asising only the share the army took in them. Practically ships of
war either conveyed the soldiers as transports for the required duty,
or themselves formed the escort and guard of the convoy of transports
which accompanied the battleships, and for the time being formed part
of the armada.

Thus, when the Seven Years’ War broke out, the attention of the French
was directed towards Minorca, which, captured in 1708 by Stanhope,
was regarded as only second in importance to Gibraltar for a naval
power having interests in the Mediterranean. Its capture was the
first appearance of England as a naval power possessing a naval base
in that closed sea. It was garrisoned by the 4th, 23rd, 24th, and
34th Regiments; and, unrelieved by Admiral Byng’s fleet, on whose
co-operation alone was it possible for the defender to hold out, its
commandant, Blakeney, was compelled to surrender in 1755, though the
troops behaved with such gallantry after the terrible bombardment,
with numerical odds against them of some 20,000 to 3000, that they
were allowed to march out with drums beating and colours flying, with
all the honours of war. The siege had lasted from May to July. It is
a noteworthy instance of the absolute importance of a most full and
cordial co-operation between the naval and military commanders in cases
such as these, when the army, cut from its home base, is dependent on
the navy for its line of communications. In the future, without full
command of the sea, isolated posts and coaling stations will be always
at the mercy of bold and skilful raids, unless powerfully armed and
sufficiently garrisoned.

Minorca was restored to the British flag in 1763, and eighteen years
later had to undergo a second siege by the French under Crillon, when,
at the end, the governor, out of 660, had 560 on the sick list against
14,000 besiegers, and for the second time the fortress capitulated.
It was taken for the third and last time by General Stuart (with the
8th and 42nd) in 1798, of whom it was said that no man could “manage
French