eek out opportunities to bring these large-scale suits in the expectation that they will receive large fees, whether or not the suit has underlying merit and whether or not the individuals on whose behalf the suit is brought benefit significantly from its resolution. The critics argue that such class actions impose unnecessary costs on manufacturers and service providers, which are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, and that such litigation deters innovation, impairs financial markets, and threatens U.S. economic competitiveness. They also argue that misuse of class actions has brought the legal system into disrepute." Deborah Hensler et al., RAND Institute for Civil Justice, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 4 (2000).
[8]  This rule establishes a list of factors for use in determining a reasonable attorneys' fee that closely resembles the percentage of fund fee factors discussed above: "(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (6) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent." West Virginia State Bar, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(a).



23 S.W.3d 604 (2000)
In the Interest of K.C., Jr., and J.M.C.
No. 09-99-461CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.
Submitted June 26, 2000.
Decided August 17, 2000.
*605 Bruce W. Cobb, Marva J. Provo, Beaumont, for appellants.
Tom Maness, Crim. Dist. Atty., Wayln G. Thompson, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, for appell