other is that you will not need them if your belief system is brought about with divine help (say, with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis; Plantinga, 2000, 171). Third, even if you might benefit from religious disagreement, discouraging it is still safer, because it can undermine your epistemic commitment to the truths you do possess. Making my case to this audience requires expanding the discussion in several ways. First, the literature tends to focus narrowly on religious beliefs, but this obscures the various and subtler epistemic benefits that disagreement can yield for belief systems. Nor will my discussion be limited to disagreement between epistemic peers.ii I will not attempt to define the notoriously slippery notion of 'religious'; for present purposes our intuitive ability to recognize particular topics as religious will suffice. My discussion aims to 2 apply to any religious belief system that contains truth claims, as opposed to construing its beliefs non-cognitively. It also aims to apply to a variety of world religions, but given the breadth of religious diversity and the fact that my interlocutors themselves are working within a JudeoChristian context, this aim may not be fully achievable. Finally, I am not assuming the truth or the falsehood, or the rationality or irrationality, of any religious (or secular) belief system. I'll start with a word about my intended audience. I'll then present my account of disagreement about religious belief systems and defend the epistemic-potential claim. I'll finish by responding to objections. Religious disagreement and epistemic commitment The interlocutors I have in mind are committed religious believers who deny the epistemic-potential claim. Some might deny that religious disagreement has any positive epistemic value. Others might agree that it may have some, but think nonetheless that suppressing it is epistemically safer. Like Plantinga, they might reason that, although a 'heightened awareness of the facts of religious pluralism could bring about a