better terms of art (ibid., pp. 178–79). For Moore, a proposition is a complex, whose constituents are concepts. The proposition 'This rose is red' is a connection between concepts. Concepts are not mental-they are what they are independent of thought or thinkers. They are immutable and have no causal properties (ibid., p. 179). The difference between propositions and concepts, such thatton is proposing to 'bring a German to your lecture next Thursday', and tells him that most likely end of November 1898 (4 December 1898, fell on a Sunday). Moore gave a (1991). sing pp. 4–11 and Chapter II is missing pp. 3, 4, 5 and 7–22, all handwritten. There are, shed, NJ is eighteen printed pages. cussion on Kant's notion of the contrast between a priori and the empirical judgments, dissertations. I discuss this in another paper. temporary notion of propositional content: ..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. T 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 C. Preti / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx 5 SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Disk Used ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R R E C propositions can have truth conditions, cannot be a relation to a particular combination of 'existents'. What makes a proposition true is that there is a relation between its constituent concepts, and this relation can be 'immediately recognized', but cannot be further defined (ibid., p. 180). In Moore's view, the truth or falsity of any proposition depends on no other. Further, the necessity that we attribute to judgments-even judgments about experience-is not derivable from any act of mind or mental entity (like Kant