empirically determine with any accuracy the properties of atoms and molecules (like their absolute sizes, gram-molecular weight, and number per mole) played an important role in supporting the skepticism/agnosticism of the anti-atomists. But they greatly underestimated the ingenuity of theorists and experimenters and their ability to devise hypotheses that would tie empirically measurable parameters to parameters of elementary bodies sufficiently tightly to determine the latter. The story of how this work led to Perrin's multiple determinations of the values of various parameters including Avogadro's number and their interlocking, mutually supporting consilience is told in various places, e.g., (van Fraassen 2009). But fast-forwarding another twenty-five years or so, quantum mechanics had become generally accepted as the most empirically adequate account of atomic behavior, and though everyone believed in atoms, hardly anyone believed their behavior could be modeled in terms of physically familiar parameters and operations, and the abstract conception had returned in full force. Scientific progress was made, but it appears to have assimilated strands from both the synthetic and analytic traditions. Some Philosophical and Historiographical Lessons I conclude by drawing some lessons, largely negative, about the current practice of appealing to the history of science to draw philosophical conclusions about science. Michael Liston – Duhem: Images of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics 82 First, we should be wary of using history to set limiting scientific images like R, AR, and NC, characterized in terms of aims and goals. Such restrictive images sound suspiciously a priori. In setting a causal explanatory agenda for science R presupposes that in principle everything is explainable bottom-up from the workings of fundamental entities or stuff. But, other than by an act of faith, we do not have good reasons to believe that. We do not have bottom-up explanations of entropy and many of the p