 such that he doubted she would be found credible. After the jury trial, counsel met with her again, when she was not under the influence of medication, and found her to be more articulate, and was willing to present her testimony at the sentencing hearing.[5] Peterson has not demonstrated that counsel's decision not to call Pharina Peterson to testify was not the exercise of reasonable trial strategy. Simpson, supra.[6]
(f) One of the State's witnesses at trial was a psychotherapist who interviewed Tasha and Tommy Peterson the day after Terrell's death. The State asked the psychotherapist if Tasha's recounting of certain events to her was "consistent with a child who had, in fact, witnessed these types of events?" The witness responded that it was, and that she believed that Tasha had provided her with accurate information. Peterson's trial counsel objected, the court sustained the objection, and instructed the jury that it alone was to decide the accuracy and truthfulness of Tasha's version of events.
Nonetheless, Peterson contends that counsel was ineffective in not making an objection sooner. Counsel's objection was sustained, the court instructed the jury on its role in treating the testimony of witnesses and deciding the facts of the case, both at the time of the objection and in final instructions, and Peterson fails to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of her trial would have been different if counsel had objected sooner. See Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 397, 399-400(2)(a), 603 S.E.2d 228 (2004).
(g) During closing arguments, the State referred to the treatment of Terrell as "torture." Counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he did not object because he believed that the State was merely drawing a reasonable inference from the evidence. See Harris, supra; Simmons, supra. Peterson fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 48, 50(2), 610 S.E.2d 26 (2005); Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 113(3), 549 S.E.2d 370 (2001)