Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 610-611 (1914) (discussed supra, at 803); Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376 (1913) (word used in passing).
[5]  See, e. g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters, 274 U. S. 37, 47, 49 (1927) (refusal to work on stone received from nonunion quarries); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 462-463 (1921) (boycott of target's product until it agreed to union's employment demands); Gompers  v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911) (boycott of company's products because of allegedly unfair labor practices); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908) (boycott of fur hats made by a company that would not allow its workers to be unionized). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,  310 U. S. 469, 503-505 (1940) (distinguishing between ordinary strikes and boycotts).
[6]  Once it is determined that the actions of the reinsurers did not constitute a "boycott," but rather a concerted agreement to terms, it follows that their actions do not constitute "coercion" or "intimidation" within the meaning of the statute. That is because, as previously mentioned, such concerted agreements do "not coerc[e] anyone, at least in the usual sense of that word," L. Sullivan, Law of Antitrust 257 (1977), and because they are precisely what is protected by McCarran-Ferguson immunity.
[7]  We agree with Justice Souter's conclusion, ante, at 790-791, n. 18, that the Seventh Claim for Relief in the California Complaint and the Sixth Claim for Relief in the Connecticut Complaint fail to allege any ง 3(b) boycotts.
[8]  The counts at issue in this litigation are the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Claims for Relief in the California Complaint. See App. 43-46 (ถถ 131โ 140), id., at 47-49 (ถถ 146-150).
[9]  Some antitrust courts, including the Court of Appeals in the present cases, have mistaken the comity at issue for the "comity of courts," which has led them to characterize the question presented as one of "abstention," that is, whether they should "exe