nd validity is a logical relation, not a causal relation (which can only occur between substances). Practical Reason, thus: combines the following discordant functions: (1) some necessary a priori propositions about what is good is necessary as a fundamental principle of Ethics. Practical Reason, according to Kant, is what gives this. It must, then, be a source of a proposition and at the same time (2) the condition of its validity. (3) it not only thus furnishes a reason, why a thing should be done, but is also itself the reason, or cause, why a thing is done. (4) Being necessary [obscured] cause not only of a principle, but also of action in accordance with a principle, it is also in its widest sense cause of action contrary to such a principle-Against this monstrous conception we have to urge (1) that there is no reason for ascribing the fundamental principles of Ethics, to any entity whatever. (Ibid., pp. 43–44)sequence of his naturalism about the objects of thought and judgment. as probably influenced in some degree by Ward, but had its major source in Vaihinger ertation. Ward published a study of Kant in 1922. temporary notion of propositional content: ..., Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. T 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 6 C. Preti / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. xxx (2008) xxx–xxx SHPS 670 No. of Pages 10, Model 5G 27 March 2008 Disk Used ARTICLE IN PRESSU N C O R R E C The crucial question, Moore claims: appears to be this. Why is our knowledge to be condemned as merely knowledge of Appearance? Why are we to be merely Transcendental Idealists and merely Empirical Realists? . . . by this too psychological sta