on between self and other. My account also suggests that we have multiple ways of understanding and engaging with others, which might require multiple explanatory strategies. Some of these are likely to Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (2012), p. 75-101 20 involve simulation processes and rely on bodily and implicit self-other matching, others require explicit mentalizing and linguistic abilities. Once the level of conceptual and linguistic self-other representation is reached, communicative actions, including personal and cultural narratives can begin to shape an individual's self-notion and influence its self-reflection and subsequently self-conceptualization as belonging to particular groups or cultures. It is not the place to argue for this claim here, but note that the account I have proposed suggests that it might be possible to conceptualize the different theories of mind which are currently debated, namely the theory-theory, the simulation theory, the interaction theory and the narrative practice hypothesis as complementary rather than as competing theories.29 Level Age Social cognitive abilities Representational format 1 Birth onwards Detection of multi-modal contingencies, neonatal imitation Automatic cross-modal matching, no self-other differentiation 2 9 months onwards Shared attention, selective imitation, social referencing, protoimperatives and proto-declaratives Implicit representation of self-other and of intentional relations, domain specific 3 18 months onwards Mirror-self-recognition, selfconscious emotions, empathy, level-1 perspective taking Explicit self-other differentiation and representation of intentional relations (E1) 4 4 years onwards Mastery of false-belief and unexpected content tasks, level-2 perspective taking, appearancereality distinction, intentional deception Explicit representations of mental states, distinction between propositional attitudes and propositional contents, E2/3 representations, conceptual & linguistic Table 1: Levels of self-and other-representa