 points raised on appeal, none of which we find to have merit:


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1. The district court's denial of Donald's motion, under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 853(n)(6), to amend its order forfeiting the pick-up truck, was not clearly erroneous.  A forfeiture order will be amended under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 853(n)(6) (part of the CCE statute forfeiture provisions) only if the petitioner shows by a preponderance that his or her right to the property was "vested" or "superior to" the right of the criminal defendant at the time of the acts giving rise to forfeiture.  A right which is known to the third party to be a sham or fraudulent is not a vested right for purposes of defeating forfeiture under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) forfeiture provisions, S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392 n. 47.  Because Congress intended for the courts to rely on RICO forfeiture provisions when interpreting the identical language of CCE forfeiture provisions, see S.Rep. No. 225 at 211-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3394-95 (in discussion of CCE criminal forfeiture statutory provisions, referring reader to discussions of RICO statutory provisions where the CCE and RICO provisions are identical), the same rule applies to criminal forfeiture under the CCE statute forfeiture provisions.


14
In forfeiture proceedings, findings of fact by a district court are reviewed only for clear error.  See United States v. $10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233, 235 (4th Cir.1987) (applying clear error standard).  In the instant case, the district court found as a matter of fact that Donald's title to the truck was a sham, and that Michael was the de facto owner of the truck because Michael paid for the truck and controlled it.  This finding was not clearly erroneous in light of evidence that although Donald held title to the truck, Michael kept the truck at his home, was the sole operator of the truck, and customized the truck himself.  Because Donald's right was a sham, Donald's int