corridors of power is lost if counsel cannot deliver any response on the issues that affect this identifiable group. Thus, attempting to work with the City Council or administration would be rendered meaningless.
We find that by its own terms, Issue 3 singles out persons with "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation." Furthermore, it does not target specific types of problems that affect all citizens for its restrictions, but rather it targets specific citizens based upon their sexual orientation. Mr. Guckenberger could recall no other time in the history of the City of Cincinnati when such a charter provision was enacted.
Finally, Cincinnati City ordinance No. 490-1992 (Human Rights Ordinance) prohibits discrimination based on many factors, including sexual orientation, in the areas of private employment, public accommodations and housing. Discrimination based upon sexual orientation, whether it be heterosexual, lesbian, gay or bisexual, is prohibited by this ordinance.
No evidence was offered by the Defendant City of Cincinnati or the intervenor to demonstrate that it is not substantially likely that the charter amendment will prohibit enforcement of the Human Rights Ordinance or EEO Ordinance insofar as they prohibit discrimination against gay men, lesbians and bisexuals. The charter amendment will not disturb enforcement of the provisions which prohibit discrimination against heterosexual people.

STANDARD
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the district court must balance four interrelated criteria:
1) Whether the Plaintiffs have shown a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits;
2) Whether the Plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury;
3) Whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; [and]
4) Whether the public interest would be served by issuing a preliminary injunction.
N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Mansfield, Ohio, 866 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir.1989); Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 942 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir.199