 primary reasons for Sec. 1983 actions and punitive damages is to deter future egregious conduct.  Id. at 49, 103 S.Ct. at 1636.   A jury may assess punitive damages in an action under Sec. 1983 if the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or involved reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.  Id. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 1640.   The question is whether the acts of Burns, which caused the deprivation of Mrs. Brown's constitutional rights, rose to a level warranting the imposition of punitive damages.  In light of the evidence before it, we believe that the jury could properly infer that Burns' acts were unjustified and that he acted with callous or reckless indifference to Mrs. Brown's constitutional rights.  Therefore, punitive damages were justified.

V.

20
On cross-appeal, Mrs. Brown argues that it was error for the district court to grant Appellants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict (JNOV) as it relates to her claims for loss of past income and future earning capacity.16  Mrs. Brown asserts that neither Bryan County nor Burns specifically raised an issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that portion of the judgment, thus the district court's action was unjustified and the award must be reinstated.  She insists that there is absolutely no legal predicate on which the district court could base its actions.  Therefore, as evidence was offered to support this award, Mrs. Brown argues that the original jury award should be reinstated.


21
This Court has determined that it "would be a constitutionally impermissible re-examination of the jury's verdict for the district court [or this Court] to enter judgment n.o.v. on a ground not raised in the motion for directed verdict."  McCann v. Texas City Refining, Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 672 (5th Cir.1993).  It is undisputed that the Appellants did not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's award for loss of past income and future earning capacity in 