eption is clear in Koyré's thought, according to which Duhem denied the occurrence of revolutions in science37. As far as I can see in his work, Kuhn most likely conceived the Duhemian work in a distinct way from his maître.38 Incidentally, the content of one of the bibliographical notes on a text by Koyré, "Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe siècle", is noteworthy here: An attack on Duhem's absurd statement that modern science begins with edicts of Bishop of Paris in 1277 against impossibility of void, etc. Documented by detailed study of some 14th century writings about the void showing clearly that they don't take a modern position, etc. Useful, but considerably 35 Review of Metaphysics and measurement – Essays in the scientific revolution, published by Koyré in 1968. 36 Kuhn (1977, 35, note 3) presents some caveats to Butterfield's The origins of modern science. 37 See Koyré (1973, 172; 1966, 15-16). I discuss this subject in another work. See Oliveira (2012). 38 Kuhn (1977, 21) referred to Koyré in these words: "the man who, more than any other historian, has been my maitre". Amélia J. Oliveira – Duhem's legacy for the change in the historiography of science: An analysis based on Kuhn's writings 137 vitiated by straw-man it attacks. Really fails to see whether there is an effect of the edicts [...] (Kuhn apud Oliveira 2012, 239). It could be suggested that Kuhn did not cite Duhem in his book about scientific revolutions because of Duhem's thesis of continuity. Under this assumption, it would make no sense that Kuhn quoted an author who would supposedly deny the occurrence of revolutions in science at a time when revolutions studies were the order of the day. Prima facie, this could be a good reason. But, when analyzing the context, I do not think this is a satisfactory reason, because of the opposition between continuity and discontinuity views, and that the notions of revolution and evolution have no place in the SSR, not even being mentioned by Kuhn in the terms proposed by some of his interpre