 for postulating vim at all, or, assuming its existence, for believing anything very specific about its distribution. Of course, it is part of the view that these are the wrong standards to apply, since the epistemology of vim is quite different from the epistemology of any other property. But an implausible metaphysics is not generally made better by being com14Section 8 below will discuss the analysis of "multiply de re" modal claims like 'I could live on Earth while being 5 feet tall'. 15Phillip Bricker's view (2001, 2006) is similar in many ways to the one just described. One difference is that he does not rule out the possibility that more than one Lewis-world has vim (he calls it "actuality"). The other difference is more important: according to Bricker, people who are qualitatively like us but lack vim are not in a position to refer to vim when we do. On his preferred version of the view, when we express propositions about the distribution of vim, qualitatively similar but vimless people fail to express anything. The vimless part of reality is a place of epistemic tragedy; but the tragedy is not that good reasoning leads to false beliefs, but that it leads to contentless attempts at thought. (8) and (9) are thus true, assuming Twin lacks vim. Bricker's central argument for going down this route is his rejection of Lewis's doctrine of the indexicality of actuality. In section 11 below, I will argue that this is one of the parts of Lewis's view that should be jettisoned in any case. bined with an implausible epistemology, one tenet of which is that the metaphysics is something it is reasonable to believe. Things might be different if striking theoretical simplifications could be achieved by taking vim to be involved in the analysis of our ordinary beliefs; but it is obscure what the theoretical benefits are supposed to be. If we understand contingency-inducing quantification as de re restricted quantification, we should be happy to accept (9). For on this view, to say that somer swans are blue is to say that