was so profound that it rendered counsel completely
unable to discover the basic information necessary” to defend
Daniels. Consequently, Jordan and Small were “understand-
ably deprived of the power to present any adequate defense in
[Daniels’s] behalf.” See Brown, 424 F.2d at 1169. The impact
of this conflict infected counsel’s representation of Daniels at
both the guilt and penalty phases of Daniels’s trial. Ulti-
mately, this meant that Daniels was constructively denied his
right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See
                         DANIELS v. WOODFORD              14977
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting
that defendant “is entitled to be assisted by an attorney,
whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary
to ensure that the trial is fair”); see also Brown, 424 F.2d at
1170.

  B.        Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

   [6] To establish a claim for constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, Daniels must establish that (1) his coun-
sel’s actions were outside the range of professional conduct,
and (2) that, but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In considering
whether Daniels received the reasonably effective assistance
to which he was entitled, we must determine whether coun-
sel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of rea-
sonableness.” Id. at 686 & 688 (“The benchmark for judging
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result.”). To determine whether counsel’s errors preju-
diced the outcome of the trial, we must compare the evidence
that actually was presented to the jury with that which could
have been presented had counsel acted appropriately. Bonin v.
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).

  1.        Counsel’s Re