e Court in Rutledge went on to state:


8
Garrett v. United States is not to the contrary.  There we affirmed the defendant's prosecution for a CCE violation even though he had previously pleaded guilty to a predicate crime of importing marijuana.  That holding, however, merely adhered to our understanding that legislatures have traditionally perceived a qualitative difference between conspiracy-like crimes and the substantive offenses upon which they are predicated.  No such difference is present here.  In contrast to the crimes involved in Garrett, this case involves two conspiracy-like offenses directed at largely identical conduct.


9
Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 300 n. 12, 116 S.Ct. at 1247 n. 12 (citations omitted).  Since Rutledge makes it clear that Garrett and its progeny remain in effect, we reject Story's argument that his conviction for CCE and the predicate offense of distribution of cocaine base violates the double jeopardy clause.

Proof of Crack Cocaine

10
Story's second argument relates to his sentencing under USSG § 2D1.1 for distribution of 1.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base.  As we have recently explained, the term "cocaine base" in this guideline refers only to crack cocaine;  more lenient sentencing provisions apply when other forms of cocaine base are involved.  See United States v. Earnest, 129 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir.1997);  United States v. Adams, 125 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.1997).  Story argues that the Government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the controlled substance underlying his distribution and CCE convictions was crack and not another form of cocaine base.


11
The district court rejected this argument in Story's resentencing hearing, stating that based upon "the evidence from the testimony of the experts, as well as taking into consideration the testimony of the other witnesses, the Court is convinced beyond any doubt whatsoever that the drugs involved in this case was crack cocaine".  In reviewing the district court's resolution of this issue, "[o]ur task 