on of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment itself. (46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 73 (1969).) In construing a judgment, it may be presumed that the court intended a valid, not a void, judgment; hence, where it is reasonably possible, such construction should be adopted as will give force and effect to the judgment. (46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 74 (1969).) A judgment which may be ambiguous may be read in conjunction with the entire record (46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 76 (1969)), and it will be construed in accordance with that record. (See Listeman, Bandy & Hamilton Association v. Wilson (1983), 94 Ill.2d 60, 64-65, 445 N.E.2d 323.) We conclude that the intent of the April 27, 1984, judgment was to make the judgment nonretroactive, notwithstanding the one reference to the contrary in the judgment, and to adjudicate the child custody and property issues between the parties. Accordingly, the court properly exercised its jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to section 304.
It is well established that a judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular judgment involved, is void and may be attacked at any time. (R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp. (1986), 111 Ill.2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d 1360.) However, as there was no issue raised as to personal jurisdiction over respondent in the proceeding to declare the marriage invalid and, as we have concluded that the court intended to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under section 304 to adjudicate the child custody and property rights of the parties, the subsequent action by respondent to vacate the April 27, 1984, judgment must necessarily fail on any other possible basis as it was brought more than two years after entry of the original judgment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1401(c); People v. Bushnell (1984), 101 Ill.2d 261, 264, 461 N.E.2d 980.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is reversed.