tial inclination to endorse (8). Views that deploy the ideology of "relative truth" in this way have recently been quite popular in many domains: defenders include MacFarlane (2005, 2007), Lasersohn (2005), Richard (2008), Kölbel (2002), and many others. Another example should convey the general pattern. A Relativist about 'tasty' who, unlike me, dislikes Marmite will think (i) that Marmite is tasty for me and not tasty for him; (ii) that the proposition that Marmite is tasty is true for me and false for him; (iii) that Marmite is not tasty, and the proposition that Marmite is tasty is false; (iv) that I believe the false proposition that Marmite is tasty, and assert it when I say 'Marmite is tasty'; but (v) my believing and asserting this false proposition involves "no fault", in some strong sense that goes beyond the idea that I am fully justified in my belief.19 The view about contingency-inducing quantification that we are considering works in a similar way. People in other Lewis-worlds who are looking at blue swans will frequently come to believe and assert the false proposition that somer swans are blue. However, since this proposition is true for them, in believing and asserting it they are conducting themselves "correctly"; their having these false 19See Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, chapter 1. beliefs involves "no fault"; they are achieving the "goals" of belief and assertion; etc. Even for words like 'tasty', the Relativist programme strikes me as extremely problematic. According to the Relativist, I ought to think that the things that are tasty for me are tasty, and the propositions that are true for me are true, whereas the propositions that are true for other people are often false; if they believe these propositions, as they ought, they will getting things wrong. This seems to describe a state of extraordinary intellectual hubris: why should I be so confident that I am the special person truth for whom coincides with truth? The further claim that everyone else ought to regard themselves as special i