   STANDARD OF REVIEW

  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary

judgment should be granted only if the moving party has shown

that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material

fact is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the

litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A genuine issue exists where the “evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id. A court considering a motion for summary judgment

must draw all “justifiable inferences” from the evidence in

favor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255. To survive a motion for


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summary judgment, however, the requester “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts”; instead, the nonmoving party must come forward

with “‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

III. CHOICE OF LAW

  Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-

law rules of the state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor

Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). Therefore, the

District of Columbia’s choice-of-law analysis applies. In

insurance cases, where the insured is a D.C. resident and the

insured risk is located in D.C., courts have held that D.C. law

applies. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Cal. Union Ins.

Co., 777 F. Supp. 968, 973 (D.D.C. 1991). Defendant argues that

D.C. law applies to this case because Dr. Hunter was a D.C.

resident when the Policy was issued and at the time he submitted

his claim for benefits. See Mem. at 4 n.1. Dr. Hunter does not

dispute this. Accordingly, the Court will apply D.C. law.

IV.   ANALYSIS

  MassMutual claims that Dr. Hunter is not