ls nothing about epistemic justification or any other kind of epistemic status. It is compatible with an evidentialist view, according to which positive epistemic status requires respecting your evidence, or a fideist view, on which positive status can tolerate a measure of belief 'beyond' your evidence (James, 1921; Bishop, 2007, 107-112). More than this, even evidentialism need not threaten the epistemic status of religious beliefs in light of disagreement. For evidentialism is a general claim, and there are many ways in which it can be spelled out (Dougherty, 2014, 101). For example, the evidentialist epistemologies of Plantinga (2000a) and Dougherty (2014) assign a large role to the evidence of one's own experiences (including religious ones) and to the beliefs of one's religious tradition, over and above the evidence of intersubjective arguments; this will tend to allow religious beliefs to remain justified even given the counterevidence supplied by disagreeing interlocutors. On the other hand, the evidentialisms of Schellenberg (2007, 190), McKim (2001, chapter 10), and Philipse (2014, part I) assign greater weight to intersubjective evidence (including the opposing viewpoints of disagreeing interlocutors), which may make positive epistemic status for religious beliefs more elusive. So it is not McKim's endorsement of the epistemic-potential claim that yields his pessimism about the epistemic justification of religious beliefs; it is the strict form of evidentialism that he endorses alongside it. The epistemic-potential claim by itself entails no position on epistemic justification or status more broadly. It does not matter for my purposes which epistemic norms committed believers abide by, as long as those norms acknowledge the epistemic goods outlined above. The second worry is that engaging in disagreement may psychologically undermine the believer's commitment to her belief system, by shaking her confidence (Plantinga, 2000b, 189). In response, we must acknowledge that disagreement can pose psychologica