s his discharge from the rehabilitation program that triggered his removal, it was harmful error for the Board not to consider his challenge to the discharge. We address these contentions in turn.

I.

27
Mr. Baker's first argument is that the Board erred in holding that the agency was not required to send a second notice of proposed removal based on his alleged failure to complete the substance abuse treatment program. Mr. Baker asserts that the agency failed to "initiate" a removal action as required by DOT Order 3910.1C, which states:


28
Refusal to enter or successfully complete a substance abuse rehabilitation program. The agency shall initiate action to remove a covered employee, or initiate appropriate disciplinary action against an employee in a non-TDP, up to and including removal, who refuses to enter or fails to successfully complete counseling or a rehabilitation program under the EAP. A determination that the employee has failed rehabilitation, may be made on the basis of off-duty drug or alcohol-related misconduct, or the employee not adhering to the terms of the rehabilitation plan.


29
Order 3910.1C, ch. IX, para. 1(i) (Dec. 28, 1994). Mr. Baker also points to Alfaro v. DOT, 16 M.S.P.R. 628 (1983), and Brooks v. FAA, 18 M.S.P.R. 178 (1983), for the proposition that an agency cannot remove an employee on the basis of charges that might have been, but were not, made.


30
The government responds that Mr. Baker's discharge from Vista Pacifica and his failure to complete the rehabilitation/treatment program were not the reasons for his removal. The government asserts that an agency may choose to hold an employee's removal in abeyance pending the employee's attempts at rehabilitation, without being forced to issue a second notice of proposed removal. The government relies on Girani v. Federal Aviation Administration, 924 F.2d 237 (Fed.Cir.1991), in which the FAA proposed to remove Girani from his position as an Air Traffic Controller because of off-duty cocaine use. The agency agreed to delay his rem