d	that	there	is	a	moral	obligation	to	care	for	the	environment since	such	care	will	promote	"the	greatest	happiness	for	the	greatest	number";	that is,	such	care	will	in	the	long	run	increase	the	overall	amount	of	pleasure	and	decrease the	overall	amount	of	pain	for	beings	that	are	capable	of	experiencing	pleasure	and pain.	A	key	problem	with	the	utilitarian,	sentience-based	position	in	favor	of	care	for the	environment	is	that	this	position	offers	no	basis	for	caring	about	non-sentient	living beings	(e.g.,	plants)	or	non-living	beings	(e.g.,	stalactites	and	stalagmites)	if	care	for such	beings	cannot	be	linked	in	some	way	to	the	pleasures	and	pains	that	might	be experienced	by	sentient	beings.	If	the	annihilation	of	some	non-sentient	natural	form (e.g.,	some	crystal	formation	on	a	remote	part	of	earth)	does	not	decrease	the	net amount	of	happiness	or	pleasure	to	be	experienced	by	sentient	beings,	then-on	the utilitarian	account-there	is	no	moral	reason	for	humans	to	refrain	from	annihilating the	non-sentient	natural	form. Some	contemporary	deontological	thinkers	have	sought	to	overcome	the limitations	of	sentience-based,	utilitarian	arguments	by	arguing	that	non-sentient beings,	including	even	non-living	beings,	are	capable	of	possessing	"intrinsic	worth"	or "inherent	worth."	According	to	these	deontological	accounts,	it	is	the	"intrinsic	worth" of	all	beings	(including	even	non-living	beings)	that	grounds	the	human	obligation	to care	for	the	natural	environment,	even	when	such	care	will	not	in	any	way	enhance the	pleasures	or	diminish	the	pains	that	might	be	experienced	by	sentient	beings Environmental Justice and Climate Change : Assessing Pope Benedict XVI's Ecological Vision for the Catholic Church in the United States, edited by Jame Schaefer, and Tobias Winright, Lexington Books, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fordham-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1574401. Created from fordham-ebooks on 2018-01-28 13:06:47. C op yr ig ht © 2 01 3. L ex in gt on B oo ks . A ll rig ht s re se