,
409 (Morales) [order discharging defendant from parole rendered appeal moot].)
       DeLeon argues that his appeal is not moot because he faces
disadvantageous collateral consequences from the fact that he was found in
violation of parole. (See Carafas v. LaVallee (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 237
[discussing collateral consequences of a criminal conviction]; People v. DeLong
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 487–492 [collecting cases].) He points out that
unsatisfactory performance on parole is a criterion affecting eligibility for
probation and mandatory supervision (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.414(b)(2),
4.415(c)(5)), and is an aggravating circumstance in selecting a term of
imprisonment (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)).
       The Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Spencer v. Kemna (1998)
523 U.S. 1 (Spencer). There the court considered whether the defendant‘s appeal
from a parole revocation was mooted by the fact that he had completed the entire
term of imprisonment underlying the revocation. (Id. at p. 3.) Interpreting the
case-or-controversy requirement of article III, section 2 of the federal Constitution
(id. at p. 7), the court held that a violation of parole does not result in civil
disabilities resembling those that stem from a criminal conviction (id. at p. 12,

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citing Lane v. Williams (1982) 455 U.S. 624, 632). The court further rejected the
argument that the defendant faced ―collateral consequences‖ from the potential
use of the parole violation in a future proceeding. (Spencer, at p. 12.) This
possibility did not show an injury in fact. First, it was contingent upon the
defendant again violating the law, a circumstance that was wholly within his
control. Second, a prior parole violation did not mandate a particular
consequence, but was simply one factor among many that could be considered in a
discretionary decision by the parole authority. (Id. at p. 13.)
       By contrast, two Court of Appeal opinions lend support to DeLeon‘s
position. People v. Gonza