it is contended and we feel rightly that it would not be open to detain a person in a Borstal School beyond the age of twenty three years, nor can he be sent back to the prison except under section 14 of the Act.
Section 14 of the Act reads thus: "14.
Transfer of incorrigibles etc.
to prisons.
Where a person detained in a Borstal School is reported to the State Government by the Superintendent of such School to be incorrigible or to be exercising a bad influence on the other inmates of the school or in the case of person directed to sent to a Borstal School before the commencement of the Madras Borstal School (Amendment) Act, 1966, to be over twenty three years of age, the State Government may commute the unexpired residue of the term of detention to such term of imprisonment of either description as the State Government may determine, but in no case exceeding: 738 (a) such unexpired residue, or (b) the maximum period of imprisonment fixed for the offence or the failure to give security as the case may be, or (c) the maximum period of imprisonment which the Court that tried him had authority to award under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, whichever is shortest." While construing section 14 of the Act we may omit the unnecessary words 'or in the case of person directed to be sent to a Borstal School before the commencement of the Madras Borstal Schools (Amendment) Act, 1936, to be over 23 years of age ' as they do not apply to a person who is sent to a Borstal School after the commencement of the Madras Borstal Schools (Amendment) Act, 1936.
These words had to be introduced to remove the anomaly that would have arisen by the amendment made to section 8 by the same Amending Act providing that no person could be kept in a Borstal School after he had attained 23 years of age and to deal with cases of persons who had already been detained in a Borstal School and who had crossed 23 years of age.
Hence omitting the above words what section 14 of the Act means is that where a person detained in a Borstal School is reported to the State Government by the Superintendent of such School to be incorrigible or to be exercising a bad influence on the other inmates of the School the State Government may commute the unexpired residue of the period of detention which in no case can be for more than five years to such term of imprisonment of either description as the State Government may determine, but in no case exceeding (a) such unexpired residue, or (b) the maximum period of imprisonment fixed for such offence or the failure to give security, as the case may be, or (c) the maximum period of imprisonment which the Court that tried him had authority to award under the Code, Whichever is shortest.
It is obvious from the foregoing that even in the case of a person who is convicted of an offence punishable for imprisonment for life, but who is detained in a Borstal School by virtue of an order made by the State Government under section 10 A of the Act, the period of imprisonment that can be substituted by the State Government in the place of the period of detention cannot exceed five years in any event.
This this the only provision in the Act which authorises the State Government to shift a person who is in a Borstal School to a 739 prison and even here it is possible only where there is an adverse report against him by the Superintendent of the Borstal Schools a stated therein.
I may here refer to some of the decisions having a hearing on the effect of an order made under section 10 A of the Act, In in re T. Munirathnam Reddi & Anr.
Subba Rao, C.J. dealing with the case of an adolescent offender who was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life observed thus: "In this case, we are satisfied that the 1st accused is not a hardened criminal.
He was a student of Sri Venkateswara College and was below 21 years at the time he was convicted of the offence.
We have also found that he shot the deceased when he abused him and his father presumably when they questioned him about his conduct in insulting his mother.
The act was done by an young man of good antecedents in an emotional state.
In our view.
section 10 A, Borstal Schools Act is really intended to govern the case of such accused.
We, therefore, while sentencing the Ist accused to transportation for life, recommend his case to the Government to take action under section 10 A and to commit him to the Borstal School for such period as they think fit.
" The above decision shows that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was of the view that on making an order under section 10 A of the Act, the State Government could commit a person sentenced to transportation for life to a Borstal School for such period as it thought fit.
The High Court of Madras has also passed similar orders in In re.
Krishnawami alias Kittan and in In the.
Periyaswami Asari.
It is true that the Kerala High Court has held in Kesavan vs State of Kerala that a person above 16 and below 21 years of age at the time he committed murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life could be detained in a Borstal School under section 10 A of the Act but he has to serve the whole or any part of the unexpired residue of his sentence in that institution.
