constitutional concerns raised by the broad

interpretation the Government urges us to adopt, we interpret § 1182(f) as


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containing meaningful limitations—limitations that the Proclamation, in

effectively rewriting the immigration laws as they pertain to the affected countries,

exceeds. After all, “whether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the

Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law.” Zivotofsky ex

rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015).

                             2. Compliance with § 1182(f)

      We next turn to whether, even assuming the President did not exceed the

scope of his delegated authority under § 1182(f), the Proclamation meets §

1182(f)’s requirement that the President find that the entry of certain persons

“would be detrimental to the interests of the United States” prior to suspending

their entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).

      Although we considered this question in Hawai’i I and ultimately answered

it in the negative, 859 F.3d at 770–74, the Proclamation differs from EO-2 in

several ways. As we discussed above, the Proclamation’s suspensions of entry

apply indefinitely, rather than for only 90 days. Unlike EO-2, the Proclamation

developed as a result of a multi-agency review. The justifications for the

Proclamation are different, too. The Proclamation puts forth a national security

interest in information sharing between other countries and the United States,

explains that it imposes its restrictions as an incentive for other countries to meet

the United States’ information-sharing protocols, and identifies “tailored”


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restrictions for each designated country. And the list of affected countries differs

from EO-2’s: the Proclamation adds Chad, removes Sudan, and includes two non-

majority Muslim countries, North Korea and Venezuela.

      Although there are some differences between EO-2 and the Proclama