ver be selected because the person doing the selecting would always choose the veteran with the highest raw score.  Since five-point veterans only had five points added to their raw score, they would always have higher raw scores than ten-point veterans.  This is what happened to Morris.  If he had only received five points for his veteran's preference, he would have been considered in the later rounds and would have been competing with those with more comparable raw scores and would probably have been selected.


9
Morris complained to the BPA about the selection process.  Morris testified that he was told that since he had already filed an EEOC complaint alleging handicap discrimination in 1986, he did not have to file again with the BPA and should take his complaints to a "higher authority," which apparently meant the Office of Personnel Management.1


10
The district court did not call a jury.  Instead, the judge heard all the evidence and concluded that a jury trial was unnecessary because there was insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination as a matter of law.  The district court found that the selection procedure used by Rivers did not give Morris fair consideration and discriminated against the ten-point veteran.  The court concluded that Morris was not selected for the position while others who had no record of any handicap were selected and that the BPA produced no evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for failing to select Morris.  The court also concluded, however, that the BPA did not intentionally discriminate against Morris because of his record of mental handicap and it did not pursue a policy or selection process which had an adverse impact on plaintiff because of his record of mental impairment.


11
The district court concluded that Morris could recover under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706, because Rivers' reliance on the raw technical scores in selecting among the three relevant applicants was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion in vio