The High 740 Court of Kerala holds that the second sentence in section 10 A has not the effect of attracting the limitation that a person cannot be kept in a Borstal School after he attains 23 years of age found in section 8 of the Act for according to that High Court that sentence merely says that the provision of the Act shall apply to an offender whose detention in a Borsal School is directed under section 10 A as if he had been originally sentenced to detention in a Borstal School, not that the provisions of the Act shall be applied in making the direction.
The High Court of Kerala appears to be unwilling to give full effect to the words as if ' in the second sentence of section 10 A in view of the presence of the words 'the whole or any part of the unexpired residue of his sentence ' at the end of the first sentence in section 10 A of the Act.
It is true that there is some apparent contradiction between the two sentences.
But having regard to the object of the legislation and the meaning of the words 'as if ' in the second sentence, we should extend all the privileges available to an offender detained under section 8 of the act to prisoner who is directed to be transferred to a Borstal School under section 10 A.
The object of the legislation is to reform of fenders who have committed acts visiting them with the penalty of undergoing prison life when they were between 16 and 21 years of age and that is sought to be achieved by taking them away from the company of adult prisoners whose continued association in a prison would have serious adverse influence on their character.
If every person who is transferred under section 10 A to a Borstal School is to remain there until he serves out the entire period of imprisonment for life the Borstal School would soon become a prison consisting of 'lifers ' and its other inmates who are detained under section 8 would be keeping company with adult offenders, thus defeating the very object of establishing a Borstal School.
The Court should as far as possible avoid a construction which will make the legislation futile.
The second reason is that the words 'as if ' appearing in the second sentence in section 10 A make it a deeming provision and such deeming provision should in law be carried to its logical end.
This Court while construing such deeming provision has adopted and applied in a number of cases the rule of construction expounded by Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. vs Finsbury Borough Council in the following words: 741 "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.
One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents.
The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.
" It may also be noted that apart from the clause in section 8 which prescribes that no person detained under it can be kept in a Borstal School after he attains 23 years of age, there are other provisions in the Act which are specially applicable to the inmates of a Borstal School.
Section 21 A of the Act empowers the State Government to order at any time the discharge of an inmate of any Borstal School either absolutely or subject to such conditions, as it may think fit.
The expression 'inmate ' in section 21 A should in the ordinary course include a person who is directed to be transferred to a Borstal School under section 10 A of the Act.
Section 19 C of the Act provides for classification of such inmates into various grades for purposes of discipline and control in a Borstal School.
The provisions in Part III of the Act lay down the procedure for releasing the inmates of a Borstal School on licence.
Section 13 A of the Act authorises the transfer of an inmate of a Borstal School in the State of Andhra Pradesh to any Borstal School or other School of a like nature in any other part of India, with the consent of the Government of the other State concerned.
Every one of these provisions is applicable to a person transferred under section 10 A.
I agree with the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Bondili Jagannath Singh vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh case (supra) that if a person detained in a Borstal School under section 10 A of the Act is to be re transferred to the prison after he serves out the full term of detention in the School it will defeat the very object and purpose of the Act of providing for detention of young offenders in a Borstal School for the purpose of reformation and rehabilitation of such offenders and that person 742 who is detained in a Borstal School has to be released if he has completed 23 years of age.
But Shri P. Rama Reddi, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh very fairly submitted while a person detained in a Borstal School under section 10 A of the Act was entitled to be released on his attaining 23 years of age before the commencement of section 433 A of the Code, he cannot be now released until he has undergone fourteen years of imprisonment as prescribed by section 433 A if he is a person who is sentenced for imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is also one of the punishments prescribed by law.
Now arises the crucial question whether on the coming into force of section 433 A of the Code, a person who had been sentenced to imprisonment for life on being convicted of an offence for which death is also prescribed as a punishment and who being a person not below 16 nor above 21 years of age had later on been directed by the State Government under section 10 A of the Act to be detained in a Borstal School is entitled to be released on his completing 23 years of age without any regard to the provision in section 433 A of the Code which insists that a person who is sentenced to imprisonment for life on being convicted of such an offence should actually undergo imprisonment for a minimum period of fourteen years.
Section 433 A of the Code which came into force on December 18, 1978 reads thus: "433 A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment".
