Tate court explained that a classic case of entrapment *344 is where the law enforcement is both the supplier and the buyer of the contraband that is the subject of the defendant's arrest. Id. at 924-25(¶ 10) (citing Moore v. State, 534 So.2d 557, 558 (Miss. 1988)). Tate alleged that the confidential informant was the supplier and the buyer of the marijuana. In the case at bar, Young claims that Cook, the confidential informant, was the buyer and supplier of the cocaine in that he alleged Cook switched the Viagra for the cocaine.
¶ 21. Tate, 912 So.2d at 925(¶ 11) provides:
Entrapment has been defined as "the act of inducing or leading a person to commit a crime not originally contemplated by him, for the purpose of trapping him for the offense." Hopson v. State, 625 So.2d 395, 399 (Miss.1993) (emphasis added) (citing Phillips v. State, 493 So.2d 350, 354 (Miss.1986); McLemore v. State, 241 Miss. 664, 675, 125 So.2d 86, 91 (1960)). The defense of entrapment is affirmative and must be proved by the defendant. If the defendant already possessed the criminal intent, and the request or inducement merely gave the defendant the opportunity to commit what he or she was already predisposed to do, entrapment is not a defense. Id. (citing Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Miss.1991)). Thus, predisposition to commit the crime becomes an issue when a defendant raises an entrapment defense.
¶ 22. This Court has held, as explained in Tate, that a defendant's prior drug activity is admissible on the issue of predisposition. See Hopson, 625 So.2d at 402. Similarly in this case, since Young claimed to have been setup and that the confidential informant switched the drugs, Young's intent was placed in issue. Young's prior conviction for possession was admissible to show intent and to impeach his claim of a setup, and it constituted an important thread of his defense strategy as to why he was targeted.
¶ 23. The trial judge in this case went further than just evaluating prejudice under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. The 