 search (the measures adopted and the objectives of
the search").
than       the   insight    that   the   Fourth   Amendment    itself   provides.5

Apparently, the Jenkins majority would hold that public officials

must determine whether a controlling appellate court will determine

that certain conduct is egregious enough to qualify as being

unreasonable even though none has specifically so held.

       Perhaps no case provides a better example of the requirement

of prior concrete law in Fourth Amendment cases that does Wright v.

Whiddon, 951 F.2d 297 (11th Cir.1992).               Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) clearly established

that the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing, non-dangerous

felony suspect is a constitutionally unreasonable seizure under the

Fourth Amendment.6            Garner was decided six months before the

incident in Wright.           In Wright, a person who had been arrested on

a charge of armed robbery and had confessed to the crime ran from

a courthouse while awaiting a probation revocation hearing.                   The

escapee was admittedly unarmed, but was fatally wounded as he ran

down an alley.           The court held that          Garner did not clearly

establish that deadly force cannot be used against a fleeing,

previously arrested, non-dangerous felon. Thus, the police officer

who shot the fleeing felon was entitled to qualified immunity.7
       Since      this     case,   unlike   Jenkins and       Wright,   implicates

       5
      "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable search and seizures...."
       6
        See also Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1985).
       7
      Of interest as it relates to the facts of this case is the
following dictum in Wright: "At a minimum, "[i]t is clear ...
that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the
use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.' Graham, 109
S.Ct. at 1871 n. 10." This dictum clearly