Section 10 A of the Act empowers the State Government to transfer any offender who has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and who at the time of conviction was not less than 16 nor more than 21 years of age from a prison to a Borstal School, if it is satisfied that it would be to his advantage as provided therein.
743 It is well known that persons who commit acts which are forbidden by law are ordinarily classified into groups on the basis of their age for determining their liability under criminal law.
Section 82 of the Indian Penal Code declares that nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.
Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.
Children who are below 15 or 16 years of age are entitled to the protection of certain beneficent provisions in the various Children 's Acts in force in different parts of the country.
Section 360 of the Code again provides for releasing on probation of good conduct or after admonition a person under twenty one years of age who is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against him.
The Act with which we are concerned in this case is again one such law which attempts to treat an adolescent offender in a humane way.
The classification of offenders on the basis of age for purposes of criminal law is, therefore, beyond reproach.
The only argument pressed before us by the State Government is that in view of the mandate of section 433 A of the Code, and person who is sentenced for imprisonments for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law cannot be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment even though by an order made under section 10 A of the Act he has been detained in a Borstal School.
This contention obviously overlooks the words 'prison ' and 'imprisonment ' in section 433 A of the Code and the effect of an order made by the State Government under section 10 A of the Act read with section 8 thereof.
Entry 4 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which reads as "4.
Prisons, reformatories, Borstal institutions and other institutions of a like nature, and persons detained therein. " also makes a distinction between a person and a Borstal institution.
Section 433 A of the Code refers to a person who is actually undergoing imprisonment.
As soon as an order is made under section 10 A of the Act in respect of a person who is sentenced to imprisonment for life and he is sent to a Borstal School pursuant thereto, he ceases to be a prisoner undergoing imprisonment.
As observed earlier he would be a 744 detenu in a Borstal School and the provisions of section 8 of the Act will have to be given their full effect in his case also.
Under section 8 of the Act the person detained in a Borstal School can be kept there for a maximum period of five years and in no case after he has attained 23 years of age.
I have already noticed that there is no provision for sending him back to prison except section 14 of the Act which will not be applicable to a person against whom no report is made by the Superintendent of a Borstal School as stated therein.
If section 14 of the Act is inapplicable there is no legal way in which he can be sent back to prison to satisfy the requirements of section 433 A of the Code.
Moreover, an anomalous situation which arises in the case of a person sent to a Borstal School under section 10 A of the Act is that if the period of detention in a Borstal School is not to be counted as the period of imprisonment because detention is ordered in lieu of imprisonment and because Borstal School is not a prison then such person cannot claim by way of credit the period of detention in a Borstal School while computing the fourteen years of imprisonment mentioned in section 433 A of the Code.
If that is so, should he undergo an extra period of imprisonment equivalent to the period of his detention to make good the deficiency to satisfy the requirements of that section ? That would hardly be a proper thing to be demanded of him.
Our attention is drawn to a decision of this Court in Maru Ram etc.
vs Union of India & Anr I have gone through that decision carefully.
There the question which arose for consideration was whether after the coming into force of section 433 A of the Code, it was open to the State Governments to reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on a person convicted of a capital offence to any period they liked on the basis of the remission rules framed by the State Governments which were traceable to section 432 or section 433 of the Code or Acts which authorised the State Governments to modify the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed by courts.
Krishna Iyer, J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of himself and Chandrachud, CJ and Bhagwati, J. observed at pages 1217 and 1218 thus: "Sentencing is a judicial function but the execution of the sentence ' after the court 's pronouncement, is ordinarily 745 a matter for the Executive under the Procedure Code, going by Entry 2 in List III of the Seventh Schedule.
Keeping aside the constitutional powers under articles 72 and 161 which are 'untouchable ' and 'unapproachable ' for any legislature, let us examine the law of sentencing, remission and release.
Once a sentence has been imposed, the only way to terminate it before the stipulated term is by action under sections 432/433 or articles 72/161.
And if the latter power under the Constitution is not invoked the only source of salvation is the play of power under sections 432 and 433 (a) so far as a lifer is concerned.
No release by reduction or remission of sentence is possible under the corpus juris as it stands, in any other way.
