tfinder could do so. Id.

We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to

have been not credible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts. Id. Evidence that does

more than raise surmise or suspicion is not sufficient unless that evidence is capable of

producing a firm belief or conviction that the allegation is true. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d

101, 113 (Tex. 2014). If, after conducting a legal sufficiency review, we determine that

no reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the matter that



                                              6
must be proven was true, then the evidence is legally insufficient and we must reverse.

Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).


        In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the

factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266. We must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s allegations.

Id. We must also consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder

could not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, in light of the

entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited

in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed

a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.


                                                  Analysis


Oral Pronouncement of Judgment


        Sam challenges the validity of the trial court’s judgment of termination because the

judge did not specify the predicate grounds or include the best interest finding in his oral

pronouncement.4 In its written order, the trial court terminated Sam’s parental rights

pursuant to sections 161.001(b)(1) (C), (E), (N), and (O) and found termination to be in

the best i