mes, rigoureuses, définitives. Les données de l'expérience scientifique ne sont qu'approchées; le perfectionnement continuel des instruments les retouche et les modifie sans cesse, tandis que le hasard heureux des découvertes, chaque jour, de quelque fait nouveau en vient grossir le trésor." (Duhem 1915, 106) 34 As Buchwald and Hong (2003, 181) elucidate, this implicit knowledge can become explicit at a given moment: "Specifically, by 'unarticulated knowledge' we intend knowledge that is generally unexpressed but that guides research. This not at all the same thing as unexpressible knowledge, such as the kind of skill that is needed to form a beautiful piano leg on a lathe. Not at all – it is knowledge that is unexpressed, that exists below the surface of explicit discourse. Such knowledge is accordingly tacit, in the sense of unspoken, but it can be – and often eventually is – heard, particularly when a science settles into a reasonably stable form." Víctor Manuel Hernández Márquez – Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de Finesse? 105 Closing Remarks If what I have argued thus far seems plausible, then we can ask whether Duhem's use of the distinction between the two mentalities has the significance scholars like Martin, Stoffel, and Cortese ascribe to it; or whether, on the other hand, Duhem resorts to the dichotomy because of its popularity among the French audiences at the turn of the century without much of a concern for a consistent and systematic treatment. The latter may be due to the fact that Duhem's oeuvre addressed three different audiences: those who, following Holton, I have called New Apollonians and Dionysians, and, of course, their theoretical and experimental counterparts. Additionally, in some cases, a number of these writings were revised and published – in part or in whole – for a different type of audience, as is the case, for example, with La théorie physique, but also with Le mixte et la combinaison chimique (1902), which takes up previously published essays with a philosophic