Court. The claimant has

testified to a variety of symptoms.” (Pl.’s Br. at 28.) She thereafter asserts that “[a]t the very

least there must be some medical basis to conclude that a specific sign or symptom is supportive,

or detracts from a claim.” (Id.) Again, this argument is based on a misunderstanding of the

applicable regulations and the role of the ALJ. Although the ALJ may consider statements by

medical experts regarding how a particular symptom affects the claimant, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.929(c)(1), such statements are neither required nor dispositive of the ultimate issue of

disability. Id. Rather, it is the Commissioner’s prerogative to determine whether a certain

symptom or combination of symptoms renders a claimant unable to work.               Id.; see also

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2).

       We note that Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue again fails to argue that the ALJ’s

determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff does argue that “there is

ample evidence that disability results from the findings and symptoms that are in fact present.”

(Pl.’s Br. at 28.) However, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal

merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.”

Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

203 F.3d 388, 389–90 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the evidence could also support another


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conclusion, the decision of the [ALJ] must stand if the evidence could reasonably support the

conclusion reached.”). Rather, we must uphold the ALJ’s decision so long as it “is supported by

substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241;

see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

       Once again, however, we would be inclined to affirm the ALJ’s findings regarding

Plaintiff’s ps