ds, like everything else, are counterparts, and in that sense represent ways certain specific things-the things whose counterparts they are-might be. If the Lewis-worlds are all one another's counterparts, then each Lewis-world represents a way any other given Lewis-world might be.46 There is only one Lewis-world-namely Cosmo itself-that represents the way Cosmo actually is. But this doesn't give Cosmo a distinctive role vis-à-vis actuality: every Lewis-world represents the way it itself is. pActually φq involves indexical reference to Cosmo only when φ already involves indexical reference to Cosmo. Since quantification is often tacitly restricted in an indexical way, many claims which contain no overt indexical words are indexical all the same. There is no particular reason to think that covert indexical reference to Cosmo is particularly common among the folk, however, although it might be more common among certain physicists and philosophers. So much for what actuality is not. But what is it? What does 'actually' actually mean? Hazen (1979) was the first to notice the difficulty of extending the counterpart-theoretic translation scheme of Lewis 1968 to a language containing an 'actually' operator; Fara and Williamson (2005) explain why some natural ideas, as well as some more intricate proposals due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, don't succeed in endowing the 'actually' operator with anything like the right logical behaviour. In a context where Semi-Rigid Pairs holds and counterpairings are global permutations, this challenge is easily met in the present framework. We can simply analyse pActually φq as pat I (φ)q, where I is a rigid plural name for the identity pairs. As we have seen, the result understood, is quantification over parts of actuality. If I were convinced that I ought to call all the worlds actual. . . then it would become very implausible to say that what might happen is what does happen at some or another world' (OPW 100). It is not obvious how to square this with his allowing (