gining that utopia, I learnt only that it is possible. Four clarifications. Firstly, the argument's premises and conclusion are strictly speaking true even if there is no knowledge from fiction or imagination. But I will argue that the premises and conclusion are non-vacuously true: some knowledge from fiction is from imagination, some knowledge from imagination is modal knowledge, and some knowledge from fiction is modal knowledge (Stokes 2007 also argues for these theses). I learnt from The Dispossessed, for example, by imagining an anarchist utopia, that an anarchist utopia is possible. Second, from modal knowledge, in combination with knowledge of actuality, one can derive further knowledge of actuality. From Animal Farm, for example, I learnt that necessarily, all revolutions of a certain type end in dictatorship. But I already new that the Russian Revolution was a revolution of that type, and so I was able to infer that the Russian Revolution had in fact ended in dictatorship. So when I say that all knowledge from fiction is modal knowledge, I mean that all knowledge from fiction alone is modal knowledge. Third, there is a trivial sense in which one can learn about actuality from fiction, since fiction is a part of actuality. From reading Animal Farm, for example, I learnt to speed read, and that despite its efficiency, spend reading is less enjoyable 2 than ordinary reading. Likewise, there is a trivial sense in which one can learn about actuality from imagination, since imaginings are a part of actuality too. Because I'm imagining dinner, for example, I know that I am hungry. It's difficult to make this distinction precise, but these examples are not knowledge from fiction or imagination in the relevant sense. Fourth, I need poetic license to use simple and familiar examples. It is almost twenty years since I read The Dispossessed, Flatland and Animal Farm, and even if I accurately remember what I learnt from them, their lessons cannot be summarized as easily as I am making out. And I knew of the possibil