ct, in which he invokes the idea of the citizen as a "fully cooperating member of society," I propose that we see Rawlsian self-respect not as a valuing stance toward one's ends or conception of the good, but as a valuing stance toward the activities that make up one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation. There is no conceptual barrier to a person failing to value these activities-to one's failing to see these activities as worth pursuing. And one's failing to see these as worth pursuing would indeed be likely to hinder one's pursuit of one's ends. It follows that viewing as worth doing the activities that make up one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation fits Rawls's characterization of a primary social good-a good that is necessary for one to pursue one's ends, whatever they are. There are three cases where we can see how a failure to value the activities that make up one's contribution to a scheme of social OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/11/2012, SPi Rawlsian Self-Respect 241 cooperation would impede one's pursuit of one's ends. If I am right that it is a conceptual truth that persons value their ends, it follows that if a person fails to value her contribution to a scheme of social cooperation that contribution is not an end for her. If she has no other ends, then she is, at it were, "at loose ends" and is hindered in the pursuit of her ends simply by not having any. In the more likely case that she does have other ends-other activities that she values to which her contribution to a scheme of cooperation is a means-then not valuing her contribution will make it difficult for her to pursue her ends simply by making it difficult to undertake the activities she must in order to pursue her ends.6 Another way that not valuing one's contribution to a scheme of social cooperation can hinder one's pursuit of one's ends is that, in making one's (unvalued) contribution, one is not pursuing one's ends. One's ends and one's contribution pull apart and so one is deprived of the experience of fulfil