ers Brief, at 6, 13, 15). However, this claim does not

allow him to circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness requirements.

       It is well settled that, “in order for this Court to review a legality of

sentence claim, there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to engage in such

review. . . . [T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim

may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an untimely PCRA petition

for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction

over the claim.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super.

2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court

has addressed the retroactive effect of Alleyne, and has expressly held “that

Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review[.]”

Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016).

       Moreover, because “[s]ection 9714 increases mandatory minimum

sentences based on prior convictions[,] [it] is not unconstitutional under

Alleyne.” Reid, supra at 785 (citations omitted).        Therefore, Appellant’s

claims based on Alleyne fail. Because Appellant has not met his burden of

proving that his untimely PCRA petition fits within one of the three exceptions

to the PCRA’s time-bar, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.

____________________________________________


4 “In Alleyne, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth
Amendment requires that any fact—other than a prior conviction—that
increases a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense must be submitted
to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, Alleyne did
not overturn prior precedent that prior convictions are sentencing factors and
not elements of offenses.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 784 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

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     Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.




Joseph D. Sel