eak of genuine (if rudimentary) forms of self-awareness and intersubjectivity. Signs for a clear understanding of the emotional intentional relations of others as being different from one's own also begin to emerge during the second half of the second year. One example is the development of empathy (Hobson 2002). Younger children will typically get distressed themselves and seek comfort when they perceive expressions of distress by others, thus exhibiting signs of emotional contagion. In contrast, children during the second half of the second year – while still showing some signs of distress themselves, indicating that there is some first personal experience of the relevant emotional state -will try to do something to console the other, thus demonstrating an understanding that the emotion belongs to the other (Barresi and Moore, 1996). Much later, once children develop an explicit theory of mind, they will even be able to show sympathy, which is the ability to understand and be sensitive towards the mental states of others without experiencing them from the first person perspective. Moreover, at around this age, children begin to display a general understanding of the fact that someone else's perspective towards an object can differ from their own. For instance, 24months olds are capable of level 1 perspective taking, which is to say that they can understand that what another person sees is different from what they see (for instance that they can see an object that another person cannot see)26, and vice versa (Moll & Tomasello 2006). Thus, it is at this level that the child begins to explicitly differentiate between self and other and to attribute intentional relations differentially to self and other. Prior to this level, the child has de facto access to the mental states of others, but she need not explicitly represent these states as belonging to the other, for she is always engaged in an episode of shared intentionality during which she herself also experiences the intentional relations that she shares with