will be good. Once more, inaccuracies in one's belief system are a live possibility. 10 In summary, epistemically malign influences can affect even a belief system that is underwritten by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis, by the influence of mundane experiences and indirect psychological and social workings on them, and the influence of direct psychological and social factors. Since belief systems are interlocking networks, any inaccuracies will likely spread through them. And since individuals together engage in groupthink, at least some inaccuracies will likely infect the religious community – even a community powered by inspired cognitive functioning. The proper functionalist might resist this claim by expanding the remit of the sensus divinitatis beyond Plantinga's account. Rather than claiming that this faculty is responsible only for generating accurate experiences of God's traces in the world, she might construe it as a global faculty that regulates all of our cognitive mechanisms. But this 'global sensus divinitatis' hypothesis cannot be maintained. It is ad hoc, in at least the following three (negative) senses. (a) It is subject to abuse, since there are few constraints on it (Boudry, 2013, 6): religious believers might suppose that anyone who disagrees with them must be mistaken. (b) It is highly implausible on general background knowledge (Howson and Urbach, 2003, 157-158). For it predicts the existence of some group of religious believers with generally accurate experiences and intellectual seemings, not only on religious topics, but on non-religious ones too. Yet this prediction falls flat: no religious group appears to have higher epistemic success rates in maths, humanities, science, and so forth. (c) The 'global sensus divinitatis' hypothesis is highly implausible even given most religious belief systems themselves (McGrew, 2014, 495). Religious scriptures and traditions do not tend to teach that believers are generally cognitively superior to nonbelievers (and indeed Plantinga's Calvi