ard, Renewing the Christian Mind: Essays, Interviews, and Talks, edited by Gary Black Jr. (New York, NY: HarperOne, 2016), 301-319. 4 See for example, Dallas Willard, Knowing Christ Today: Why We Can Trust Spiritual Knowledge (New York, NY: HarperOne, 2009); and Dallas Willard, The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge (Forthcoming). 5 C. Stephen Evans, "Separable Souls: A Defense of 'Minimal Dualism'," Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3) (1981): 313-332. 6 C. Stephen Evans, "Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life after Death," Christian Scholar's Review 34 (3) (2005): 327-340. Christian dualists are at least committed to Significant Minimal Dualism. According to the alternative view, Christian physicalism, we are physical bodies or at least parts of physical bodies, like the brain and central nervous system.7 Some Christian physicalists hold that these physical bodies have non-physical emergent properties. Some Christian physicalists argue that dualism is incompatible with central elements of spiritual formation. Neuroscientist Warren Brown and psychologist Brad Strawn offer the only substantive account of spiritual formation from the view of Christian physicalism and its accompanying objections to dualism.8 Hence, it is on their arguments that this chapter focuses. Although some argue that dualism is the biblical backdrop which informs and makes intelligible Christian spiritual formation,9 Brown and Strawn argue that contemporary neuroscience proves this false while supporting Christian physicalism. On their view, spiritual formation is illuminated by a set of neuroscientific data. This data, they claim, supports a view of spiritual formation that requires special attention to the physical nature of our spiritual life. As such, it emphasizes our embodiment and neurological and social development, which they claim is incompatible with dualism.10 Call this the incompatibility thesis. We argue that Brown and Strawn fail to support their incompatibility thesis. Additionally, we argue that Chri