aseby. The king’s army was in three lines: the first of
four regiments, the second of three regiments, the third of the king’s
and Rupert’s regiments. Lord Astley commanded the infantry (about 5500
men), Rupert the right, and Langdale the left, wing of cavalry, or
“horse,” each about 2500 strong.

The army of the Parliament was thus disposed: right wing, six
regiments of cavalry under Cromwell in three lines, with the right
flank echeloned back. Ireton commanded the cavalry of the left wing,
of five regiments of cavalry and one of dragoons arranged in two
lines, while the latter lined a hedgerow to protect the left flank.
The infantry under Skippon was in two lines: the first, five regiments
strong, the second or reserve, three regiments. The baggage, with a
strong guard of “shot,” was posted in rear of the left flank.

The battle began by the attack of Ireton against the opposing cavalry
“in echelon right in front”; but as this exposed his right flank to the
fire of the infantry squares of the first line, he turned his right
squadrons upon them. In this he was dismounted and wounded. Whether
from this cause, or what not, Rupert routed this wing, pursuing them as
far as Naseby, and then wasting time in attacking the baggage train,
while Ireton’s broken squadrons rallied. This is a perfect example
of the reckless and unskilful way in which the Royalist charges were
always made.

The Royalist first line next advanced, and, breaking Skippon’s left and
centre, forced it back upon the second line or reserve; but by this
time Cromwell’s cavalry had broken that under Langdale, and with a true
appreciation of the situation, had then despatched but two regiments
in careful and guarded pursuit, and turned with the remainder on the
king’s still unbroken centre. This relieved the pressure on Skippon’s
infantry, and these, thereupon, rallied, and in a combined attack broke
the king’s remaining square. The battle was virtually over. Rupert
returned, all too late and all too exhausted to be of serv