ne thinks that e.g., gourmet cooking is good for oneself, the fact that one gets remunerated little for it is not likely to change that assessment. Again, this is because one's judgment that an activity is good for oneself is founded upon features of oneself, not upon factors such as prestige or compensation. One might, of course, choose to make a contribution that involves activities for which one is not well suited because one prefers wealth and prestige. But this phenomenon is compatible with the idea that one's judgment about what is good for oneself is generally unaffected by how well remunerated one is for one's activities. Having considerably less wealth than others, then, is not likely to diminish one's self-respect if self-respect is understood as a belief that one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation is valuable for oneself. It follows that Rawls's discussion of envy does not support the good-for-oneself interpretation of self-respect. The priority of liberty The doctrine of the priority of liberty is justified by Rawls largely in terms of its support for citizens' self-respect. This doctrine states that, when a society has reached a level of wealth that allows all citizens a decent standard of living, constraints on liberty that would increase citizens' wealth should not be permitted. The merits of Rawls's argument for the priority of liberty have been much discussed (Doppelt 1981; Shue 1974/75; Hart 1979; Neilson 1979; Taylor 2003). I do not hope here to add anything to that discussion; I confine myself to showing that Rawls's argument for the doctrine supports the idea of self-respect as a conviction that one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation matters. There are two types of restrictions on liberty, according to Rawls, that might be imposed for the sake of increasing wealth (1971: 244). First, liberty might be less extensive but still distributed equally. Second, liberty might be distributed unequally-it might be limited for only some citizens. The first type of restriction 