], Pascal has separated off faith from physics in just the manner we have seen in Duhem, ruling out equally the use of natural reasoning to defend Christianity and to attack it. (Martin 1991, 75) Martin has enabled us to establish a close relationship between the methodology of the bon sens and the Aristotelian epagôgè through the problem of the infinite regress; and between the problem of infinite regress and the solution proposed by Pascal to this problem with "his doctrine of the heart". According to Martin, his doctrine leads precisely to the separation, at the same time methodological and thematic, Duhemian and Pascalian, of two areas that do not touch each other: the reason and the senses are two faculties that serve entirely different areas, in such a way that the natural reason may not be useful neither to defend nor to attack the faith. However, let's not forget that to Aristotle, the virtue which allows us to grasp the principles is the noûs through the procedure of the epagôgè which appears to be the solution proposed by the Greek philosopher the problem of the infinite regress. In sum, it is possible to establish a relationship between the bon sens and the noûs and "doctrine of the heart". We need to return to the thought of Aristotle to explain this possible relationship. Aisthesis and Noûs in Aristotle In the sixth book of the Nicomachean ethics we find the famous Aristotelian classification of the different kinds of virtues by which the knowledge is acquired: téchne, epistéme, phrónesis, sophía and noûs (Aristotle 1926, 1139: 15-20). Later, in this work, it is argued that only the noûs can capture the principles. Aristotle explains what should be understood by each of these capacities and concludes that the principles can only be captured by the noûs, although it is not very clear what the procedure by which the noûs captures the principles is. In the Posterior analytics Aristotle expresses: Since we learn either by induction [epagôgè] or by demonstration [apodeixis]. Now demonstra