nstrations, was for the
purpose of drawing attention from his real course of approach, which
soon developed to be by way of the United States and other fords of
the Rappahannock, fifteen and twenty miles above Fredericksburg, where
he crossed his army and was bearing down by way of Chancellorsville
upon Lee's left and rear. Here the Federals encountered Anderson's and
McLaw's divisions, and thinking it an advance by Lee took a formidable
defensive position, extending his lines from the Furnace and Tabernacle
Church to Chancellorsville, thence behind Mineral Spring Run to and
beyond the old Mine Road.

This strong position and the superior numbers of the Federals put the
consideration of a front attack out of the question, but the emergency
was great and had to be met; but how? Longstreet's corps was away
and the inadequacy of numbers was great and conditions serious. But
Jackson, as usual, cut the gordian knot. In answer to the query of
Lee, as to what should be done, he replied, "Outflank them." This
was accepted as the best solution, and Jackson was entrusted with
this important task. On the morning of May 1st he set out with his
old division commanded by General Colston, A. P. Hill's and Rodes'
divisions. This was a great risk for Lee to divide his army in the
front of his advancing antagonist for this great flank movement. It
was contrary to the principles of strategy for Jackson to take his
corps of 26,000 men, leaving Lee with about 18,000 men an easy prey,
to be crushed by Hooker, who could then turn upon Jackson with his
entire army; but Hooker did not know conditions or did not avail of the
opportunity thus presented. He also certainly blundered in failing to
properly protect his right wing, but for this failure of Hooker success
would hardly have attended Jackson's move. The disparity in numbers and
position in favor of the Federals was too great.

Our course was up the old turnpike to within a mile or two of
Chancellorsville, thence directly to the left over a country road,
passing along the immediate 