ormance curve converging to 1 is plurality rule on a full ticket, even if there is a clear preference for the ideal ticket (Figures 6, 7 and 8). Figure 6. There is a higher preference for the ideal ticket than for any other ticket on the population (tickets CAB and CBA are tied in a not-too-close second). However, the preference for a single candidate to take the first position is higher for C than for A. FI NA L DR AF T 13 Figure 7. There is a higher preference for the ideal ticket than for any other ticket on the population (tickets BAC and BCA are tied in a not-too-close second). However, the preference for a single candidate to take the first position is higher for B than for A. Figure 8. There is a higher preference for the ideal ticket than for any other ticket on the population (tickets BAC and CAB are nottoo-close second and third). However, the preference for a single candidate to take the first position is higher for B than for A. Thus, as it turns out, voting on a single candidate is not a very reliable procedure for choosing a ticket when there is priority on the positions to assign. Actually, it almost always yields worse results than the other three methods we examined. (This should give us pause to think about record charts based on the popularity of a single band or an artist). Plurality rule on a full ticket seems to score higher on all our criteria. For the decision problem involving positions without priority we compared two of the previous voting methods (Plurality rule with runoff and Plurality rule on a full ticket) to a new procedure (Count for conditioned feasible options). Even if it does not stand out as clearly as in the previous decision problem, Plurality rule on a full ticket performed better than other methods (Figures 10, 14, and 15). As in our previous problem, there seems to be no significant difference in the performance of these methods when there is a homogeneous distribution of preferences among all tickets: there is no convergence to 1 for any method, under these conditions 