o meet
the situation in the good governmental way, we were sure they would do.

This explanation is given to set right the general impression that the
"Comal" was a Red Cross ship. There was no connection whatever between
the "Comal" and ourselves, excepting through good will and good
fellowship; and again the impression that we were mistreated by the
Spanish government at Havana, subjected to discourtesy or requested to
leave is a mistaken one. The facts are quite the contrary. We entered
under the supposition that Havana was open, as Santiago was open; but it
was not an open port. We were in Spanish waters, subject to Spanish laws
and customs, and so regarded them, as we should have expected to do in
any country, remembering experimentally that our own country is not too
much inclined to easily remit its custom duties.

Dividing the time of our Cuban campaign into sections, the incoming days
fall exclusively to Santiago. Days of an army in one sense inactive, in
another rushed and crowded beyond its powers to meet or control. Days
when everything is needed and nothing can be gotten at. No one knows
where anything is--must have a formal order to obtain it when it is
found, and cannot get the order. Officers clamor for their needy men,
the sick list increases, complaints are rife, patience gives place to
desperation, and a time of general confusion follows.

Again I would say that to those taking the first lessons in army life,
all these things seem incomprehensible, to say the least, and "Who's to
blame?" seems to be floating in the very atmosphere about them.

Deplore such a state of things as we will, it is still a part of army
life. It belongs to war, and the grey-haired military chief, whom all
would recognize were I to name him, was correct when he once said to me:
"Strange as it may seem, the days of 'rest' at an active field are its
hardest days."

The ofttimes perplexed officers at Santiago will neither exclaim nor
disclaim against this little statement, if it should ever meet their
eyes. They will reali