omity.

IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. 
*800 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, and delivered a dissenting opinion with respect to Part II.[*]
With respect to the petition in No. 91-1111, I join the Court's judgment and Parts I and IIโA of its opinion. I write separately because I do not agree with Justice Souter's analysis, set forth in Part IIโB of his opinion, of what constitutes a "boycott" for purposes of ง 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. ง 1013(b). With respect to the petition in No. 91-1128, I dissent from the Court's ruling concerning the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. Part I below discusses the boycott issue; Part II extraterritoriality.

I
Determining proper application of ง 3(b) of the McCarranFerguson Act to the present cases requires precise definition of the word "boycott."[1] It is a relatively new word, little more than a century old. It was first used in 1880, to describe the collective action taken against Captain Charles Boycott, an English agent managing various estates in Ireland. The Land League, an Irish organization formed the previous year, had demanded that landlords reduce their rents and had urged tenants to avoid dealing with those who failed to do so. Boycott did not bend to the demand and instead ordered evictions. In retaliation, the tenants "sen[t] Captain Boycott to Coventry in a very thorough manner." J. McCarthy, England Under Gladstone 108 (1886). "The population of the region for miles round resolved not to have anything to do with him, and, as far as they could prevent *801 it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do with him. . . . [T]he awful sentence of excommunication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly alone for a time. No one would work for him; no one would supply him with food." Id., at 108-109; see also H. Laid