hat
any error was harmless.33 Id.

   Similarly, the district court found that the jury was
instructed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in
its deliberations, but not to count and compare aggravating
  32
      In its plurality opinion in Harris, the California Supreme Court stated
that “[b]ecause the jury is directed to take into account the existence of
any special circumstances found to be true, the constitutionally mandated
objective of focusing on the particularized circumstances of the crime and
the defendant is undercut when the defendant’s conduct is artificially
inflated by the multiple charging of overlapping special circumstances or
multiple special circumstances based on an indivisible course of conduct
having one principal criminal purpose.” Harris, 679 P.2d at 449. Thus, in
“those cases involving a single act or an indivisible course of conduct with
one principal criminal objective, the jury should be instructed that
although it found several special circumstances to be true, for purposes of
determining the penalty to be imposed, the multiple special circumstances
should be considered as one.” Id. at 452.B
   33
      A state court’s conclusion that a constitutional error was harmless is
reviewed de novo. Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1126.
14998                    DANIELS v. WOODFORD
and mitigating factors. Despite this, the district court con-
cluded that this erroneous “double counting” did not result in
prejudice warranting reversal. In rejecting Daniels’s argu-
ment, the court relied on Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465
(9th Cir. 1995). In Williams, the petitioner was convicted
under the 1977 death penalty statute, and we conducted a
harmless-error analysis based on the structure of that statute,
which we concluded was a “nonweighing” statute. See id. at
1475-80. By contrast, Daniels was prosecuted under the 1978
version of the California death penalty statute,34 which the
Williams court found to be, “undoubtedly,” a weighing
regime. Id. at 1477.35

   Although th