inadequate hiring of Burns.  We also find that the district court did not plainly err in dismissing the jury's award for Mrs. Brown's loss of past income and future earning capacity.  For these reasons, the jury's verdict stands and the district court's judgment is


63
AFFIRMED.


64
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:


65
Although I concur in most of the opinion of the Court, I dissent from Part VI of the opinion and the judgment as to Bryan County.  My disagreement is with the majority's treatment of the Monell1 issue--"it is clear that a single decision may create municipal liability if that decision were made by a final policymaker responsible for that activity" maj. op. at 1183 --which is based on our prior opinion in Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep.  Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 754 (5th Cir.1993).


66
Clearly, Sheriff Moore was a policymaker under Monell;  clearly, he hired Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns;  clearly, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Sheriff Moore was deliberately indifferent in failing to conduct an adequate background investigation.2  However, one inadequate background investigation, even by a municipal policymaker, is not the "unconstitutional municipal policy" of which Monell, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), or City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), speaks.  This error, in my opinion, flows from blurring the distinction made clear in Tuttle--"where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation."  Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824, 105 S.Ct. at 2436 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).


67
I do not agree, therefore, with the majority's implicit reasoning  that any "distinction between policies that are themselves 