f set; many of the benefits of Jerzak's graded-belief semantics can be enjoyed by an all-out-belief semantics. Jerzak also notes that with certain uses of 'want'-what he calls the advisory 'want'-it is not the agent's beliefs, but rather those in the context of evaluation or utterance that should figure in the semantics. We set such uses of 'want' to the side. 4Decision-theoretic approaches to want ascriptions (see e.g. Levinson 2003; Lassiter 2011; Phillips-Brown fc) face more or less this same problem. Wrenn (2010) proposes a solution that bears a certain resemblance to our own, although he confines his view to cases of all-things-considered desire (as opposed to 'some-things-considered' desire, in the sense of Phillips-Brown ms). Our approach, by contrast, is designed to be compatible with some-thingsconsidered desire, either by bringing in multiple preference rankings (à la Levinson 2003; Crnič 2011), or by replacing possible worlds with something coarser (see section 7). 5See also Iatridou (2000:243) for several other examples of FWAs. 2 where he is promoted to...We needn't continue any further with the belief-setbased account, since it's broken down already: there are no worlds in Wu's belief set where he's promoted. He believes that he won't be promoted! Theorists have noticed this problem before. Indeed, Heim herself saw it- and gave us the following, memorable CFWA, (3), below-when she brought the belief-set-based approach onto the scene. (3) I want this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will be over in a few hours). (Heim 1992, p. 199) Yet Heim did not venture a solution.6 To our knowledge, only one theorist has: Rubinstein (2017). But her solution is not satisfactory, as we argue in section 3. In sections 4–5, we develop a solution of our own-one in which conditional belief is integral to the semantics of 'want'. Our account is inspired by a striking parallel between indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals on the one hand and non-(C)FWAs vs. (C)FWAs on the other. By way of preview