his kind of reasoning where it leads, one will end up thinking that the practice of using the sentence 'some swans are blue' to mean that somer swans are blue is more or less confined to Cosmo. People in other Lewis-worlds, even ones in most respects similar Cosmo, do not express the very same propositions that we express when they use contingency-inducing quantifiers. It would be a bad mistake to confuse (9) with the counterfactual claim that if I had been spatiotemporally related to blue swans but otherwise qualitatively similar to the way I actually am, I would not have used 'some swans are blue' to say that somer swans are blue. There are lots things that people in other Lewis-worlds never do that I would have done even if I had been qualitatively different in all 7 kinds of ways. For example, no-one in any other Lewis-world lives on Earth. But my living on Earth is counterfactually robust: there is a wide range of qualitative properties which I lack, such that I would still live on Earth even if I had them.14 The "pictorial ersatzism" attacked in OPW §3.3 is a view on which (8) and (9) both fail. There is a property "vim", which we often use in restricting our quantifiers. Cosmo and its parts have vim; other Lewis-worlds don't. Vim could have been distributed differently with respect to ordinary qualitative properties. You don't have to have vim to be a swan, or to be a person, to have beliefs, etc: thus analyses in the mould of (3) can still be extensionally adequate. It is reasonable for us to be highly confident that we have vim. It is also reasonable for the many people who lack vim to be highly confident that they have vim. But they are just wrong. The vimless part of reality is a place of pervasive epistemic tragedy, where good reasoning leads people to form systematically false beliefs about the distribution of vim.15 This is not an attractive view. Applying the epistemological standards that normally apply to the postulation of new primitive entities or properties, there seems to be no justification