ong as she exists.) The unity of persons, and of much else, is provided by constitution and the first-person perspective. (For details, see Baker 2007b; Baker 2007a; Baker 2013) Persons are of different primary kinds from bodies, human or otherwise. (Persons have first-person persistence conditions; bodies do not. Persons have innumerable causal powers that bodies lack.) Nevertheless, my view is not a property dualism. On my view, there are not two kinds of properties; there are myriads of kinds of properties, none of which is instantiable only by immaterial substances. (I do not believe that there are any finite immaterial substances.) My view is nonreductive throughout. I am as nonreductive about artefacts as I am about natural objects: 'Every thing is what it is and not another thing', and that goes for the familiar things that we interact with.5 Being a dialysis machine is as irreducible (and hence as much are part of basic ontology) as being a person or being a human organism. Hence, the relevant charge against me is not property dualism; a better criticism is that my ontology includes too many concrete objects and properties, that my ontology is bloated. I accept the charge as the price for being nonreductive. So, I am no dualist; I don't stop at two kinds of substances or properties. One advantage of the Constitution View over Substance Dualism is that there is not (or rather I cannot think of) any naturalistic way that an immaterial mind could have come into existence, but I can think of a naturalistic way that the first-person perspective could have come into existence: the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective – consciousness and intentionality – seems to have evolved gradually over many species (from the first stirrings of intentionality in organisms with limited flexibility in responding to their environments to the more developed intentionality of mammals);6 and the robust stage comes into existence as human beings developed syntactically complex languages with resources for first-per