their motions for either directed verdict or JNOV.  Thus, the lower court should not have decided whether sufficient evidence exists to support this award.  However, as the Appellants point out, Mrs. Brown failed to object to this error at trial, and it is the "unwavering rule in this Circuit that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only for plain error."  Id.  In other words, this Court will reverse only if the error complained of results in a "manifest miscarriage of justice."  Id.  Furthermore, contrary to Mrs. Brown's contention, the issue is not whether any evidence exists to support the jury verdict.  Instead, the issue is whether the district court's action constituted plain error.


22
Upon reviewing the record, we do not believe that the lower court's error resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.  The only evidence offered in support of the award comprised of Mrs. Brown's testimony, which reflected that she had accepted an offer to commence work a few days after the day of the incident.  Her compensation would have been measured on a commission basis, which she believed would have paid between $1,500 to $1,800 a month.  The district court's ruling that this evidence was lacking does not arise to plain error.  Mrs. Brown's failure to object at the appropriate time denied the district court the opportunity to rectify any errors.  Therefore, the court's ruling will stand.

VI.

23
Having found that Burns violated Mrs. Brown's constitutional rights, the next inquiry concerns the possible liability of Bryan County.  Liability will accrue for the acts of a municipal official when the official possesses "final policymaking authority" to establish municipal policy with respect to the conduct that resulted in a violation of constitutional rights.  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion).


24
Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore was the final policymaker for the Sheriff's Department.  As such, it is patently