The legislative power of the State under Entry 4 of List II, even if it be stretched to snapping point, can deal only with Prisons and Prisoners, never with truncation of judicial sentences.
Remission by way of reward or otherwise cannot out down the sentence as such and cannot, let it be unmistakably understood, grant final exit passport for the prisoner except by Government action under section 432 (1).
The topic of Prisons and Prisoners does not cover release by way of reduction of the sentence itself.
That belongs to Criminal Procedure in Entry 2 of List III although when the sentence is for a fixed term and remission plus the period undergone equal that term the prisoner may win his freedom.
Any amount of remission to result in manumission requires action under section 432 (1), read with the Remission Rules.
That is why Parliament tracing the single source of remission of sentence to section 432.
blocked it by the non obstante clause.
No remission, however, long, can set the prisoner free at the instance of the State, before the judicial sentence has run out, save by action under the constitutional power or under section 432.
So read, the inference is inevitable, even if the contrary be argument ingenious, that section 433 A achieves what it wants arrest the release of certain classes of 'lifers ' before a certain period, by blocking section 432.
articles 72 and 161 are, of course, excluded from this discussion as being beyond any legislative power to curb or confine".
(Underlining by us.) Then the learned Judge considered the effect of section 5 of the Code on the remission laws or rules.
Section 5 of the Code reads thus: 746 "5.
Saving Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force".
It was contended by the petitioners in that case that section 5 of the Code saved all remissions, short sentencing schemes as special and local laws and therefore, they would prevail over the Code including section 433A. Repelling that contention, Justice Krishna Iyer proceeded to observe thus: "The anatomy of this savings sections is simple, yet subtle.
Broadly speaking, there are three components to be separated.
Firstly, the Procedure Code generally governs matters covered by it.
Secondly, if a special or local law exists covering the same area, this latter law will be saved and will prevail.
The short sentencing measures and remission schemes promulgated by the various States are special and local laws and must over ride.
Now comes the third component which may be clinching.
If there is a specific provision to the contrary, then that will over ride the special or local law.
Is section 433A a specific law contra ? If so, that will be the last word and will hold even against the special or local law. .
A thing is specific if it is explicit.
It need not be express.
The anti thesis is between 'specific ' and 'indefinite ' or 'omnibus ' and between 'implied ' and 'express '.
What is precise, exact, definite and explicit, is specific.
Sometimes, what is specific may also be special but yet they are distinct in semantics.
From this angle, the Criminal Procedure Code is a general Code.
The remission rules are special laws but section 433A is a specific, explicit, definite provision dealing with a particular situation or narrow class of cases, as distinguished from the general run of cases covered by section 432 Cr.
P.C. Section 433A picks out of a mass of imprisonment cases a specific class of life imprisonment cases and subjects it explicitly to a particularised treatment.
It follows that section 433A applies in preference to any special or local law because s.5 expressly declares that specific provisions, if any, to the contrary will prevail over any special or local law.
We have said enough 747 to make the point that 'specific ' is specific enough and even though 'special ' to 'specific ' is near allied, and thin partition do their bounds divide ' the two are different.
Section 433A escapes the exclusion of section 5.
" A reading of the above passage shows that the Court was of the view that in view of the non obstante clause used in section 433A of the Code which excluded the operation of section 432, the remission rules which were traceable to section 432 could not prevail over section 433A and section 5 of the Code could not, therefore, be relied on by the petitioners.
In the instant case reliance is not being placed on any rules traceable to section 432 of the Code or on a statute which empowered the State Government to reduce the period of imprisonment imposed by the Court passed under the legislative power derived from Entry 2 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution but on an independent statute which specifically deals with the case of a small section of persons namely adolescent offenders traceable to the legislative power derived from the expressions 'prisons ' and 'Borstal institutions ' in Entry 4 of the State List.
If in the case of such offenders, the State Government makes an order under section 10 A of the Act directing their detention in a Borstal School, then they cease to be persons undergoing imprisonment for life on being convicted of an offence for which death is also prescribed as one of the punishments but they will become detenus in a Borstal School.
The Act which is a local law, therefore, prevails on all the provisions of the Code including section 433A of the Code as there is no provision which excludes the operation of the Act which deals with Borstal institutions.
