ast offensive
effort on both sides of the canal, bringing on the second battle of
Kassassin; and on this occasion the troops he brought from Tel el
Kebir were reinforced by a force of five battalions from Salahieh to
the north; but the fighting was not severe and the loss on both sides
insignificant, while in retiring, the Egyptians abandoned three guns,
two of which were taken by the Royal Marine Light Infantry.

The army was now concentrated within striking distance of the first
objective, the defeat of the Egyptian army under Arabi. Repeated
reconnaissances had shown that in front of the village of Tel el
Kebir was a long line of entrenchments, the right resting on the
canal, the left, some four miles out _en l’air_ in the desert.
The desert, absolutely treeless, and without marked undulations,
afforded absolutely no cover, and to cross the fire-swept approach
against entrenched troops would have caused serious loss. Sir Garnet,
therefore, decided on making a night march to get within charging
distance, and thus inaugurated on a large scale the system of night
attacks, which, as a distinguished soldier long since remarked, will,
if properly prepared for and organised by a nation, cause it to win the
next great war.

The ground favoured the operation, but the distance was not
inconsiderable, and the danger of that unreasoning panic which
sometimes seizes the best troops was always present. At anyrate, any
manœuvring in the dark or the early dawn was out of the question. The
army must march in the order in which it was going to fight, and
therefore each battalion had one half in first and the other half in
second line, either marching in line formation or in line of companies
in column of fours at deploying interval, from which lines could
speedily and readily be formed. Extended order was not required for the
rush into the entrenchments which the general planned. It was not to be
a fire-action, but a shock-battle such as the Peninsula saw.

[Illustration: _Formation of the Line of Battle at Tel-el-Kebir,
13^