h Palma had an opportunity to participate or contest the allegations. The
State made no attempt to prove a probation violation, preferring instead to avoid the cost of
formal probation violation proceedings, so there was no actual evidence presented upon which a
finding could have been based. Because there was no formal determination of a probation




                                                3
violation, the unappealed order does not preclude relief under Idaho Code Section 19-2604 for
Palma. 3
       The discharge order also did not constitute a prior utilization of Idaho Code Section 19-
2604(1) in this case, for it did not address the type of relief contemplated by that statute.
Section 19-2604(1) provides an avenue for relief if “sentence has been imposed but suspended,
or if sentence has been withheld, upon application of the defendant.”           I.C. § 19-2604(1)
(emphasis added). The 1999 order of discharge was not entered “upon application of the
defendant,” and was not based upon invocation of Section 19-2604(1).
       Our opinion that Palma did not waive the right to seek relief does not intimate any view
as to whether she should be granted the requested relief. In making that determination, the
district court must consider the factors set forth in the applicable statute, including whether an
amended judgment would be compatible with the public interest. Palma will bear the burden to
show that relief should be granted. 4 Hanes, 137 Idaho at 42, 44 P.3d at 297.
       For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.
       Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.




3
        Because we conclude that failure to appeal from the discharge order did not waive
Palma’s right to request relief, we do not address her assertion that she was unable to appeal the
order as a result of lack of notice.
4
        The State suggests that the current version of Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1) does not
apply to Palma’s motion. That is an issue to be