Section 433A of the Code was introduced not to set at naught provisions like section 10 A of the Act which dealt with a special class of offenders like adolescent offenders but only to regulate capricious and arbitrary decisions under section 432 of the Code and the remission rules sometimes reducing the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on persons who had been convicted of capital offences but had been sentenced to imprisonment for life to short periods like five to six years.
That is apparent from the notes in clauses found in the Bill under which section 433A of the Code was introduced.
The relevant clause is given below: "Clause 33: Section 432 contains provision relating to powers of the appropriate Government to suspend or 748 remit sentences.
The Joint Committee on the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972 had suggested the insertion of a proviso to section 57 of the Indian Penal Code to the effect that a person who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into that of life imprisonment and persons who have been sentenced to life imprisonment for a capital offence should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in Jail.
Since this particular matter relates more appropriately to the Criminal Procedure Code, a new section is being inserted to cover the proviso inserted by the Joint Committee".
The Joint Committee 's recommendation on section 57 of the Indian Penal Code which is referred to in the above clause was as follows: "Section 57 of the Code as proposed to be amended had provided that in calculating fractions of terms of punishment imprisonment for life should be reckoned as equivalent to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years.
In this connection attention of the Committee was brought to the aspect that sometimes due to grant of remission even murderers sentenced or commuted to life imprisonment were released at the end of 5 to 6 years.
The Committee feels that such a convict should not be released unless he has served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.
" It is obvious that Parliament which was aware of laws like the Act which were in force in the States did not choose to interfere with them by enacting section 433A of the Code.
If it intended to nullify or modify such laws the non obstante clause in section 433A would have been more comprehensive including all local statutes enacted for the benefit of children and juvenile or adolescent offenders.
Considering the case in the light of the observations made in Maru Ram 's case (supra) I feel that section 10 A of the Act remains unimpaired and it has to be given full effect even after the enactment of section 433A of the Code.
The contrary view expressed by the Madras High Court in In re.
Ganapatt cannot be accepted as correct.
I am, therefore, of the view that section 433A of the Code 749 would not operate in respect of persons dealt with under section 10 A of the Act and that Parliament never intended while enacting section 433A to deny the benefit available to adolescent offenders under section 10 A of the Act.
When once this conclusion is reached, the argument that by reason of Article 254 of the Constitution, the Act should yield in favour of a later Central legislation which is repugnant to the Act would not arise because there would be no such repugnancy at all.
If section 433A of the Code is kept out of the way, section 10 A of the Act should be interpreted in the same way in which it was understood all along.
So construed a person who is detained under section 10 A of the Act in a Borstal School would have to be released on his attaining 23 years of age.
My view receives support from the decision of this Court in Kunwar Bahadur & Ors.
vs State of Uttar Pradesh which was a case under the U.P. Borstal Act, 1938, the relevant part of which reads thus: "It was then argued that so far as appellant Nand Kishore is concerned, he appears to be only 15 years at the time when the occurrence took place and it appears that when he was sent to prison the Jailor referred him to the Sewa Sadan under section 7 of the United Provinces Borstal Act, 1938.
Under this section where a prisoner is sentenced for transportation i.e. life imprisonment and is below the age of 21 years he should be sent to Borstal School where he cannot be detained for more than five years.
The law thus contemplates that for such an offender the sentence of five years will be equivalent even to a higher sentence of life imprisonment.
It is not disputed before us that the appellant Nand Kishore had already served 5 years in that institution and has been released therefrom.
The question, therefore, of his surrendering to serve the remaining sentence does not arise.
With this modification the appeal is dismissed.
" In view of the foregoing, there is no ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
With great respect I agree with the order proposed and also with the reasoning of my learned brother, Justice Venkataramiah.
There is however some anomaly in Section 10A of the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925.
The said section has been set out in the judgment.
It empowers the State Government to 'transfer offenders sentenced to transportation to Borstal 750 School '.
