hird strike offenders can seek to be resentenced as second strike
offenders, but it does not specifically authorize an appeal from the denial of a petition or
motion for resentencing. However, section 1237 provides that a defendant may appeal
“[f]rom a final judgment of conviction” (id., subd. (a)) or “[f]rom any order made after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party” (id., subd. (b)).
         There can be little doubt the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was an
order made after judgment, since, in a criminal case, judgment is synonymous with the
imposition of sentence. (Fadelli Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Appellate Department (1995)
34 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200.) Sentence was imposed for defendant’s current offenses in
1998. Although “‘an order ordinarily is not appealable when the appeal would merely
bypass or duplicate appeal from the judgment itself[]’” (People v. Totari (2002) 28
Cal.4th 876, 882), an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a section 1170.126 petition or
motion pertains only to that particular ruling, and so does not constitute an improper
second appeal from the judgment.
         The question, then, is whether the trial court’s ruling affected defendant’s
substantial rights. The trial court’s consideration of a petition under the Act is a two-step
process. First, the court determines whether the petitioner is eligible for resentencing. If
the petitioner is eligible, the court proceeds to the second step, and resentences the
petitioner under the Act unless it determines that doing so would pose “an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)

                                                6.
       Here, we are concerned with the first step of the process — the initial eligibility
determination. Section 1170.126 grants the trial court the power to determine an inmate
serving an indeterminate life term as a third strike offender is eligible for resentencing as
a second strike offender only if, as an initi