ION
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, prohibiting the implementation of issue 3, until further order of this Court, and ORDERS the Plaintiffs to post bond in the amount of one hundred dollars.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  In fact, the Court recognized that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and ... the right [of voters] to cast their votes effectively ... of course, rank among our most precious freedoms." Williams, 393 U.S. at 30, 89 S.Ct. at 10
[2]  First, the cases speak unmistakably in race-neutral terms. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969) ("State may no more disadvantage any particular group ..."); Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 3194, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982) ("laws structuring political institutions or allocating power according to "neutral principles ... are not subject to equal protection attack"); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971) ("so long as the [legislation does] not discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class ...").

Furthermore, Gordon, a case not involving race, was distinguished from Hunter not because the legislation in Gordon did not specifically involve a racial minority, but rather because the legislation involved no identifiable group at all. Thus, as the Supreme Court of Colorado pointed out, if Hunter
were decided solely on the basis of the "suspect" nature of the class[] involved, there would have been no need for the Court to consistently express the paramount importance of political participation or to subject legislation which infringed on the right to participate equally in the political process to strict judicial scrutiny. To the contrary, were [Hunter] ... simply a "race case[]" the Supreme Court would have been required to do nothing more than to note that the legislation at issue drew a distinction that was inherently suspect (i.e., 