It further provides that if the State Government is satisfied that any offender who has been sentenced to transportation either before or after the passing of the Madras Borstal Schools (Amendment) Act, 1939, and who at the time of conviction was not less than 16 years, nor more than 21 years, might with advantage be detained in Borstal School, direct that such offender shall be transferred to a Borstal School, there to serve the whole or any part of the unexpired residue of the sentence.
(emphasis supplied).
The section further stipulates that the provisions of the said Act should apply to such offender 'as if he had been originally sentenced to detention in a Borstal School '.
In the instant case, by the order dated 12th September, 1980, the State Government had directed that the petitioner should be detained in a Borstal School 'to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence till he attains the age of 23;.
My learned brother has, with the aid of the principle enunciated by Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. vs Finsbury Borough Council deemed that the original sentence of transferring the petitioner to a Borstal School has been passed by the Court at the time of imposing sentence originally.
But in fact in passing the order under Section 10A expression used by the State Government is that the person concerned should be detained in 'Borstal School ' to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence till he attains the age of 23 years.
So the sentence actually passed by the enabling section by the State Government directs the detenu 'to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence '.
Therefore we have to deem as if the sentence was passed by the court at the time of the passing of the original sentence by the court.
In a matter of this nature, the statute should be more specific and in that view of the matter, the Government should consider the question of either altering the language of Section 10A of the Act or be more specific while passing any orders under Section 10A of the Act.
With these observations I respectfully agree with the decision of my learned brother.
H.S.K. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
The respondent, an adolescent, was convicted for an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.
After the respondent had undergone the sentence for a few months in a prison, he was ordered to be detained in a Borstal School under an order made by the appellant State Government under section 10 A of the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') to serve unexpired portion of the sentence till he attained the age of 23 years.
Since the respondent was not released on his attaining the age of 23 years, the respondent filed a habeas corpus petition in the High Court.
The High Court allowed the petition and directed the appellant to release the respondent.
Hence this appeal by the State Government by special leave.
The appellant contended that in view of the mandate of section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 any person who was sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death was one of the punishments provided by law could not be released from prison unless he had served at least 14 years of imprisonment even though by an order made under section 10 A of the Act he had been detained in a Borstal school.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: The appellant 's contention overlooks the words 'prison ' and 'imprisonment ' in section 433A of the Code and the effect of an order made by the State Government under section 10 A of the Act read with section 8 thereof.
Entry 4 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which reads as "4.
Prisons, reformatories, Borstal institutions and other institutions of a like nature, and persons detained therein.
" also makes a distinction between a prison and a Borstal institution.
Section 433A of the Code refers to a person who is actually undergoing imprisonment.
As soon as order is made under section 10 A of the Act 730 in respect of a person who is sentenced to imprisonment for life, and he is sent to a Borstal school pursuant thereto, he ceases to be a prisoner undergoing imprisonment.
He would be a detenu in a Borstal school and the provisions of section 8 of the Act will have to be given their full effect in his case also.
It is true that there is some apparent contradiction between the two sentences of section 10 A. But having regard to the object of the legislation and the meaning of the words 'as if ' in the second sentence, we should extend all the privileges available to an offender detained under section 8 of the Act to a prisoner who is directed to be transferred to a Borstal school under section 10 A. Under section 8 of the Act the person detained in a Borstal school can be kept there for a maximum period of five years and in no case after he has attained 23 years of age.
There is no provision for sending him back to prison except section 14 of the Act which will not be applicable to a person against whom no report is made by the Superintendent of a Borstal school as stated therein.
If section 14 of the Act is inapplicable there is no legal way in which he can be sent back to prison to satisfy the requirements of section 433A of the Code, Moreover, an anomalous situation which arises in the case of a person sent to a Borstal school under section 10 A of the Act is that if the period of detention in a Borstal school is not to be counted as the period of imprisonment because detention is ordered in lieu of imprisonment and because Borstal school is not a prison then such person cannot claim by way of credit the period of detention in a Borstal school while computing the fourteen years of imprisonment mentioned in section 433A of the Code.
If that is so, should he undergo an extra period of imprisonment equivalent to the period of his detention to make good the deficiency to satisfy the requirements of that section ? That would hardly be a proper thing to be demanded of him.
