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ACCEPTING MORAL LUCK1 by Robert J. Hartman Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman Abstract: I argue for the view that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and constitutive properties can partially determine an agent's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two agents drive recklessly, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. But only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that view, and, in doing so, I exemplify a general way to advance the debate. First, I argue against an account of moral responsibility that implies that the judges are equally blameworthy. Second, I argue that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver. Third, I present an alternative sense in which the agents in each case pair are morally on par. Introduction One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a skeptical argument that rules out our being morally responsible agents. That is, no one is morally responsible for anything, because luck affects us in ways that uni