ing. This argument is without merit. Although, the issue was not raised in Virginia's pre-trial memorandum, the issue was raised during the testimony of both Tom and Virginia, during closing arguments, and in Virginia's Motion for Reconsideration.
[8]  In Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975), this court discussed the substantive standard to be applied in custody cases between a parent and a non-parent. There we said:

[P]arental custody ... [is] preferable and only to be refused where clearly detrimental to the child. .. . Unless the superior court determines that a parent is unfit, has abandoned the child, or that the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive custody, the parent must be awarded custody.
[9]  Although Virginia is correct in noting that some of the other factors did weigh in her favor, the superior court discounted the difference that these factors would make. It seems clear that although the cultural needs factor and the problems of merging with Morgan's new step-family may have tipped the balance in favor of Virginia, continuity weighed much more heavily in favor of primary placement with Tom.
[10]  See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 482 (Alaska 1994).
[11]  Cf. McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1995).
[12]  AS 25.24.150(c) provides that the court shall consider

(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs....
[13]  See Nichols v. Mandelin, 790 P.2d 1367, 1373 (Alaska 1990).
[14]  Virginia does not dispute the other three reasons given by the trial court.



387 Mass. 326 (1982)
439 N.E.2d 770
ATTORNEY GENERAL
vs.
SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF ESSEX.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.
May 3, 1982.
August 31, 1982.
Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH, & O'CONNOR, JJ.
John F. Tierney for the defendant.
Maria I. Lopez, Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiff.
NOLAN, J.
The Attorney General brought this action in the Superior Court for declarato