ence has been presented which supports a finding that a given condition exists it is presumed in absence of proof to the contrary that the condition has remained unchanged."  475 F.2d at 258.


15
We are mindful of the limited review which this Court conducts in administrative appeals.  We do not have the latitude to freely decide the case as we see fit; we determine only whether the Secretary's finding is supported by substantial evidence.  In reviewing the appeal of an initial disability benefits case, we consider whether the Secretary's finding of no disability is supported by substantial evidence.  However, in light of principles of administrative res judicata, this is not the proper inquiry in a benefits continuation case.2  We must ascertain whether the Secretary's finding of improvement to the point of no disability is supported by substantial evidence.  In each case, the burden remains with the claimant to prove the existence of a disability.  Crosby v. Schweiker, 650 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1981).  If, however, the evidence in a continuation case is substantially the same as the evidence had been in the initial disability benefits request case, benefits must be continued.  Otherwise, termination of benefits will often depend not on a finding of changed condition, but simply on the whim of a changed ALJ.  With this in mind, we turn to an examination of the evidence presented at each hearing.


16
At the initial benefits request hearing, Simpson alleged two medical conditions as causes of his pain.  First, he claimed that polycystic kidney disease was the source of his debilitating pain.3  He also maintained that osteoarthritis contributed to his disability.4  The medical testimony on these conditions revealed that Simpson was asymptomatic with regard to the kidney disease and that his objective back impairment was minor.  None of the doctors doubted the claimant's sincerity about the pain he was experiencing.  This pain was reiterated by Simpson himself, as well as his family, friends, and pastor.  It is 