ry Laudan and Imre Lakatos. 1 Dámian Islas Mondragon is a Professor at the Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango, México. Address: Boulevard del Guadiana No. 501, Ciudad Universitaria, C.P. 34120, Durango, México. Email damianislas@ujed.mx. Orcid: 0000-0001-8538-6835 Dámian Islas Mondragon – Book Review 158 According to Velasco, Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935) is a response to the problem of the empirical sub-determination of theories formulated by Duhem. Popper response to this problem is twofold, (i) that scientific evidence is theoretically dependent and (ii) that scientific evidence is ambiguous. Indeed, Popper defended point (i) without recognizing Duhem's influence on the matter; while point (ii) was not explicitly addressed by Popper but only indirectly in recommending not to "save" the hypothesis in the face of a major refutations. However, Popper's recommendation has to do with certain adjustments – drastic or not (Quine, 1951, 43) – within the theoretical system in order to maintain some theoretical statements. It seems to me that Duhem's argumentation on the matter is more modest by merely suggesting that when there is any conflict with experience, what is refuted is necessarily ambiguous. In relation to Duhem's influence on thinkers such as Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan, Velasco contends that the main idea that these philosophers inherited from Duhem is that "philosophical interpretations of science must be based on the analysis of the history of science" (2016, 39). However, Velasco ends by arguing that, with the exception of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan resorted to the formulation of methodological meta-rules to ensure not only the rationality of isolated scientific theories; but also the rationality of the research traditions that constitute the very history of science. In other words, both authors ended up "sublimating" the rationality they criticized in order to submit history to its own methodological meta-rules. In his work, João Cortese seeks to show the common elements bet