n this tractor, didn't you obtain possession of that on or about the same time, around the 15th of February, 1951? A. Yes, he [Mr. Muyres] just told me to take it back and try to sell it for him and get what I could get for it. Both of them did.
"Q. Who's he? A.W.F. Muyres and LeNore [defendant] both told me."
On August 27, 1951 plaintiff sold the pickup truck for $775.00. Later, plaintiff realized the sum of $650.00 from his disposition of the tractor. Plaintiff extended the credit on the note as of August 27, 1951, the date he sold the pickup. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff had a conversation with defendant wherein she said:
"... as soon as she got the money she would finish paying off the note, the difference."
In view of this and other facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record, we are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to show defendant's authorization to plaintiff to get the personal property, sell it and apply the proceeds of the sale as a payment on the note, and that as soon as she had the money she would finish paying on the balance. Inherent in the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was the finding that defendant authorized plaintiff to make the credit on the note. On appeal, findings of fact made by the trial court will not be disturbed if supported by substantial, competent evidence, and in the determination of that question the appellate court does not weigh evidence but is concerned only with whether it supports or tends to support the judgment of the trial court. (In re Estate of Osborn, 179 Kan. 365, 295 P.2d 615, and cases therein cited.) Subsequent to plaintiff endorsing the credit on the note, defendant ratified the payment by stating that as soon as she got the money she would finish paying the difference, and she is now estopped from asserting that she did not authorize plaintiff to credit the note.
In Gorrill v. Goff, 148 Kan. 765, 84 P.2d 953, we stated that a *993 payment, like any other act, may be ratified and may be approved by express oral ratification; when,