[743F H; 744A E] Emperor vs Lakshman Shivram, A.I.R. 1933 Bom.
(FB), referred to.
In re T. Muniratnam Reddi & Anr., A.I.R 1955 Andhra 118.
In re.
Krishnaswami alias Kittan, A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 109.
In re.
Periyaswami Asari, A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 223 and Kesavan vs State of Kerala, 1957 K.L.G. 1049, overruled.
If every person who is transferred under section 10 A of the Act to a Borstal school is to remain there until he serves out the entire period of imprisonment for life, the Borstal school would soon become a prison consisting of 'lifers ' and its other inmates who are detained under section 8 of the Act would be keeping company with adult offenders, thus defeating the very object of establishing a Borstal school.
The Court should as far as possible avoid a construction which will make the legislation futile.
The second reason is that the words 'as if ' appearing in the second sentence in section 10 A make it a deeming provision and such deeming provision should in law be carried to its logical end.
[740E G] East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. vs Finsbury Borough Council, at p. 132.
referred to.
731 If a person detained in a Borstal school under section 10 A of the Act is to be re transferred to the prison after he serves out the full term of detention in the school it will defeat the very object and purpose of the Act of providing for detention of young offenders in a Borstal school for the purpose of reformation and rehabilitation of such offenders and that person who is detained in a Borstal school has to be released if he has completed 23 years of age.
[741G H] Bondili Jagannath Singh vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh.
1983 (2) Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 262, upheld.
In the instant case, the Andhra Borstal Schools Act, 1925, which specifically deals with the case of a small section of persons namely adolescent offenders traceable to the legislative power derived from the expressions 'Prisons ' and 'Borstal institutions ' in Entry 4 of the State List and which is a local law, prevails on all the provisions of the Code including section 433A of the Code as there is no provision which excludes the operation of the Act which deals with Borstal institutions.
Section 433A of the Code was introduced not to set at naught provisions like section 10 A of the Act which dealt with a special class of offenders like adolescent offenders but only to regulate capricious and arbitrary decisions under section 432 of the Code and the remission rules sometimes reducing the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on persons who had been convicted for capital offences but had been sentenced to imprisonment for life to short periods like five to six years.
[747E H] Maru Ram etc.
vs Union of India & Anr.
, ; , explained and distinguished.
Section 433A of the Code would not operate in respect of persons dealt with under section 10 A of the Act and that Parliament never intended while enacting section 433A to deny the benefit available to adolescent offenders under section 10 A of the Act.
Therefore, section 10 A of the Act remains unimpaired and it has to be given full effect even after the enactment of section 433A of the Code.
[749C D] In re Ganapati, ; overruled.
Kunwar Bahadur & Ors vs State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 S.C. 1509, referred to.
(Per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) There is some anomaly in section 10 A of the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925.
It empowers the State Government to 'transfer adolescent offenders sentenced to transportation to Borstal School '.
It further provides that if the State Government is satisfied that any adolescent offender might with advantage be detained in Borstal School, direct that such offender shall be transferred to a Borstal School, 'there to serve the whole or any part of the unexpired residue of the sentence '.
(emphasis supplied).
The section further stipulates that the provisions of the said Act should apply to such offender 'as if 732 he had been originally sentenced to detention in a Borstal School '.
My learned brother has, with the aid of the principle enunciated by Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Court.
Ltd. v Finsbury Borough Council, deemed that the original sentence of transferring the petitioner to a Borstal School has been passed by the Court at the time of imposing sentence originally.
But in fact in passing the order under section 10 A expression used by the State Government is that the person concerned should be detained in 'Borstal School ' to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence till he attains the age of 23 years.
So the sentence actually passed by the enabling section by the State Government directs the detenu 'to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence '.
Therefore we have to deem as if the sentence was passed by the court at the time of the passing of the original sentence by the court.
In a matter of this nature, the statute should be more specific and in that view of the matter, the Government should consider the question of either altering the language of section 10 A of the Act or be more specific while passing any orders under section 10.A of the.
[750E H] East End Dwellings Co. vs Ltd. vs Finsbury Borough Council, [1952] Appeal Cases 109 at p. 132, referred to.