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Siegel/Epistemic Charge 1 Epistemic Charge Susanna Siegel forthcoming in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Psychologists have long argued that perceptual experiences, like many other perceptual states, result from inference – or at least, from a process they have happily called 'inference'.1 But by and large, those interested in the epistemic role of perceptual experience have not concluded that experiences epistemically depend on the inferences psychologists describe. For instance, there is no presumption that the structural goodness or badness of the inference can make the experience it leads to better or worse. Instead, it is usually presumed that experiences are not the kind of states that c