nisterial employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279, 1281 (9th Cir.1982), abrogated as recognized by American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1991).[17] Therefore, we remand for further proceedings.

Washington Law Against Discrimination
¶ 51 Erdman further contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims under the WLAD due to its non-profit religious employer exemption, RCW 49.60.040(11). She also asserts that the statute is unconstitutional. We begin with the constitutionality argument.
¶ 52 We presume the constitutionality of RCW 49.60.040(11), which exempts non-profit religious employers from the WLAD. See City of Bellevue v. Lee, 166 Wash.2d 581, 585, 210 P.3d 1011 (2009). The statute provides:
"Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit.
RCW 49.60.040(11).
¶ 53 Erdman raises two constitutional arguments. First, she asserts that the statute violates article I, section 12, the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution. Second, she asserts that the statute violates the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.
*310 ¶ 54 Initially, we note that Erdman cites no relevant authority regarding her article I, section 12 argument. She cites three cases: Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280 n. 9, 285, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985), Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wash.2d 791, 813, 83 P.3d 419 (2004), and Duranceau v. City of Tacoma, 27 Wash.App. 777, 620 P.2d 533 (1980). Piper and Grant County establish only the existence of a fundamental right to pursue an occupation. Furthermore, our Supreme Court also has rejected the applicability of Duranceau and the proposition that the religious employer exemption is governmental interference wit