r, to
extend it to twenty-one years for pension, did not provide sufficient
recruits for a meagre army, and, as the Crimea proved, gave not only
an insufficient number of men, but no reserves at all. When peace was
signed, we had boy soldiers in the ranks much as we have now, many of
the older men having perished; yet they fought well, as they always
have done. Outside the first line there were foreign legions and
militia, and that was all. The times even then were past since an
army of 25,000 men was considered a respectable command for a serious
European war; and the change in the conditions is even greater now,
with all Europe an armed camp, and the armies themselves counting as
many thousands as they did hundreds “when George the Third was king.”
Nor was the longer service Act of 1867 any better. It gave twelve years
with the colours and nine of re-engaged time to obtain pension. But the
army then was more under its proper strength annually than before.

The plain fact is, that an army of even the dimensions of our own
cannot attract a sufficient number of recruits for so long a period
as ten or twelve years. You can get enough men to do so for a force a
few thousands strong, like the Royal Marine Corps, but not for an army
which has to put in fifteen or sixteen years in such climates as some
parts of India or Burmah.

Short service was inevitable, and since its introduction the army
has rarely, I believe never, been below its numerical strength.
The question of reserves, important as that is, and of good
non-commissioned officers is quite beside the question. Neither would
be worth a row of pins without a sufficient number of men, however
young, in the ranks. Besides, if serious war comes, the same method
will be adopted that was in vogue in the much-belauded long service
days. Battalions were weeded then as they are now, and though they had
permanently a larger proportion of older men in the ranks to stiffen
the regiments, the same stiffening can always be got from the reserves
whenever it is wanted. Ou