icated to Wendy and Ernest information about how he had hidden his assets.  As a defendant's participation in a conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence indicating that he or she agreed with one or more others to commit a crime and only one overt act need be shown in furtherance of the agreement, see United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 886 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3563 (U.S.1995);  United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1270 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 107 (1993), we affirm Michael's conviction of conspiracy to obstruct justice.


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7. The admission of hearsay statements against Wendy, when she does not appear, even by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been part of the conspiracy of which the statements were in furtherance (the drug conspiracy), may have been in error, see F.R.E. 802 (hearsay generally inadmissible);  cf.   F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) (hearsay statement of coconspirator admissible when statement is during and in furtherance of the conspiracy), but their admission was harmless.  The statements were made by Michael to his drug coconspirators, to the effect that Michael had the title to his house transferred to Wendy's name and he had given her $500 for it.  Admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the fact that overwhelming evidence supported the jury's verdict of obstruction of justice.  Wendy was shown to have told law enforcement that she lent Michael $40,000, yet her income was shown to have been only $120.00 per week, at most, for her entire eight-year working life.  The jury's conclusion that Wendy must have been lying to law enforcement about the loan is the rational conclusion anyone would reach from this evidence, as it is impossible to save $40,000 on such a small salary and simultaneously to pay any living expenses.  We therefore find that the admission of Michael's statement, if erroneous, was harmless, and therefore cannot serve as a basis for overturning Wendy's conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice.